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PREFACE
Since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, Republic of Moldova has 
made clear progress towards the consolidation of its state, of its military and 
civil institutions, making itself notable on the geopolitical map of Europe. How-
ever, Moldova seems to be still scarcely present on the mental maps of the deci-
sion-makers from the West. Unlike the Baltic nations, that embedded themselves 
into the mind of the European public as a cohesive group of free nations, distinct 
from their poorer neighbors (Belorussians, Russians or Ukrainians, whit their 
more violent hystory after the disintegration of the Soviet Union), Moldova was 
approached with prudence if not completely neglected so that when important 
EU officials have remembered, after 2003, about the post-soviet origins of this 
republic, the Chisinau diplomacy felt offended.
Frankly speaking, the policy of forgiving and the ambiguity were the main 
ways of treatment through which the West has avoided any similarity between 
the path of the Republic of Moldova and of the 3 Baltic countries even since 
their detachment from the USSR and the restoration of their formerly bour-
geois statehoods, destroyed by the Soviets after the Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact. 
But these are all the similarities that could be made between the path followed 
by Chisinau and those adopted in Vilnius, Riga or Tallinn. After the recovery 
of independence by these states, the West has not tolerated the presence of 
Russian troops on their territory a single day while for Moldova, even the ac-
knowledgement of its independence was conditioned, in the autumn of 1991, 
by the signing of a peace treaty with the Russian Federation and the adherence 
to the CIS. The most important institutions of the Western community (EU, 
CECS, UN) have remained in expectance even when the foreign mercenar-
ies and military forces of the Russian federation were openly and massively 
involving into the support of a bloody military rebellion in the Republic of 
Moldova during March-July combat hostilities against a state, which was rec-
ognized by the UN only some days before that.
The sudden dissolution of the USSR has caused the effect of a massive “de-
centralization” of political and military powers in the former soviet republics, 
at the same time creating the impression of a security vacuum, deprived of any 
kind of stability guarantees. Unlike the Baltic Nations, who managed to rap-
idly and elastically take the control over basic elements of the state sovereignty 
in their countries with the enthusiastic, full and unconditioned support of the 
West, which that allowed them to evacuate permanently all the foreign military 
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troops off their sovereign territory, in less than 2 years and without victims, 
becoming, this way, truly free and open towards the integration into Western 
institutions, Moldova has faced a heavy military resistance in its Eastern ter-
ritories, strongly supported by influent groups from Russia and Ukraine. The 
easy access to the weapon dumps and arsenals, as well as the integral transfer 
of certain combat units, tanks, rocket launchers, fighter planes and helicopters, 
to the paramilitary militias of the separatist movement rapidly leaned the tech-
nical superiority balance in favor of Transnistrian para-military guards and 
other security offsprings. On July 21st, 1992, presidents Eltin and Snegur signed 
a cease-fire agreement, drawn up between the Russian Federation and the Re-
public of Moldova, putting the end to the military hostilities in the region. This 
act has eloquently proved that the violence and hostilities caused during the 
military conflict in Transnistria were started and managed through direct or-
ders from Moscow.
Ignored by the West and internally weakened by the lack of an attractive iden-
tity of its statehood, Republic of Moldova has unsuccessfully sought to be heard in 
different European capitals, but in which figured only two unconditioned priori-
ties: the diminishing of the atomic threat, associated with the fast demoralization 
of the former soviet strategic military units, and the emancipation of Baltic states, 
the soviet regime of which has never been recognized by the West. The uncertain 
situation from the ex-soviet territories, the internal conflicts and the interethnic 
tensions of different intensity have aggravated the general economic crisis and the 
conflicts related to the change of forms of property in Moldova. The economic 
assistance given initially as a placebo for the (supposed or real!) launched reforms 
has become, in time, an “unemployment” assistance. The little experience in public 
administration has soon become the fief of a clientesque and rapacious bureauc-
racy, while the strong public confidence in the political elites has become, at the 
end of the 90s, a burden for the latter, who became too divided and vulnerable to 
their past, and too distant from the citizens.
Thus, Republic of Moldova has become a hostage of its unsolved prob-
lems, among which, the “frozen” conflict in Transnistria is on the first place. 
Nonetheless the security context for Moldova has recently changed essentially. 
Three important changes have been made at different levels of the security 
scale: (1) pan-European security architecture, determined by the dual process 
of NATO and EU enlargement, which influences the change of Russia’s poli-
cies in the “common neighbourhood”, (2) the specific regional context, which 
appeared as a consequence of two successful revolutions in Ukraine and Geor-
gia, concomitantly with the melt-down in the relations with Romania, and, 
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(3) the radical shift in the orientation of Moldovan foreign policy following the 
Parlamentary elections of March 2005.
A favorable regional context is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the defeat of structural vulnerabilities, some of which are related to other se-
curity scales, among which one shall emphasize on the frozen reforms of the 
most important institutions related to defense, public order and security, as 
well as to – and not in the last place – the interaction between the external and 
domestic politics.
These observations have encouraged us to launch this research on the con-
ditions, concepts and the effects of state security policies, especially on the way 
in which these threats influence the officials of civil and military institutions 
in the Republic of Moldova, the extent and the big danger of residual risks and 
the influence of external factors as accelerators or decelerators of the political 
system crises.
Chapter I is based on the analysis of concepts operated within this study, 
showing through significant examples and arguments the evolution of the se-
curity domain into a democratic state. The chapter makes numerous referenc-
es to the coordination system and the security ‘terminology’ used in the EU 
and NATO, analyzing the security sectors of certain NATO member states and 
the tremendous transformations suffered in the last decade by certain emerg-
ing democracies.
Chapter II analyzes the evolution of the security sector reform in Republic 
of Moldova, relating the risks and dangers, common to the countries in the 
period of transition, to our country’s particularity. The civil – military coopera-
tion and the development of the legislative framework, of civil and military ca-
pabilities, represents the reason why the author asks himself whether the refor-
mation of this sector could become a big advantage for the Republic of Moldova 
in a wider mainframe of the European and Euro-Atlantic enlargement.
Chapter III amplifies an analysis of security risks for the Republic of 
Moldova, rendering a picture of external threats, as well as priorities which 
have to be followed by the actors of the certain sector. The author is dedicating 
enough space to the transfer of options and dilemmas which have to be con-
fronted by the public authorities to a bigger mainframe of the European and 
Euro-Atlantic enlargement.
Chapter IV outlines the major concerns related to the Domestic Affairs 
business, painting out the punctional division of labor between the Ministry of 
Interior and other’ aglucies of the state, dealing with individual security, public 
order and human rights. The general conclusion is that the reform is still in the 
backyard of political agenda, and more efforts are to be placed into this issue.
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Chapter V represents a tentative to approach the system of security of the 
Republic of Moldova from an economic perspective, subject to certain con-
cepts, analysis tools used by it, such as the concept of “economic security”, not 
often greeted by the adepts of economic neo-liberalism, because the monitor-
ing and assurance of the economic order could imply precautionary actions 
from the state, which could affect certain business interests. The author draws 
interesting remarks about the effects of illegal activities upon the quality of 
governance and democratic options of large.
Chapter VI approaches the problems of the “frozen” conflict from the left 
bank of the Dniestr River, which represents by all accounts the most severe 
security threat of Moldova’s post-soviet legacy. The author describes in full 
details when and how the Transnistrian separatist regime emerged as a privi-
leged recipient of assistance provided by the Russian Federation throughout 
the last decade, as a result of the ‘neglect’ from the international community, 
but also due to inherent weakness of Moldova’s ‘unfinnished transition’. With 
the latest developments in the region, the author makes several important rec-
ommendations and specific proposals which, to his opinion, could bring the 
process of conflict settlement into a framework regulated by law and human 
rights primacy. The Chapter inspires also a new strategic rethinking on the 
external and home affairs priorities, in which the armed forces and the civil 
society have an increasing role. 
Chapter VII continues the topic of decading the roots and scape of the ag-
gressive separatism in Transnistria further analyzing the factors, trends and 
elements which feed the secession. The author unveils the existence of some 
cases of political suppression and dissidents expeled from the region that stand 
against the regime, on the background of aggressive privatizations, and in-
tense production of weapons that contradict the stipulation of the Cease-Fire 
Agreement of July 21st, 1992 and the process of regulation of the conflict, as 
agreed between Moldova and Russia. 
Chapter VIII tries to explain the equation of security in the so-called wider 
Black Sea region. The idea of this text is that, even if the interest for the region 
has massively increased lately, only the premises for outlining and implement-
ing of a decisive strategy in this area exist as yet. The text below should be read 
for this reason, too: it is aimed to outline the premises and the mainframe of 
such a strategy. 
Chapter IX summarizes the increasing role of the Black Sea Area in the 
economy and security of the EU and NATO, through a thorough analysis of the 
opposing strategies and old rivalries that describe the current status of coopera-
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tion among countries that meet in the area. It underlines also the fact that the 
hinterland of the area is a second driving force, its by instrumental role after the 
Caspian oil-extraction capabilities, that is very much promising to become one 
the most sophisticated and dynamic pieces of the EU’s Wider Europe.
Chapter X provides an overview of the geopolitics that affects the domestic 
and foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova, through a complex overview 
of the latest developments and inter-positioning. It does provide a number of 
interesting explanations and forecasts as per the intensity of relations between 
Moldova and its neighbors, international organizations and other stakeholders 
having a relevant power on the democratic choice for the Moldovan society. 
The last chapter aims to provide a synthesis of the main opinion flows re-
garding the matter of security problems in the Republic of Moldova. The opinions 
were collected with the help of linear interviews, carried out in June–July, 2005.
The book provides a conceptual and analytic foundation for addresing the 
agenda of the security sector reform in Moldova. Given the tremendous tasks 
that have challenged Moldova in the last decade we all expect that the energy 
and commitment of its political, economic and cultural elites will be at least 
equivalent to it. By “anatomyzing”, these crisis-prone issues have invited us to 
reflect upon their complex interdependence, as well as towards effective poli-
cies in Moldova.
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C h a p t e r  I .
THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY 
AND ITS POLITICAL SIGNIFICATIONS
Dr Igor Munteanu, Director
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) ‘Viitorul’
1.1. About the taxonomy of the security concept
The concept of “security” is a multidimensional term, which includes a 
wide variety of aspects and elements that are not only related to political and 
military aspects, but also to the economic, cultural, ecological and even the 
demographic ones. Probably, the fear and concerns caused by the existence of 
an unknown enemy, were, traditionally, the base of all the security concepts 
which ever appeared in the political theory and practice.
The anticipation of possible attacks was the key stone of the security re-
lated field. But anyway, paradoxically, these concepts have been constantly 
contradicting themselves over the question, what an attack means, where they 
could come from and what could be done to prevent them? This is the reason 
why “security”, “freedom” and “equality” are among the most debatable con-
cepts of political theories and thought1. The different meanings attributed to 
this concept are not usually determined by the so-called “irreconcilable dif-
ferences” between the political extremities, by the “protestant” or “orthodox 
spirits” of the “jiggers” of these concepts, but these rather depend on cultural, 
socio-political factors, and even on the socio-professional circumstance in 
which these concepts are put across.
The common element which characterizes them is mainly based upon the 
fear for attacks that could be launched upon the public authority, the people 
or the properties. The traditional political-military meaning of the “security” 
term is bound up with conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the sur-
vival of certain entities, like states, governments, territories and the society. 
The special nature of the threats that could subvert them, calls for the imple-
mentation of several extraordinary means to prevent or to solve them. This is 
 Barry Buzan, Peoples, State and Fear, An agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 99, 2nd ed., p. 7
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the reason why the appeal to some superior state reasons/argument (“raison 
d’etre” of any political regime) usually has been necessary to legitimate the use 
of force and to mobilize additional forces by the state or to request certain high 
authorities, to tackle the “security risks”.
All the medieval princes and philosophers were constantly frightened of the 
aggression of certain foreign powers and the home conspiracy and even Machi-
avelli identifies numerous common things between those two threats, because 
in the everyday practice, peace with neighbours strengthens home stability and 
vice-versa. Applying to security reasons a governor could call for general mo-
bilization, using his (unwritten or constitutional) right to use all the means to 
stop an undesired evolution. Especially from the middle of the 19th century, si-
multaneously with the development of certain more or less evaluated systems of 
auto-limitation of states, some alternate judicial space which is meant to defend 
a certain political system from extreme types of insecurity, appeared.
The classic argument according to which, in some specific cases, the 
government can use all the necessary methods appears in its strongest form 
through the force of the “state security” argument, although aiming for the 
percept risks, dangers and threats to represent the constant concern of the ex-
ecutives legally acceded to the power. But how we separate these “existential” 
security dangers from the minor or the less important ones? How can we pro-
tect ourselves from certain tyrannies, frightened by their own survival, which 
will use the presence of imaginary or less imaginary dangers to unstoppably 
assert their control over the society and the state as a whole?
In his famous book, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, Barry Bu-
zan, offers us alongside Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde a rational and simple 
framework of evaluation of these terms. He says that, adding certain problems 
on the security agenda actually shows the attempt to treat them by some other 
rules, different from conventional ones. “Securitization” – means taking-up 
some practices of drawing out from normality of certain problems which have 
to be solved through political, economic or cultural means, just by using the 
reason that these can mean “an existential danger”. In other words, the logic 
of those who use the tool of securitization is as follows: “if we don’t solve this 
problem, nothing else matters!2 This is the reason why we have to analyze seri-
ously the reasons appealed to by those who use the rhetoric of some “existen-
2 Barry Buzan, alongside Ole Waever și Jaap de Wilde, “Security: A New Framwrok for 
Analysis”, Library of US Congress, p.24
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tial dangers” to apply to some conditions which otherwise would be linked 
with normal political phenomena.
Concluding, it should not be asserted – “more security – the better” – be-
cause labeling a certain topic as being related to “national security” actually 
means a failure to treat something by the means of public debates. In theory, 
any problem could be normatively transferred: from its normal habit into the 
area of “security-related problems”, from everyday problems into existential 
subjects, which labels these subjects with near mythological dimensions, and 
the debates upon them – with a strong neurotic load.
The states differ a lot in defining “securitization”, its social degree of ac-
knowledgement and assimilated traditions. Some states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Burma) over-politicize religion, meanwhile in other states, the religion is sepa-
rated from the state. Some states focus on the conservation of national iden-
tity as the central element of their security sector (after an accentuated public 
concern to keep intact the national language (ex-USSR)), or on the right of a 
distinct ethnic identity (Macedonia). In this case the securitization of some 
things and phenomena is an essential inter-subjective process. Different states 
and nations have contradictory opinions on the degrees of “threat” to their 
security. The index of foreign emigration serves us as an example: meanwhile 
the Finish people seem to be very concerned about their 0.3% annual rate of 
emigration, the Swiss people live with an emigration index of 14.7%. It is al-
though evident that when states and nations decide to “securitize” a certain 
phenomena it is a political decision, which will determine this actor to act in a 
certain way, different from if it haven’t made this decision.
Along the factors that lead to the “securization” of certain issues, there are 
other things that matter. Very important is how the people percieve or how they 
assimilate the decisions to “securise” aspects of social life. Sometimes the reasons 
and the effects of some “securitization”-related decisions can seem paranoic for 
the opponents to the rules of a political system. As example are the perceptions 
of the West upon the USSR’s official policies on “pop music” and “jeans”.
Certainly, there are dangers that cannot be solved by political means, as 
the invasion of a foreign enemy. In general, de-securitization of certain prob-
lems and their transfer to the “average” political options seems to be the best 
solution to optimize the settlement of certain conflicts or subjects that are 
difficult for the society. Exactly on this reason, the security policy represents 
a functional political practice subject to certain assessment of the special im-
portance of a problem, of its dimension for a certain political community. The 
actors (and those who accept them as being actors!) use political language to 
build a relation of causality between certain perceived dangers and the ten-
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sioned situation of the community to which it refers. It is necessary, though, 
for some problems transferred from the public domain into the security one 
to be accepted, asserted and executed according to certain legal procedures, 
because, most of the times, the special treatment applied to some “existential” 
security problems also implies the use of important public resources, and the 
use of public money has to answer some clear questions about the reasons and 
expedience of spending them.
Even the discussion on the limits of the security sector is a battlefield be-
tween the state and sociologic theories, which debate upon the conventional 
thinking that the state is the only subject of the security system. From an eco-
nomic perspective, these hypothetical contradictions could be explained by 
the effects of their extremities: when the securitization of the environmental 
sector is little, we could confront with a much higher degree of tolerance to the 
environmental crimes, to the pollution or the destruction of the fauna or flora, 
or the forests unprotected by the law. On the other hand, when the security 
sector is too wide – excluding some much more conventional problems of the 
public sector – we could face some serious problems linked with the protec-
tionist policy and the state’s rough intervention into the market economy. 
Despite the contradictions and the existing opinions on the types of se-
curity risks there is a wide consensus on the fact that security is fundamen-
tal for the prosperity and stability of the human community, assuring the re-
duction of poverty, and instantly transferred into terms related to individual 
security, to the access to social services and political processes. Security is a 
main responsibility of each government, this being the main condition for a 
political regime to protect the rights and freedom of its citizens, ensuring the 
necessary conditions for social and economic development of the society. The 
UN and OECD give a special importance to the concept of security, search-
ing to diversify its connotations: from traditional security assistance through 
defense, special services and police to ensure the security of living and the 
social organization3. This way, the security system includes: the armed forces, 
police and other order maintaining troops, special services, penal and judicial 
institutions, as well as public authorities responsible for the supervision and 
exercise of control over the actors of this sector (the Parliament, Government, 
and Ministry of resort).
The security sector is a sector of competition. Generally, some of its ref-
erential actors are privileged upon the others. The state is considered to be 
3 OECD, Security System Reform and Governance, OECD, 2005, isbn 92-64-00786-5.
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the actor naturally invested with security attributes and resources allocated 
for this aim, in no case the only one, because social relations are built reali-
ties. Even the things that didn’t seem to be a true security sector subject: the 
internet, high technologies transfer – all of a sudden becomes a sensitive area 
for the public order. And on the contrary, certain responsibilities which were 
previously considered to be inherently linked with the power of the regime 
(cinemas, computer, mobile telephony) have been strongly decentralized and 
privatized. From this perspective it is necessary to spot the existence of a rela-
tionship between:
• Referent objects: things that can be threatened in an existential way 
and require safeguards;
• Actors that are securitizing: the actors that are changing the quality 
of referent objects declaring them as being “objects regarding some-
body’s security (state or national)”;
• Functional actors: are those actors who can influence the situation of 
the “securitized” domain in their favor.
In this analysis, the sovereignty of a state is a “referent object”, and the iden-
tity is the referent objective for an ethnic group or a nation, which has the senti-
ment of a direct or indirect threat that could contribute to the scouring out or 
even the dissolution of this (ethnic, national, linguistic) community, because 
the survival of this community depends on the perpetuation of traditions, lan-
guage, culture, and the way of life. The transfer of a referent object in the center 
of political concerns – because what threatens us becomes immediately a prior-
ity of auto-conservation – could also have other objectives, not just those re-
lated to the “good” of the citadel, but rather to the survival of certain unclosed 
social or administrative structures. The example of the failed “putsch” from 
august 1991 (GKCP) in the USSR, represents this way a failure attempt to freeze 
(through securitization) the course of political events in the former union re-
publics, which lead to – the pact of those three leaders of the Slavonic republics: 
Eltsin, Kravciuc and Shushkevich (Bjelovejsk) and the fall of the USSR.
At another level, besides the attempts to take over the power of the state by 
force there are other types of attempts of “securitization” of certain problems 
of group interest. Limitation of public-related information, suspension of the 
access to governmental sessions, unauthorized interception of phone calls are, 
hereby, false attempts to use “securitization” tools for some misunderstood 
aims. Following the above mentioned logic we will notice, though, numerous 
attempts to advance some other referent objects to the altitude of “indispensa-
ble elements of security”.
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Excessive securitization regards mental structures, habits and biases to 
take the entire control over the society, so that often the discussions over a sup-
posed “security” problem reflects the inability of some groups or institutions 
to solve this problem in a “normal way” that is political.
Speaking about the reverse side of the coin, besides the effects of the exces-
sive securitization there is a real danger of un-securitization of really tough 
problems, this leading to huge material and human losses (proliferation of ra-
dioactive weapons, terrorist acts, human traffic, etc), but in all of the cases 
placing a problem on the security constellation is not strictly a technical prob-
lem, but a political and social one, asserting a tight relationship between the 
actor, who “securitizes” it (transfers it from between the political ones to the 
survival related vital subjects) and the audience (poll, nation, a states political 
community), initiating coordinated practices in this direction.
The authorities that can “securitize” a domain or certain topics are, usu-
ally, government officials, members of the parliament, or groups that through 
public declamations plead in favor of the “exceptional” importance of this very 
topic. Usually the actors who broadcast these declamations to the public are: 
political leaders, public servants, central or local governments, different board 
groups, acting more like facilitators of “securitization” than as “referent ob-
jects”. These actors, different in their importance and distinct interests com-
pete for the competence to “securitize” the public space. Actually, they compete 
in their actions to represent a single “referent object” – public wealth. Referred 
to, the key question is: who can provide the best security and in whose name?
Insecurity has a lot of aspects and faces. There are more typologies known, 
that are internationally established through the attempt to organize the exist-
ent risks and threats4, although we have to acknowledge that the attempts to 
organize this dynamic sector of security risks and threats is a very tough thing 
to do. Through dissociation and reference the security adds in certain key sec-
tors: military, political, economic and environmental, but each of these sectors 
has its own agenda. Further let’s give examples of that which represent these 
security agendas.
The military security agenda is prevalently structured upon states and 
the relationship between them (with the notable exception of cases when cer-
4 Bigo, Didier (994), Polices en reseaux: l”experience europeenne. Paris; Presses de Sciences 
Po.; Buzan Barry, National Security in the PostCold War third World, Strategic Review for 
Southern Africa, 994; John Chipman (992) The future of strategic studies, beyond grand 
strategy, survival.
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tain states fail or are disintegrated, which is a subject for active intervention 
of the security and military international community, the case of mostly Al-
banian populated region – Kosovo, or Bosnia Herzegovina). In practice, the 
military security agenda demonstrates the ability of central governments to 
resist against potential home or foreign threats, involving the use of military 
forces against some non-military threats believed to threaten the existence of 
the state (rival ideologies, drugs or illegal emigration). With the development 
of national states, we have contemplated the rigorous separation of functions 
and the appearance of certain agencies responsible for the public security (na-
tional police, on one hand and national armies on the other). It is not by ac-
cident that modern states have jelled themselves through disarmament of the 
citizens in order to follow an ideal model of functioning, in which the state 
alone has the legitimate force in the society, on the basis of complex procedure 
and legal guaranties on the instruments of power. This comes in contrast with 
the functionality of feudal states, in which the use of force represents a decen-
tralized right at more levels: cities, markets, mercenaries, famous vassals, etc.5, 
substituted in time with the reference of uniform application of rights and the 
state’s sovereignty.
Economical agenda of security: the economic sector has numerous refer-
ent objects, starting with individuals, social groups and states to more complex 
and abstract systems of global market. For individuals, the economic security 
appears clearer in terms of basic biological necessities (real food, clothes, shel-
ter, education, protection). The term “security” is often used in economic affairs 
especially regarding the guarantee of operated investments in certain countries 
or sectors. For states, the economic security equals to the individual biologic 
necessities, but when national economies depend on vital resources, these very 
resources are to be legally securitized. Unlike firms – which can disappear af-
ter a bankruptcy, – the states cannot, ending up, in the worst case “externally 
administered”, by the means of special missions (IMF, World Bank) the emer-
gency supervisors of certain sectors of economy (Foreign Administration by 
the Federal Bank of Germany of National Bank of Bulgaria). National econo-
mies can experience losses as a result of preferential policies which give them a 
5 There are notable exceptions for this example: the case of the USA is a chrestomathy mod-
el of deviation from the ideal westphalian state, guaranteeing by constitution the right of 
port-arm to its citizens, and its states to keep their militias as a means of defense against 
the hegemony of the federal government. In the same group, Switzerland, Israel and South 
Africa have kept till today the structural elements of “armed citizens” connected to diverse 
territorial self defense units and the last ones to the conditions of individual security.
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disadvantage, or as result of certain boycotts on the international scale (Libya, 
Iraq), or of unwanted nationalizations (Kuwait, Russia). In addition to securiz-
ing the numerous foreign threats, the actors can securitize domestic reforms, 
vital for avoiding devastating effects as a result of a recession, debt increase, lost 
investments, or the fluctuation of national currency, which lets us claim that 
most of the times, the rationale of economic security is accepted because of the 
effects that it can have upon other sectors.
Societal agenda of security: Being strongly related to the stability of the 
political system (organizational stability of the states, the efficiency of the gov-
ernment system and the ideologies that credit the legitimate government), soci-
etal security needs a separate approach. The fundamental element of the societal 
security is the “identity”, namely – “self image” of the national communities and 
individuals who are reported to these communities. The established authors of 
the analyzed domain warn about the danger of the confusive use of the term 
“societal” instead of “social”6. This is because social security regards the indi-
viduals’ well-being in economic values, while societal security regards the col-
lectivities and their identity, including the actions meant to defend that of “what 
we are” from the others in normative TERMS. The concept of national identity 
includes a series of objective factors, such as: spoken language, thus represent-
ing a personal and political choice when certain individuals prefer to determine 
their own identity as part of one or other ethnic/linguistic community. The dan-
gers that can be perceived as being fundamental for the survival of a certain 
community are as follows: depopulation, ethnic assimilation, loss of traditional 
way of living, or deprivation of the linguistic space necessary for the cultural 
continuity of that very group, so that certain minorities can loose the ability to 
reproduce their culture, or in other cases, when the cultural prints of a minority 
are immortalized as an effect of the decolonization process. However, we have 
to mention that societies are vulnerable in different ways, this depending on the 
way their identities are built: the Irish remain to be Irish despite the fact that all 
of them are speaking English, while in other cases the loss of national language 
deprives the members of these communities from primary ethnic loyalty.
Political agenda of security: refers exclusively to the stability of social or-
der, framing the threat to the state’s sovereignty as one of the key dangers. 
The increase of foreign trade and massive proliferation of communications 
has radically changed the paradigm of the threats to the modern states. The 
6 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Rien-
ner, 998, pp.20.
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 23
only problem related to this sector is its conceptual wideness and, at the same 
time, the fact that most of other security sub-sectors have direct effects over 
the political security7. Let’s take for example the principle of sovereignty – as a 
distinct element of the international judicial system, but as well as a minimal 
condition for the functionality of the framework of domestic rules over the 
territory and the population of a state. As a general regulatory of interstate 
relations, sovereignty is a necessary and sufficient condition for the states not 
to degrade under the pressure of abuses and illegalities. At the same time, the 
sovereignty has become the aim of some huge home and foreign pressures: as 
a result of hegemonic policies of some large states that want to control their 
neighbors, or of some objective integration processes including the result of 
the EU expansion on one hand; and as a result of the acceleration of modern 
communications, bringing to the opening of national borders, “natural” lim-
its of the pre-modern states, on the other hand. Without doubt, in the field 
of international relations, sovereignty is about authority and power; about 
who decides, what is decided and in whose name?8 Ensuring a basic princi-
ple which guarantees the right of national communities to live independently, 
autonomously and without foreign intervention, sovereignty was a fertile soil 
for the ideas related to the nature of international law, because the traditional 
separation from the roman law between “jus naturale, jus gentium and jus 
civile” could not serve as sufficient levers for interstate relations. That’s why 
sovereignty appeared as a political and judicial concept, capable of separating 
home authority (governed by an autonomous normative structure) and for-
eign authority which exists just through cooperation. According to this logic, 
sovereignty is the central concept of collective systems of security, regardless 
of their shape, form and duration. Although, governments represent the legiti-
mate voice of the state, sometimes these seek to make abuse of the securitizing 
rhetoric when they feel the danger to be substituted by other elites.
Environmental agenda of security: widely debated in the political theory 
and practice, the environmental movement became extremely vocal mostly 
with the help of international organizations (UN, EU), applying simultane-
ously two different extremities – its scientific dimension and its political one. 
7 Jahn, Egbert, Pierre Lemaitre, and Ole Waever, Concepts of Security: Problems of Research 
on Non-Military Aspects, Copenhagen Papers, No., Centre for Peace and Conflict Re-
search (987).
8 Hinsley, The concept of sovereignty and the relations between states, Cambridge Univ.
Press, 986, pp. 285.
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Concepts like the poverty of resources and sustainability have shed important 
resources of foreign donors to poor countries. But even people’s opinion be-
comes a political decision when it is supported by the government. A series of 
real disasters like those from Chernobyl or Bhopal dictate certain actions to 
prevent other from happening. However, there exist certain different percep-
tions about what is a security threat: in the absence of other ways of solving 
its nutritional problems, etc., a poor nation could consider the intensive use of 
its natural resources as a good thing, and even building certain air polluting 
industries could be an acceptable solution for the people just to have jobs and 
nutritious food. In general, the ecologist agenda includes: the threat of climate 
change, lose of biodiversity, deforestation and the appearance of new deserts, 
land erosion, the end of natural resources, but also demographic problems, re-
lated to epidemics and low living conditions, the downfall of people’s literacy, 
uncontrolled migration, etc.
1.2. About ways of measuring the security risks 
The collapse of the old bi-polar system has completely changed the conflict 
paradigm and the conventional threats toward countries and nations. Conven-
tional routes of weapon trade, more or less monitored by international agen-
cies, have undergone changes too, supplying a huge demand market, including 
from some fundamentalist, extremist, anarchical, and Marxist groups. Some 
might say, that, alongside liberalization of the ex-Soviet economies, the world’s 
weapon market was liberalized too, and this resulted in an unprecedented in-
crease of illegal trade with illicit substances by-passing international conven-
tions, and the loss of control over the arming process of certain countries, so 
called “the Patriarch”, as a result of their refusal to cooperate with interna-
tional disarmament and non-proliferation agents of WMD.
The increase of the instability degree on the regional level was immedi-
ately interpreted as the attempt of some governments to protect their countries 
independently of the weapons non-proliferation treaties, by producing weap-
ons by their selves, or creating new political and military alliances. As a result 
of the new security risks, sometimes called “unconventional”, asymmetric, 
that may be armed or non-armed operations, but which tend to affect the na-
tional security of a country by provoking some direct or indirect consequences 
on its social and economic life, the entire foreign affairs system realized it is 
pressed by a range of some especially dangerous tendencies, among which we 
will mention the following:
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• Conflict proliferation that tries to take the control over the gas and oil 
resources, to ensure the access to the limited sources of drinking water 
that pass through one or several countries, or to establish the mono-
poly on the mineral and natural resource export;
• The spread of military disputes between tribes, ethnic or religious 
groups, as a result of the state structures’ breakdown, this kind of dis-
putes result in serious threats toward certain national communities or 
central authorities, their goal being not only of military interest, but 
also to take political control over local communities;
• The tolerance of crimes, apparently justified by “collateral loses”, 
emphasizing here that almost 4 million people died in the last decade 
(1990–2000), 90% of which were civilians, and about 18 million people 
were forced to take refugee as a result of the conflicts;
• The increase of the conventional weapon trade, light and tactical wea-
pons, being used in several conflict, without being registered by the 
specialized international institutions;
• The increase of the potential risk of radioactive material usage (the 
so called “dirty bombs”), consisting of radioactive and biological sub-
stances;
• The appearance of explicit nuclear risks, as a result of the initiated 
nuclear programs by some countries, North Korea as an instance, or 
because they ignored the international embargo, imposed on coun-
tries like Iran. 
Authors that worked systematically on the security concept considered 
that the individual insecurity and the instability of the institutions, deprive 
the political power of trust and hope, elements that offer stability to any politi-
cal regime. Traditionally, we consider that hard threats are of foreign nature, 
coming from outside the national borders. This approach is submitted to a 
cruel test nowadays, because today this kind of threat can originate both from 
outside and inside the national states. Security becomes a broad and multidi-
mensional concept, which in fact reflects the changes at the security structures’ 
level, including energetic crises that affected EU after 1970. Traditionally, secu-
rity was analyzed and monitored from a strict national point of view, as a part 
of collective alliance commitments. Nowadays, the geographical dimension of 
the issues related to security extended to the inclusion of some under-national 
and global levels. In this very way, the goal of this concept extended from its 
military meaning to much larger aspects of a political, economic, social and 
environmental nature. This is why the concept of “security” is often used in 
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broad contexts and meanings; from vital needs to obtain basic products, to the 
security of citizens and the assurance of peace on a global level. 
Especially in the Western Europe of the last decades, the convergence of 
the two aspects of security – domestic and foreign – became a common and 
indisputable place. New types of threats emerged, while other older became 
less frequent, if not eliminated for good. In this way, the risks related to the 
environment or to the balance of the social protection systems are nowadays 
regarded as security threats, this approach being already considered during 
international conventions, like Helsinki Final Act (1973). Later, these shy ele-
ments of new security concepts were also integrated in the Unique Europe-
an Act9. Addressing their security problems, the countries that were part of 
the former USSR must learn that the national sovereignty and state building 
means more than copying a state institution, on behalf of their tired of politics, 
population and much more than the rules to justify only the political forces. 
Sovereignty means the insurance of unity, integrity and indivisibility condi-
tions of the political nation, the sole subject that can assure legitimacy to insti-
tutions and dynamic stability of the political process. 
As an effect of globalization, these threats can vary a lot under both the 
aspect of their intervention domain and their geographical position. In op-
position to the hard type threats, the rest can be logically regarded as soft that 
means they are more easily to be monitored, more “domestic”, based on the 
resources they use and the potential impact they might have had at that very 
moment. If previously, it was considered that hard threats can be only of mili-
tary nature, today, we must affirm that this approach needs some fundamental 
changes, also including aspects related to civil domains. Terrorist attacks are 
illustrative to show the major damages and destructions that can be caused by 
civil means. Even the implications of these threats are different, because of the 
impact and the effects that different threats bring are rather different.
  
9 Article nr. 30.6 (a) of the Unique European Act states: “The high contracting Parties con-
sider that a closer cooperation in issues related to European security would contribute to 
the development of a European identity in foreign affairs matters. They are ready to coor-
dinate their positions in different political and economic aspects of security.
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Traditional threats New threats
Origins Foreign Foreign/local/electronic
Aspect Especially military Military and civil
The main actor State powers State and non-state actors
Implication Direct Direct and indirect
Hard conventional threats might have direct consequences/results, espe-
cially if they imply military means. But today, the effects of this kind of actions 
can indirect, too. For example, the attack on a very important infrastructure 
can be cause chain effects on other economic infrastructures of a country, 
causing a break down (national energetic systems) or the destruction of vital 
elements for the functioning of a modern national community. Among these 
asymmetric/non-conventional threats we can distinguish the following:
• Transnational and international terrorism, including its biologic and 
cybernetic aspects;
• The attempts to take control over home or international transport 
systems;
• Individual or collective threatening actions against the communica-
tion systems stability;
• Focused actions that pursue to affect the international image of a 
country;
• Economic or financial aggressions aimed at destabilizing the econo-
mic system;
• Deliberate made ecological accidents;
Terrorism, that become the major issue of all security forums in the last 
years, especially after the dramatic event of September 11, 2001, came to be 
considered a “hard” threat recently, being previously mentioned among other 
local, territorial problems, in certain countries. The organized crime was also 
regarded in the same way, as being an exclusively home threat, and only in the 
last two years, due to its spread abroad, it became a strategic problem on the in-
ternational security agenda. We could have noticed two important tendencies 
of the traditional security concept change in the last decade: the first related 
to dramatic reduction of the potential conventional military attack against 
Western Europe, as a result of USSR collapse, that means also the blurring of 
the difference between foreign and local threats. Previously, the foreign threat 
was defined only as a result of the invasion of a hostile power, while the home 
security risks were, traditionally, thought to be sabotage acts or threats against 
public order. International terrorism became immediately a visible factor of 
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the conflicts between countries, being at the top of the most dangerous secu-
rity risks known up till today, among which the following can be mentioned:
• Ethnic tensions;
• Drugs, radioactive material and human trafficking;
• International organized crime;
• Political instability as a systematic and creation factor of political 
systems;
• Reestablishment of the spheres of influence;
• The increasing number of small vulnerable countries, characterized 
by a corrupt and inefficient government.
On the other side, the “soft” risks, considered to be more and more impor-
tant for the regional security and the stability in the EU “neighborhood”, refer 
to the civil matters and other common threats which require cooperative an-
swers. EU security strategy identifies the new global threats as being complex. 
“Europe faces a range of new threats which are more spread, less visible and 
less predictable”. Neither country is able to assure by itself solutions for com-
plex problems it faces. The vast aggressions of some countries against other 
countries are improbable10”. Generally, The EU Security strategy identifies 11 
global threats, among which:
Category Maximum priority Major priority
Terrorism √
WMD11 proliferation √
Regional conﬂicts √
Failed states √
Organized crime √
Poverty √
Diseases √
Demographic growth √
Resource dependence √
Limited resources √
Clime changes √
Some of the threats listed in the EU Strategy are closer to the meaning of what we 
perceive as “hard” threats: weapon of mass destruction proliferation (WMD), regional 
conflicts and failed states.
0 A Secure Europe in a better world. European security Strategy, 2003
 WMD – weapons of mass distruction.
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The Common Foreign and Security Affairs (CFSA); the Amsterdam Trea-
ty established the object of “the security consolidation by all means” as one 
of the 5 fundamental objectives of the Foreign and security Affairs. The trea-
ty includes the EUO “Petersberg” tasks (humanitarian and rescue aid tasks, 
peace-enforcement missions and crisis management tasks, including peace-
keeping) in the text of the EU Treaty.
The specialized literature comprises typologies (Moorof) which divide the 
“soft threats” in 4 main types; (1) the individual level, affected by the environ-
ment, criminal, and health threatening, (2) society level, which refers to mat-
ters related to the identity and the status of minorities, (3) community level, 
which refers to threats related to the concept of sovereignty and the activity of 
the public administration and government system, but also the specific lacks 
(corruption, inefficiency), and (4), regional level, which refer to the regional 
stability and the coherence of the relations betweens countries and nations. It 
is well known, that “soft” threats are left behind on the international agenda, 
because of the military issues, or those described as “hard” from the point of 
view of security, fact that imposes natural compensations in order to make the 
“soft” problems to be regularly advanced, having an institutionalized position. 
In the end, though the “soft” threats are usually included among the aspects 
of some policies which refer to the social management, caused by the division 
between “minor” and “major” policies; “soft” threats regard the quality and 
the intensity of the country’s existential matters.
It is useful, in this context, to examine the types of threats which are con-
sidered by the legislation Republic of Moldova as being fundamental for the 
national security of the country. We underline that, according to the National 
Security Concept (No. 445-XIII of 05.05.95), by national security we under-
stand:
“The protection of the individual, society, country, and their rights and in-
terests, established by the Constitution and other RM laws against foreign and 
home threats”, 
specifying that these threats represent the intensions of some hostile forces, 
manifested in different forms, or factors of ecologic, technical or other types, the 
realization or influence of which may constitute a threat for people, society, and 
the country”. The Concept formulates a list of these threats, as follows:
• Direct aggression and territorial claims of other states;
• Local or regional conflicts that occur very close to the borders Repu-
blic of Moldova;
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• Uncontrolled transportation of weapons, as well as components of nu-
clear, bacteriological and chemical  weapons on the territory of the 
Republic of Moldova and near its borders;
• Actions performed to change the constitutional order using violence, 
undermining or liquidation of sovereignty, independence, and territo-
rial integrity of the Republic;
• Actions performed to undermine or liquidate the economic, techni-
cal-scientific and  defensive potential of the country, or to create dan-
gerous ecological situations;
• Actions performed to strain the social situation and to provoke social 
conflicts;
• Terrorism and organized crime, drugs trafficking and illegal immi-
gration;
• Actions the goal of which is to undermine the constitutional rights 
and liberties of citizens.
In comparison, the Lithuanian legislation establishes a more complex struc-
ture of dangers and risks, which the institutions connected to the national secu-
rity sector of their country, must deal with. In this way, the law from December 
19, 1996, signed by Algirdas Brazauscas mentions 5 types of threats:
• Political: political pressure and dictate, attempting to establish areas of 
special interest and to assure social rights that will not permit Lithua-
nia to obtain international security guarantees, threats from foreign 
states to use force under the pretext of defending their interests and 
the attempts to force Lithuania to accept different dangerous and di-
scriminating agreements.  
• Military: the use of military capacity in the neighbourhood of the Lit-
huanian borders, military transit on the national territory, illegal crea-
tion of armed groups or their invasion on the national territory, brutal 
and open aggression;
•  Specific: Espionage, subversive activities on behalf of foreign secret 
services, including through the establishing of some under cover or-
ganizations’ activities, organization of diversions and assaults upon 
the lives of some Lithuanian citizens, direct or indirect interference in 
the home affairs of Lithuania, attempts to influence state authorities, 
home affairs and social processes, illegal and transit immigration, re-
fugee influx, to incite ethnic hate and unfaithful behaviour toward the 
Lithuanian state, attempts of some countries to impose on Lithuania 
principles of double citizenship.
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• Economic: economic pressure, blockade or other economic hostile 
actions, investments with political purposes by buying up properties, 
energy supply systems and other enterprises, communication facili-
ties, railways, gas network systems, credit and financial companies, 
dependence on energetic systems or dependence on one or a group of 
foreign countries, energetic vulnerability, foreign debts, destabilizing 
interventions against banking and financial systems in order to take 
over their control.
• Criminal  transnational organizations: activities of underworld orga-
nized structures, illegal business and smuggling, terrorist infiltrations 
abroad and illegal activities on national territories, illegal transit or 
trade of weapons, drugs, radioactive and other dangerous material, 
the production and circulation of forged money, money laundering 
gained as a result of some illegal activities.
When attentively comparing it with other country’s legislation, we will no-
tice that the RM law puts a bigger stress on the “military” character of the ac-
tions that assure national security, while the Baltic countries’ laws accentuate 
the civil, preventive character. It is very illustrative the manner in which the 
legislation of national security is placed in the ideological and national context 
of the legislation of thesevery states. In this way, in the preamble of the Lithua-
nian law it is stipulated even from the very beginning that, 
“The Lithuanian state, created many centuries ago, on a Christian unifying 
fundament for Europe, represents an integral part of the community of Europe-
an nations. The Lithuanian nation never accepted any kind of conquest or sub-
jugation, resisting in all possible ways in order to free itself, and this nation will 
remain unchanged. The aspirations of the Lithuanian nation were and still are 
related to the defense of freedom, the guarantee of a free and stable development 
of its ethnic community, the development of its natural creative force and the 
progress in the world. The Lithuanian democratic and independent state must 
assure a safe existence of the nation and its free development, because the state 
security represents a condition necessary for its democratic development12”.
The law No. RT I 2001, 7, 17, approved on December 20, 2000 by the Esto-
nian parliament, and that came into force on March 1, 2001, defines from the 
very beginning that:
2 The basics of national security of Lithuania, Law No VIII-49, december 9, 996.
32 MOLDOVA ON THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY
“The objective of the activity of all security authorities is to assure the na-
tional security and constitutional order by non-military means, of prevention 
accumulation and processing of information necessary for the formulation of 
security and national defense policies.”
The same law stipulates the competence of the information service in Estonia, 
establishes the manner of creation and operation of the Security Council, while in 
the Republic of Moldova it is created by a presidential decree (20.08.1991), being 
presided by the head of the state. The law of national security of Lithuania estab-
lishes as its major objective “the creation of conditions for free and democratic de-
velopment of the nation and state, the protection and defense of the independence 
of the Lithuanian state, of its territorial integrity and constitutional order.”
The second general remark is related to the very precise and rigorous char-
acter of the structure of the adopted legislation, in which the competences allo-
cated to the public authorities holding offices in the security sector of the coun-
try are found in all their details. The law on national security of Lithuania speci-
fies all the competences of the following structures: Saiema (the Parliament), 
the commission for parliament security, National Security Council, the Presi-
dent, the Prime Minister, the Government Ministers, the Minister of Defense, 
the supreme head of armed forces, The Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, the head of security services, other state ministries and serv-
ices, local public authorities, other public organizations. There is a tendency of 
integration of the legislation regarding the national security in all Baltic coun-
tries, in distinction to RM, which has a much more fragmented legislation. In 
the Lithuanian law we can find the structure of competences, the legal base and 
the objectives of all actors invested with public authority in this domain.
The third remark can be made in relation to the dangers considered to 
be grave, from the point of view of the functioning of the country’s security 
system. Listing the major dangers for the state and society, the Latvian law 
continues with the concise and exact description of the assumed competences 
by the authorities, while the RM legislation is limited to the enumeration of 
some “general principles  for the assurance of security”.
The fourth remark is related to the express and repeated mentioning of the 
fact that the authority staff that have responsibilities in the security sector are 
a part of the general system of public service, thus, limits and provisions com-
mon for any other categories of public officials being applied to them as well. 
(Chapter III of the law on Estonian national security, December 20, 2000.)
It is useful to underline that, according to the legislation of the Baltic 
countries, the institutions of the security sector are not left “to take care of 
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themselves”, but have the responsability to present some periodic reports to 
the legislative, so that every year the Parliament would adopt the Annual Plan 
of Defense, entitled “Analysis of Threats Against the State” (Section 26, the law 
on national security of Latvia), which represent a comprehensive evaluation of 
all types of risks and dangers. In Latvia, this general estimation is presented at 
the same time by the administration of the information and security institu-
tions, and by the Constitution defence bureau, after the examination made by 
the National Security Council, following to be approved by the government, 
annually. We underline that the same procedure is also followed by the au-
thorities with the function of national defence in Latvia so that these institu-
tions would annually present an assessment of military dangers, coordinated 
beforehand with the National Security Council and the Constitution defence 
bureau, further being approved by the Government. Moreover, based on these 
assessments that are presented in the Parliament, two annual plans are ap-
proved – one of defense and another of security.
The Latvian Annual Plan of defence is an assessment of a broader plan of 
development of the armed forces, requesting active involvement of the Min-
istry of Defence, the General Staff and the General Commander, as a result 
of the consultations with all the important actors of society. The Latvian law 
also stipulates the existence of some complementary plans of mobilisation in 
case of accidents, emergency situations, war, civil protection. Article 5 of the 
Latvian law (December 19, 1996, No. VIII–49) on national security stipulates 
the clear responsibility of the government, to prepare a long term plan and 
the corresponding programs for the development of the national security, to 
establish training procedures and their implementation based on foreign legis-
lation by presenting them to the Seimas (the Parliament) for approval.
Finally, we should mention the value layer on which the security sector is built 
in Baltic countries. This way, in the cases of Lithuania the law stipulates that
“National defence and security of Lithuania will be developed as indivisible 
parts tied to the Common European transatlantic defence and security systems”. 
The consolidation of the security of the Lithuanian state is the only objective of 
the foreign security and defence and policies of the country.”
The only legal base for the functioning of the security sector is the Lithua-
nian legislation, the Constitution, the democratic and independent character of 
the country (art. 1), the sovereignty (art. 3), and the sanctions for any usurpation 
of the state power or of the national territory (art. 8) being directly mentioned. 
Again, the Lithuanian legislation establishes the EU, EUO, and NATO integration 
with full rights as being the most important way to assure the national security, 
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while the legislation of the R. of M. ignores the establishment of normative com-
mitments based on the law. The maximum that the Moldovan legislators can af-
ford, in the Law on national defence of RM (345-XV of 25.07.2003) is to announce 
in its first article that “the national defence is the will of the entire population”.
In Latvia, its competences are related, generally, to the coordination of a 
unified state policy in the field of national security, implemented by the state 
institutions and the supervision of their fulfilment, as well as of the plans and 
concepts related to the national security, according to the law. The Supreme 
National Council will propose Saiema, i.e. the Parlament, the appointment 
and dismissal of the Director of the Bureau for the protection of the Latvian 
Constitution, but all the decisions of SNC, with some exceptions, will have a 
consultative character, that will not allow state officials to deny their respon-
sibility over the decisions that they have taken (section 20, Law on Latvian 
National Security, December 29th, 2000).
In the Republic of Moldova, the Supreme Security Council (SSC) is a con-
sultative body which analyses the activity of the ministries and departments 
in the field of assurance national security, presenting recommendation to the 
president of the Republic of Moldova on problems related to foreign and do-
mestic affairs of the state. SSC is active in the fields related to the assurance of: 
state security, public security, military, economic, ecological security, and other 
important issues. The reason why the SSC didn’t engage since its creation and 
untill very recently in sensible matters, like the problem of Transnistrian sepa-
ratism, is because it has regarded this problem as an exclusively political one13, 
excusing itself from one of its major functions.
This can be deduced from the fact that, according to the National Strategy 
Concept of security, the actors of the security sector – obviously including SSC – 
assures the protection of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of 
Republic of Moldova, its constitutional regime, the economic, technical-scien-
tific and defensive potential, assures the fact that legal rights and interests of 
individuals against informative and subversive actions of special services and 
foreign organizations, or criminal attacks of some individuals or groups” are 
guaranteed…14 Only on July 21, 2004, the first working session of the SSC, on 
3 Vadim Enicov, report at the conference organized by IPP in Chisinau “SSC in the system 
of assurance of national security in the R. of M.: its role, needs and possibilities of improve-
ment”, July, 2005.
4 The Parliament’s decision on the approval of the Concept of national security of the R. of M. 
at the creation of the Coordinative Council for the elaboration of projects of law and other 
normative acts which will regulate the construction, preparing and use of Armed Forces, 
No. 445-XIII of May 5th, 995, Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova No. 35/399 of June 
29th, 995.
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the problem of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict took place (!), during 
which the decision to interrupt  the negotiations and seek other solutions to set-
tle the conflict (ban on export, obstruction of the financial flows, involvement 
of international organizations), etc. appeared as a result of a decree of President 
Snegur, on August 20th, 1991, and further undertaken in the Law on defense 
(art. 8), in which the SSC, was sometimes mistakenly qualified as “one of those 4 
public authorities with competence in the field of assurance of state security, the 
rest of them being: the Parliament, the head of the state, and the government”15, 
not being an authority stipulated by the Constitution of the R. of M.
The regulation on the functioning of the SSC, adopted on October 8th, 1997 
(No. 331-II), stipulates its attribution to present to the head of the state sugges-
tions on different foreign and home affairs matters, but also the examination 
of some plans of action on essential problems for the security sector: plan of the 
creation of Armed Forces, plan on weapons and  military equipment supply, 
mobilization of armed forces, mobilization of the national economy in case of 
war, a plan of an interaction between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, the SIS, the Department of Civil Protection, etc., but we find 
out that none of these elements accomplished the objective of deliberations 
and technical elaboration in the last decade. In exchange, on October 6th, 2001, 
international terrorism was included on the SSC agenda (including the par-
ticipation of sappers in different international operations of disarming arms), 
cases of selling the military patrimony from the National Army warehouses 
(December 13th, 2001), but also the presentation of a Concept for the reorgani-
zation of the National Army and modernization (May 13th, 2004).
1.3. Defining the security sector and structural reforms
The general objective of the security sector reform is to create a safe en-
vironment for development, prosperity and democracy. This ideal objective 
is based on two important principles: (1) the ability of the state to generate 
conditions that will reduce the vulnerabilities that its citizens are exposed to; 
and (2) the ability of the state to use more effectively the tools of home affairs 
that it has and to prevent and approach different security risks that affect the 
society. We can not avoid the changes that the traditional concept paradigm of 
security has undergone:16
5 Vedim Enicov, idem
6 DAC, Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Eng-
hancing Policy Coherence.
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• The security policy is spread today from the exclusive stress on the 
protection of state stability and political regime to aspects related to 
the welfare of the population and human rights;
• Security and development are closely connected, so that the reform of 
the security sector can not remain a “taboo” area for the citizen any-
more, being regarded as a public political matter and an issue of good 
governance, a fact that leads to a larger opennes of the sector to the 
public control;
• The role of the state institutions that were elected to monitor the se-
curity sector is re-assessed today. The military factor is just one of the 
political tools of security, along other tools (legal, social, economic), 
also important and of impact.
The origins of most conflicts that exist today are caused, from the point 
of view of most researchers, by the poor organization of the state institutions, 
by corruption and abuse of power, the weak institutions and limited responsi-
bility of the officials for their obligations, facts that destroy the quality of the 
state administration and feed the individual and regional insecurity. From this 
point of view, many countries freed from the foreign trusteeship (as a result of 
the last waves of decolonization in the ’70s–’80s, or as a result of the collapse of 
the ex-socialistic blocks – Yugoslavian and Soviet) didn’t succeed to establish 
durable states, a fact that caused the stimulation of home risks, inter-ethnic 
tensions, and poverty of the population.
There are three main principles that can reduce the security threats in case 
of weak countries: democracy, a good governance, and the rule of law. These 
principles are based on the fundamental characteristics of the security system 
of global level, starting from the premise that the existence of differences is 
not a reason to use force as a method to settle the conflicts.  The general objec-
tive of the reform in this sector is usually defined as “the transformation of 
the security institutions, so that they play a more efficient, legal and demo-
cratic role in the assurance of home and foreign security for the citizens of 
that country”.17 This transformation requires strengthening of the civil control 
over the security sector, professionalizing the security forces, demilitarization 
and strengthening of civil functions of the institutions in this sector; strength-
ening the rule of law. What do we understand by these indispensable elements 
for the reform of the security sector?
7 Towards a better practice framework in security sector reform, NIIRC, Occasional SSR 
Paper No.  August 2002.
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a). Strengthening the civil control and the supervision of the 
security sector
This implies an effective reform of the central government institutions and 
of the non-governmental sector for the consolidation of the abilities of these 
entities in the field of supervision, management, and control over the security 
sector so that the relevant institutions from this sector would exist and function 
according to their role in a democratic society. Specifically, this supposes:
• Reforming and professionalization of the Ministries of Defence and 
Home Affairs; the establishment of ombudsman bureaus; the creation 
of consultative councils for problems related to policies issued in this 
domain; strengthening of the relations of legislative supervision over 
the functioning of these ministries, the creation of functional entities 
for internal audit;
• The strengthening the ability to participate in the reform of the se-
curity sector reform of the NGOs, professional associations, research 
institutions and advocacy, universities;
• Supporting the efforts related to strengthening the belief among mi-
litary men that the civil institutions are able to assess efficiently the 
challenges and the special technical requirements of the security sec-
tor, assuming the responsibility for the decisions taken or proposed in 
this field.
b). Profesionalization of the security forces
The goal of this element is to contribute to the growth of the degree train-
ing of the forces that are responsible for the protection of the society, state and 
individual, in order to fulfil their specific roles, including by:
• Military assistance programs in order to train military men to under-
stand the roles and limits stipulated by the legislation in a democratic 
society (training from the point of view of responsibility for respecting 
the population, human rights, international humanitarian right, na-
tional minorities in a civil state, etc);
• Technical training programs to modern performance standards, in-
cluding through the acquisition of new military equipment;
• Strengthening the effective abilities of the police to assure public order 
and the use of national legislation.
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c). Demilitarization and peacekeeping
This element is meant to limit the access to the weapon market and to 
re-qualify in a professional way those military groups that leave the security 
forces entities for some civil professions. Generally, demilitarization implies 
programs like:
• Disarmament – the reduction of the access to conventional weapons in 
the post-conflict societies;
• Demobilization – (also called “decommission” – term used in Great 
Britain regarding the paramilitary entities of IRA in the North Ire-
land) – meaning to the same extent the breaking of armed groups in 
the process of reconciliation and strengthening of peace;
• Reintegration – the involvement of former paramilitary soldiers wit-
hin civic activities.
d). Consolidation of the rule of law
The process of reorganization of the security sector wouldn’t be complete 
if the consolidation of an independent and viable legal framework isn’t done. 
That would assure a civil-democratic control over the security forces. Accord-
ing to the previous experience, this element comprises:
• The creation of an efficient and unbiased judicial system, having the 
political support of the reform in law and the existence of some com-
prehensive programs of consolidation of capacities for judicial and le-
gislative powers;
• The creation of a law free from the influence of political factors. 
The problem of the democratic control over the security sector apparently 
is not new at all, even if it reappeared as a positive condition for the develop-
ing states. Let us try to further examine the nature of this control, its ways of 
expressing, types of control and its normative base. From the very beginning, 
we should mention that the problem of this control reappeared over and over 
again during centuries, its meanings being different depending on the existent 
type of society, historical conditions and basic ideologies.
Niccolo Machiavelli is one of those who firmly pleaded in his works for 
the establishment of public control over the army, declaring that “the military 
force must be subordinated to the power of the citizens who can use it only in 
defensive purpose”…18 In his turn, another important representative of po-
8 Niccolo Machiavelli, Dell”arte della guerra, Opere, ed. By Sergio Bertelli and Franco Ga-
eta (Feltrinelli), 960.
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litical thought, Carl von Clausewitz, stated that “the subordination of the po-
litical will to the military one would be absurd, because politics generated the 
war, it is the intelligence, and war is only its instrument and not vice a versa. 
So it is only possible to subordinate the military will to the political one”…19 
The idea of subordination of the military factor to the political one appeared 
during the American revolution as an indispensable attribute of freedom, and 
respectively, of democracy and rule of law. Because “from the point of view of 
law, rule of law and democracy represent two faces of the same political real-
ity”, declared Jean Gicquel, “establishing the conditions that not only permit, 
but even impose in modern conditions the effective mechanisms of civil con-
trol over the armed forces”.20
The established characteristics of the rule of law are, generally, described 
as: separation of the powers in the state, election by the citizen, by a universal, 
direct and secret vote elements related to the state power, adoption of a real 
legislative framework, doubled by the mechanisms that assure the observance 
of the law; equality of citizens from the point of view of law, conditions of the 
appropriate use of law in the interest of the citizen, clear delimiting between 
the state and the political parties, the enforcement of human rights and, at 
last, taking military forces and police under the civil authorities’ control, these 
bodies being responsible to them for their actions. It is generally believed that 
a representative democracy, together with the rule of law and a mature civil so-
ciety, can generate stability of the social structures and can avoid conflicts, in-
cluding those that might involve military men. All this is because of the nature 
of their mission, “the high degree of professionalism of the military men can 
lead to their isolation from the rest of society, military men having the tenden-
cy to develop a corporatist auto-reflexive medium, that might want to interfere 
“to correct the course of events» to equal extent as the degree of breaking the 
legitimacy of the political system, or when the dominant ideologies of the state 
differ from the missions military men have”… (Jean Blondel)21
This way, the democratic control over armed forces, together with the po-
litical control, represents the right of the political society to supervise the way 
9 Carl von Clausewitz, About war, Military Publishing house, Bucharest, 982, p. 63, Nic-
colo Machiavelli, Dell”arte della guerra, Opere, ed. By Sergio Bertelli and Franco Gaeta 
(Feltrinelli), 960.
20 Jean  Gicquel, Droit constitutionannlel et institutions politiques, Montchrestien, Paris, 
989, p. 29.
2 Jean Blondel, The military and its role in the political process , An introduction to com-
parative government, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 979, pp. 43-432.
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in which the armed forces, police and the security bodies are performing the 
missions they were given, namely protecting society from potential risks, and 
they don’t obstruct the constitutional liberties that are found at the basis of 
the rule of law. The efficiency of the parliamentary control represents a reli-
able binder between the political society and the civil society. The same con-
stitutional key factors must assure the impossibility of transfer of dominant 
positions within the political system to wards the military, and the use of force 
must be performed only under the direct authority of the leaders, elected in a 
democratic way. Let us see some useful events:
The US Constitution contains essential provisions over the competences 
and attributes of the state institutes in the field of civil control over armed 
forces. Article II, par.2 stipulates that “the president will be the supreme com-
mander of the armed forces and USA ships, also of the state militias, when 
these are called to serve the USA”. Though it appoints the president with im-
portant control competences, the Congress keeps its power to declare war, to 
organize and keep the army, war navy, and to adopt law to command and 
regulate the military forces22. 
In France, the general organization of defense is in the competence of the 
Council of ministers, and the decisions related to the general command of de-
fense are taken within the Defense Committee, the president of which is at the 
same time the president of France, vice-president being the Prime-minister. 
The Minister of Defense is directly responsible in front of the Prime-minister 
for carrying out the military policy, particularly, for the organization, moni-
toring and preparation of the armed forces, having the competence to issue 
orders and instructions, which underline the directives of the defense field 
made by the prime-minister.
In Great Britain, the Government has the role to plan in the field of secu-
rity and defense, including by allocating money necessary to fulfil military 
plans that include the structure of forces, their level of training to fight, neces-
sary modifications in the investment program. The general military program 
that was created as a result of this assessment process is annually revised by 
the government and, depending on the requirements to balance the public ex-
penditure, establishes the military expenses in the end. The problems of na-
22 The remark made by historian David F. Trask is interesting “the civil leader of the american 
executive is at the same time the leader of the military hierarchy, the civil control over 
armed forces is assured in this way” – Civil control over the USA armed forces, US Informa-
tion Agency, April 993, p. 3.
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tional defence are discussed in the parliament, at least 6 days per year – one 
day for each category of armed forces, two days for the budget and one for 
defence and foreign affairs problems. 
In Lithuania, the democratic control over armed forces and other institu-
tions of the security sector is stipulated in a separate chapter (chap.8) of the law 
on national security. The chapter clearly states the fact that “all decisions related 
to defence policy and armed forces must be taken by civil governments demo-
cratically elected, and these policies and defence expenses must be present d to 
the public”. Like the legislation, the Parliament controls the armed forces and 
other institutions of the security sector, auditioning their administration and 
adopting their functioning budgets. Only civil people must be appointed for 
the positions of Minister of National Defence, Minister of Home Affairs and 
his vice-ministers, director of the State department of Security. The phrase 
“usually civilians” is used in the legislation of RM, leaving a large possibility of 
manoeuvres to the political authorities who select and forward to the parlia-
ment the candidates who will rule these ministries or public authorities.
In Slovenia, “the civil control over the armed forces and, respectively, over 
the security system, was one of the basic ideas of creating an independent 
state” and only after the reorganization of its security forces, Slovenia man-
aged to leave behind the former federal system dominated by the Yugoslavian 
Federal Army and the secret police.
The Latvian legislation dedicated a principle to underline the importance 
of the civil control over the armed forces. The Law on national security of 
Latvia of December 29th, 2000, establishes that “the operation of the national 
security system is based on civil-military cooperation, used to plan and coor-
dinate the activities of state authorities, public authorities and forces of the na-
tional army, in order to settle the threats that can endanger the state stability. 
The basic principles of civil-military cooperation are: effective coordination 
and cooperation, the unified understanding of common goals and the respon-
sibilities assumed to reach these goals.” The Latvian legislation stipulates that 
“the national security is based on the activities of state institutions and the 
participation of each citizen of the country, on the cooperation with the civil 
society that is opened and aware of the existing dangers and responsibilities, 
democratically oriented and prepared to protect the freedom of Latvia”.
The legislation of the Republic of Moldova has almost no references to the 
methods, utility and practical forms needed to acchieve public control over the 
security sector. Article 20 of the Law on SIS states “the presentation of periodical 
reports on the activities developed in front of the legislative”, it also mentiones 
that in this way” the parliamentary control is carried out by the Commission 
42 MOLDOVA ON THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY
for national security, according to this regulation (The Regulation of the Parlia-
ment), and the financial control is performed by the Court of Account.23
The only reference to citizens in the Parliament’s decision from 1995 on 
National security concept stipulates “their possibility to join associations of 
public order maintenance and the assurance of security in their places of resi-
dence, to create community groups close by to military and special entities, to 
offer assistance to the bodies that assure national security as part-time work-
ers”. In addition to the fact that these provisions are free of any civil control, 
this list of rights is, in fact, an open way to recruit people for secret services, 
respectively, a part of absolutely different matter, having nothing in common 
with the standards considered by ECDO as being vital for a good functioning 
of the security sector. In this context we will mention that the Latvian law 
forbids in its law on national security strategy the creation of “paramilitary 
associations, close by to different military or/and special entities”, consider-
ing this a repetition of the old mentality and of the regime of political police.
Generally, by “security sector” we understand all organizations that have 
authority to use, command, or threaten with the use of force in order to protect 
the state and its citizens, and also of those civil structures that are responsible 
for general management and supervision of the elements of this system. From 
this point of view, the security sector consists of three elements:24
• Groups that have the mandate to monitor force instruments (legal vio-
lence) – military or paramilitary men, public forces;
• Institutions that have a clear role in monitoring and supervision of the 
security sector- civil ministries, parliaments and civil society;
•  Public authorities responsible for the functioning of the rule of law – 
justice, people’s lawyers, penitentiaries.
Due to the fact that the process of reform of the security sector (military 
forces, police, security services, law and supervision authorities) is very com-
plex and relatively new for most of the countries that appeared as a result of 
the collapse of the old empires, numerous efforts are required from the behalf 
of international communities. In special ECDO, The World Bank, UN and EU 
are known as being the most active organizations in the assistance of security 
23 Law on SIS, No. 753-XIV of December 23rd, 999.
24 Hendricksona, Dylan. A review of the Security Sector Reform, London, The Conflict, Se-
curity and Develpment Group funded by DFID, Centre for Defence Studie sat King”s Col-
lege London, September 999, p. 29.
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sectors’ reform, and this is because in the absence of security and stability, the 
most important development objectives can not be reached.25
Frequently, the international community has a fundamental role in con-
ditioning the creation of this sector in the new countries, through projects of 
technical assistance and modernization, but also by transferring recommen-
dations that come from the already existent standards within the western de-
mocracies. ECDO believes there exists a set of principles and norms that guide 
the efforts of consolidation of the security sector, to some extent these are ap-
plied in the EU member-states:
1. The Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be focused on the concern and 
interests of the citizens and the sector must be understood and credi-
ble on a local level, it must be established on unconditioned respect 
of democratic norms and most known international principles in the 
field of human rights, contributing to the creation of an open environ-
ment toward freedom and not fear.
2. SSR must be regarded as a decisional framework able to respond to 
different security threats in a systematic, fats and efficient way.
3. SSR must be monitored according to the same responsibility princi-
ples (accountability) and transparency that can b also applied to the 
entire public sector, including by facilitating some important public 
involvements in the process of assurance of security. 
The analyses performed by DAC show that, in most ex-socialistic coun-
tries, SSR is perceived in a more restricted way, and because the most impor-
tant stimulant for reform was the desire to integrate in NATO and EU. The 
reform activities confined with the strengthening of the border security, to 
strengthening regional stability and civil-military relationships. Generally, the 
biggest concern of the SSR authors was frequently related to the transfer of 
the western norms and values and administration techniques in this field, the 
fact which resulted, in the opinion of western authors, in “the cover up of the 
reform”.26 Another conclusion stated by the DAC researches is that, frequently, 
the SSR concept and specific terminology of this sector is by far not known 
among the officials and authorities responsible for institutions that will under-
go the reform. A lot of countries started to use the SSR concept just to justify 
25 OECD, Security issues and Devleopment Co-operation: a conceptual framework for en-
hancing policy coherence, DCD (2000), 4/REV2, Paris, OECD, December 2000.
26 Overview of Regional Survey Findings and Poicy Implications for Donors, Dylan Hen-
drickson, King”s College London, OCED, 2005.
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the policies of reduction of the costs for specific institutions that can not find 
their place within the political regime.
Especially, in the ex-soviet area, the biggest problem that SSR must face 
is related to the influence of the old staff of the secret and military police that 
competes with the promoters of new reforms, in order to take control over the 
state institutions.27 Their situation is complicated also because reform of the 
police, army and special services takes place concomitantly with the strength-
ening of the legality in these states. The increase of the role of an independent 
judicial system, and the creation of a mature civil society. It is interesting to 
note that, especially in the countries in which that showed their will to inte-
grate into NATO or EU, military men become real “engines” of SSR reform, 
also because the positive auto-perception and the rediscovered legitimacy to 
have an important role within the process of joining Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions. The Baltic States and Slovenia are an example, they were accepted, on 
March 29th, 2004, as members of North-Atlantic Alliance and in May 2004, 
members of EU, they also managed to get in front of other CIS and SEE coun-
tries from the point of view of SSR reform. In most of these countries, the 
approach regarding the absolute power of the security system that is situated 
above any law and normative acts shows the remaining features still not erased 
from the period of the party-state.
1.4. The international context in dynamic change
The year 2001 was marked by terrorist attacks on New York, causing an 
unprecedented mobilization of the Western world, the attack of the interna-
tional coalition led by the USA against religious groups from Afghanistan and 
the intervention in Iraq. The war in Iraq aimed at stopping the oppressive dic-
tatorship of Saddam Hussein, using a concept of pre-emptive attacks (made 
public on September 20th, 2002), but which didn’t succeed in much stability 
in the Middle East, though a lot of resources were invested in order to de-
stroy the terrorist groups and to establish military bases in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Though there existed sophisticated collective security arrangements, 
UN, OSCE showed themselves as being unprepared to face the violence of the 
conflicts from the Balkan Peninsula, or in other regions of the former USSR, 
being frequently compared to the inefficiency that culminated in the general 
destabilization of the League of Nations in 1930. 
27 Tanja Petovar, Overview of regional survey findings and policy implications for donors, 
OECD, 2005, p. 25.
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 45
This is because neither UN nor OSCE could resist military operation at 
a large scale, for example an imaginary invasion of Russia into Baltic States 
or Caucasus. It is clear that these collective institutions are rather ready for 
an institutionalized dialogue or, in the worst case, for monitoring missions 
for human rights, of reduced intensity, unable to assure the functioning of a 
collective security system in the Wilson’s sense of the word28. The only institu-
tions that have the necessary ability to prevent major destabilizations in any 
European region are EU and NATO. 
The disappearance of “critical foreign threat” at the end of the cold war re-
quired a reconfiguration of the “security triangle”, called in this way after the 
relation established between NATO, WEU and EU. On the basis of its specific 
mandate, NATO could be able to offer only a political-military contribution 
for the increasing challenges of a dynamic European security environment: 
collective defence, peacekeeping operations, partnerships and political-mili-
tary dialogues. The implementation of the WEU Common Concept (1985) was 
the first attempt to create a different European security strategy that would be 
able to face the changes in this field. At the same time, because of the fratri-
cidal war in Balkans, the implementation of a new method of approach of the 
treats with local European character, was required in addition to the security 
umbrella, guaranteed by the USA.
The creation of a European security dimension after 1998 would confirm 
the importance given by the EU to the development of its own foreign and 
security policy,29 also including the idea of a common defense policy (well for-
mulated in the Amsterdam Treaty). The slim progress in this field was the 
result of reduced abilities or lack of resources, rather of inter nal “disturbances” 
of EU and because of the EU’s decisions to complete a range of institutional 
reforms, partially caused by the spread, but also by the split related to specific 
European polarizations. This policy of “Europeanization” of the EU security 
stimulates and continues to feed a lot of speculative contradictions. To under-
stand the nature of these debates, we will further analyze some of the known 
approaches, which describe different security “cultures”, following relatively 
different logical models. 
28 Charalambos Papsotiriou, the Problem of European Security, in Security Dilemmas in 
Eurasia, Nereus Ed., IIR, 999
29 Javier Solana, A secure Europe in a Better World, Thessaloniki European Council, June 20, 
2003, www.eu.int
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The European Union: Starting with May 1st, 2004, EU is defined as a union 
consisting of 25 countries, with around  450 million people, which produces al-
most 25% of the GBP, the fact that motivates a natural ambition to be regarded 
not only as an important economic actor on the international level, but also 
on the level of global security. This concern of the Europeans to play a more 
important role on the global level is due to the complex increase of the inter-
dependencies on the foreign affairs level. Even if there exists the temptation to 
attribute to the US the role of ruler of a monopolist global power, the interna-
tional realities are much more complicated, which offers an essential role to 
institutionalized cooperation and dialogue structures, by involving some in-
ternational organizations in defining the dangers and threats at a global level. 
At the macro-decisional level of EU, a clear distinction is made between the 
“internal security” culture (police) and the “internal security” (which implies 
the activity of the diplomatic and military expertise service). The approach that 
dominates the WEU and EO discourses, especially after the Copenhagen Eu-
ropean Council (June 1993), was an exclusive one. This approach is manifested 
through the integrity of the parties as a basic method to “structural conflict 
management and their prevention” within EU, hoping that any kind of conflict 
can be settled by including them in a system of cooperative relations30.
The East Ward enlargement of EU in two successive waves, and from 
2003, the emergence of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), confirms 
the implementation of this approach in the settlement of structural conflicts, 
described also by the elliptic phrase of the President of the European Commis-
sion, who said that EU must be bordered by a “circle of friends”. The creation 
of a military group within NATO was not only accepted, but even actively 
encouraged by NATO. The development of a European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) represents a project that still evolves. Like European enlarge-
ment, it will have an essential role in determining the future outlines of the 
future union, having as an object the consolidation of the foreign abilities of 
the union in order to act through strengthening civil and military capacities 
for the prevention of conflicts and crisis management.
In case this policy is constantly supported by the EU members, it will cre-
ate a common identity promoting the integration between members. ESDP 
actually means the key to EU unification. But what do ESDP consist of? Being 
an older ambition of the EU, starting from the abandoned plan to establish a 
30 Changes in the security concept and the JHA agenda, www.libertysecurity.org
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European Defense Community (1954), this policy could be outlined only with 
the adoption of the EU Maastricht Treaty (1993), which established a common 
foreign security policy for the first time, stating the progressive creation of a 
common defense policy, that could lead to a “common defence”. Balkan crises 
constantly stimulated this tendency, and the decisions of the heads of states 
and governments at the Council of Nice (1993 and 2000) contributed to the 
creation of political and military structures, which would be responsible for 
taking decisions during crises.
NATO: according to the North-Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the 
UN Charter, NATO mission is based on the protection of the freedom and se-
curity of its members by political and military means. Since its creation, NATO 
promoted just and long-lasting peacekeeping in Europe, based on democratic 
values, human rights and the rule of law, objective that obtained new mean-
ings after the “iron curtain” was dropped and at the end of the “cold war”, con-
solidating the Trans-Atlantic cooperation base between North America and 
European states. The security and the cohesion within the Alliance contribute 
to the fact that each of its member states will not depend only on national ef-
forts in solving its security problems. 
Especially because of this reason, the Alliance represents an association of 
states, determined to assure security through mutual guarantees and stable re-
lations between them, by means of collective security and mutual assistance.
After 1990, NATO has played the key role in maintaining and consoli-
dating the Euro-Atlantic security, immediately after the Cold War was over, 
this being possible because of political and military partnerships, cooperation 
and consolidation of dialogue between the old enemies, members of opposing 
military blocks rivals. Opportunities were opened for new member states to 
join. NATO reaffirmed the commitment to contribute to the prevention of 
conflicts and crises management, including through peacekeeping  operations 
(Balkans). The Atlantic Alliance remains today the most stable and safe secu-
rity structure of Western Europe and the US, a fact which is confirmed by the 
WEU countries, and by the Maastricht European Council leaders.
The hope expressed in the EU Treaty that WEU will form the armed hand 
of EU must not be regarded as an attempt to substitute NATO and the Ameri-
can military presence in Europe, but as a “personalization” initiative of the 
European presence in NATO. 
During the still unfinished process of redefining its goals, NATO engaged 
in the last years in security tasks that exceed its original mission, which was re-
lated to the defence of its member states from foreign attacks. The importance 
of NATO for the European security was confirmed by the crucial role the Al-
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liance has played with its military intervention in Bosnia, this mission being 
given to European commandment. The enlargement of the North-Atlantic Al-
liance towards East was a real test of the resistance of the post-war commit-
ments and of NATO’s ability to show its relevance in the condition of major 
changes of international relations. Many of the observers didn’t believe in this 
ability, considering that NATO was not able to face changes. With the disap-
pearance of its historical rival, USSR, NATO found itself facing the security 
challenges of its member states and, in spite of competitive priorities, NATO 
kept its ability of inter-operability, fast reaction and convergence between the 
founding members. 
The UN: through the Security Council, UN has showed its character of be-
ing the most important actor of the international dialogue on subjects related 
to security and stability in the world. In December 2005, UN General Assembly 
intends to extend the membership of UN Security Council. This is not well per-
ceived by the USA, which considers this a fact that will diminish its efficiency, 
will reduce the influence of the actual SC members and will introduce in SC a 
group of countries that voted several times against some of the US initiatives.31
The OSCE: OSCE kept its general function as regional institution of inter-
national security, including all European states, Canada and the USA; fact that 
allowed it to play an important role in promoting peace and stability, in con-
solidating security through cooperation and promoting democracy, human 
rights, and social stability. The Helsinki Final Document (1992) stipulates the 
possibility of OSCE implication in peacekeeping actions, establishing whether 
these operations represent an extremely important element of the organization 
in order to prevent conflicts and crises management. But never up till now, had 
OSCE monitored on its own responsibility peacekeeping operations.
Nonetheless, the existence of important specialized international organ-
ization in peacekeeping and conflict settlement didn’t prevent the breakout 
of  56 military conflicts in over 44 places on earth, only between 1990 and 
2000.32 During this period, only 3 conflicts have involved world-known states 
3 According to some analysis, the candidate states to become members of SC or UN (Bras-
il, Grmany, India, Egypt, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa) were several times against rather 
than supporting the initiatives launched by USA. Jst Japan and Germany voted several 
times to support USA (50% and respectively 55%). Nigeria and South Africa voted against 
USA initiatives more than 80% between 2000-2004. Source: Deaprtment of State, “US 
Priorities for a Stronger, More Effective UN”, June 7, 2005.
32 Armed Conflicts Report, 200, Project Ploughshares, Waterloo, Ontario, 2002.
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as main characters: Iraq against Kuwait (1990), India against Pakistan (2000), 
Eritrea against Ethiopia (2000). In other 53 analyzed cases, the conflict gen-
erators were rebel forces that tried and sometimes succeeded to seize the power 
through coup d’etat, or foreign military interventions within local conflicts.
At the end of 1980s, EU agencies for regulation and Europol policy-maker s 
developed a security concept that combines broad categories of activities 
with an increased degree of risk: terrorism, drug trafficking, organized and 
trans-border crime, illegal immigration, refugees and ethnic minorities. The 
analysis of these risks led to a reconsideration of the role given to strategic in-
formation gatheres, police agencies, in redefining the role and coordination of 
police agencies. Globalization process and the informational boom limited the 
existent distinctions, but kept them on the security agenda of EU, in which the 
terrorist attacks are treated together with conventional threats. It is not sur-
prising at all that most important decisions related to the limits of Schengen 
zone, the debates on Europol and on new European Security Bureau entered 
the EU working agenda, being also kept in the agenda of the Justice and Home 
Affairs.
Mentioning the military ability, EU established the task to create in 2003 
a force of about 60.000 soldiers, for at least 60 days, in order to engage in hu-
manitarian and rescue actions, peacekeeping crises management missions. We 
must mention that the military and defense dimension of EU do not include 
territorial defense. Conflict prevention and crises management require a com-
bination of civil and military instruments. EU decided that the Lisbon Euro-
pean Council (2000) will assure the creation in 2003 of an entity consisting of 
5000 police officers for different international missions. On April 11, 2002, the 
European Commission adopted several recommendations that will improve 
the civil capacity to prevent conflicts, and in November 2001, this commission 
adopted an official statement on financing these operations.
The feeling of fragmentation and relative inefficiency of efforts to prevent 
conflicts has substantially modified in the last years the cooperation agenda 
between NATO, EU, UN, in order to accieve a better coordination at a global 
level. Many people explain the EU expansion to East as a project motivated 
firstly by security concerns, so it is a project that wants to strengthen peace, to 
end historical divisions between East and West, between east and west Euro-
peans. The perception of a common identity constantly motivated the efforts 
of the partners from East to take part in different EU open programs, and the 
same thing is valid for Balkan countries, or the countries situated at the out-
skirts of the former USSR (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus), which intend or 
prepare themselves to obtain the status of candidate-country. 
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The initiation and development of common strategies or monitoring pro-
cedures of the crises within EU are clear coordination examples. The example 
of cooperation between NATO and EU in lower Serbia (Kosovo) or in Bos-
nia, illustrates the real cooperation mechanisms, though there exist formal 
EU–NATO inter-operable agreements. Article 3 of the EU treaty requires close 
cooperation between its institutes in order to assure military security. The Eu-
ropean Council is the authority that elaborates strategic directions for the EU 
security policy, based on proposals from the Council of Europe and European 
Commission, the coordination of their efforts being stipulated in EPSD.
There is a strong link within EU between foreign and local security as-
pects. The most important political and security fields in EU are related to: the 
supply with raw materials and energy resources for all its members, a Single 
European Sky, GALILEO, the protection of vital infrastructures for EU mem-
bers, cyber-crime and the security of air transportation means. All these fields 
are essential for EU, though they are not specially mentioned within ESPD/
ESPC. Actions against international terrorism represent a similar example in 
this sense. An important element of EU Commission is related to non-prolif-
eration and disarmament including common actions with Russia, monitoring 
missions of weapon export, etc.
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C h a p t e r  I I . 
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN MOLDOVA
Nicolae Chirtoaca, 
Director of the Institute for European Political Studies
Introduction
Like in most transitional countries of the Eastern Europe the intersection 
of democracy, market and security aspects of Moldovan way toward the com-
petitive economy and open society is extraordinarily fragile, endangered by 
changing external peril and internal incapacity to identify priorities and to 
meet the challenges of this complex nature of the modernisation process. The 
lack of security and stability is still a major obstacle to the democratic stabili-
zation of Moldova, which has already negative consequences for individuals, 
state and the Moldovan society as a whole. The geographic location is also im-
portant for Moldovan national security. The country lies on the crossroads of 
three distinct geo-political zones: South-Eastern Europe, Central Europe and 
Euro-Asian Region. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union Moldova did 
not break the relationship with former soviet republics mostly because of the 
economic reasons  in the effort to keep the foreign markets and guaranteed 
supply of energy sources and raw materials. But the membership in the Com-
monwealth of Independent States did not allow Moldova to solve the difficult 
problems related to the national security.
The very quick geopolitical changes in former post-Soviet periphery, pro-
liferation of the new risks and dangers, especially of non-military character 
and the unsettled and frozen conflicts in the Black Sea – Caspian Sea region 
have already a direct impact on the security and stability in the Eastern part 
of the European continent. Therefore one of the main transitional challenges 
Moldova is still facing is the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The very quick 
geopolitical changes, proliferation of the new risks and dangers, which heavily 
impact the whole post-war order and the value systems, make this task more 
difficult especially for the small states that recently appeared on the political 
map of Europe. 
The weakness of Moldova as a transitional state on one side and the 
post-imperial syndrome of Russia’s policy in the so-called “nearest abroad” on 
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the other side creates a dangerous mixture generating permanent instability 
and growing risks. Over the past years with little international notice and even 
less action, the situation in Transnistrian part of Moldova controlled by the 
pro-Russian separatists has degraded to the point of challenging the security 
interests and democratic values of the enlarged Euro-Atlantic community. The 
process of the EU and NATO eastward enlargement transforms the western 
border of Moldova in to the Eastern border of the Euro-Atlantic community 
of states. Moldova accounts for an almost 500 kilometres long sector of the 
new Euro-Atlantic border in Eastern Europe. The fact that the neighboring 
Romania is already the full-fledged member of the Alliance, as well as the un-
ambiguous declarations by Ukraine concerning its membership in NATO, has 
changed the distribution of power in the region. Thus more active cooperation 
with NATO becomes, in a way, a natural need for broader perception of the 
National Security Concept in Moldova. 
Therefore, it is so actual and important to estimate how the enlargement 
of EU and NATO processes may involve the country and its neighbours, to 
examine what a changing security environment implies for them and what 
kind of security and defence arrangements are in the offer. The emerging new 
European security order requires more efficient actions and efforts in address-
ing the new risks and threats, closer cooperation with Moldova and efficient 
assistance in stabilizing the situation alongside the new EU borderland. Yet 
there is no indication of this being done or seriously planned.
2.1. Assessments of Risks and Dangers
Despite the radical decrease of the pure military dangers for the majority of 
the European nations after the end of the Cold War, the Republic of Moldova 
continues to face risks and threats in the area of “hard security.” Political and 
territorial separatism remains one of the main concerns and the obstacle in the 
process of state building and on the way of reintegrating the Moldovan society.
The military, financial and political support provided by the Russian Fed-
eration to the so-called «Moldovan Transnistrian Republic« over the past fif-
teen years has strengthened the military potential of separatists that is now 
practically equal with Moldova’s Armed Forces potential.
The presence of the Russian troops on the left bank of the Nistru River 
against the will of the Moldovan people and the decisions of the international 
organizations are a real threat to the country’s national security. The control of 
separatists over the Eastern border with neighbouring Ukraine and different 
forms of smuggling activities, as well as large-scale money laundering remain 
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the main sources for the financial support of the paramilitary formations of 
Transnistria, separatist’s procurement of armament, weapons and other mili-
tary material. 
Because of the foreign involvement and geopolitical dimension of the 
Transnistrian conflict Moldova does not have the political and military poten-
tial to address these security issues  in a proper and adequate way. The country 
urgently needs assistance and help in working out a reliable and long-lasting 
strategy for the efforts to counter these hard security risks. Like other coun-
tries from South Eastern Europe that have not succeeded in finalizing the 
market-oriented reforms, Moldova faces a wide range of non-military security 
threats and risks. These include:
• organized international crime that operates the majority of the illegal 
and criminal business and has a trans-national character and forms of 
organization;
• trafficking of human beings, deeply rooted in the social and economic 
crises and in the rapid development of illegal trans-border activities, 
as well as in a growing external demand for such kind of “services”; 
• growth of arms smuggling as a result of the lack of efficient arms con-
trol on the Transnistrian part of Moldova; 
• illegal migration that derives from substantial unemployment and on-
going economic and social stagnation in the country; 
• political manipulation of territorial and ethnic conflicts in order to 
maintain the instability and uncertainty of the situation and to black-
mail the legal government of the country;
• insecurity of energy supply routes and infrastructures that are still 
connected to the networks controlled by the separatists and possible 
economic and energy blockade used by Russia to put pressure on RM.
To a large extent, these “soft threats” – whether they originate in the ex-So-
viet countries or not – are spilling over into the EU through its new direct 
frontier and remain real challenges for stability and security of the enlarged 
Europe. The main official documents that contain the principals and direc-
tions of the state activities in the field of national security and defence is the 
Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova adopted by the parliament of the 
country on June 6, 1995. The  Doctrine has not been changed since its approval 
by the supreme court more than seven years ago. This document mentions the 
democratic control over defence sphere as one of the main principal of the new 
kind of civil-military relations, asserts the supremacy of the political control 
of the elected bodies of the public authorities over the military institutions and 
structures of the state and the Armed Forces as a hole. 
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According to the Doctrine the existing military dangers to the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity are considered  the following:
• Territorial claims or pretensions of other countries;
• attempts to interfere in the home affairs, to destabilise the domestic 
situation in the country; 
• presence of foreign troops on the territory of the state against the will 
of the people; 
• subversive activity of separatist organisations, attempts oriented  to 
the armed violation of the territorial integrity of the country;  
• creation of illegal military forces on the national territory.
Another document that contains the definition of priorities concerning 
the national security is the National Security Concept adopted officially by the 
parliament in 1995. According to this concept the threat to the state security 
is understood as actions, conditions and the factors presenting danger to the 
state, society and citizen and are considered as following:
• actions directed to a violent change of the constitutional order, to 
undermine or destroy the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
country;  
• activity, directly or indirectly promoting expansion of military opera-
tions against the country or causing civil war;  
• armed or other violent actions undermining the state foundations; 
• espionage, transfer of data, containing state secret to other states, ille-
gal reception or storage of the data classified as state secret, with the 
purpose to transfer it to other states or anti-constitutional structures; 
• treachery expressed in assistance to other state in realisation of hostile 
activity against the Republic of Moldova;  
• actions with the purpose of infringement of constitutional laws and 
freedom of the citizens causing threat to the state security; 
• preparing and committing acts of terrorism, and also endangering the 
life, health and inviolability of high officials, representatives of state 
power of foreign states during their stay in the Republic of Moldova;
• actions that contribute to the appearance of emergency situations on 
the transportation system,  communication, life-support and economy 
infrastructure; 
• plunder and smuggling of weapons, ammunition, combat material, 
explosive, radioactive, poisoning, narcotic, toxic and other substan-
ces, their illegal manufacture, use, transportation and storage if the 
interests of state security are affected; 
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• creation of illegal organisations or groups presenting threat to state 
security, or participation in their activity. 
On July 26, 2002 the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova approved the 
Concept of the Military Reform. The officials explained the necessity of this 
document by a need to solve a range of problems the Armed Forces have been 
facing during the last years of change. The establishment of a new efficient and 
flexible system of military security able to guarantee the defence of territory, 
sovereignty, independence, territorial unity and integrity of the state are con-
sidered the main objective of the reform. The necessity of the reformation of 
the army is explained by the following factors:
• imperfection of the present system of the military security of the state;
• the declared permanent neutrality status of the country and the ne-
cessity of foreign policy adjustment to this principle; 
• the present geopolitical situation and  to the new realities, risks and 
missions generated by the changes on the international arena;
• the insufficiency of financial resources and the need to correlate the 
military security system of the state with the present possibilities and 
the perspectives of  economic development of the country; 
• relatively low defence potential  of the Armed Forces and reduced mi-
litary capacities of the country.
The Concept highlightes that Republic of Moldova does not have enemies 
and, therefore, the probability of a major threat to the military security of the 
state is a minor one for the time being. The main sources of threats are con-
sidered to be the regional instability and the emergence of a large diversity of 
non-military risks. For the first time the cross-border risks such as organised 
crime, illegal drug, weapon and strategic material smuggling and trafficking 
are listed in the official document. The Concept of the Military Reform con-
tains the following hierarchy of the main regional risks: 
• the strategic imbalances of the military potentials in the region;  
• the existence of certain degree of military tension and conflicts that 
can spread off; territorial separatism and the internal political, social 
and economic conditions that can have a negative impact on  the mi-
litary potential capable to  diminish the power and authority of the 
public administration;
• the appearance of  dysfunction in the financial, informational, energe-
tic, communication and telecommunication systems of the states;  
• politico-military rivalries between newly formed  states.
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During Soviet time Moldova did not have any important technological 
and industrial military capacities on its territory. Some of the production units 
and plants of the former military-industrial complex are not functioning any 
more or are undergoing radical restructuring on the base of conversion. Con-
sequently, Moldova cannot be a source of transfer of military goods. All pro-
curements of arms and munitions are controlled by the state. A special Gov-
ernment Commission was created to monitor such activity on the territory 
of the country. Moldova has joint all the international agreements regarding 
the non-proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons. On the territories 
controlled by separatists’, light artillery systems like «Grad» are produced as 
well as weapons (Kalashnikov machine guns etc), mine launchers for the needs 
of local paramilitary units and exported to different “hot spots” on commer-
cial basis.
The alienation of the public power from the population and the decline in 
society’s spiritual-moral potential, imperfect legislation and inefficient state 
policy are the main factors that block the sporadic efforts of public power to 
reduce the negative impact of these phenomena on the societal life. There are 
real dangers to the civilian security system in Moldova:
• human rights abuses in the Eastern region of Moldova under the con-
trol of separatists; 
• widespread corruption and the absence of efficient anti-corruption 
strategy and mechanisms; 
• low tempo of reformation of the justice system and of the law-enfor-
cing and security agencies; 
• high level of political parties influence on the local mass media and 
as a result the manipulation with public opinion especially within the 
electorate campaign. 
Over the past years it became clear that the economic factor is decisive for 
the national security and durable development of the country. Only stabilisa-
tion and growth of the Moldovan economy will be able to satisfy the interests 
of citizens, society and state, to solve problems associated with a deficiency 
of resources necessary for the stabilisation of nome situation as well as for 
the resolution of national security problems. At this extend the non-military 
threats linked with specific aspects of the radical socio-economic reforms are 
as follows:
• possible failure of the democratic and liberal reforms due to the Mol-
dova’s governing circles incapacity to ensure the steady transition to 
the market economy; 
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• high cost of macroeconomic stabilisation without a visible impact on 
the real economy and life standards. Possible destabilisation  of the 
situation in the society, radicalisation of the political regime;  
• growing role of the «shadow economy», corrupt governance and as a 
result, a chronically weak and inefficient state; 
• organised crime involvement in the community’s life, its transitional 
character becoming a source of regional instability.
The territorial separatism remains one of the most acute dangers for the 
Moldovan state and its future. The recent years have been marked by continu-
ous efforts made by the Moldovan government aimed to find a peaceful solu-
tion to the conflicts which oppose the legal authorities of the country and the 
leaders of separatist formations from the left bank of the Nistru river known 
also as “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic”. Despite the concrete steps and 
unilateral concessions made by the government and the active involvement of 
the OSCE and international mediators the conflict is far from being settled. 
The social and economic vulnerability of the society and its members re-
mains, political instability and political-territorial separatism remain main 
home threats. The unfinished market reforms, social and political polarisa-
tion of the society, the growth of corruption and organised crime, deteriora-
tion in inter-communal and inter-ethnic relations create a wide range of home 
and foreign risks to the country's security. Mistakes made in the initial stage 
of democratic reforms have weakened law-enforcement institutions as well as 
state regulation and monitoring thus provoking the decline of the role of the 
state and reduction of its efficiency in addressing the security problems. 
2.2. Security Sector Definition and Integration Concept
The growing powers and responsibilities of the institutions in the secu-
rity sector objectively require a better co-operation between civilian servants 
and military, the efficient democratic oversight and control. The human and 
financial resources invested in the security sector require more efficient use of 
created capacities. It increases the need for co-ordination among institutions 
in the security sector based on the explicitly formulated strategy followed by 
coherent actions and responsible attitude of the governing circles and of the 
society as a hole.
In Moldova the discussions regarding the need as well as the main goals 
and objectives of Security Sector Reform are generated from time to time by 
the change of government or after the new head of state is elected that try to 
implement some electorate and political promises. The absence of a qualified 
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debate on what are the fundamental characteristics of SSR,  raises quite serious 
issues about the effectiveness and the concrete ways the current situation can 
be improved. Despite the rapid expansion of international co-operation in the 
field of security and defence in the last decade, there has been little analysis of 
the nature, content and consequences of this sector reformation especially in 
the post-socialist countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The difficulties 
in assessing the commonly accepted definition of SSR derive also from the fact 
that the sector itself is at the same time the building block of strategy and a 
tool driving democracy in the field of security and defence.  The absence of a 
common understanding as to what are the goals and instruments of the of SSR 
has produced already the following consequences:
First, SSR is defined in a broader context of democratic reforms and ad-
justment of the armed forces and security services of the state to the new geo-
political realities and threats. This holistic way concerns mostly good govern-
ance, conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction, and proliferation of 
non-military threats, political control over the military as well as the democra-
tisation of the civil-military relations. The growing number of issues that are 
included within the area of security sector reform leads to a loss of focus and 
finally risks to diminish the efficiency of the reforms. 
Second, there are real conservative trends in the attempts to address the 
new challenges existing already in the security sector on the basis of old ap-
proaches and policies without re-evaluating what needs exist and thus to make 
them relevant to the circumstances in the country and at the regional and 
sub-regional levels.
 Third, the new kind of civil-military relations is understood mainly as a 
need to correspond to the international requirements imposed from outside 
the country by the multilateral organisations Moldova is a member of. In the 
absence of the adequate understanding about the fundamental democratic 
norms that regulate the new relationship between civilians and armed forc-
es, that form the checks and balances system, it is premature to speak about 
a concrete model of democratic and efficient control over the military to be 
implemented in the country. This is one of sources of confusion in terms of 
exactly what policies, ideas and values should be considered as a basis for the 
reformation of the existing security and defence system.
Fourth, within a broad SSR agenda and without shared conceptions and 
common strategic approach to the SSR different stake holders like government, 
civil society representatives and international institutions pursue different ob-
jectives and therefore provide sometime conflicting policies being focused on 
different aspects and priorities of the same processes. 
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Despite a certain degree of confusion in Moldovan society concerning the 
real content and the ways of SSR implementation there are already the key 
policy instruments in this field. The security sector encompasses all those in-
stitutions, organisations and units that have authority to use force or the threat 
of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures 
that are responsible for their management and oversight. The security sector 
in Moldova includes:
a) Central public authorities responsible for the management and over-
sight of the security sector;
b) Armed forces – military and paramilitary formations;
c) Police forces – the Interior Ministry troops “carabineries”;
d) Border guards and customs services;
e) Security and intelligence service;
f) Judicial and penal systems and their institutions;
 
Over the years of Moldova existence as an independent country, a legal 
division of authority between the state institutions responsible for national 
security has been gradually established according the generally recognised 
democratic norms and principals. The following public authorities and insti-
tutions are involved in developing and ensuring the national security of the 
Republic of Moldova: 
• The President of the RM: according the Constitution the president of 
the state assumes full responsibility for the national security and de-
fence. He is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
and has personal responsibility for defensive capability of the country 
and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The head of the state di-
rects the state agencies and mobilise resources for ensuring the imple-
mentation of this constitutional task. He has also the rights to define 
the main directions of the country's domestic and foreign policy that 
finally should be approved by the parliament of the country;  
• The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova that develops and forms 
the legislative framework in order to ensure national security, as well 
as the democratic control over the military and the monitoring on the 
current activity of the armed forces and law-enforcing agencies. The 
legislators also adopt the state budget that includes the expenses rela-
ted to the national security and defence; 
• The Government of the Republic of Moldova, as the central body of 
the executive authority, is responsible for national security as a whole 
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and for the defensive capability of the country in particular within the 
limits of its constitutional power. The government directs and moni-
tors the activities of the state authorities and agencies directly opera-
ting in the field of national security and defence. The executive branch 
of the power take care of the defensive capabilities of the country, of 
the Armed Forces provision with armament, ammunitions, military 
equipment and different kind of material resources. The government 
acts strictly in accordance the decisions of the parliament and the de-
crees of the president related to this specific area of its responsibility. 
The government co-ordinates also the activities of central executive 
authorities (ministries, state departments and agencies) as well as of 
the local executive authorities, designs state budget for implementing 
specific programmes in the area of national security and defence; 
• The Supreme Security Council is an advisory body for the President 
of the country and its main task is to develop the general directions in 
organisation and maintenance the country’s security and defensive ca-
pability and military construction. The Council assists the head of state 
in identification and assessment of threats to national security, drafts 
operational decisions to prevent them and monitors the implementa-
tion of decisions in this area by central and local executive authorities;
Despite the existing legal division of powers and responsibilities between 
different state authorities and structures, the necessity to achieve synergy be-
tween the specific institutions of armed forces and security services as well as 
to increase the level of general awareness by setting priorities using co-ordina-
tion as a tool remains one of the main problem. The common understanding 
of these issues by all the actors and the need for a legal framework and respec-
tive regulations remain important. 
The lack of efficient co-ordination leads to overlaps especially in the ac-
tivity of the structures of the Ministry of Interior and other special services 
of the state. The need for efficient co-operation in the field of national secu-
rity derives also from the very nature of the new threats and their different 
impact on the national security. In the Republic of Moldova, there are three 
state structures of executive power specialised in state security maintenance: 
the Information and Security Service (ISS), the Service of the State Protection 
and the Boarder-Guard Troops Department.  Relatively recently, the fourth 
one has been created: the Centre for Countering Organised Crime and Cor-
ruption. According to the legislation, these institutions form the system of the 
agencies of state security of the Republic of Moldova in which the leading part 
is played by the ISS. Such a situation explains a high demand of co-ordination, 
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but also of governmental and parliamentary management and oversight. The 
appropriate and flexible response implies bridging the gap in activities of dif-
ferent forces, services and agencies. 
It is commonly accepted the leading role of the armed forces within the se-
curity arrangement in the state. The army bears a major strain and has for the 
third time in a decade to be reorganised in order to meet the new challenges 
and the new threats. One of the main objectives of the latest army reform con-
cept is to transform it in a flexible, movable, and sustainable forces able to be 
the leading force in any crisis management with well determined tasks. One of 
the main goals of the current Concept of Military Reform consists on chang-
ing the existing approach to the defence planning through the adjustment of 
the Armed Forces to the modern requirements. Despite the fact that this docu-
ment has been developed exclusively within the framework of the MoD and 
therefore has a certain departmental character its authors tackle the role and 
duties of the military the concept has all the features of the national security 
concept representing a complex of ideas, objectives and directions of activities 
followed by the assertion of force structure, mechanisms and budgeting proce-
dures. One of the strategy goals is to raise the level of co-operation in the field 
of defence and national security.  The document contains also the idea of the 
system’s planning part that includes the following elements:
• geopolitical situation, possible sources of potential crises, external 
risks and threats; 
• sources of internal instability and risks; 
• economic situation of the country and its potential for the armed for-
ces maintenance at the required level of combat readiness including 
the financial resources that can be allocated to the military sphere; 
• structure and capacity of the armed forces for addressing the problems 
including the country’s participation in European security and stabi-
lity arrangements (possible participation in blocks, alliances, armed 
forces participation in peacekeeping operations, etc.)
In this way the concept of the military reform creates the basis for bet-
ter co-ordination of the state policy in the field of national defence and se-
curity by connecting external and internal factors as well as different state 
agencies responsible for foreign policy, internal stability and security, interna-
tional co-operation. Programs and activities in the military and security area 
are planned according the financial capacity and economic resources of the 
country. The concept determines the national requirements in defence area, 
establishes objectives of the military policy, and develops tasks for the armed 
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forces and security agencies. On the basis of the Concept, programs should 
be developed by the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Department of 
Border Guards, and by the Service for Information and Security. The planning 
will be carried out under the guidance of the Government and the final paper 
will be approved by the Parliament as a state program of activity.
2.3. SSR in Key Areas of Civil-Military and Inter-agency 
Co-operation
Over the years of Moldova existence as an independent country a legal di-
vision of authority between the state institutions responsible for national secu-
rity has been gradually established according the generally recognized demo-
cratic norms and principals. The parliament has done its job in approving the 
long-term principles and priorities of Moldova’s foreign and security policy, 
mainly through the adoption of the Military Doctrine and of the National 
Security Concept. The other major constitutional role of the legislature like 
controlling and correcting the national security policy and strategy and the 
budgeting process has been exercised with modest success. The regular activ-
ity of the standing parliamentary committees on defense and national security 
as well as on the foreign policy is not marked by big achievements from the 
strategic point of view. Anyway the regular hearings and discussions within 
the respective committees have contributed to the raise of degree of transpar-
ency to the decision-making process in this field of state responsibilities.
In terms of civil-military relations, the principle of democratic (civilian) 
control over the armed forces has been recognized as a rule of the democratic 
play and partly institutionalized. Over the years of independence, Moldovan 
society has gained some experience in democratizing the military. Some ef-
forts to raise public awareness concerning the national defense planning and 
military budget approval have been made. Within the society, there is already 
an understanding of the necessity to ensure the accountability of the military, 
security services and law enforcers to the elected public authorities. 
The lack of democratic traditions from one side and the creation of the na-
tional army from the scratch, on the basis of the officer corps and personnel 
inherited from the red army on the other side are still real challenges for the new 
independent state. However, the real test for the civilian control is still to come 
with the practical implementation of a delayed and painful restructuring and 
adjustment of the armed forces to the real threats and to the dynamic of coop-
eration with the emerging collective (cooperative) security system in Europe. In 
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these circumstances the military leadership made efforts to protect and preserve 
the military system, relying mostly on the old experience and being tempted to 
restore the former infrastructure and the ways of military organisation. These 
trends have been reinforced by the limited democratic experience of the military 
as well as by the lack of competence and expertise of new civilian governments.
 At the same time, the military doctrine of the country stipulates that differ-
ent institutions and  units of the National Army can be used to assist the frontier 
guard and the interior troops (“carabineries”) in the protection of the population 
against armed violence, in the localization and blockage of the potential conflict 
areas, in the prevention of armed clashes, the armed protection of important ob-
jects and civil units, in the liquidation of the consequences of natural disasters, 
damages and catastrophes, in accordance with the legislation.
In some cases the Armed Forces can be used in peace-time, in order to 
assure the military security of the state. In accordance with the National Se-
curity Concept approved by the Parliament, the main tasks of the military se-
curity include, along with the defense of the state against external aggression, 
the localization of armed conflicts and the neutralization of illegal military 
activity  in the immediate vicinity of the country’s borders, the support given 
to the state bodies and units during the implementation of the missions aimed 
at the re-establishment of national security. 
The Concept of Military Reform, approved by the Parliament in 2002, spec-
ifies the reasons for the use of the Armed Forces in the above mentioned situa-
tions. It stipulates that, during the crises, the Armed Forces can participate in 
accordance with the law, and in co-operation with other states, in the following 
actions: prevention of destabilizing actions, neutralization of terrorist elements 
and other illegal armed groupings, prevention of proliferation of conventional 
and mass-destruction arms, intervention in crises situations in order to protect 
citizens and basic infrastructures of the state. The armed forces may be used in 
cases of natural disasters, damages and catastrophes at the solicitation of the 
Government, in accordance with the existing laws.
The main restriction related to this chapter is stated in the Law on Armed 
Forces and gives the Parliament the special right to limit the use of armed 
forces in the situation that are not  related directly to state defense and protec-
tion. In cases of states of emergency, the decree of the President of the Republic 
of Moldova is required in such cases. There is still a certain misunderstanding 
concerning the similarity of the legal provisions that determine “exceptional 
situation” and the constitutional notion “state of emergency”.
A  frequently neglected aspect of democratic control over the armed forces 
in Moldova is the issue of whether the government is actually competent to 
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decide on and implement a security sector reform and direct the course of 
military reform. More exactly, it is a problem of the weak state that is not yet 
able to develop the body of civilian expertise in defense issues, which is needed 
to ensure balance and to provide competent and adequate advice. The rapid 
turnover of governments in Moldova like in the majority of the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries compounded this lack of expertise. When governments are 
reliant on the military for advice on defense issues, it is the armed forces, and 
not the government, which effectively decide policy. This state of affairs still 
persists in Moldova, despite the existence on paper and in law of what pretends 
otherwise be adequate mechanisms for democratic control. 
From one point of view, the institutional and low making issues such as 
the drafting and approval of new normative acts and re-definition of the lines 
of responsibility of the military and security structures have been success-
fully accomplished. Whilst new public power structures and institutions have 
emerged rather rapidly created by the decisions of the law makers, attitudinal 
change appears to be taking place over a longer time period than institutional 
or legal change. The effective operation of institutions and procedures in the 
field of the national security can be ensured altogether with an important at-
titudinal change, the acquisition of shared norms and values by civilians and 
military aware of the existing and verified norms of the countries with long 
democratic experience.  
 Moldova like many other Eastern European countries founds it excep-
tionally difficult to evaluate successful model of civil-military relations within 
the framework of the on going reformation of the national security system. 
Therefore the objective analysis of the current state of the democratization of 
the national army in general and of the civil-military relations in particular 
is so important for Moldova especially taking into consideration the need to 
ensure the cost-saving and efficient inter-agency co-operation. The willing-
ness of the political elite as well as of the governance to reintegrate the country 
into the Europe and to conclude  in the nearest future the process of transition 
toward the democracy of market economy create good precondition to reach 
this objective. 
2.4. SSR:  Current State and Action Plan
The security sector reform agenda put forward in the Concept of the Mili-
tary Reform describes concrete goals which the government and the respective 
ministries should strive to achieve. There is only the problem of the central 
agency of the state that will assume all the responsibility for the reform imple-
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mentation. According the Concept the president of the country and the presi-
dency as institution should play the essential role in the security sector reform 
involving in this process the government and its structures. The problem con-
sists in the lack of real and reliable mechanisms capable to allow to the head of 
state to put into practice the main ideas of the reform and to monitor the proc-
ess itself. The Supreme Security Council of the state is not instrumental and 
has not human or logistical resources to play an active role. More that that the 
SSR is not a high priority for the governing majority that is concentrated most-
ly on the stabilisation of the economic and social situation in the country.
The MoD can play the key role in this situation but there is a risk that 
this ministry will try to pursue its own corporate interests without paying 
too much attention to the interests and co-operation with other state power 
structures involved in the process of reform. In the favour of the special role 
the MoD should play is the fact that the military forces will be a key part of 
security sector reform. At the same time, without clear mechanisms for ac-
countability, armed forces potentially can constitute a threat to democratic 
governance and can consume a much more resources than other parts of the 
security sector. Another key priority of security sector reform is to ensure that 
military forces are oriented exclusively towards those tasks for which they are 
most appropriate. 
Effective police forces under the civilian control and management is an-
other essential element in establishing the conditions for community security, 
in enhancing the economic and social stability. The governing political ma-
jority try to take under full political control the police forces and to use them 
in the struggle against the radical opposition. At the same time the organise 
crime is interested to infiltrate the law enforcing agencies provoking the antag-
onistic relationship between the police and different sections of the citizenry. 
Building the capacity of police forces according the democratic is particularly 
important in the current situation. 
Judicial reform is not yet finished in Moldova and this element of demo-
cratic transition of the country is included in the list of priorities monitored 
by the Council of Europe. Judicial appointments are frequently politicised and 
influenced by the political power, trials can be subject to long delays, and cor-
ruption is a real problem. Effective and impartial judicial and penal systems 
can play a key role in reducing crime and in consolidation of justice and social 
stability. Building the capacity of judicial and penal systems,  encourage re-
form in this area should be real priorities of the SSR agenda.
It is evident that security sector reform involves fundamental issues of 
governance. The problems Moldova is still confronted with is a result mainly 
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of poor governance and the lack of capacity of the state to respond in adequate 
way to the new challenges as a hole and to the changing structure of risks and 
threats in particular. The steady improvement of the conceptual approach to 
the problem this sector has to address is not followed by the concrete  activi-
ties. The inertia of old approaches and the conservative tendencies remain very 
visible in decision-making process concerning the defence and security. There 
are several elements of the further reformation of the national security that 
can be considered essential for Moldova.
First, to strengthen the civilian oversight and management of the armed 
and security forces through raising the level of their professionalism and of 
degree of their accountability to civilian authorities. Without doubt larger ci-
vilian involvement in the security policy development and the civilian man-
agement is the key element of responsible governance in this sector. The com-
petence and the professionalism of the civilian expertise as well as efficient 
independent institutions can ensure civilian leadership for the security sector 
to function according to the democratic norms and principles. Low quality of 
the civilian expertise and control is one of the major obstacles in establishing 
a good governance in the security sector and to ensure the efficient civilian 
management. The reforms agenda in this area should  include: 
• strengthening civilian expertise in the Ministries of Defence of In-
ternal Affairs of Justice and special services through the formation of 
experts and specialists and the transfer of knowledge;
• raising the decision-making capacity and competence of the standing 
parliamentary committees that monitor defence, internal affairs, poli-
cing and secret services;
• developing the concrete model of the civil-military relations and of the 
democratic oversight of the military according the democratic norms 
and the concrete environment and situation existing in the country;   
• establishing independent research institutes (think-tanks) specialised 
in the problems of national security and defence that will work in di-
rect contact with the decision-making structures.
Second, to raise the level of transparency in security sector planning, man-
agement, and budgeting. The Military and especially the Security forces are 
often unwilling to share information with civilians, and there are limited pos-
sibilities to form specialists that will be in the future independent analyst in 
this area. A lack of transparency creates the dangerous trend toward the high 
politicisation and abusive use of the military and security services by the au-
thorities or by the political groupings that control the power. Such a situation 
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can undermine a country’s long-term economic and political stability as well 
as to put under question the democratic development of the country.
Theoretically such situations are regulated by the Moldovan legislature. 
The concrete categories of information about the security sector that are  con-
sidered confidential and are stipulated in the Law “On the State Secret”, but 
the rest can be made public without the risk of compromising state security. 
In practice there is still big inertia of the old times to make secret much more 
information and data than the legal norms allow to. The development of in-
creased transparency, in line with best practice of the countries with long term 
democratic traditions can contribute to the democratisation of the sector
Third, to involve more actively the institutions and organisations of civil 
society in monitoring the security sector and in developing the defence and 
national security policy, budget policy and resource allocation. The associa-
tive sector institutions and organisations in transitional societies like Moldova 
require more assistance from the state and from the international agencies to 
play more visible role and to carry out these activities. Efficient monitoring 
that involves the civil society organisations and media is able to raise the ef-
ficiency of civilian control over the security sector organisations. These steps 
can be introduces in the SSR agenda  in Moldova. Increased transparency in 
budgeting and improved auditing mechanisms can help to reduce the level of 
corruption and waste of resources in security sector programmes.
Fourth, to develop the international co-operation that promotes regional 
and sub-regional peace and security by actively involving countries into part-
nership, based on the European norms and principals in the security area. 
Both governmental and non-governmental sectors can play an active role in 
enhancing mutual security, so that local problems do not become regional. 
Such a co-operation can play the role of the knowledge transfer and contribute 
to the change of mentality of the involved in common projects Moldovan civil-
ians and military, is able to  reinforce balanced civil-military relations. 
Promoting regional confidence-building mechanisms within the frame-
work of existing security arrangements like Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe and NATO Partnership for Peace Program  can enhance mutual un-
derstanding between governments and reduce the risk of inter-state conflict. 
More attention should also be given to including civil society in regional dia-
logues. 
Fifth, to consider as a priority the conflict settlement and the post-conflict 
transformation including the reintegration of the eastern part of the country, 
currently controlled by the separatist regime. The settlement of the Transd-
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nestr conflict can considerably  enhance local and regional security by re-
moving the source of destabilisation and the surplus of armament, weapons 
and munitions that are not under the control of the Moldovan authorities. 
The normalisation of the situation in the Eastern part of Moldova can tackle 
cross-border proliferation of small arms. These efforts should be followed by 
concrete measures aimed at enhancing border controls as an integral part of 
security development programmes.
Respect for human rights and rule of law by the security sector organisa-
tions can be ensured by relevant training helping the police and other security 
forces to get the appropriate knowledge and the understanding of the code of 
conduct in the democratic society. Programmes of external assistance in this 
area aim to provide the behavioural changes can play a role of catalysts.  
2.5. Euro-Atlantic Enlargement and SSR in Moldova
Moldova, like the majority of the “New Eastern EU” and NATO neighbors 
are objectively interested in a stronger and more unified Europe that com-
plements NATO and does not compete with or undermine the alliance when 
addressing pressing security challenges. These transitional states will need 
to set security and foreign policies that will be more effectively harmonized 
with those of the EU, assuming that Brussels can develop a coherent and uni-
fied policy of its own. Of course, the military capabilities of all new Eastern 
neighbors remain limited and overstretched amid budgetary cutbacks and the 
growing primacy of social and economic priorities. 
Moldova like other new neighbors interested in European integration sup-
ports the Brussels efforts to enhance Europe’s capacity to speak with one voice 
on important policy issues, being aware of the risk that one voice may ulti-
mately become a formal compromise between 25 European capitals that could 
further undercut the EU’s policy in relations with them. Like many other CEE 
states Moldova still consider a connection with the United States to be one of 
the key security relationship in the post-Soviet world. Although the EU was 
once envisaged as primarily an economic alliance, it has since gained increased 
political importance and may play a bigger role in democratic stabilization of 
its immediate Eastern vicinity. 
But at least for now, the general feeling in the Chisinau, however, is that we 
must continue to cooperate responsively and carefully with Washington and 
Brussels.  Objectively Moldova is interested in strong U.S. influence in East-
ern Europe, as the support of this global superpower is of crucial importance 
for the process of conflict settlement in various unstable regions and “frozen 
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conflicts”. Coupled with appropriate economic and financial benefits, political 
and diplomatic support on issues that are a priorities for the new East Euro-
pean democracies, this policy may help guarantee more durable commitments 
to the transatlantic relationship on the part of Washington’s new allies.
In terms of EU and NATO enlargement and its implications for the Na-
tional Security Strategy, Moldova needs efficient international assistance to 
deal with its hard and soft security risks. These threats are actual, clear and 
present, and in some cases existential. They stem from troops entrenched in 
other countries, seizures of territory, border changes de facto, “peacekeeping” 
that cements the outcome of military interventions, and creation of proxy 
statelets with troops that have long since been upgraded from para-military 
guerrilla to conventional combat-ready military. 
Taking into consideration the recent geopolitical evolutions and the strate-
gy of NATO focused on counting the wider range of military and non military 
threats and risks s the new concept and framework for RM-NATO coopera-
tion in needed. A permanent framework for cooperation planning and review 
can work out recommendations and real assistance concerning the following 
security and defense aspects:
• Political, military and diplomatic joint actions aimed at the settlement 
of the TN conflict;
• Security Sector and Defense Reform;
• Cooperation planning and review activities;
• Comprehensive strategy  for further  RM integration with Euro-Atlan-
tic structures.
It is necessary to develop proposals to further tailor Individual Partner-
ship to tackle key thematic issues and individual Partners' needs and capa-
bilities, to promote defense reform which encourages military transformation 
and interoperability, and to enhance regional cooperation and mutual sup-
port. These new measures should allow for more focused and deeper practical 
cooperation. Partnership for Peace can be an increasingly effective instrument 
of cooperation in such areas as peace-support operations and the fight against 
organized crime, terrorism and territorial separatism. It is clear now that the 
PfP should be refocused in order to reflect its post-enlargement dimensions 
and the Alliance's capabilities to address the new threats. 
Thus, an evolving Euro-Atlantic strategy for this region should bridge the 
disjunction between security policy priorities and actual security threats. It 
needs to refocus attention toward the persistent “old-type” threats and reorder 
its priorities accordingly.
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International institutions should launch a broad-based effort to stabilize 
“the ‘Wider Europe’ by encompassing economic integration, preventive diplo-
macy and collective security. Active involvement of the region in international 
institutions and initiatives would be the best means to that end. The coordi-
nation of the efforts of regional and global institutions active in new Central 
Europe to prevent inefficient redundancies and contradictory policies is ur-
gently needed. To that end, collaborative mechanisms between the EU, NATO, 
the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the sub-regional co-operative ar-
rangements like GUAM combined with efficient assistance of the internation-
al financial institutions can be an efficient tool to stabilize entire region from 
the Baltic to the Caspian Sea. 
2.6. Conclusion
One of the main strategic goals of the Moldovan state consists in stabilisa-
tion of the situation and escaping from a downward spiral wherein insecu-
rity, corruption, criminalisation and underdevelopment are mutually comple-
menting and reinforcing. The complexity of this stabilisation agenda and of 
the long term and adequate strategy development means that the socio-eco-
nomic, governance and security dimensions of the reforms must be tackled 
simultaneously. Therefore the systematic consideration of what constitutes the 
main goals of the planned reforms is of paramount importance for the suc-
cess of this endeavour. Not of the less importance is the compatibility of the 
democratic rules and principals in SSR area with each country’s particular 
background and political and social environment. The central objective is to 
ensure good and competent governance and the efficient co-operation with 
the international partners that understand the nature of the transformations 
the transitional countries are undergoing. 
The interdependence of the SSR and other modernisation agendas like de-
mocratisation, separation of powers (checks and balances), democratic control 
of the armed forces and security services, rule of law, transparency, protection of 
human rights, an equitable and independent judiciary, the active participation 
of civil society institutions and organisations requires much broader approach 
in comparison with the existent one. The lack of generally applicable norms and 
criteria on SSR and its elements makes the problem even more difficult.
An internally weak state like Moldova, facing serious obstacles to over-
come the social and economic crisis, to conclude the democratization process 
in the nearest future is unlikely to provide a strong basis for the development of 
effective SSR. Formal ccommitments of the government to the internationally 
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 71
agreed SSR objectives have little chances to lead to the success in this complex 
area. It is much more difficult to involve the governing forces in the reform 
design and development without external pressure and without the active 
participation of the multilateral organizations. Incorporating security sector 
problems into political dialogue should give the reforms a high priority in its 
ongoing political co-operation with leading continental and Euro-Atlantic or-
ganisations. This can also provide a mechanism through which EU and NATO 
governments define which external support might be appropriate in the par-
ticular circumstances of individual country.
One of the main tasks in insuring the good governance in the aria of na-
tional security and defense consists in training the civilians and military in 
order to form the skills of joint efforts and allowing them to work successfully 
together in dealing with the respective problems especially at the strategic 
level. What is really important for good governance is that both civilians and 
military work closer and in the spirit of team on defense problems avoiding the 
counter productive rivalry. 
The external influence and the existence of outside “agency of change” 
could be a realistic solution for the countries with limited internal potential 
for democratic change. From that point of view the international cooperation 
of the country in transition with the international organizations and on the 
bilateral bases can contribute substantially to the advancement of reforms The 
external expertise turns to be a key element for these societies that are in the 
argent need for assistance and  help in gradual adjusting the existing security 
and defense systems to the democratic rules and requirements. 
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C h a p t e r  I I I .
INSECURITY CHALLENGES 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Dr Iulian Chifu
It is common to claim that Republic of Moldova is vulnerable and gen-
erally an ‘unsafe and instable place’, jeopardized by multifarious and strenu-
ous security risks. On the other hand, anybody who visits Chisinau, not men-
tioning smaller cities or the rural area, has the feeling of “stopped time”, or 
a space where nothing happens. What is the real dimension of security risks 
and which are the insecurity challenges in the Republic of Moldova today? We 
tried to present briefly the real situation of the security threats and to find out 
which might be the options of solving these problem in the nearest future and 
on medium term.
12 Fundamental security threats and risks of the society 
in the Republic of Moldova
The Republic of Moldova adopted the first National Security Strategy and 
that of Defence – documents that are still in force today – in 1995. The two 
documents are completely outdated and do not comply to exigencies of this 
kind of document. In a period of 10 years, when the countries changed several 
times their own strategies: USA 3 times, Romania revised it once in 4 years and 
the last time after September 11th, the Republic of Moldova still remained in 
an empty phraseology without being able to elaborate administrative plans 
and force directions in preparing the state for the biggest challenges of the 
century. Between neutrality and non-affiliation to military structures of CIS a 
lot of agreements were signed, in which the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Civil 
Protection Commandment (latest of the “Emmergency situations”), Ministry 
of Defense and the Ministry of National Security (later SIS), joined the same 
institutions from the ex-soviet space. Neither this tendency supplied the need 
of security of the Republic of Moldova.
Putting down today, even telegraphic ally, the amount of threats against 
national security of the contemporary Moldovan society is a difficult and 
broad activity. We believe that, even today, all necessary assessments to iden-
tify critic tendencies and parameters are not available, so that full approaches 
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would be done. The fact that the first shy steps are done today at the level of 
civil protection and the subject of critical infrastructure protection, was for 
the first time discussed at the meeting of partner countries representatives in 
Chisinau represents just a beginning in the direction of a coherent and funda-
mental document. Untill then, the only solution is to make use of other models 
by imitating them, a solution that is better in a way than the existent one. We 
don’t want to cover this subject but we have selected 12 extremely vital points 
for the security of the Republic of Moldova in an attempt to create the first 
breaches in the formalism and sufficiency of inherited bodies from the old 
society and that have a lot of reform generations behind in order to become 
satisfactory for Moldovan citizens. The approach to these essential directions 
today is considered a new activity, a benefic beginning. 
3.1. Transnistria 
Certainly that we cannot begin the approach to this subject without putting 
in focus the threats against national security related to Transnistria. The situ-
ation of separatism in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova repre-
sents a key-security challenge because of several reasons. First, the existence of 
Republic of Moldova is questioned as a state, which, since its independence, 
couldn’t control its entire territory, population, and the central administrative 
structures haven’t reached the separatist region. The risks related to this phe-
nomenon are the transformation of Moldova in a weak state or even a failed 
one, without the possibility to exercise its power and to manage its territory.
The first point in this subject is the one which refers to the presence in this 
region of some foreign military groups that don’t have a status, without hav-
ing the approbation of the government; there are also immense stores of weap-
ons, illegal corrupt structures, characterized by organized crime, paramili-
tary enforcement bodies, separatist units of militia, security service or other, 
as well as the bodies of former state plants collective groups – OSTK. This 
subject is on top of the security challenges list because the situation makes 
possible the majority of other risks to threaten Moldovan society. The perspec-
tive of conflict settlement, of the separatist situation and of the retreat of the 
Russian troops is still unclear, though this subject is very often found on the 
political agenda of the NATO member states, EU and former Soviet countries. 
Keeping this subject in focus may create substantial possibilities to reunite all 
resources and to make the decisive step in solving the situation. 
But maybe the most dangerous thing is that the existence of separatism is 
related to  – in the opinion of its own population, the European one or of dif-
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ferent experts – the absence of political will in Moldova to solve the conflict. 
The unanimous adoption of documents on this subject – as it happened after 
the Kozak memorandum and especially this summer, in Parliament plenum, 
with the law on principles for solving the Nistru conflict – it is an extremly im-
portant step. But it cannot replace the lack of credibility of the measure when 
the separatist leaders have properties, newspapers and profitable businesses 
on the right bank of Nistru, together with politicians from Chisinau, without 
respecting the state or paying their taxes. When separatist leaders find support 
and business partners to finance separatism. When the sums that circulate in 
the narrow space of Transnistria as incomes or benefits substancially exceed 
the efficiency of the institutions that respect the law and with which they com-
pete in Chisinau. And finally, when there exist agreements and commitments 
that keep the privileges and the possibility of the separatists or of the firms 
registered in Transnistria of any nationality, to falsify the rules adopted in 
Chisinau, for the profit of some politicians from the Parliament or Chisinau 
Government. 
This situation stops any possibility to draw the support of international 
communities to a final, just and longlasting  regulation of the separatist 
problem, as long as the lack of credibility exists – and, in consequence, lack 
of legitimacy – in concrete actions for developing the existent situation and to 
take back the state control over the separatist region.
3.2. Non-viable solutions of the Dniestr conflict, 
which weaken the state
We moved to the second position in the challenges of security and security 
risks, the adoption of a non-viable solution of the Nistru conflict which might 
weaken the Republic of Moldova. Our option is clear, because questioning the 
integrity of the state is one the of most important threats against the national 
security of any state.
Questioning the viability of the state can have 4 directions: keeping a for-
eign troop that doesn’t have a status/with undetermined mandate on the terri-
tory of the Republic of Moldova, especially when a multinational troop is not 
mentioned, but the troops of another country – especially if it was a former 
ruler, Russia, involved in the conflict – and judjed by the international com-
munity, see ECHR vs. Ilashku and others versus Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Moldova case. The second circumstance would be the implemen-
tation of a solution that imposes the control of the separatist region over the 
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security, defense and foreign affairs decisions of the Republic of Moldova. 
The “Kozak plan” was a similar formula that could block through the repre-
sentatives of the separatist region any option of the Republic of Moldova, in-
cluding the strategic ones, or joining EU or other settlement of security prob-
lems by joining NATO.
The third principle would subsidiarily suppose that accepting the immedi-
ate separation of the Nistru region from the Republic of Moldova and surviv-
ing in a separatist area, such as the enclave between Moldova and the Ukraine, 
with control over all economic agents and non-regulated relations in the re-
gion, trafficking and trans-border crime threat, the unpredictability and lack 
of stability in the region, and maintaining a centre of instability sine die. 
This step has 2 components, the eternal security threat through the trans-
fer of instability and crime, but may be more important, the questioning of the 
legality of a state that doesn’t want to monitor problems of one of its regions. 
There are no other countries like this in Europe. We place here risky models 
that will not lead to a just and long-term solution of the Nistru problem, but 
contrary to this, will make this problem appear constantly in the agenda. In 
this sense the previous experience led to a range of lessons learned by the in-
ternational community. Let’s examine these models: 
The “Kosovo Model”
Promoted more by Tiraspol and Moscow, a so-called ‘Kosovo model’ is 
met today in Romanian academical circles quite frequently – for instance see 
the plan launched in public by the Social-Democratic Institute “Ovidiu Sincai’, 
and personally supported by Prof. Adrian Severin – but also in open debates in 
the Republic of Moldova. Actually, the Kosovo case belongs to a state, restrict-
ed Yugoslavia, sanctioned by the International community (UN minus Russia, 
in case of the resolution regarding the intervention) because it caused a geno-
cide against a group of minorities, in a certain region of the country. The law 
was outside of the international legislation, and this was the reason why UN 
took over the administration of the region for a certain period of time, having 
to establish further a way of an administrative settlement. There was a mili-
tary intervention against an aggressor state and then the long-term interna-
tional administration was established. Then a long-term solution needed to 
be found, but it is not found yet.
Actually there is no such thing as Kosovo model. There are 7 different 
opinions and no defined solution, more than that, the Kosovo case is a failure. 
It started with no solution, hoping that later the best centre-periphery relations 
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will be found. The responsability of the international community requires that 
several forces be immobilized in this region for almost 6 years, a settlement 
solution not been found yet. It is even worse than in the Crimea case – when 
there was also no final plan from the very beginning and the arrangements 
were not the best ones; Kiev is not pleased with the solution, but it was still 
accepted – and even worse than Iraq case from the point of view of prospec-
tives – in the case of Iraq, a parliament and a government is voted, a consti-
tution and a federal arrangement between the three communities (kurdish, 
sunit, shiit) was agreed upon, and after the validation referendum, it will be 
possible to move to another constitutional election in order to establish legal 
bodies that will be able to administer the state.
The Transnistria case is ostensibly different from the Kosovo case, because 
the state is the one who respects the international legislation and rules, but the 
separatist region is outlawed, with banned leaders in EU and USA, because of 
facts of supposting international crime. In Transnistria, there is no dominant 
ethnic minority, other than that of the state there are more Russian and Ukrai-
nean ethnic representatives in the capital of the Republic of Moldova, Munici-
pality of Chisinau, than on the whole right bank of the river than in Transnis-
tria – and the international community imposed no forced sanctions upon the 
behaviour of the state, it was only a a conflict between separatists – supported 
by a foreign country – and the legal state that is internationally recognized. So 
there is no Kosovo solution, and by no means the future relation between the 
centre and the regional leadership can be applied in Transnistria.
The “Cyprus Model” 
It is the second idiosyncrasy of the reaserchers in relation to a possible so-
lution in the Nistru crises. Actually, there is no ‘Cyprus model’, too, as long as 
the Cypriot crisis is not solved ! Moreover, the exception made by the EU led 
to a strange situation when the solution negotiated by local political authorities 
and heavily supported by the UN and EU was rejected by Greece, the country 
that is almost a part of EU, while the Turkish region voted for the reunifying 
solution! The Cyprus case is a failure; too, that is why this model cannot be 
applied today, in a EU with much more problems and more « orthodox » in 
respecting rules by future candidates.
There is no reason to talk about comparative situation in the Greek regions 
of Cyprus and of the right bank of the river in the Republic of Moldova. The 
difference is enormous, and the joining conditions of Cyprus are very different 
from those of Moldova today. More over, if Turkey has important prospec-
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 77
tive to enter EU – it was about to do that, but the war in Cyprus stopped the 
process, and today the beginning of negotiations is expected – in the case of 
Russia, the one that has the role of supporter of the separatist region, and there 
is no prospective of that kind in the predictable future! The model cannot be 
applied in its initial form, just for the reason that there are no credible means 
of pressure and persuasion of the separatist party to accept the reintegration 
plan, like the case of Turkey with EU. Actually, the only acceptable solution 
would be the direct support through expertise, reform and administrative ca-
pacity of the state power and of the legal state of the Republic of Moldova and 
to retake the control over the separatist party, respecting the qualified and well 
expressed will of the population from the Eastern bank of Nistru to have a lo-
cal administration or an autonomous region, in broader or narrower limits. 
3.3. Energy security
In order not to devote too much space to the economic security in all 
its components, I have chosen the most essential element for the Republic of 
Moldova – the energy security. The Republic of Moldova is completely de-
pendent – especially the import of oil and gas – on the supply of goods from 
Russian Federation. Apart from known Moscow pressures on the policy of 
ex-soviet states through energy mechanisms, Republic of Moldova continues 
to have a reduced payment capacity for the consumed gas or oil. Although 
through excising these imports should become important sources of income 
to the state budget, the lack of payment ability of small consumers, but also of 
industrial consumers, doubled by the tax dodging and smuggling at a large 
scale of these products, all these lead to an extremely delicate situation. 
The fact that Moldova is forced to pay the «world» price as Russian Federa-
tion requests, leads to big problems of supply especially because the lack of an 
alternative source, the fact that permits the existence of any kind of prices, no 
matter how prohibitive they might be. In fact, the Republic of Moldova pays to-
day the same prices as the rest of European countries do – with the exception of 
the special supplies. In relation to electric power, the biggest productive capacity 
remains the Kuciurgan thermo-power plant, situated on the left bank of Nistru 
and under the control of separatists. This situation can be compensated only by 
imports from Ukraine or Romania, but in the first case the resources are lim-
ited – with the exception of those that come from far-away and the cost of which 
is raised because of the shipment – and the second one has European prices. 
If until recently Chsinau was threatened by the prospective of remaining 
without resources of gas or electricity, because of blocked supplying lines that 
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cross separatist Transnistria, today the Republic of Moldova is a little bit re-
lieved, after the commitment taken by Bucharest, by president Traian Basescu 
personally, that he will not allow Chisinau to be blackmailed because of energy. 
This does not mean that any kind of energy consumption must not be paid, and 
the Republic of Moldova still has an unpaid debt for more than 5 years.
A solution must be identified on medium or long term. In case of oil, the 
things become clearer after Azpetrol took control of the Giurgiulesti terminal. 
A solution for gas supply will not be elaborated soon, on short term, but there 
is a possibility of a gas pipeline that will make a detour of Russia, with Kaza-
khstan or Turkmenistan being the starting points, then going and supplying 
gas to Ukraine and then continuing through Central Europe: this could be an 
alternative. The possibility of an Egyptian gas pipeline that will reach Turkey 
is still worked on; the project is going to be put into practice after long years.
In the matter of electric power, the Republic of Moldova has an immediate 
solution – the investments in the third group of the atomic-electric power sta-
tion from Cernavoda. Once, Chisinau was invited to take part in investments 
in the second group, a form of foreign loan was even established to perform 
the payment, but Andrei Sangheli, the agrarian Prime-minister of the Repub-
lic of Moldova at that time, rejected the offer. The second group is going to be 
put into operation very soon now, so that would have been a solution already. 
At least the investment in the third group should be done, that is somewhat 
reduced as the one needed for a chain of micro hydro-electric power stations, 
the cost/profit efficiency of which is lower.
No matter what the solution is, a medium-term solution is very necessary, 
in the circumstances of constant shortages on the Moldovan market. And 
not last, the big investors in the energy filed will not be able to approach the 
Republic of Moldova as long as there exists unfaithful competition of the tax 
dodgers and smugglers that are tolerated by the authorities work, or the state’s 
interventionalism on a free market. 
3.4. Organized crime
The organized crime is the forth on the challenges list against the national 
security because it directly affects the population, and is extremely visible, 
especially when criminals settle their conflicts in public spaces. This subject 
becomes more important as it speaks about politicians, businessmen that work 
together with different types of criminals. It is important also to mention the 
white collar mafia that works with the so called legal thieves, the one who ob-
tain, hierarchically, the trusteeship over an area or another of the territory or 
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economy of the Republic of Moldova, requesting protection taxes from busi-
nessmen and controlling a certain part of the economy. The lack of a direct 
solution that will lead to an end of this type of activity – and not to an agree-
ment between the state and these mafia men – draws away both the foreign 
investors and the real resources of the state’s budget, with enormous costs for 
a correct functioning of the state.
3.5. Trafficking
Trafficking is another threat against the security of the Republic of Moldo-
va, because of its diversity, of its trans-border relevance and of the mainte-
nance of the separatist area as a source of trafficking products but also as a 
safety heaven for different criminals, involved in these operations. The most 
dangerous is human trafficking – with its components of body organ traf-
ficking for illegal transplant, trafficking of children for illegal adoptions, 
trafficking in women for prostitution and, of illegal labor force trafficking; 
drugs trafficking, trafficking in radioactive substances (in possible com-
ponents for an atomic or dirty bombs), small arms trafficking (produced in 
Transnistria, without serial numbers or identifying elements and launched in 
war zones or that are under embargo), but also the trafficking/smuggling of 
products – especially those excisable (tobacco, alcohol, perfumes), or imita-
tions brought from the countries that do not respect the rules of intellectual 
property protection – China, Singapore, Taiwan, etc. – which directly affect 
the national economy, especially the competition with the original goods, in 
the Republic of Moldova or on the markets where these products may arrive, 
especially in EU. Letting this problem without a solution may strain the rela-
tions with EU countries and with multinational firms producers of registered 
brands, and the effect may be much important than of other threats that are 
more visible and with greater impact over the population. 
3.6. Emerging oligarchies
A very important problem in the ex-soviet area is the emergence of oli-
garchs that have multibillion fortunes, who can afford buying political deci-
sions and influencing them. The Republic of Moldova is not an oil country, 
and does not possess resources that would permit it to get rich in a fast and 
uncontrolled way, in the absence of some market regulations. But there have 
emerged some rich individuals that showed their influence in this field lately. It 
is for example Boris Birstein or Igor Smirnov, or other rising oligarchs, as well 
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as the accumulation of enormous fortunes and the tendency to control politics 
field through immense and uncontrolled funds or mixing political positions 
with economic interest can lead to big problems in the balance and democratic 
control of the country. This problem also requires adoption of some rules that 
imply loyal competition, equal access to chances and opportunities. Also 
there is a need for anticorruption legislation based on defining the conflict 
of interests and the control of the fortunes of the public officials, the declara-
tion of interests by public officials and withdrawal from their businesses or to 
refrain from taking decisions that are in conflict with the state’s interest.
3.7. Lack of administrative ability and of fundamental 
elements of the rule of law
This is one of the most important chapters marking the risks against na-
tional security. It consists of aspects related to crime, lack of market regulation 
and the emergence of oligarchs through unfaithful competition and the inca-
pacity to apply the legislation – the administrative incapacity to support the 
rule of law. Also mentioned here are large-scale violation of law, corruption, 
tax dodging, illegal work or violation of legislation by economic agents – natu-
ral and legal persons, but also the state – and the lack of the capacity to apply 
the existent law or the impossibility to apply the legislation equally, no mat-
ter the judge or law! There is an entire legislative and administrative reform, 
starting from the one applied to public officials to that of the law at all levels, 
but also the elimination of good will in the activity of the legal bodies. The 
risk of neglecting these aspects is related to the prestige of the law and of le-
gal bodies, to the credibility of these institutions and cooperation given by 
citizens to those two institutions in the process of implementation of the legal 
documents or in the public administration of some domains. The lack of this 
contribution of the population makes the activity of the enforcement and legal 
institutions inefficient and abusive in the administrative fields; it produces 
non-participation of citizens in the decision-making and makes almost im-
possible to put the present regulations, law norms and legislation into use.
3.8. The emerging “Prut wall” between Moldova and Romania
I have included this one in the list of 12 risk and threats against the secu-
rity of the Republic of Moldova. It is generically called “the Prut wall” because 
of the costs of the second phase of the Shoengen agreement by Romania, in the 
nearest future. In the absence of radical and direct solutions, the Republic of 
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Moldova may face a real wall built near Prut, before Romania joins the Euro-
pean Union. It is necessary that Republic of Moldova establishes itself the goal 
of obtaining free movement of its citizen in the EU countries. The elimina-
tion of visas (even the one with Romania that will soon be introduced), has 
several steps to pass, and Romania has a favourable experience in this domain, 
because it succeeded to remove visas on January 1, 2002, 5 years before joining 
the EU! In order to accomplish this, the Republic of Moldova, must get rid of 
European Council monitoring by adopting necessary provisions according to 
the recommendation from 2002 in the first place. At the same time, it must 
start debates with the EU on the subject of signing rejoining treaties with 
member and associated states, the implementation of a proper law and the 
issue of secured identity documents, and the strict monitoring of population, 
for further implementation of necessary legislation and to put into practice 
the provisions of an efficient control of its borders, especially the Eastern ones. 
The removal of visas or the rejection to introduce them – for the population of 
European and associated states is a new step that will be well received by the 
European citizens. And a deep European solution for products and people 
control, on the right bank of Nistru, can only strengthen the image that there 
exist political decisions to settle the conflict and for the elimination of crime 
import from Transnistria in the rest of Moldovan territories.
3.9. Failure of reforms – loosing hope
I had identified among major risks against the security of the Republic of 
Moldova the failure/delay of democratic reforms and of market economy. It is 
obvious that this kind of phenomenon will lead to the sine die failure/delay of 
setting closer to the EU. A very special mention comes after the identification of 
the main threat against the security of the Republic of Moldova – Nistru sepa-
ratism and the presence of foreign troops on this territory. This reality doesn’t 
have to be a reason to delay reforms, but contrary to this, the changes on the 
right side of Nistru can make the right bank look more attractive for the popu-
lation from the separatist region. More than that, the failure to solve the Nistru 
problem will never be regarded by the international community as an excuse to 
slow/block the reforms. A second component is the loss of trust and public sup-
port. Today, there is a major people’s support for the joining EU. Not using this 
ace in time can lead to the loss of trust, the loss of people’s hope and reversibility 
of the integration direction towards the Western world and democratic values, 
but the extremist and antidemocratic groups can gain advantage.
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3.10. Reforms, consolidation of the independent statehood, 
democratization and civilian control over the security 
sector actors 
It is almost impossible to expect the emergence of a democratical environ-
ment, rule of law and effective market economy in Moldova unless the security 
environment (domestic and foreign) will be shaped up to reflect these values 
and priorities as well. The main obstacle at this point is to give a clear sense of 
strategic priorities in reforming the so-called “force structures” of the state. It 
is all about a range of successive phenomena that are related to:
– army reform – determining special domains in order to develop com-
plementary abilities of strategic partners, international cooperation 
in operation areas under diverse aegis, profesionalization and appro-
priate equipment supply in order to be able to respond to the security 
challenges on its territory;
– police reform – the transformation out of a repressive body into one 
that serves population, police demilitarization, to make it serve com-
munity indeed, as a public service, etc.;
– information services reform – to transform it from a repressive secu-
rity body, a body of judicial inquiry and prosecuting, into one that will 
deliver classified information to people who have access to it, it is im-
portant to make it a non-political body, with no double-subordination, 
to establish a strict control over the employees in order to accomplish 
a real national informational service, etc.
Democratization and civil control over these institutions, a real parlia-
mentary control and judicial control over the actions that can lead to reaching 
human rights. It is no use to insist on these priorities. The lack of a national in-
dependent informational service creates dependency on other states, the lack 
of civil control leads to the possibility of independent and oppressive actions 
against citizens or the possibility to assume control over political and eco-
nomic life, or a discretionary use by the police, people or groups of interest, of 
information exodus to unauthorized people. 
3.11. Reconciliation with the past
An important subject for the reestablishment of real, trustful and re-
spectful relations between the repressive in the past enforcement bodies and 
the contemporary democratic society, the citizens once oppressed. It is the 
need to forget the past, to offer access to the archives and personal files of 
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politically chased people and to sentence those who worked in the political 
police and who destroyed a lot of human lives. The reconciliation with the past 
is difficult, but the 16 years that passed since we accieved sovereignty and 14 
since we gained independence may allow this step, too. By solving cases of po-
litical police and eliminating from the new information service of those who 
had performed illegal activity, it is absolutely important in order to restart the 
construction of a trustful basis between society, citizens and informational 
systems. This kind of moral reform will bring a lot of benefit to informa-
tion services that can start the institutional reconstruction on new bases. The 
experience of ex-socialist countries from Eastern and Central Europe – to-
day members of EU and NATO – show that the process ended without public 
executions or excessive transparency by revealing state secrets, but contrib-
uted to a re-launch of new information services that are credible for Western 
partners. The lack of fears regarding illegal interception of telephone, internet 
and fax information, illegal surveillance with political goals, can determine a 
raise of consumption in the field of telecommunication and of the trust in the 
security of these types of communications, and the increase of the trust in the 
respect of human rights by the state.
3.12. Social security: identity problem
Social security is a security element, defined this way by the Copenhagen 
school, the one which redefined the concept of security in the case of NATO. 
This component must also be settled by renouncing to/passing from the Wil-
son type of identity (associated to the century old political realism, that pre-
supposes the impossibility of legitimacy of a state without identifying a single 
entitled nation, that will justify the existence of the state) to the identity of 
modern type, respectively, to take oneself a real identity, the Romanian one, of 
the majority of Moldovan population and the elimination of frustration and 
complexes that led to the so called “Moldovan soviet type” pseudo-identity. 
That, as stated many times before, affects both the relations with Romania, 
and those with the Ukraine, both its neighbours.
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C h a p t e r  I V.
POLICE REFORM AND HUMAN SECURITY 
IN MOLODVA
Romanita Berghia,
Independent Expert
Introduction
Policing and the police are at the outset of the criminal justice system. Polic-
ing activities range from the routine provision of administrative services to citi-
zenry, through systematic or ad hoc patrolling of certain areas, to criminal in-
vestigation, recovery of stolen property and bringing to justice of suspects. It also 
includes certain functions of punishment such as arrest, detention for limited 
periods of time, and the administration of fines. Obviously, in different criminal 
justice systems the police have different functions. Yet, in most of the systems 
policing is a mix of preventive, administrative and repressive functions.
In most of the systems the police are the first criminal justice agency which 
citizens get into contact with and, in turn, form opinions about the whole justice 
system. To many the police are the primary reference and symbol of state power. 
It is a subsystem of justice under continuous scrutiny by the citizenry and the 
object of frequent political debate regarding powers of control, issues of privacy 
and issues of crime prevention and control priorities. Often the real or perceived 
failures on the part of the police to meet the real or perceived as important needs 
and interests of the community or social interest groups lead to the development 
of alternative policing styles. Policing is indeed the most targeted process in the 
continuous evaluative process of the justice system.
It is no surprise, then, that of all the subsystems of justice, it was polic-
ing that aroused major interest in, and a need to show that things are indeed 
changing in the post-communist countries following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. A number of reforms were and are still directed towards police. Most 
probably the major share of international assistance and donors efforts in the 
justice sector went into the policing area. This paper provides an overview 
of the challenges of reforming the structures and processes of policing in the 
context of the democratic transition in Moldova. It begins with a discussion 
of the concept of democratic policing as the perceived goal of police reform 
in a state under democratization, and then outlines the general parameters of 
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police reform in Moldova, including some of the main obstacles and problems 
that have been encountered. Finally, it outlines some directions for future re-
search on crime control and police reform in the country.
4.1. Democratic policing
Democratic policing is characterized by an orientation to service for civil 
society, rather than the state; transparency and accountability; integrity man-
agement as a central function of police administration; a semi-autonomous 
status of the police organization and system; the treatment of police as citi-
zens; and the possession of skills needed to perform allocated tasks efficiently 
and effectively, as indicated by the degree of professionalism at all ranks of the 
organization and across specific functional tasks (e.g., managerial skills at the 
higher ranks, technical skills in investigations, or people skills by street level 
police in encounters with citizens).
Striving to achieve these values is seen as essential for work performance of 
the police which can be labeled democratic.   The most difficulty transitions, giv-
en the legacy of socialist policing policies, cultures and values, include integrity 
management, that is operational policies which actively and persistently enforce 
stated normative standards to prevent corruption and abuses of power; semi-au-
tonomy which refers to the need and capacity by the police to balance responsive-
ness to state and civic society demands with the requirement that the police to 
enforce the law impartially, professionally and without bias; internal democracy 
within the police organization; and accountability by the police to relevant state 
legislative, executive and judicial organizations and to civic society.
If effectively implemented, core values will lead to enhanced performance 
which ensures the personal safety of the population and public order balanced 
against the demands that policing be attuned to professional, integrity and 
service oriented priorities. Accountable police are transparent in their pro-
cedures and operations and are subject to both internal and external control 
mechanisms that ensure the police are performing their functions in a way 
that respects rule of law and the human and civil rights of the people they 
serve. Police who enjoy public legitimacy are viewed both by state actors and 
the public as representing significant and legitimate interests in society, hence 
as acting fundamentally in the public interest and effectively fulfilling their 
duties in a trustworthy and just manner. 
The key to the concept of legitimacy is consent. Liberal democracies up-
hold the value of consent of the governed, which bestows legitimacy and the 
moral right of government to govern, a function which includes the provision 
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of basic public services such as security and order. The need for consent is es-
pecially true of police, who exert much potential power, both intrusive and co-
ercive, over citizens. Public consent and legitimacy of policing in democracies 
are based on the general belief that police adhere to the law and due process, 
are subject to control, are accountable and transparent, are politically neutral, 
and seek to protect human and civil rights. 
4.2. Challenge of police reform in Moldova
The structure and functioning of socialist police continue to influence the 
development of post-socialist Moldovan police and criminal justice systems. 
Policing in Moldova was based on the model developed and applied in the 
entire Soviet Union. The Marxist-Leninist state was ideologically framed as 
a socialist state of the people and also their political organization. Since the 
function of the state was to facilitate the transition to an ideal Communist 
society where all means of production would be communally owned, it justi-
fied exercising control and coercion to that end. As a result, criminal law was 
intended to protect both citizens and the socialist state from criminal acts, and 
‘to help propel the system toward Communism’. Police were a key instrument 
in protecting both the state and citizens, and fostering development of socialist 
consciousness by enforcing conformity with state ideology.
While the Soviet-style militia gradually evolved from a militarized body 
that suppressed political opposition to a law enforcement body responsible for 
ensuring public order (and relying on the complicity of citizens in their own 
control), it remained an authoritarian police force closely tied to the party-state. 
Common to all socialist systems, the mission of the police (militia) was essen-
tially political – i.e. to further progress towards communism under the leader-
ship of the communist party. The authority of the police derived from policies 
determined by the party central committee and police were in practice subor-
dinate to the party and expected to execute the will of the party. Party influence 
was omnipresent, with political indoctrination of recruits (recruitment was of-
ten influenced by the degree of ideological commitment of the applicant), and 
most police were party members. Socialist-era police were also highly central-
ized, with high degrees of supervision over daily activities and decisions, and 
had a militarized administrative style based on the strict obedience of orders.
Centralized control also prevented the development of administrative au-
tonomy of local police. Given the tightly constrained decision-making power 
of individual policemen who normally had to seek approval from higher-ups 
on most decisions, the development of individual powers of judgment and dis-
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cretion among individual police officers was inhibited. Socialist-era police also 
lacked transparency, and the existence of classified laws and regulations that 
reached into areas of daily life meant that the state’s authority as exercised by the 
police was both overarching and unknown to citizens. Furthermore, the Party 
functioned above the law, with a prohibition against investigating and prosecut-
ing Party members unless authorized by the Party itself.  Manipulation of the 
legal process was thus enabled by the blurring of political, judicial and law en-
forcement powers and close links between Party, prosecutor’s office and police.
While Western European democracies underwent a process of liberaliza-
tion in their criminal justice and penal policies after World War II, which in-
cluded abolition of the death penalty and the development of alternatives to 
imprisonment, the criminal justice systems of Communist countries did not 
experience the same type or degree of liberalisation. Compared to Western 
European states, official crime rates were very low. Since state socialist ideol-
ogy stated that crime was by definition a capitalist phenomenon that was sup-
posed to disappear with the achievement of communism, a lower crime rate 
confirmed the superiority of the communist system over the capitalist system. 
As a result, officials tended to actively discourage the reporting of crime, with 
the result that crime rates were artificially low levels and are considered un-
reliable by analysts. At the same time, socialist criminal policy was harsh in 
comparison to that in Western Europe, and rates of incarceration were high 
through convictions in criminal cases and by the use of psychiatric evalua-
tions for unsocialist thoughts and acts. 
For example, whereas Western Europe relied heavily on fines in terms of 
penal sanctions (often comprising over 80 percent of penal sanctions in many 
European countries), Moldova relied predominantly on the punishment of im-
prisonment. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova faced the task of 
building a criminal justice system that was more democratic and transparent. 
Crimes had to be redefined, depoliticised, and penalties diversified and made 
less harsh. Criminal justice system transformation included removing refer-
ences to socialist rule of law, introducing due process guarantees, eliminating 
the categories of ideological crimes and crimes by analogy, abolishing the death 
penalty and introducing softer sentencing as well as reducing the reliance on 
imprisonment by introducing alternative forms of penalties and non-custodial 
sanctions such as fines, while also improving living conditions in prisons.
The post-1991 social context was one of growing levels of poverty, unem-
ployment and extremes of social differentiation, while privatization of state 
assets and market reforms were transforming the economy. Policing was of-
ten severely under-resourced, and understaffing due to the departure of many 
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personnel from police structures (for better paying private employ in private 
security firms or as muscle for organized crime), low levels of public trust and 
prestige accorded the police, and serious morale problems left the police struc-
tures weakened and less able to fulfill their functions in an ever more chal-
lenging environment. Moldova, like all post-socialist societies experienced an 
explosion of regular and transnational organized crime involved in smuggling 
drugs, people, arms, or conventional contraband such as cars, and in some 
areas, the criminalisation of the economy through growth of the shadow econ-
omy and links between organised crime and corrupt state officials.
The impact of crime rise on citizen attitudes has been significant. 
Moldovan citizens have demonstrated high levels of fear of crime and feel-
ings of insecurity. At the same time, they generally continue to perceive the 
police as corrupt or as serving the interests of the state or private interests 
rather than those of the community. The widespread fear of crime is not only 
a result of the actual increase in crime rates, but also in part a function of the 
liberalisation of the media in Moldova and their transformation from ‘good 
news media’ which censored domestically troubling news items, to ‘bad news 
media’ operating on the assumption that crime and exposés of corruption and 
ineffectiveness of state officials, including the police and criminal justice sys-
tem, sells more papers. Another major difference between Western Europe 
countries and Moldova is in attitudes towards the police. Victims of crime in 
Moldova remain less likely to report the crimes to police. Reluctance to report 
crimes in Moldova may also result from fear of revenge by the organized gangs 
responsible for certain types of crimes. 
The growth in public fear of crime in Moldova has significance for politics 
and policy. In contexts where public fear of crime reaches high levels, public, 
media and political parties can create pressure for punitive crime control poli-
cies as ‘law and order politics’ comes to dominate the political agenda, leading 
to calls from certain political parties, media and members of the public for 
more punitive crime control policies. In Moldova the emergence of state-or-
ganized crime syndicates engaged in smuggling of all kinds of goods and peo-
ple, a traffic protected by violence and fear, undermined much of the impetus 
for reform and increased public demands to crack down on crime.
Thus, the Moldovan society encountered significant challenges in trans-
forming its policing structures. The country faces the legacy of a decades-long 
experience as a state socialist regime which used the Soviet model of policing 
based on police that remained subject to Party control. Moreover, Moldova ex-
perienced sharp increases in crime and pervasive public fear of crime and the 
perception that police were unable to adequately assure their personal safety 
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and protect their property.  These factors also contributed to the widespread 
emergence of private police and security firms, a theme to which I will return 
later in the paper.
4.3. Experiences in Moldovan police reform
Fundamental and sustained reform of the regular policing system has 
proven one of the more difficult tasks faced by Moldova. While many changes 
have been made in police organisation in terms of the declaratory statements 
of policing officials, legal frameworks and symbolic and structural reforms 
implemented (such as changing the name of the organisation from militia to 
police, changing uniforms and rank structures), they have often proven su-
perficial and do not yet appear to have succeeded in fundamentally changing 
the working values, habits and practices of the police to the point where they 
could be said to fully embody democratic policing. The police cannot yet be 
said to adopt a service mentality and the relationship between citizens and po-
lice must still undergo fundamental change before it can be said that police are 
accountable and enjoy public consent and legitimacy. Chronic under funding 
and lack of effectiveness in combating crime contribute to the lack of public 
trust and confidence in police organisations throughout the region. 
Moldova has been active in reforming police structures and legislation but 
continue to experience problems with police use of excessive force and mis-
treatment of detainees and continuing police accountability problems. Police 
reform in Moldova not only confronts the legacy of state socialism, but also 
lingering aftermaths in terms of organized criminal networks, widespread 
trafficking and corruption. 
Achieving democratic policing throughout the country is vital for long-term 
reform efforts. 
Police organisation in Moldova continues to demonstrate authoritarian 
tendencies, and remains more militarised, centralised and politicised than is 
generally the case in Western societies. The problems of police transformation 
must be seen in the broader context of corruption and organised crime that 
pervade Moldova. In certain cases police continue to exhibit serious problems 
of abuse of power, corruption, mistreatment and even torture of detainees and 
prisoners. One legacy of the Soviet system is the highly centralised plans and 
a culture that discouraged initiative and the development of personal discre-
tion among officers. This has had a lingering effect on leadership and man-
agement in Moldova, including in the policing field. Moldova has a system of 
legal education that tends to be highly theoretical, without adequate teaching 
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of practical skills. The training of police managers in Moldova tends to heav-
ily emphasize learning the legal framework and theoretical issues, rather than 
practical and effective management techniques.
Moreover, centralised control and party oversight, led to a fear of discre-
tion at the lower ranks. Police working the street were reluctant to take any 
action not directly specified or sanctioned by their superiors, leading to vast 
inefficiencies and massive corruption as officers went in search of directions 
whenever an unusual situation occurred, rather than use their discretion to 
arrive at a situationally justified solution, or sought to solve the problem faced 
by intimidation and corrupt means. Of course, the willingness to make deci-
sions which are not precisely spelled out by law or organisational regulations is 
a  fundamental aspect of democratic policing. 
The transformation in policing involves a fundamental shift in how polic-
ing – and security more generally – is being governed. Not only is the authority 
to produce security being transferred to groups within states, but this author-
ity is being handed upwards (supranationalisation) to international political 
actors such as the United Nations and European Union, but also to interna-
tional financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund, regional actors such as the OSCE and OECD, and foreign assistance 
agencies within states, who are increasingly becoming concerned with state 
spending on security and the relationship between economic and political de-
velopment and reform of the security sector. This transformation suggests the 
need for governance of policing and security at transnational levels. 
Multilateralisation of both the auspices and providers of policing is evident 
in Moldova. Public fear of crime escalated dramatically while police lacked 
adequate resources and know-how to combat the surge in crime. Addition-
ally, policing capacity was undermined as many members of the regular police 
and state security agencies left the services for private sector employment with 
private security companies.  The police were perceived as unable to provide 
public security, and as a result those who could afford to turned increasingly 
to private security agencies. These agencies have become providers of many 
functions traditionally performed by the state, including law enforcement, but 
also administering justice, resolving disputes, protecting people and property, 
debt enforcement and intelligence-gathering.
In Moldova the emergence of a ‘shadow state’ and underground, largely 
criminalised, economy controlled by organised crime groupings led to a system 
of private and brutal enforcement and protection, or policing, of that economy, 
and spilled over into the legal economy as legitimate domestic and international 
firms were pressured into buying protection for their personnel and properties 
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against criminal acts from the very people most likely to do them. The state 
police could do little to protect companies against such extortion and demands 
for participation by organised crime in their legitimate activities.
The Moldovan transition from state socialism involving rapid privatization 
and economic liberalization from 1992-1996 also triggered important struc-
tural changes in the provision of law enforcement, security and justice. The 
transition created a broad array of new economic actors who required protec-
tion in an environment rife with extortion and criminal groups. However, such 
protection was not provided adequately by the state security and law enforce-
ment services, which experienced personnel loss and diminishing efficiency 
as the state deliberately sought to decrease the power of state security and law 
enforcement structures by decentralizing them and creating multiple agencies 
with overlapping areas of jurisdiction. As a general result of these reforms, state 
control over organized coercion and administration of justice became increas-
ingly fragmented. The vacuum in protection resulted in a surge in growth of 
private protection and enforcement agencies that drew on the personnel of state 
security structures and offered services based on special relationships with 
those state structures. What has become visible in Moldova is a ‘hybrid sector’ 
of private security firms that exist between the private sector and the state.
These profit-driven firms sell protection and contract enforcement services, 
drawing especially on their links with state security organs to not only provide 
protection, but to engage directly in the sphere of business transactions through 
informal negotiations with other enforcers in case of breach of contract or fail-
ure to service a debt. The chiefs of private protection companies openly admit 
what they call mutually beneficial cooperation with the state organs, meaning 
an exchange of operative information for money or equipment. The Moldovan 
state encouraged the formation of such firms through legislation that made it 
easy to set up such agencies, particularly if an individual had professional expe-
rience in state law enforcement or security organs. In such a way, creating space 
for the establishment of private security firms was a means of facilitating the 
reemployment of former security and police officers in the private sector.
Private security agencies in the country have close links to state police 
and security agencies, due in part to having absorbed large numbers of former 
secret service, police and army officials, and communist-era high officials. 
Furthermore, the police routinely direct victims of certain crimes to look for 
private protection and assistance or else, through inaction, tacitly encourage 
other victims to seek private means of redress. The situation in Moldova, with 
its diverse range of security auspices and providers, is suggestive of a weak 
state which has difficulty meeting the security needs of its citizens. Neverthe-
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less, some experts on the dynamics of weak and failing states maintain that 
international donors have over-relied on the state as the main authorizer and 
provider of security. Rather, they suggest that reforming the governance of 
security in weak and failing states requires drawing on local knowledge and 
creative mobilisation of a broad range of non-state actors and resources, both 
domestic and transnational. Creative partnerships in security governance, in-
cluding those between state and non-state actors, is being advanced as a po-
tential means of serving local public security needs while relieving pressure on 
state agencies and enabling them to emerge or regenerate.  
4.4. Conclusions
The effects of Soviet-type policing continue to be felt in Moldova, although 
it is expected that with the passage of time, post-socialist conditions will fade 
and a more distinct national system of policing will become evident. The ho-
mogenising effects of international norms and EU standards as well as the 
impact of international donor assistance must also be taken into account as 
factors shaping the future development of the Moldovan policing system. 
Despite the structural and procedural reforms implemented in the polic-
ing organisation across Moldova, the overall results are not yet satisfactory, 
especially when one takes into account the views of citizens and crime victims. 
The continuing low rate of public confidence and satisfaction in the police 
and reluctance to report crime, along with the generally elevated fear of crime 
and feelings of insecurity throughout the country, speak to an urgent need for 
improving police performance in crime prevention and control and chang-
ing the relationship between the police and local communities. The record 
of the past fifteen years indicates that the transformation from authoritarian 
to democratic policing is not something that can be quickly achieved, but is a 
long-term process requiring years of reform and investment. 
Finally, new forms of security provision have emerged throughout the 
country. Private security companies have become suppliers of services previ-
ously provided by the state.  The proliferation of private security companies 
and their ambiguous links with state police and security institutions require 
further study, with special attention to implications for security governance. 
As noted earlier, crime and fear of crime are powerful political issues which 
are easily exploited for partisan and personal gains. The temptation to use crime 
and the police as political symbols and issues is ever present. Only when that 
temptation is resisted by political leaders and community activists can reform 
of policing systems begin to move toward democratic norms and forms.
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C h a p t e r  V.
ECONOMIC SECURITY OF MOLDOVA: 
A LOOK INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
Valeriu Prohnitchi,
Economist
5.1. Economic security in the period of globalization
The economic security is a concept that has little acceptance between the 
adepts of economic neo-liberalism. This tendency serves as an ideological base 
for the economic policies implemented in many developed countries and for 
recommendations made to underdeveloped countries’ governments by the 
international financial institutions. The economic security is not included in 
this mainstream of contemporary economic thinking. The main cause resides 
in the fact that the monitoring and assurance of the economic security in-
volves prevention, interdiction and penalization actions from the government, 
which are oriented towards various “objects” that may undermine the security. 
Obviously, this necessity cannot be seen in a good light by those who recom-
mend the stepping down of the state from the game of market forces and the 
assumption by it of the role of arbiter in this game. 
These precisions are necessary for understanding the double difficulty 
faced by the “subject” that formulates the economic security strategies, espe-
cially in the case of countries which do not enjoy a big freedom in taking deci-
sions in relation to foreign players (other countries, regional and international 
organizations). On one hand, the subject must convince the public and foreign 
partners that we must think seriously about the matter of economic security. 
On the other hand, he must really think and ensure this security. 
There are very many definitions of economic security, because the concept 
itself is rather permissive, even ambiguous1. Economic security can be regard-
ed in relation to different categories of security objects: of the producers, con-
sumers, production factors’ owners, of the state2. In the context of this study 
we will define the economic security as the totality of necessary conditions for 
 Buzan, 2000.
2 Prohnitchi, 2002.
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the realization of a normal economic development of the country and for the 
recuperation of differences in development compared to the European coun-
tries, for the integration to which the Republic of Moldova has an orientation. 
The title of this study, which aims at having “a look in the 21st century”, 
does not intend to be a pathetic title. The 21st century will be characterized by 
a globalization of the economic activities at an even larger scale. The intensifi-
cation of the globalization of markets will bring about a series of benefits and 
expenditures, risks and advantages. The understanding of these consequences 
implies a fundamental rethinking of the economic security. The governments 
of Moldova, which will try to ensure a higher security for the society they gov-
ern, will face major dilemmas. On one hand, the more profound integration of 
the country in the global economic body will commit us to a broader opening. 
The state boundaries will not longer be economic boundaries, and the abilities 
of the government to influence the system by economic policies will progres-
sively decrease.
On the other hand, the whole humankind will begin to face new risks, for 
the defiance of which it is not yet prepared: 1) natural and ecological disas-
ters produced by the impact of the activity of hydrocarbons; 2) the depletion, 
and together with this, the markup of natural resources, especially of hydro-
carbons; 3) the increasingly unlinear and unpredictable evolving character 
of international markets, which threatens to degenerate in a global economic 
crisis, of the same level as that from 1929-1933; 4) the intensification of social 
protests and the appearance of some pressing, eventually terrorist, groupings, 
better organized than nowadays, and which will fight against globalization. 
Openly or indirectly, at a larger or smaller scale, Moldova will face new 
risks, too. These will impose the development of a strategy for ensuring eco-
nomic security, a strategy that does not exist in the present time. The given 
strategy must allow the attenuation of present economic vulnerabilities of 
Moldova, which today derive from: 1) major social and economic expenditures 
involved in illegal economic or even criminal activities, 2) the outdated struc-
ture of external commerce and the commercial dependencies determined by 
it, 3) economic and political pressures, which can be planned for the Republic 
of Moldova through foreign investments, but also the deficit of direct foreign 
investments, 4) badly assured energetic security and 5) quantitative and quali-
tative penury risk of human resources as a result of the demographic crisis and 
the emigration of the labour force. 
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5.2. Economy of illegal activities
Evasions
Evasions can be legal and illegal, the latter being analyzed in this study. 
In the Republic of Moldova the main types of evasions with major financial 
impact are the fiscal (non-payment of taxes) and custom (contraband, includ-
ing elements of fiscal and currency evasion) evasions. Their immediate impact 
is obvious: firstly, public budgets suffer loss, secondly, economic agents who 
want to activate legally are affected. If there are not taken measures for the 
counteraction of evasions, the economic logic will tell those who activate le-
gally to chose from: transferring more and more activities to the illegal sphere 
or leaving the market. The long-term impact on the economic security is also 
clear: the authority of the state is broken down as a supreme exponent of the 
economic policy and the financial resources that should be used for redistribu-
tion to poor and vulnerable social classes are reduced. As a result, the indices 
of poverty increase and efficiency of social protection policies decreases. 
The governments of Moldova should be prepared for the fact that in the 
future the temptations for making these evasions will grow. This fact is de-
termined by: 1) the implementation of informational technologies on a larger 
scale by the economic agents (particularly the application of e-commerce, 
especially difficult to be monitored by the custom, monetary and fiscal au-
thorities) and 2) the more profound integration of national economic agents 
in international production and commercial networks. For counteracting, the 
government needs to endow itself adequately from the point of view of infor-
mational technologies, to participate at the international agreements of fight-
ing evasions and crime and to contribute to the adequate monitoring of activi-
ties in off-shore regions on an international scale. 
Custom evasions
The information about economic infractions offered now to the public is 
dozed. Nonetheless, on the basis of the existent studies and of the information 
made public by the Center for Counteracting Economic Crimes and Corrup-
tion, it could be affirmed that the custom and fiscal evasions involving oil 
products are present in the category of those which have the most disastrous 
impact on public finance and fair competition. The authors of one study show 
that in 2002 the oil products illegally brought to the country made up 15-16% 
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of the actual total consumption.3 The oil merchandise contraband is closely as-
sociated with fiscal evasion. The sale of contraband oil products has impeded 
the accumulation of VAT and excise income of 120 million lei in the budget! 
According to the same assessment, 60% of the total imports are made through 
enterprises recorded in off-shore regions, a situation that leads to the loss of 
huge budgetary income. 
The custom evasions are possible due to the following main causes:
• The business culture that dominates the Moldovan society;
• The corruption of customs officials and the lack of transparency in the 
functioning of the customs system; the complexity of the legal frame-
work that regulates the customs procedures;
• The discretion which can be exerted by customs officials during the 
fulfillment of their responsibilities;
• The opacity of employment procedures, the lack of an efficient public 
control and the big monetary costs for being recruited as a customs 
official;
• The lack of operative information regarding the international prices 
for imported merchandise at the disposal of customs officials;
• The lack of an efficient frontier between the Republic of Moldova and 
Ukraine of the Trasnistrian segment and the “porosity” of the frontier 
of the rest of the perimeter between the two countries. 
Most of these cases are institutionally inflicted, and they must be ap-
proached from a neo-institutional perspective. The administrative and moni-
toring capacities of the customs system must be consolidated. Firstly, the 
informational integration of the national customs service in a single system 
and of the national system in other European systems is needed. In the next 
decade, together with the advance of affairs between Moldova and the EU, the 
problems of the customs system and of customs evasions will be among the 
most important ones, which Moldova will have to solve for the achievement of 
a more favorable image in the eyes of Europeans. As well, the solution of the 
Transnistrian problem in a manner that would allow Chisinau to establish an 
efficient control over its internationally recognized Eastern border will signifi-
cantly decrease the number of evasions. 
3 Roscovan and others.
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 97
Fiscal evasions
Fiscal evasions are increasingly difficult to assess, given their obscure na-
ture. Nevertheless, on the basis of some indirect evidence, qualitative meas-
urements and of some reports of Transparency International – Moldova, and 
of activity reports of the Main State Fiscal Inspectorate, we conclude that the 
fiscal evasions are often encountered as a phenomenon and imply an enor-
mous financial cost for the public budgets. According to the estimations made 
by specialists, in 2002 the frequency of fiscal evasions (practiced by 64% of the 
contributable legal persons), was higher than in 1994 (53%).4
An index of the spreading of fiscal evasion is that the number of economic 
agents who submit fiscal reports is considerably smaller than the one registered 
in Inter-administrative National Register of the Republic of Moldova (REN-
IM). This way, according to the records of RENIM, in 2004 there were almost 
122 thousand economic agents in Moldova.5 Among these, only one fifth was 
economically active, submitting fiscal reports.6 Some of those who were not 
submitting fiscal reports just did not activate, others activated, but only in 
the dark sector, and others were the so-called ghost-enterprises. Namely the 
economic agents from the last two categories are those who practice fiscal eva-
sions in rather big proportions.7 Nonetheless, fiscal evasions are practiced by 
those who submit fiscal reports, too. According to the made estimations, eva-
sions have increased from 632 million lei in 1999 to 1413 million lei in 2002.8 
There were taken some actions that reduced the number of ghost-enterprises, 
including the raise of the amount starting with which economic agents can 
register as VAT payers. 
Fiscal evasions are possible because of the following:
• Business culture and the lack of social responsibility of the entrepre-
neurs;
• Complexity and ambiguity of the fiscal legal framework;
4 Carasciuc and others.
5 “Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Moldova, 2004, NSL, February 2005, electronic version.
6 According to the declarations of the former minister of Economy of the Republic of Moldo-
va, Mr. Marian Lupu, made at the “Development of Business and of Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Moldova” International Conference (June 29th – 30th, 2004).
7 According to the declarations of State Inspectorate officials, at the end of 2002 only in 
Chisinau municipality activated over 500 ghost-enterprises (“PSFI seeks new ways of 
fighting ghost-enterprises” news, Infotag, December 3th, 2002).
8 Carasciuc and others.
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• Rather reduced capacities of fiscal administration of state authorities 
in this field;
• Disintegration of the system: along with the Main State Fiscal Inspec-
torate, the fiscal functions are fulfilled by customs bodies and by the 
Center for Counteracting Economic Crimes and Corruption. As well, 
the State Fiscal Inspectorate is subordinated to the Ministry of Finan-
ces, while the Customs Service is not. 
• Possibilities of easy corruption of fiscal officials who have very small 
salaries comparative to those paid in the private sector; the reports of 
the Accounting Court show that, after the fiscal inspectors and cus-
toms officials offered some unjustified facilities to economic agents, 
the public budgets loose income of hundreds of million lei9;
• The discretion of fiscal inspectors;
The opacity of employment procedures, the lack of an efficient public con-
trol and high costs for being recruited as a customs official. Fiscal evasions 
influence the economic security by the same means as the customs evasions, 
generating considerable budgetary loss and affecting the institution of fair 
competition. 
Corruption
The empirical data show that there exists a link between the level of eco-
nomic development of the country and the perceived level of corruption.10 A 
higher level of corruption is associated with a lower level of per capita income, 
which in its turn consolidates the vicious circle of corruption. Moldova is one 
of the most corrupted and poor states of Europe. Corruption is an institutional 
element that can undermine the economic system and this happens because it 
generates a whole set of macroeconomic and structural distortions, reduces 
the economic efficiency in using factors of production and highlights social 
inequalities.11
A high level of corruption is always associated with a bigger proportion of 
dark economy.12 To our opinion, in Moldova corruption is responsible of:
9 Decision no. 47 of June 4th, 2004 of the Accounting Court “Regarding the report of the 
Accounting Court on the administration and use of public financial resources in 2003” 
(MO no. 38-46/23 from August 3th, 2004).
0 Prohnitchi, 2003.
 Idem.
2 Piculescu.
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• The languor of direct foreign investments;
• The big part of dark economy;
• The inefficient allocation of public expenditures between sectors 
(priority is given to big, complex projects) and inside sectors (priority 
is given to capital investments instead of maintenance expenses) and 
even the dilapidation of public financial means;13
• The increase of costs for entering the market and of transactional costs;
• The organization of some inefficient public tenders, expensive for pu-
blic budgets;
• Providing some not qualitative public services.
All the national and international reports on corruption denote that in 
Moldova the public perceives this phenomenon as being widely spread. Its 
costs are very high, even if we take into consideration only the administrative 
corruption, which affects the economic agents. In 2002 the economic agents 
have paid unofficial taxes afferent to various procedures regulating businesses 
in the amount of 16 million dollars. (1% of the GDP) We must add the bribes 
paid by students to university teachers, by patients to doctors, by parents to 
school teachers, by drivers to road police, by defendants to judges and others. 
We assess that the value of the bribes paid annually reaches 5-6% of the GDP 
in the Republic of Moldova.
We will not give details about the factors that generate corruption, because 
we deal with a whole bundle of dependencies and interdependencies. Never-
theless, starting off from the classical definition given by Robert Klitgaard to 
corruption (corruption = monopoly + discretion – responsibility), we can state 
that corruption in Moldova is generated by the following:
• Concentration of administrative resources for the assurance of an al-
most exhaustive control on the behalf of the state over private econo-
mic agents;
• The big discretion practiced by those who elaborate, apply and interpret 
the regulations (laws, governmental decisions, other normative acts);
3 For example, see the Decision of the Accounting Court: no. 47 from June 4th, 2004 “Regard-
ing the report of the Accounting Court on the administration and use of public financial 
resources in 2003” (Monitorul Oficial no. 38-46/23 from August 3th, 2004), no. 53 from July 
23rd, 2004 “Regarding the results of the control of the efficiency of expenditures for the 
maintenance of the Ministry of Transport and Communications and of the formation and 
use of the road fund in 2003” (Monitorul Oficial no. 8/30 from October st, 2004), no. 58 
from July 30th, 2004 “Regarding the results of the control of the correctness and efficiency 
of expenditures for investments of capital allocated by the budget consolidated in 2003”.
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• Small responsibility of public officials over the civil society and the 
lack of social responsibility of corporations.
In future the phenomenon of corruption will receive more accentuated 
transnational elements. Its efficient counteraction will be possible only by more 
efficient participation or adherence of Moldova to international organizations 
and agreements that aim at eradicating this phenomenon (UN Convention 
against corruption, OECD Convention regarding the fight against corruption 
among the foreign officials involved in international commercial transactions, 
UN Convention regarding transnational organized criminality) and the ef-
ficient implementation of the National Strategy of Corruption Prevention and 
Counteraction. 
5.3. Foreign trade
The Republic of Moldova is a classical example of a small and open econ-
omy. It is a small economy because it cannot influence essentially the inter-
national prices of any products it transacts abroad. It is an open economy, be-
cause: 1) it does not restrict significantly the import and it is not in its interest 
to do that and 2) the export assures an essential part of the national income. 
The assurance of normal conditions for making exports and imports and of a 
favorable rapport of international terms of trade is vital for such economies.14 
The normal progress of export and import implies the reduction of all 
kinds of risks that can affect the international trade, home risks, as well as 
foreign risks. From the home perspective, the risks are decreasing together 
with the structural diversification of products of export and import. Nonethe-
less, countries may accept an increase of concentration of export on account 
of some products with a high added value, this way gaining income that com-
pensates the assumed risks. Countries may also accept a big concentration of 
import around some investment goods, because this will allow the assurance 
of a better economic growth in the future. From the foreign perspective, the 
economic and political risks are decreasing together with the geographical di-
versification of export and import.  
4 The rapport of international terms of trade is the relation between the index of prices of the 
exported products and that of imported products (for an exhaustive definition see Sava, 
999). Generally the countries are interested in a rapport as big as possible, this kind of 
amelioration meaning that the same quantity of export allows the purchase of a bigger 
quantity of import. 
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Product diversiﬁcation
Table 1 indicates the evolution of the structure of Moldova’s export in the 
period before and after the Russian financial crisis from 1998. The export is 
split into sections, but the author has calculated the index of concentration 
of export on the basis of Herfindahl index and a level split into groups of 
merchandise.15
Table 1. Structure of exports classified into sections and groups of merchandise, 
% if not indicated otherwise
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 01-06’
2005 
Export, total millions USD 874,1 631,8 463,4 471,5 565,5 643,8 789,9 985,2 507,4
Food products including 
drinks, tobacco
54,8 55,4 42,6 42,1 44,5 41,5 39,8 35,1 37,2
Textiles and articles of 
clothing 
6,7 9,8 13,9 17,7 18,4 16,7 16,4 17,3 18,0
Vegetal produce 8,6 11,3 14,7 14,0 13,9 16,5 11,6 12,2 12,1
Raw leather, dressed leather, 
furs
1,4 1,7 2,8 2,8 2,0 3,6 5,7 7,9 7,5
Animal and vegetal oils and 
fats 1,0 0,6 0,5 0,8 1,5 2,6 3,7 4,2 3,7
Machines and devices, 
electric equipments 5,2 6,5 5,9 5,1 5,4 3,9 3,8 4,0 4,6
Mineral products 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 1,1 1,8 2,6 3,1 1,6
Common metals and articles 
made of them
1,0 1,5 3,5 2,5 0,5 1,1 2,5 3,0 3,0
Various 21,0 12,8 15,7 14,5 12,6 12,3 14,0 13,3 12,3
Herﬁndahl concentration 
index
0,361 0,373 0,301 0,328 0,354 0,348 0,348 0,331 0,342
Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author
The primary analysis of these data communicates us that, compared to 
1997-1998, the degree of concentration of export has not varied significantly. 
More than that, even if it seems that the dependency of exports on the food and 
drink industry products has decreased, this happened not as a result of the in-
tensification of other exports, but because the exports of food and drinks have 
5 The Herfindahl index of concentration of export is calculated according to the following 
formula , where x
i
 – the export of the product, i, x – total export. The splitting has 
been made at the level of sections coded with 3 digits in the Classified List of Merchandise 
of the Republic of Moldova. Theoretically, the Herfindahl index has values between 0 and 
, higher values indicating a higher concentration of exports. 
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succumbed. Until now Moldova was not able to revert to the level of 1997, when 
it exported food and drinks with a value of 479 million USD. The interdictions 
imposed by Russia in 2005 on the import of vegetal and animal products from 
the Republic of Moldova will not allow the recovery of the difference compared 
to 1997 this year also. The given structure of exports bear very high risks, be-
cause major events that could affect the food industry (for example a draught 
that would destroy the local basis of raw material) could catastrophically reduce 
the export incomes, with severe financial and social consequences.
As to the imports, it could be stated that Moldova has reduced their prod-
uct concentration at a level higher than in 1997. (Table 2)
Table 2. Structure of imports classified into sections and groups 
of merchandise, % if not indicated otherwise
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 01-06’
2005 
Export, total millions USD 1171,3 1023,6 586,4 776,5 892,2 1038,0 1402,3 1768,5 1006,5
Fuels and mineral oils 34,6 31,2 38,8 32,4 26,6 22,3 20,5 21,0 20,2
Machines and devices, 
electric equipments
12,9 19,1 11,8 12,7 13,9 14,1 15,3 13,6 14,2
Chemical products 9,6 9,1 7,8 9,6 9,0 11,2 9,5 9,1 10,0
Textiles and articles of 
clothing
5,3 6,1 11,3 10,0 10,3 9,7 8,4 8,5 8,3
Common metals and 
articles made of them
4,4 4,0 4,3 4,1 4,2 4,7 5,0 6,3 6,4
Food products drinks, 
tobacco
7,5 5,5 3,1 9,2 8,8 7,0 6,6 6,0 5,9
Rubber, plastic materials 
and articles
3,1 3,2 3,4 3,1 3,8 4,8 4,9 5,7 5,9
Transport means and 
materials
3,0 4,6 2,1 2,0 2,4 4,9 5,4 5,4 5,4
Vegetal produce 3,2 1,6 1,9 3,3 4,2 4,2 5,9 4,2 4,2
Raw leather, dressed 
leather, furs
0,3 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,4 1,6 2,6 4,1 3,6
Wood pasta, paper, 
cardboard
4,1 4,5 3,7 3,6 3,9 4,3 4,0 3,6 3,6
Various 11,3 10,2 10,6 9,2 11,8 10,8 11,3 11,8 11,4
Herﬁndahl concentration 
index
0,372 0,361 0,408 0,355 0,305 0,272 0,265 0,263 0,254
Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author
Generally we can affirm that the present product structure of imports 
reflects the needs of an economy that lacks own natural resources and that 
passes through an intense period of economic growth.
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Geographical diversiﬁcation
Moldova has left the soviet period after fifty years of profound commer-
cial integration with other states ex-members of the USSR. The foreign trade 
abroad USSR was permitted only with the consent of central control and plan-
ning bodies. The impact of the faulty administrative orientation of commer-
cial fluxes is still noted by the national economic system.
This way, in the period between 1996-2004, the trade with the group of EU 
countries has increased much more rapidly compared to other groups (exports 
to the EU increased with an annual average of 16,7% compared to a general 
average of 5%, while the imports from the EU have increased annually with 
24,4% compared to a general average of 11,8%). Despite the relatively fast com-
mercial integration into the EU, more than half of the exports and over 40% of 
imports are destined/result from the CIS countries.(as Table 3 shows)
Table 3. Structure of the foreign trade on big geographical areas, %
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Export – total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
CIS 62,6 68,3 69,6 67,9 54,7 58,6 60,9 54,4 53,6 51,0
EU 11,6 9,8 13,4 15,7 28,1 26,3 24,9 26,6 26,7 30,1
ECE 21,3 16,3 8,0 10,2 10,2 8,8 7,5 9,6 12,4 10,7
Rest of the world 4,5 5,6 9,1 6,2 7,0 6,3 6,7 9,3 7,3 8,2
Import – total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
CIS 66,6 60,9 51,6 43,0 41,3 33,5 38,1 39,4 42,3 43,2
EU 13,5 16,5 24,5 33,8 32,8 36,1 35,6 34,4 36,0 32,9
ECE 14,1 13,0 14,1 14,7 15,8 17,5 13,2 11,1 9,5 11,3
Rest of the world 5,9 9,6 9,8 8,5 10,1 12,9 13,1 15,2 12,1 12,6
Commercial balance 
– total 
-100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
CIS -93,3 -39,5 1,3 -2,9 9,5 5,3 1,3 -14,8 -27,7 -33,5
EU -26,5 -35,7 -57,3 -62,9 -50,6 -51,3 -54,1 -47,1 -48,1 -36,4
ECE 35,0 -3,5 -32,0 -21,9 -37,2 -31,0 -23,1 -13,4 -5,8 -11,9
Rest of the world -17,4 -21,2 -11,9 -12,3 -21,7 -23,1 -24,1 -24,7 -18,4 -18,2
Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author
This stagnation is partly explained by the fact that Moldova cannot suc-
ceed in a commercial expansion to the countries of East and Central Europe. 
The lack of progress in commercial affairs with Central and East-European 
countries is determined by the following factors:
• During a good period of time Moldova had difficult affairs with Ro-
mania, the main commercial partner in Central Europe, affairs that 
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inevitably transferred to the commercial grounds as well. Romania 
banned several times the import of Moldovan products. 
• The countries of this group are not as attractive from the point of view 
of the market potential as those from the Western Europe, do not offer 
the advantage of “checked” affairs, like those held by the Moldovan 
exporters with partners from Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine or the 
advantage of similar business cultures and mentalities.
• Many countries from this region have economic structures similar to 
that of Moldova and the import of Moldovan products is not an inte-
resting variant for them.
At a more detailed scale of decomposition (from big geographical regions 
to countries) it can be found out that, as the Table shows, a spectacular reduc-
tion of dependence of exports on the Russian market, the 5 fold increase of the 
importance of Italy and the doubling of Germany’s importance. At the same 
time, we should mention that the decrease of dependency of export on the 
Russian market was not a consequence of “structural recovery”, but one of the 
absolute losses of positions held by Moldovan products. In 2004 the total value 
of Moldovan exports to Russia represented only 70% of the value of products 
sold in 1997. Besides, we should mention that, as in 1997 over 4/5 of the total 
exports were made only to 6 countries, the situation has not changed even 
until 2004. 
Table 4. Concentration by countries of the exports of the Republic of Moldova, 
% if not indicated otherwise
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total, millions USD 874,1 631,8 463,4 471,5 565,5 643,8 789,9 985,2
Russia 58,2 53,3 41,3 44,5 43,7 37,1 39,0 35,9
Italy 2,7 3,5 5,5 7,7 8,0 8,8 10,4 13,8
Romania 6,7 9,6 8,9 8,0 6,7 8,8 11,4 10,0
Germany 3,7 3,8 7,2 7,7 7,1 7,2 7,1 7,2
Ukraine 5,7 7,7 7,0 7,5 10,1 9,5 7,1 6,6
Byelorussia 4,1 5,0 4,7 4,6 5,3 6,1 5,2 6,0
Total of quotas, % 81,1 83,0 74,7 80,1 80,9 77,5 80,3 79,5
Sources: NSL
Regarding the imports we can state that the Republic of Moldova has a 
more vast territory for possible maneuvers (Table 5). Unlike exports, 4/5 of 
the Moldovan imports are made not from 6, but 11 countries. A fundamen-
tal structural modification, which was made in 2000, was Ukraine surpassing 
Russia in importance to the imports of the Republic of Moldova. A good part 
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of the exports made by Ukraine to Moldova is a re-export of Russian merchan-
dise, including electricity and oil products. Nevertheless, Moldova must avoid 
the risk of entering into an excessive commercial dependency on Ukraine or 
any other country. 
Table 5. Concentration by countries of imports of the Republic of Moldova, % if 
not indicated otherwise
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total, millions USD 1171,3 1023,6 586,4 776,4 892,2 1038,0 1402,3 1768,5
Ukraine 18,0 14,8 13,5 13,5 17,1 19,6 22,1 24,7
Russia 28,4 22,8 23,6 15,4 16,1 14,8 13,0 12,0
Romania 8,6 11,0 13,9 15,4 10,5 8,7 7,0 9,3
Germany 8,1 9,0 10,5 11,3 9,4 8,3 9,7 8,5
Italy 4,1 6,3 6,5 6,3 7,2 8,5 8,3 7,4
Turkey 1,2 1,0 2,0 2,3 2,2 3,2 3,4 3,9
Byelorussia 4,1 4,9 3,9 4,1 4,4 3,9 3,6 3,6
France 1,1 2,2 2,1 2,6 2,9 2,2 2,5 3,0
Kazahstan 0,4 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,9 3,4 2,8
Poland 1,1 1,0 1,4 2,0 2,0 2,4 2,8 2,5
China 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,9 1,1 1,5 2,1
Bulgaria 5,3 2,9 1,6 1,8 2,3 2,0 2,1 1,7
Total of quotas, % 80,7 76,3 79,3 75,4 75,4 75,6 79,6 81,6
Sources: NSL
Double risks
The evolution of foreign trade of the Republic of Moldova was marked by a 
stagnation determined by the Russian financial crisis from 1998 that had con-
tagious effects in the financial and production spheres of the Moldovan econ-
omy. These effects transmitted through channels of foreign trade and dem-
onstrated double risks to which the Republic of Moldova is exposed: a small 
number with a relatively small added value is exported to a limited number 
of countries. Essentially Russia gets 36% of the exports made by the Republic 
of Moldova and almost 80% of these exports are food industry produce, actu-
ally wines and cognacs. The interdictions on imports from the Republic of 
Moldova (on animal and vegetal products) introduced by Russia in 2005 in 
two rounds may be followed by a third round of interdictions oriented against 
Moldovan wines. 
Moldova is already vertiginously loosing positions that it held on the Rus-
sian wine market in the inferior and medium segments and any brutal interven-
tion may lead to the irrecoverable loss of its place on the market. The dim diver-
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sification of exports denotes also the weakness of the Moldovan private sector. 
Because of this weakness, the national exporting capacities cannot keep up with 
the imports and the commercial deficit is increasing continuously. (Table 6)
Table 6. Indices of the relations of international terms of trade and commercial 
deficit
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Index of physical volume, last year = 100%
For exports 72 100 106 122 116 120
For imports 92 71 128 118 118 129
Index of average prices, last year = 100%
For exports 120 147 111 96 99 104
For imports 108 158 115 100 100 106
Degree of covering imports with exports, % 61,7 79 60,7 63,3 62 56,3 55,7
Commercial deﬁcit, % GDP -23,1 -9,5 -23,8 -22,1 -23,6 -30,5 -30,4
Commercial deﬁcit, millions USD -391,8 -122,9 -305 -326,7 -394,2 -612,4 -783,4
Direct foreign investments + Transfers for 
the remuneration of work provided abroad, 
% of the commercial deﬁcit -104,9 -83,2 -101,7 -88,7 -51,6 -72,8
Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author
In addition, the prices for imported goods rise faster than those for ex-
ported ones, thus further complicating the task of accumulating currency re-
sources for maintaining the commercial balance. During the last four years 
the imports have increased physically and in value faster than the exports. 
If the difference between the rates of growth of imports and exports will be 
maintained during the following months, the commercial deficit in 2005 will 
exceed the exports. It will be a bizarre situation, which we do not know if other 
countries face. Even if, during a short period, there probably won’t be major 
problems with financing the deficit (the currency transfers from abroad were 
even bigger in 2005), this kind of development of the foreign trade is not good, 
even harms the consolidation of competitive advantages of Moldova.
5.4. Direct foreign investments and the security 
of national economic interests
Economical transformations in Moldova can continue only if they will be 
accompanied by the increase of actual income and by the amelioration of the 
level of life of the population for the assurance of social support of reforms. In 
order to fulfill these conditions the product sector has to recover and even to 
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overwhelm the performances gained before the beginning of transition. Sub-
stantial investments are necessary for this. In agriculture alone, according to 
some estimations, investments of over 2 billion dollars are necessary, for this 
sector to get back to the optimal level of production.16 As it is well-known, 
these kinds of capitals do not exist in the Republic of Moldova, and the income 
transferred from abroad serve and will serve for the assurance of consumption 
needs. This is why the attraction of direct foreign investments (DFI) is an indis-
pensable condition. Especially because DFI can assure not only the necessary 
investments, but also a transfer of technologies and advanced management. 
Table 7 shows that the economic performances achieved by the enterprises 
with foreign stock in Moldova are much more superior to the relatively small 
balance these have in using the labor force. Local companies are requested to 
mact such performance. 
Table 7. Indices of the activity of companies with foreign capital
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
The ponderosity of employees in the total of 
employees from the national economy, %
1,4 1,8 2,2 3,6 2,3 7.6
Volume of production (current prices), thousands lei 311,4 749,6 795,6 1608,5 2587,7 3250.7
Ponderosity in the total production, % 5,3 12,5 11,1 18,4 23,9 33.4
Ponderosity in the total of exports, % 14,3 31,3 24,5 38,4 40,9 36.6
Ponderosity in the total of imports, % 27,4 31,6 36,7 43,5 45,8 37.4
Source: MIDA 
The results of Moldova in attracting direct foreign investments are am-
biguous. On one hand, the stock of direct foreign investments made in the 
economy of Moldova has increased spectacularly from 28,6 million in 1994 to 
902,5 million in 2004.17 But this stock was accumulated not in a progressive 
way, the visible progress alternating with notable stagnations. The rhythm of 
annual entries of capital in 1997-2003 was instable, varying between US$ 38 
million in 1999 to USS 146 million in 2002, drastically falling to US$ 58 mil-
lion in 2003. Until 2001 the DFI fluxes were linked to a great degree to the 
privatization of attractive production of infrastructure objectives. After this, 
the foreign investors appear to have begun to explore with increased interest 
the possibilities of founding new companies (de novo), better than risk the 
placement of capital in former state companies. These attitudes are explained 
6 CNFA.
7 NBM.
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by two causes. Firstly, the great privatization is practically over, even if there 
still exist several public enterprises, which eventually could be attractive for 
investors (Moldtelecom, some wineries). Secondly, the notorious examples of 
“deprivatization” and harassment of some foreign investors discouraged those 
who previously considered Moldova attractive. 
UN reports on global investments place Moldova in the category of coun-
tries that attract DFI at a level higher than their economic potential, by eco-
nomic potential being understood the GDP.18 But Moldova is situated in the 
category of the countries that attract DFI under their economic potential im-
mediately after the definition of this potential is expanded in order to include 
available labour force and exports.19 Indeed, as it is showed in Table 9, Moldova 
was above the average of countries in the region in the means of DFI and GDP, 
but definitely under the average as an amount of DFI per capita. 
Tabel 8. ISD in Moldova as compared with other states in the region, 
1995-2002 average
% of GDP USD per capita
Bulgaria 4,4 70
Lithuania 3,9 122
Moldova 4,8 18
Romania 2,7 46
Slovakia 3,7 233
CIS outskirts* 2,9 15
CIS nucleus** 2,9 39
Note: * – Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;
** – Belarus, Kazakhstan Russia, Ukraine;
Source: WB
In consequence, theoretically Moldova still has some reserves for increas-
ing the flux of DFI. Still, in the context of preoccupations for economic secu-
rity we have to ask ourselves if direct foreign investments represent a comfort-
able modality for the propagation of economic interests of foreign investors, 
and by their help and the help of political interests of their origin countries.  In 
particular, the public is frequently disturbed by the fact that Russia is the main 
investor in the Republic of Moldova. 
Similar questions arise not only in the case of our country. In all the small 
countries private foreign companies have means of influence for influencing 
8 UNCTAD;
9 Chivriga and Prohnitchi.
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policies. The aim of the government is to adequately administrate the inter-
ests of foreign companies, to balance the interests and minimize the chance of 
propagating fatal interests. More transparency and public responsibility in the 
affairs of the state with foreign investors would help in the way that latter will 
follow strictly economic interests and not political or other ones.
Evidently, the influence exercised by the foreign investors depends on the 
size of companies and their countries of origin. From the point of view of size, 
it could be told that only 3% of the amount of companies with foreign capital 
present in Moldova has a statutory capital exceeding US$ 500 thousand. The 
majority of foreign companies (70%) have a statutory capital of under US$ 10 
thousand.20 This kind of structure suggests that, even if there are influences, 
they come from a relatively limited number of companies with foreign capital.
Table 9. Geographic composition of DFI, %, 2003
% din PIB
Russia 22,9
EU 32,9
Great Britain 6,4
Spain 6,2
France 5,3
Germay 4,5
Other EU 10,5
USA 10,0
Oﬀ-shore regions* 6,9
Romania 3,6
Other countries 23,6
Note: * – Liechtenstein, Cyprus, Malta, Caiman Islands
Source: WB
From the geographical point of view, the situation of DFI mainly reflects 
the composition of foreign trade (Table 9). In the category of countries, Rus-
sia has the first place with almost 23% of the DFI stock, followed by the USA, 
Great Britain and Spain.
It appears that Russia has an exaggerated growth, but still it is balanced 
by an even higher hrowth of the EU region, to our opinion. Also here, Russian 
companies have made the main investments until 1998, after what Russia’s 
growth decreased drastically in the annual flux of investments. 
20 Interview with Sergiu Ghetiu, director of MEPO, for INFOTAG press agency, October 5th, 
2004.
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The main companies that ensure the high growth of capital from the Russian 
Federation, Spain, the USA and Great Britain in the total stock of DFI are:21
• Russian Federation – “Moldovagaz” (energetic sector), “Green Hills 
Market” (trade and services);
• The USA – “Mobiasbanca” (banking sector), “Moldova Agroindbank” 
(banking sector), “Dionysos Mereni” (wine-making industry), “Cri-
cova Acorex” JSC (wine-making industry), “Dairy factory in Hancesti 
(Alba)” (food industry), “Sun Communications” (TV and communi-
cations services), “Jolly Allon” (hotel services);
• Spain – “Union Fenosa” (energetic sector), Glass Container Company 
(industry);
• Great Britain – “Compudava” (informational technologies).
It must be mentioned that the relatively high growth of investments in 
off-shore regions, which, to the opinion of some authors, could be exported and 
reinvested Moldovan capital, could have its sense in obtaining a better treat-
ment, compared to the local investors.22 It could be stated that the foreign invest-
ments made in the Republic of Moldova have a rather balanced structure from 
the geographic point of view. They are not made in technologically “sensitive” 
sectors, because they are simply missing. It is true that the Russian capital is 
massively present in Moldova, particularly in the energetic sector. The question 
is would have Moldova beneficiated of lower prices for natural gas if, instead of 
Gazprom, another company from another country was the main share-holder of 
Moldova-Gaz. The answer would probably be negative.
In the next decades the chances of Moldova to attract direct foreign in-
vestments will grow significantly. These perspectives are determined by the 
following:
• The expansion of the EU towards Romania and Bulgaria, after what a 
part of the foreign companies present in these countries will seek new 
locations in the new neighbor countries of the EU, where the costs of 
labour and administration of businesses will be smaller;
• The expansion of Asiatic economic interests (China in the first place) 
towards Eastern Europe;
• The economic growth achieved by Moldova and the consolidation of 
the Moldovan private sector (foreign investors wish to have partners 
2 Chivriga and Prohnitchi.
22 WB.
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in Moldova, who are consolidated from the financial, management 
and image point of view);
• The creation of a free trade zone between Moldova and the EU;
The growth of income of the population of Moldova, as a result of eco-
nomic growth and of transfers of currency from abroad increase the potential 
of the local market. For the government of Moldova the challenge will reside 
in the capitalization of these favorable factors through adequate policies and 
attitudes for the foreign investors. The guarantee of rights to property, absti-
nence from administrative interferences in the private business, reduction of 
corruption and bureaucratic burden – these are the fundamental recommen-
dations for Moldova to attract foreign investments at the level of some success-
ful countries in the region.
5.5. Energetic security
Moldova does not have natural resources, which, at the present level of 
development of energetic technologies, would allow to assure its consumption 
needs integrally or in a significant proportion. Nowadays, the only combus-
tible used in the Republic of Moldova is natural gas (which covers 80% of the 
necessities of the energetic sector) and which is almost integrally imported 
from Russia. This situation will not change in the predictable future, and that 
is why any strategy of energetic security must start from the premise that the 
primary bearers of energy will have to be imported anyway and that Russia 
will remain the main provider of natural gas for quite a time.
Energy in the equation of Moldo-Russian aﬀairs
The energy imported from Russia is one of the two main factors (the ex-
ports to Russia are the second factor) that deeply anchor Moldova in a sit-
uation of unilateral dependency on the Eastern giant. Moreover we have to 
mention that the energy is alternatively the “pretzel” and “stick” frequently 
used by Russia in its affairs with other countries of Central and even Western 
Europe as well. The instrument was used recently, with the occasion of a meet-
ing of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of CIS countries, on August 25th, 2005, 
in Moscow. The easiness with which Moscow has managed until recently to 
project its influence in Moldova through the energetic sphere is explained by 
a vast series of factors:
• The Russian company “Gazprom” has been unofficially granted mo-
nopolist rights in providing natural gas to Moldova;
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• The lack of similar or alternative energetic resources in Moldova or the 
neighbouring region;
• The technical and economic problems, which make the immediate 
diversification of providers impossible (the very high fixed costs, ne-
cessary for building some new trunk pipes);
• The accumulation of some historical energetic debts towards Russia;
• The lack of own technical abilities necessary for an adequate accoun-
ting of gas consumption.
Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is of little importance for the transition of gas 
to Europe. The Moldovan territory is traversed only by one important trunk 
pipe to Romania. Because of this, for Chisinau, unlike Kiev, it would be more 
complicated to annihilate the aggressiveness of “Gazprom”, threatening with 
the application of higher transit taxes. The lack of transparency and public 
responsibility in the energetic field of the Republic of Moldova, which not ac-
cidentally received the epithet of “state within a state”.
• Low technical and economic efficiency of the main producers of elec-
tric and thermal power in Moldova (and who are concomitantly the 
main consumers of gas and the most indebted);
• Superannuation of the transportation infrastructure maintained by 
the companies distributing thermal power, which causes great losses 
while transporting.
It must be kept in mind that the debts are the main channel of exercising 
economic and political pressures. If the consumption would be regularly paid 
for and the accumulation of great debts would not be admitted, there would be 
less possibilities of manipulation for Russia. Estonia and Slovakia, like Moldo-
va, import 100% of the consumed natural gas and 100% of the imported gas 
is from Russia, but these countries do not allow blackmail and implication in 
their home affairs.
The governments of Moldova will have to take into account that the objec-
tive of integration of Moldova into the EU will even lead to the accentuation of 
the dependence of the energetic system on natural gas. One of the ecological 
rigors of European energetic policy imposes the regection of heavy combusti-
bles for the functioning of power stations and the gradual conversion to natu-
ral gas. This rigour will determine not only Moldova, but also other countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe in future to rely on the gas imported from 
Russia to a greater degree than in the past. Moldova must try to free its ener-
getic affairs with Russia of any political element and to pay the bills regularly. 
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The increase of tariffs for methane gas provided by Gazprom, beginning 
with 2006, 2007 at most, is inevitable and the government must take that into 
account when elaborating its energetic strategies. This increase will be deter-
mined by three factors: modifications that intervened in the business strategy 
of Gazprom with all the countries from the so-called “near vicinity”, Russia’s 
acknowledgement of the fact that the obtained political benefits are smaller 
than the financial costs for supporting the global increase of prices for hydro-
carbons. Moldova must prepare for this by balancing the tariff grid, modern-
izing TES-s and the infrastructure of transporting thermal energy. In fact, the 
increase of the gas tariff at the level of those collected from Central-European 
countries has an advantage as well: Russia will loose any possibility of black-
mail for the future. 
Electricity
The annual need of electric energy of the Republic of Moldova is esti-
mated at 5-6 billion kW/h. Leaving Transnistria aside, Moldova can produce 
autonomously only 30-35% of the electric energy it consumes. According to 
the strategy of development of the electro-energetic system of the Republic of 
Moldova, local companies that produce electricity power must have capacities 
of covering 100% of the needs until 2007. Presently Moldova makes use of the 
electric power produced by TES-1 from Chisinau, the Hydroelectric junction 
from Costesti, the Thermoelectric Station from Cuciurgan and some is pur-
chased from Ukraine. 
For Moldova it is crucially important to re-obtain the control over the Sta-
tion from Cuciurgan. The installed power of the 12 blocks of TES Cuciurgan 
is 2,52 MWt, while the needs of the whole Moldovan economic system are as-
sessed to 1,1-1,2 MWt. According to the contract of privatization of the Station 
from Cuciurgan, the owner (which is now the Russian corporation “EES Ros-
sii”) will invest in 2007 over US$ 160 million for the development of the sta-
tion. The allotment of such an amount is rational only if the investor considers 
export the main prospective activity. In these circumstances, Moldova will 
have a crucial role, because it has the necessary infrastructure for transporting 
electricity to the Balkans, the target of economic expansionism of the Russian 
corporation. But Moldova has to keep in mind that there are some economi-
cally strong societies in Kiev, which intend to control the export of electric 
power from Cuciurgan. With this purpose, it is planned to build a new trunk 
pipe of high pressure transport that would pass through Ukrainian territory 
and minimize the length of the path through Moldovan territory. 
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Several times Transnistria has used the “energetic weapon” against Chisi-
nau. It is difficult to say if the change of owner will make it impossible for the 
Tiraspol regime to energetically blackmail Moldova. From the technical point 
of view, Moldova now has much better capacities for ensuring its electrical se-
curity. In case the situation from July-August 2004 repeats, when Transnistria 
has stopped providing energy from Cuciurgan, Moldova could import the nec-
essary energy from Romania. Three lines with the voltage of 110 kV and one of 
400 kV (Isaccea – Vulcanesti) link Moldova to Romania and one more, of 400 
kV (Suceava – Balti), is to be built in 2-3 years. The beginning of function of 
the new line will allow Moldova to export electric power in normal regime.
The situation will ameliorate when the two regional electric stations (Balti 
and Cahul) will be built and when the II energetic project, financed by the 
World Bank, will be implemented. The electrical composition of this project 
earmarks US$ 28 million for the purchase and installation of equipment of 
measuring electric power, of testing measuring transformers, of equipment for 
transforming stations and the modernization of the telecommunication and 
reception system. This will allow the liberalization of the market, the increase 
of activity for investors, and for big consumers – to sign individual contract 
with the best providers. 
Emigration – fundamental risk for economic security. 
Is Moldova overpopulated?
It is rather frequently that one can hear the argument of overpopula-
tion of the Republic of Moldova as an explanation of the massive exodus of 
population, of low per capita income, of rampant unemployment and other 
social-economic problems we are facing. The argument has its right for exist-
ence, but it must be specified. As it is showed in Table 10, the density of popula-
tion in a series of European countries is comparable or even higher than that 
of Moldova. 
Table 10. Demographic indices in European countries 
Country
Density of 
population, 
people/km2, 2002
Level of 
urbanization, 
2005 
Annual average of the growth 
of population,%, 2000-2004
Urban Rural 
Belgium 337 97 0.24 -0.84
United Kingdom 243 89 0.38 -0.26
Czech Republic 129 74 0.02 -0.45
Denmark 124 85 0.34 -0.37
Albania 124 44 2.07 -0.39
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Poland 122 62 0.04 -0.27
Republic of Moldova 120 41 -0,51 -0,03
Slovakia 110 58 0.49 -0.48
Hungary 110 66 0.14 -1.57
Armenia 108 64 -0.75 0.09
France 108 76 0.72 -0.34
Azerbaijan 97 50 0.62 1.16
Romania 88 55 -0.20 -0.26
Sources: NSL, United Nations Statistics Division
In our opinion, the problem resides in general not in the high density of 
population, but in the high density of rural population and in the low level of 
urbanization of the country. Not accidentally, in the structure of Moldovan 
emigrants taken on a residence average, overwhelm those from the rural area, 
with a growth of 70%.23 Albania and Azerbaijan, countries with levels of ur-
banization similar with the Moldovan one, are other two examples of coun-
tries with intense emigration, mainly alimented by the rural population. 
Thus, we deal with a profound structural factor, which can be truly deter-
minant for a series of economic problems, faced by the Republic of Moldova. 
In particular, this demographic factor can be responsible for the low labor pro-
ductivity in agriculture and low income gained in this sector. After almost 
5 decades of repression of the normal demographic development of Moldova 
by unionist directives and policies, the impact of this factor manifested in an 
explosive manner immediately after the stopping of centralized subvention of 
Moldovan agriculture, and the salaries for social-professional categories that 
are remunerated from the public budgets (doctors, teachers) have succumbed. 
The problem gets more complicated if we take into account that the majority 
of small town in the Republic of Moldova are, in fact, pseudo-urban establish-
ments, mono-industrial one decade ago, that is dependent on a single fabric or 
plant, which probably does not function today. 
During the period of transition the problem of rural congestion has not 
become simpler. On the contrary, from 1997 until 2004 the growth of popula-
tion from the right side of Nistru who lives in towns decreased from 42,2 to 
41,4%. We conclude that Moldova in general is not an overpopulated country, 
but rather rurally overpopulated. The rural economic subsystem has not signif-
icantly diversified together with the advancement of economic reforms and has 
23 “Populaţia economic activă, ocupată și șomajul în trimestrul II 2005”, Informative note, 
August 2005, National Bureau of Statistics.
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not begun to offer more non-agricultural opportunities to residents from the 
countryside. The local and central government was not able to assure the eco-
nomic diversification and development of small towns in Moldova and to open 
the “gates” for the movement of a segment of young population from villages to 
these towns. Moreover, on the background of worsening of the economic situ-
ation, the internal emigration from villages to towns was not a rational option 
for the countryside residents who were advantaged compared to those from 
towns by the fact that they could survive from agricultural subsistent activities. 
The natural result was the orientation of village residents towards other coun-
tries, initially Russia, and then more and more towards European countries.
5.6. Demographic crisis
The Republic of Moldova faces a serious demographic crisis, which began 
to manifest even in the last decades of existence of the USSR. The respective 
crisis manifests by the decrease of the birth rate, increase of mortality, crisis 
of the model of a traditional family and the incapacity of simple auto-repro-
duction of population. The accumulation of these factors resulted in a clear 
depopulating tendency of the Republic of Moldova. According to the forecasts 
of demographers, during 50 years the population of Moldova (on the right side 
of Nistru) could decrease with 400-500 thousands. 
Only these factors taken separately will cause a quantitative and maybe a 
qualitative reduction of human resources necessary for a rapid and solid eco-
nomic growth and development. But the negative consequence of the demo-
graphic crisis caused by social and natural factor are aggravated by the exodus 
of the labor force abroad, a relatively recent phenomenon, which began at the 
middle of the 1990s and got alarming proportions beginning with 2000. Emi-
gration is a complex phenomenon with social, economic, cultural and politi-
cal roots and implications. It is a rational strategy for individual survival and 
evasion from poverty. Nevertheless, it implies costs, as well as economic ben-
efits for the country. The benefits have a short-term and impermanent mani-
festation: the reduction of pressure over the labor market, attenuation of the 
potential of social disturbance, assurance of higher income in families with 
emigrant members, assurance of bigger currency reserves on the accounts of 
the NBM and partial balancing of the commercial deficit. These benefits could 
gradually attenuate, together with the reintegration of families abroad. 
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The consequences of emigration for the economic security
The costs of emigration have to be supported for a long time and are bur-
dening. The complexity of negative consequences makes us affirm that emi-
gration is a factor that fundamentally threatens the economic security of the 
country. The quantification in monetary terms is difficult, but we can list the 
following risks that arise from emigration:
Quantitative reduction of human factor, illustrated in Table 11. This 
shows that emigration has intensified as an absolute number and as a per-
centage of the total population living in Moldova (without the Transnistrian 
region), as well as a percentage of the total of labor resources.24 The latter ten-
dency is explained by the absolute reduction of the number of employable per-
sons, from 2,1 million in 1998 to 1,9 million in 2004.
Table 11. Evolution of emigration, thousands of persons, if not indicated 
otherwise
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
T2
Emigrants’ stock (NBS) – – – 138 149 234 294 367 383
Annual reﬂux of those who 
emigrate for the ﬁrst time (CBS AXA)
11.4 17.4 26.4 52.0 33.2 60.2 76.9 71.1* n.a.
Stocul de emigranţi (CBS) 46 64 90 142 176 236 313 384 n.a.
Stock (CBS), as % of the total 
population on the right side of 
Nistru (NBS)
1,3 1,8 2,5 3,9 4,8 6,5 8,7 10,6 n.a.
Stock (CBS), as % of the labour 
resources (NBS)
2,2 3,0 4,3 6,8 8,4 11,6 15,9 20,2 n.a.
Notes: * – first ten months
Sources: CBS, NBS, the last two rows were calculated by the author
Qualitative reduction of the human factor. As the existent studies show, 
the educational profile of emigrants is very high: 25,7% have higher education, 
51% have technical or special education.25 Only 1/3 of the emigrants did not 
have income-bringing activities before their leave, the rest being those who 
had a place of work. In other words, the ones who left are citizens with an edu-
cation and work experience higher than the average in the country. 
24 In conformity with the definition used by NBS, the labour resources are constituted by the 
total number of persons with intellectual and physical abilities necessary for carrying out 
an activity useful for the national economy, which contains the population of employable 
age (5-64 years) and economically active persons under and over the employable age.
25 Gudumac and Ghencea.
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Emigration generates negative social consequences, consolidating the cri-
sis of the traditional model of the family. The number of children who live 
without one or both parents (who are abroad) is increasing. According to the 
official information published by the Ministry of Education, in February 2005 
around 28 thousand children were living without both parents, who had emi-
grated abroad, 5 thousand more than in December 2003. Over 68 thousand 
children live without one parent (who is abroad). One third of those who emi-
grate think that, after labour emigration, the social and moral connections in 
families degenerate, and 14% (probably on the basis of own experience) have 
declared that the family disintegrates.26 We think it is not by accident that the 
general rate of divorce has increased from 38 per 100 marriages in 1999 to 59 
per 100 marriages in 2003. Disintegration of families complicates the sociali-
zation of children, and, when they grow up, it impedes their harmonious and 
plenary integration with the economically active population. 
Emigration produces patterns of behaviour followed by emigrants’ chil-
dren. Many of them don’t even try to find a place of work in the Republic of 
Moldova, but orient towards the countries where their parents are. In several 
countries of destination of Moldovan emigrants formed Diasporas or other 
similar networks of mutual help, which considerably facilitate the arrival, set-
tlement and finding jobs for the second generation of emigrants.
All these lead to the conclusion that the pattern of economic growth of 
Moldova, in which prevails the labour factor in comparison to the capital fac-
tor, which is and will be undermined by the emigration of the labour force. The 
quantitative reduction of labour resources undermine the growth in intensive 
working sectors, and the reduction of quality and training of the labour force 
impedes the consolidation of more advanced technological sectors. The quan-
titative and qualitative degradation fundamentally impedes the placement of 
bigger direct foreign investments in the national economy, elementary because 
the technological lines cannot function without people. 
26 Gudumac and Ghencea.
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C h a p t e r  V I .
THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: 
CHALLENGES, PARTNERS AND PERSPECTIVES
Dr. Iulian Fruntasu,
Associate Researcher, IPSIR
It is obvious that security represents a complex field which cannot be ex-
haustively analyzed in a single study. However we consider possible and useful, 
at the same time, to make an outline of the security of the Republic of Moldova 
by military, political and geo-strategic means. We will give a special consid-
eration the subject of temporally occupied Eastern territories and the threat 
from the Russian Federation, the international legal instruments that contrib-
ute to the consolidation of the national security, the partners, with whom there 
should be made privileged affairs and the policies for realizationd the objectives 
related to the consolidation of the National Army and implicitly of the Republic 
of Moldova.
6.1. Temporally occupied Eastern territories and the threat 
emanating from the Russian Federation
Currently, the Eastern region of the Republic of Moldova is under tempo-
rary occupation by the Russian Federation’s which led to a limited war during 
1992. When it comes to the armed intervention and political objective, this be-
ing shown by the very Cease-fire Agreement from July 21st, 19921, signed by 
Presidents Eltsin and Snegur, that clearly indicates who were the parties of the 
conflict. The political and military, as well as strategic inability, to treat openly 
the Transnistrian conflict as an anti-constitutional military rebellion, gene rated 
and supported by Moscow, created an ambivalent situation to the disadvantage 
of the Republic of Moldova. Such an erroneous approach also made its way into 
some Western academic societies, that treated this conflict as a fratricide civil 
war, without mentioning where the “indigenous brothers”, Smirnov and An-
tiufeev, came from2. Until lately, opinions regarding the war led by the Russian 
 Which should be annulled, as some observers mentioned.
2 Look, for example, ”From Ethnopolitical Conflict to Inter-Ethnic Accord in Moldova”, 
Flensburg, Germany, ECMI Report  , March 998.
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Armed Forces against Chisinau, despite all the evidence, were taken as extrem-
ist anti-Russian ones, but the rejection of the Kozak Memorandum created the 
right momentum to phrase a clear thesis about the realities from 13 years ago 
that in turn, hopefully, will lead to the setting-up of new policies by civil and 
political societies, that are meant to consolidate the statehood and sovereignty.
The Russian national chauvinism in the Republic of Moldova was power-
ful enough to discourage the transfer of Soviet military units under the State’s 
jurisdiction, while officers and sergeants were refusing to make the oath of 
allegiance to the new Republic. This way, unlike in other ex-Soviet states, 
Moldova managed to maintain just a little part of the military infrastructure 
and weaponry, this undermining the ability to solve the problem of the Rus-
sian Armed secessionism in the Transnistrian region. The Soviet/Russian con-
ventional weapons played an important role regarding the way political and 
security situations evolved in the Republic of Moldova. To elucidate the con-
nection between the military and political elements, and in particular the way 
the independence of the Republic of Moldova was undermined by the implica-
tion of the armed forces of the 14th Army, it is necessary to see how the Soviet 
and Russian holdings evolved in those five categories, in accordance with the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
Period Location Tanks ACV Armored 
transporters
AVLL
Artillery Attack 
helicop-
ters
Support 
helicopters
Aviation Troops
11.1990/ 
02.1991
Chisinau 13
Tiraspol 155 246 294 230 13
Bender 3
Dubasari 9
Ribnitsa 5
Chisinau 124 37 18
Rezina 10
Cahul 9
Chisinau 7
Marculesti 33
Total 155 402 348 248 0 20 33
07.1992 Tiraspol 126 198 215 127 12 9.254
Chisinau 124 37 21 1.624
01.1993 Tiraspol 124 181 131 133 12 9.225
01.1994 Tiraspol 121 175 113 129 7 7.708
01.1995 Tiraspol 120 166 103 129 9 6.356
11.1995 OGRF 120 130 103 129 9 6.529
01.1996 OGRF 120 130 103 129 9 6.529
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07.1996 OGRF 120 130 103 129 9 6.285
01.1997 OGRF 119 129 100 129 9 4.923
07.1997 OGRF 119 129 101 129 2 7 3.004
01.1998 OGRF 119 129 101 129 7 2.824
07.1998 OGRF 117 129 98 129 7 2.620
01.1999 OGRF 117 133 98 128 7 2.642
07.1999 OGRF 117 133 98 128 7 2.642
01.2000 OGRF 108 131 83 125 7 2.346
07.2000 OGRF 108 131 83 125 7 2.641
01.2001 OGRF 108 131 83 125 7 2.571
01.2002 OGRF 0 0 75 0 7 2.597
The table was elaborated by the author on the basis of the analysis of the 
quantity of CFE Limited Equipment in Moldova, according to the annual in-
formation provided to the Joint Consultative Group by the Member-States of 
the CFE Treaty. (ACV stands for Armored Combat Vehicles; AVLL for Ar-
mored Vehicles-Look-Like)3.
As it can be seen also from the analysis of the quantity of conventional 
equipment, the basis of secessionists’ army was set up by the 14th Army’s trans-
fers, in most of cases deliberate ones. The consolidation of separatists’ armed 
and paramilitary forces was made with the assistance of the Russian military 
experts, by means of establishing weaponry manufacturing capabilities on the 
spot, as well as by joint maneuvers with the Russian military units. Beginning 
September 1991, the Russian military forces conducted the process of setting 
up the National Guard, Workers’ Self-Defense Units; established training cent-
ers for troops. Since November 1991, the officers of the 14th Army transferred 
weaponry, ammunition, communication equipment, facts acknowledged by 
Lieutenant-General Iakovlev, the Army’s commander. In March – April 1992 
the separatists began to receive armored vehicles, although the corrected ver-
sion of Russian military exchange information in accordance with the CFE 
Treaty, made in February 1992, leads to a plausible assumption that the trans-
fer of weaponry began earlier. At that time Tiraspol received the equipment 
of the 237th de-mining brigade, and on May 19th 1992 it received 10 T64B, 10 
armored transporters (BTR 70), 6 pieces 120mm mine launchers etc. On May 
24th 7 armored transporters (BTR 70) with crew have moved from the rocket 
brigade in the Bender’s fortress to Dubasari.
3 Details in Iulian Fruntașu, O istorie etnopolitică a Basarabiei, 82-2002 (Cartier: Chișinău, 
2002), pp. 34-333.
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Since spring of 1992 the 14th Army has been preparing for major military 
operations. The Russian Defense Minister Graciov instructed General Netka-
ciov as follows: “Due to the worsening of the Transnistrian situation and start-
ing from the point that this is a Russian land, we have to defend it by all means 
and methods at our disposal. We have to fill the units of the 14th Army with 
reservists and to bring the 14th Army to military action status level.”4 The or-
der of engagement of the 14th Army in Moldova was given by the Command-
er-in-Chief from Moscow, though the aim was just to show the power but not 
to wage a full scale war. We can certainly state that the military intervention 
of the Russian Federation had a limited character, just to change the military 
balance in favor of Russian separatists. However, the combat possibilities of 
the 14th Army in 1992 were sufficient to launch operations on the entire ter-
ritory of the Republic of Moldova. On February 2nd 1994 the official paper 
“Rossiiskie Vesti” has confirmed the Presidential Advisor Serghei Stankevici’s 
acknowledgment that Lebed wasn’t acting on his account while sending the 
14th Army against Moldova, a fact confirmed also by his promotion to Lieuten-
ant-General in September 1992 and the “decoration, in October 1992 by the 
Eltsin government, of 200 soldiers and officers who participated in military 
operations against the Government of Moldova.5
Russian secessionists were fully supported as well by the Unions of Cos-
sacks from the Russian Federation, by political parties and by Russian local and 
central executive bodies. “Cossacks and other similar categories of fighters for 
the independence of the phantom-republic were recruited by the “Union of Of-
ficers” from Sankt-Petersburg, by the National Republican Party, by “Faterland” 
(“Otechestvo”), “Revial Union” (“Soyuz Vozrojhdenia”) and “Union of Don 
Cossacks” movements, as well as by the bodies of the Russian Defense Ministry. 
On 27.02.1992 there were about 2 thousand Cossacks in Tiraspol, 500 of them 
coming from Rostov-on-Don, Kuban, Altai; the rest of them representing the 
Cossack groups from Dubasari, Grigoriopol and Slobozia, established in a hurry. 
In “Dnestr” battalion were registered over a thousand Russian volunteers.”6
4 The intervention (obobșcionnaia spravka  Ministerstva Oboronî Respubliki Moldova o 
poătapnom vmeșatelistve ciastei 4-oi armii Rossiiskoi Federaţii vo vnutrennie dela lev-
oberejnîh raionov Respubliki Moldova i peredaci boievoi tehniki, orujia i boepripasov 
antikostituţionnîm voorujennîm formirovaniam, Nezavisimaia Moldova, 04.06.992.
5 Helsinki Watch – to Russian authorities, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November , 993.
6 Ion Guceac, “Military Operations and the right”, The Transnistrian Conflict: the truth as it 
was, the Reports of the Scientific-Practical Conference “State interests and the role of home 
bodies in ensuring the constitutional order, human rights and freedoms in the Eastern 
regions of the Republic of Moldova, January 2-3 993 (Chișinău: Logos, 996), p. 97.
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Although from the beginning of the 90’s Russian separatists produced 
small amounts of less sophisticated weapons, the basis of Transnistria’s indus-
trial military complex was set up in 1995 with the assistance of Russian Fed-
eration.  The plants involved in the production of weaponry and ammunition 
are Machinery Plant from Tighina, “Electromas” from Tiraspol, Metallurgic 
and Pumps Factory from Ribnita, which produce grosso modo the following 
types of weaponry: multiple reactive systems BM-21 “Grad”7; 82 and 120mm 
mine launchers; antitank grenade launchers SPG-9; portable grenade launch-
ers RPG-7; 9mm automatic rifles; 5,45mm PSM pistols; antipersonnel mines. 
The CFE equipment is deemed unaccountable (UTLE) if it is not control-
led by the constitutional authorities. Additional to other types of weaponry in 
the separatist region of Transnistria, there is the following quantity of UTLE: 
tanks – 18 units; armored combat vehicles – 49 units; 100mm artillery – 32 units, 
which were transfered, like the other equipment by the 14th Army/OGRF:
Type of weaponry 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998-2000
T-64 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
BTR 30 30 40 40 40 40 40
BRDM 6 6 6 6 6
BMP 12 12 3 3 3 3 3
SAU 122mm “Gvozdica“ 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
85mm artillery 8 8 8 8 8 8 12
PTM MT12 100mm 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
BM-21 – – – – 8 20 20
82mm mine launchers 30 30 30 30 30
120mm mine launchers 18 18 39 39 39 39 45
ZU – 23-2 24 24 24 24
ZAC S-60 12 12 12 12
Anti-aircraft artillery AZP-100, 100 mm 10
ZRK “Osa“ (launching units) – – – 2 2 2 2
ZRK “Strela-10“ 2 2 2 2
PZRK (“Igla“, “Strela-2“) 13 13 13 13
PTUR “Fagot“ 30 30 30 30
SPG 9 9 9 9
Light weapons 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000
MI-8T helicopters 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
MI-2   helicopters 1 2 2 2
AN-26 aircraft 1 1 1 1
7 Voennâi balans na Dnestre vosstanovlen. Armia Pridnestrovskoi respubliki polucila na 
voorujenie reactivnîe ustanovki sistemî “Grad“, Pridnestrovie, 05.0.96.
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AN-2 aircraft (cons.) 2 2 2 2(4)
IAK-18 aircraft 2 2 2 2
IAK-52 aircraft 10
The table composed by the author according to OGRF sources (T-64 – 
tank; BTR – armoured vehicle; BRDM – reconnaissance armoured vehicle; 
BMP – combat vehicle for infantry; SAU – self-propelled vehicle; PTM MT 
12 – anti-tank launcher; BM-21 – system for launching multiple shells “Grad”; 
ZU – anti-aircraft defence installation; ZAK – anti-aircraft defence artillery 
complex; ZRK – anti-aircraft rocket launching complex; PTUR – guided an-
ti-tank rocket; SPG – anti-tank mine launcher).
The close cooperation with military structures of Russian secessionists in 
the Eastern regions ensures not only the possibility for fast recruitment of lo-
cals, but also the increase of the military efficiency by means of interoperabil-
ity, because many military objectives, as it is Tiraspol military airport, are run 
by the Russian Army alongside with the Armed Forces of Russian separatists 
in the Transnistrian region. 
Therefore, taking into account the above mentioned facts in a summa-
rized way, we can state without hesitation that the Russian Federation led a war 
against the Republic of Moldova, limited in its aim and military intervention. 
Due to the fact that Moldova can’t afford an open conflict with Moscow there 
is nothing to do but to wait for more favorable international circumstances for 
the constitutional bodies to regain control over the Eastern regions and to end 
the occupation. Until then, though, it is necessary to voice with determination 
the respective truth, without suspending the political dialogue with Russia 
which should be based on clear principles. 
The first step towards the consolidation of statehood should be the Parlia-
ment’s statement in which the military conflict from 1992 is called as it really 
was: a Moldovan-Russian war and to ask the Government to launch the proce-
dure of compensation requests and to promote this status within the UN. Such 
statements and diplomatic initiatives will most probably be taken by Moscow 
as hostile ones, but since it shows anyhow irritation concerning less serious 
things, then it doesn’t make any difference, because it is neither possible nor 
necessary to indulge a country which is violating the Republic of Moldova’s 
sovereignty for 13 years. With some cold blood, determination and spirit of 
civilization from the side of Chisinau, Russia, nolens-volens, will have to coop-
erate the way it cooperates with the Council of Europe which was quite explicit 
regarding the Russian Federation’s responsibility for the occupation of Eastern 
regions of the Republic of Moldova.
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6.2. International legal instruments 
International legal instruments are extremely important to the states with 
a minor political and military weight, like the Republic of Moldova. Even the 
states with significant economic, political and military potential are trying 
to avoid the situation of being criticized for the violation of international law, 
while the state’s image becomes increasingly important in the period of glo-
balization and means of mass communication, when an eventual undignified 
action comes right through and has noticeable effects. In such circumstances 
Chisinau should pay more attention to this field, which comes as a “natural” 
ally. For the time being we will consider just two of them that have a higher 
profile: the decision of the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) in Ilascu 
case and others against Moldova and Russia8, and the adapted CFE Treaty.
The case of Ilascu and others against Moldova and Russia is important 
because the Court has ruled out that Russia exerts “jurisdiction” over the 
separatist “Nistrian Moldovan Republic” where the Russian troops keep their 
presence since the declaration of independence by Moldova in 1991, the re-
sponsibility being extended upon the actions of local administration which 
survives thanks to its support. The Court has also mentioned that the Rus-
sian Federation supported the separatist authorities through its political state-
ments, that its troops participated to the fight, and that it continued to offer 
its military, economic and political support after the Cease-fire Agreement. 
More than that, the applicants, namely Ilascu and others, were arrested with 
the participation of Russian troops and were held under arrest at their facili-
ties, afterwards being transferred into the hands of separatist regime, knowing 
pretty well that this regime is illegal and unconstitutional.
It is worth mentioning that the Committee of Ministers has adopted an in-
termediary decision on July 13th 2005 regarding the ECHR Decision from June 
8th 20049, in which it is insisted upon the Russian Federation to spare efforts in 
order to free the prisoners, beyond paying the financial penalties. The Com-
mittee of Ministers has also reminded Moscow that the obligation to respect 
the Court’s decision is unconditional. 
8 Case of Ilașcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (Application no. 48787/99) Judgment Stras-
bourg, 8 July 2004 
9 Interim Resolution ResDH (2005)84 concerning the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights of 8 July 2004 (Grand Chamber) in the case of Ilașcu and others against 
Moldova and the Russian Federation (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 July 2005 
at the 935th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), http://www.coe.int
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It is necessary to efficiently and faithfully cooperate with Strasbourg in 
the context of ECHR decision and subsequent decisions on monitoring, the 
substance of which should be used in other international circumstances, as for 
instance, in the OSCE framework, in order to counter-balance the attempts to 
constrain Moldova to some unjust solutions, as it was in the case of the war led 
by Moscow against this post-Soviet country. 
Another legal instrument which is also political-military refers to the CFE 
Treaty that represents one of the corner-stones of European security10. Follow-
ing the disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty and the disintegration of USSR, 
the Member-States initiated the process of adaptation of the CFE Treaty to new 
political and security realities on the European continent, adopting the adapted 
Treaty on 19.11.1999 in the framework of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul. In this 
adapted Treaty it was strengthened the indispensability of the host-state consent 
to the temporary deployments and terms of Russian forces’ withdrawal were 
achieved. Istanbul’s success was not a surprise for those directly involved in the 
process of adaptation, though we cannot deny a certain benefic influence of the 
international circumstances like the pressure of the Western Member-States 
of the Treaty upon the Russian Federation for the violation of the ceiling for 
holdings in the Flank Zone, namely the North Caucasus, where the Russians 
launched operations with a massive use of conventional armaments.
Therefore, the Final Act which is a part of the agreement package along-
side with the adapted Treaty11, contains the following references about Moldo-
va: “[Member States] … Have taking note of the statement by the Republic of 
Moldova, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its renunciation of 
the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory12” and have wel-
0 To see in details Iulian Fruntașu, ”Retragerea trupelor ruse din Moldova în contextul 
Tratatului FACE adaptat: percepţii, interese și natura schimbătoare a securităţii europene”, 
ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/comments
 In the adapted Treaty the following reference clause is present: “Having taken note of the 
Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty held in Istanbul from 7 
to 9 November 999, as well as of the statements made by certain States Parties concerning 
their political commitments”. OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 999, Istanbul Document, January 
2000, PCOEW389, p. 9.
2 This says: “The Republic of Moldova renounce the right to receive a temporary deployment 
on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions that control and prohibit any presence 
of foreign military forces on the territory of Moldova.” OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 999, Is-
tanbul Document, January 2000,  PCOEW389, Annex 3, p. 250. The author’s dilemma who, 
by the way, prepared and read the Statement at the Conference was the contradiction be-
tween the short term objective (ensuring the withdrawal of the Russian troops) and the 
medium term one (the accession to NATO which will need temporary deployments).
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comed the commitment of the Russian Federation to withdraw and/or destroy 
the Russian conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty by 
the end of 2001, in the context of its commitment referred to in paragraph 19 
of the Istanbul Summit Declaration.13
It is important here to make a distinction between the adapted Treaty which 
by the way contains clauses regarding the consent of host-State14, including the 
Final Act, that in turn contains strong political commitments because they 
had been undertaken in the package with the Treaty, and the Istanbul Summit 
Declaration which has a political implementation regime as any other OSCE 
document. Although on the other hand it could be argued that the cross-ref-
erences between the Final Act and the Summit Declaration strengthened the 
mandatory character of the latter. The Summit Declaration says the following 
relevant things regarding Moldova in the first two paragraphs: “Recalling the 
decisions of the Budapest and Lisbon Summits and Oslo Ministerial Meeting, 
we reiterate our expectation of an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Moldova. In this context, we welcome the recent progress 
achieved in the removal and destruction of the Russian military equipment 
stockpiled in the Transnistrian region of Moldova and the completion of the 
destruction of the non-transportable ammunition. We welcome the commit-
ment by the Russian Federation to complete the withdrawal of Russian forces 
from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the will-
ingness of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process, 
within their respective abilities, by the agreed deadline.”15 The web of legal and 
 At that time the first objective was the more important for the Moldova’s security. It is also 
significant and hilarious at the same time that during the negotiations in Vienna the 
Moldovan statement regarding the temporary deployment was received with hostility by 
Russia that tried to insist that we can’t renounce a right. 
3 OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 999, Istanbul Document, January 2000, PCOEW389, pp. 48-49.
4 A couple of examples where is mentioned the host country consent. In the Preamble: “State 
Parties, recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their 
international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or the political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purpose principles of the UN Charter”. In the Article I, p.3: “Conventional armaments 
and equipment of a State Party in the categories limited by the Treaty shall only be present 
on the territory of another State Party only in accordance with the international law, the 
clear consent of the host member state, or with a relevant resolution of the UN Security 
Council. Explicit consent must be provided in advance, and must be in effect as provided 
for in the Article XIII, p. bis”. Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 999, 
January 2000,  PCOEW389, pp. 9-20.
5 Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 999, January 2000,  PCOEW389, 
pp. 48-49.
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political documents, as well as the existent relationships convey the substance 
of the relevant commitments undertaken with regard to Moldova:
                      In the package                           Cross-references
Adapted Treaty Final Act OSCE Summit Declaration
The consent of 
the host State is 
present in several 
Articles.
1. Withdrawal of Russian 
TLS by the end of 2001.
2. Renunciation of the 
right to temporary deploy-
ments in the Article 13. 
Paragraph 19. The complete withdrawal of armed forces 
by the end of 2002. The ammunition and armaments are 
not obviously in the 5 CFE categories, but these also fall 
under the authority of the Treaty because they are in the 
armed forces’ use and their excess is not relevant in the 
document’s terms. This somehow tautological distinc-
tion was accepted to speed up the withdrawal of combat 
equipment and it explains the diﬀerences between the 
deadlines of 2001 and that of 2002. 
It is true that Moscow’s approaches vary, depending on the Russian percep-
tions regarding the threats and challenges it faces, Russians exerting political 
pressures following which the NATO offered guarantees of no deployments in 
the new Member-States, which were credible enough for Russia to move fast 
from the idea of leaving the Treaty to its ratification. In a wider context, though, 
it is clear the fact that the adapted CFE Treaty is more convenient to the Russian 
Federation than to the Alliance because NATO anyway was treating for many 
years with some sort of understanding the violation of the North Caucasus’ ceil-
ing, as well as Moscow’s behavior in the so called immediate neighborhood. Now 
things are starting to change, meaning that the toleration of the illegal presence 
of the Russian forces is diminishing, although Moscow tries to stress the stipula-
tions in the adapted Treaty which are more convenient to it and to minimize the 
commitments concerning Moldova and Georgia, stating either that these are 
political and without a deadline, or that are bilateral and with no effect on third 
parties.16 But if we imagine a hypothetic situation in which Poland would state 
that its commitment annexed to the Final Act regarding its limitation of hold-
ings for tanks at 1,577, for Armored Combat Vehicles at 1,789 and for artillery at 
1,370 are not valid any longer because they are political, officials in the Russian 
MFA and Defense would hit ceilings in their offices.
In the case of Moldova and the CFE Treaty it is important to keep in mind 
that from the perspective of many Western chancelleries this Treaty maintains 
a system of relations that affects the security of the entire continent and that it 
6 “Ministr oboronî RF: Stambuliskie obiazatelistva Rossii iavliaiutsa politiceskimi i ne im-
eiut srokov”, Interlik, 3.07.04; “SȘA obuslovili ratificaţiu DOVSE vîpolneniem Rossiei 
Stambuliskih obiazatelistv”, Interlik, 07.2.04.
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solves more important issues than just the withdrawal of the Russian forces from 
the Moldovan territory. This situation should keep the Moldovan diplomacy on 
the alert and to lead to additional political and diplomatic initiatives in consul-
tation with Washington, London and Ankara on one hand, and on the other to 
negotiations with Moscow. It is not the best idea of self-gratitude in a reduced 
capacity, as it was shown by the 1996 Flank Agreement, to block the ratification 
of the adapted Treaty when this is decided to by important member-States of the 
Alliance. Without serious diplomatic initiatives regarding the complete with-
drawal of the Russian Army and that of Russian separatists the assertion from 
“The Defense Monitor” has a high chance to become true: “As it was with its 
predecessor, the adapted treaty regime will likely be plagued by illegal Russian 
actions in the North Caucasus and the former Soviet Socialist Republics. Mos-
cow views noncompliance as consistent with its security interests and therefore 
is willing to risk the ostracism while the NATO states are deterred from punish-
ing Russia because they are not harmed by the Russian actions.17”
Despite that, at this moment it is clear that the CFE adapted Treaty in 
Istanbul had a positive impact upon the security of the Republic of Moldova, 
because Russians withdrew and/or destroyed, on Western money by the way, 
a significant part equipment18 (see the table with Russian TLE). It is also sig-
nificant in this context the fact that Moscow keeps its equipment involved in 
so called peace-making mission, hoping that these will be exempted from the 
CFE if its troops will receive an OSCE mandate. This is why it necessary to 
insist upon the unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops, weaponry and 
ammunition in accordance with the Decisions of the Istanbul Summit, with-
out the ratification of the CFE adapted Treaty before the implementation of 
above-mentioned decisions. It is also necessary to launch diplomatic actions 
both within the CFE Treaty context, and using as well political mechanisms, as 
for example, the NATO-Russia Council, in order to assign clearly to the Rus-
sian Federation the responsibility for the UTLE from the occupied area which 
must be withdrawn and/or destroyed by Moscow. 
Certainly, the legal and institutional international tools are not limited to 
those represented by the Council of Europe or the CFE Treaty mentioned above. 
7 “Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion”, The Defense Monitor, December , 
2000.
8 Thereby, on November 6 the MFA of the Russian Federation has announced the comple-
tion of the retrieval process of ELT’s in conformity with the Decisions of the OSCE Summit 
from Istanbul.* The Russian headquarters from Tiraspol has reported the destruction of 
239 units of TLE and the withdrawal of other 25 to Russia.
130 MOLDOVA ON THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY
We could also recall the NATO-Russia Council, PfP, Stability Pact, BSEC, or 
GUAM. Altogether or separately, all these make a good opportunity to promote 
the legitimate security interests of the Republic of Moldova, in particular PfP, 
which normally could lead to the situation when the Republic of Moldova will 
request the full membership of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.
6.3. Partnership as a long-term strategic decision
The “natural” partners of the Republic of Moldova are the USA and EU 
member states that do show a more responsible attitude towards the develop-
ment of the democracy and the consolidation of security and stability on the 
European continent. However, such an attitude implies taking more open and 
engaging positions towards the Russian authoritarian tendencies at home and 
imperial ones abroad. The USA, for instance, has fully supported the radical 
political transformations in Georgia and Ukraine, despite the Kremlin’s iras-
cibility. Poland and Lithuania have saved the appearances, pleading on behalf 
of the EU for the same democratization objectives through the “chromatic” 
change of regimes. Also, Great Britain displays a more principled attitude to-
wards the support of the integration efforts of the Eastern and Central Euro-
pean countries, taking into consideration their sensitivity emanating from a 
legacy of not-so-friendly relations with Russia. 
Therefore, the Republic of Moldova should assume certain responsibilities 
regarding the long-term strategic orientation that covers the Eastern and Cen-
tral European countries and Washington with London’s intermediation when 
the UK supports the ex-Soviet and ex-Socialist countries. Moldova’s hopes con-
cerning the involvement of the Euro-Atlantic community to solve the Transnis-
trian problem and to consolidate the security in this area could be connected to 
the increasing of the interest of Washington towards the Black Sea region. This 
very interest was  generated not lastly by Romania that expressed its readiness 
to contribute to the security and stability in this region.19 There is also a notice-
able increase of interest towards the countries from the Black Sea region from 
the academic community and NGOs.20 This very trend should be fully support-
ed by the Republic of Moldova which could also support Romania’s efforts in 
9 Traian Băsescu, ”The Black Sea Area: Advancing Freedom, Democracy, and Regional Sta-
bility”, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, March 0, 2005, www.cfr.org
20 See, for example, Ronald D. Asmus, “Anchor the Black Sea Region to the West”, The Nation, 
8 September; Bruce P. Jackson, “The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region”, March8, 
2005, www.newamericancentury.org
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 131
this regard, but also could develop own initiatives regarding the consolidation 
of democracy and security in the region. Undoubtedly, a trustful policy in this 
field could be managed only by professionals and here it is necessary to ensure 
an appropriate level of Moldovan diplomatic presence in Washington and also 
the improvement of communication with the US Embassy in Chisinau.
6.4. The “blood for friendship” policy and upgrading 
professionally the National Army
Theoretically, the Republic of Moldova has the chance to bypass certain 
existent clichés, analyzing the substance of what could be called the founda-
tion of long-term cooperation with the USA. It is true that forwarding the 
request of accession to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and accept-
ing the NATO standards are important steps in this direction, like the border 
security and management, the reform in the military sector, the democratic 
monitoring of the planning in the military sector and the transparency of the 
decision-making process regarding armed forces. Each Membership Action 
Plan is crucial for the reformation of the National Army and of the structures 
responsible for the national defense. With all that, as we mentioned above, 
there is a theoretical chance to bypass the models offered by Moldovan neigh-
bors from Eastern and Central Europe, namely the engagement in uncondi-
tional combat (with personnel around or more than 10-15 battalions) in every 
armed campaign led by the USA from this moment of in the future. Beyond 
the structural changes, democratic reforms etc, what is important for the po-
litical decision-making factors from Chisinau is that this fundamental change 
may occur only after the unambiguous and substantial commitment shown 
by the number of soldiers sent to Iraq, Afghanistan or any other geographical 
destination where Washington deems necessary the American involvement. 
Any other way is an attempt to make theories or a half measure.
As never before the USA needs active partners for antiterrorist campaigns 
and Moldova has the chance to join the Central and Eastern Europe and even 
over-compete these countries by the extent of its effort. The “blood for friend-
ship” policy could be deemed by certain left observers as one without principles 
and harmful due casualties that would occur in the Moldovan army. But the 
fate of underdeveloped countries is to have bad choices – if principles could be 
debated by some French intellectuals who are narrowing the European political 
and economic horizon due to their socialist positions, than Moldovans, leaving 
aside certain theoretical remarks about the side-effects of the American military 
campaigns, should do nothing but just associate with the mission of establishing 
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democracy that is managed by Washington. This commitment of the intellec-
tual and political elite should be irreversible and without any doubts – “the old 
Europe” can not serve as a model because of its economic and political impo-
tence, the fact shown many times in the past years, like the war in Bosnia-Herze-
govina and other post Yugoslav regions. The “blood for friendship” policy could 
be deemed, as we mentioned above, to be harmful as it comes to casualties, – an 
argument that apparently is concerned with human lives. However, it could be 
stated that the Russian continuing aggression and the treatment of Moldovan 
citizens who migrated to Russia are leading to more casualties than an eventual 
participation to the USA led military campaigns. The death toll in the context 
of relations with the Russian Federation is and will continue to be bigger, as the 
past time has shown and the present is showing, because this country is and will 
continue to be a messenger the European civilization failure, regardless of the 
political and economic developments on the continent.
A certain “blood for friendship” policy would suppose, in concrete terms, 
the American expertise regarding the training and establishment of more in-
fantry battalions of rapid reaction (with helicopter and transport aviation sup-
port) to back the USA in military campaigns (in Iraq, for example) or the EU 
in peace-making effort (in Bosnia, for example). This expertise would include 
the respective studies like those for the junior partners new in Alliance (NATO 
Defence College or NATO School (SHAPE) from Oberammergau) and the in-
volvement of the American instructors in the field, by the example of Georgia.
We could suppose with a high degree of probability that Moldova’s irre-
versible commitment on the “blood for friendship” way will attract the finan-
cial and logistic resources of the allied members. Based on these trained units 
it could be possible to create the future professional Army of the Republic of 
Moldova. Currently, in accordance with the general structure, the Army’s per-
sonnel is 7.227 people. The military form 3 infantry brigades, one artillery 
brigade, a special force battalion, a brigade of antiaircraft missiles, an aviation 
base, an escadrille of mixed aviation, as well as support and technical units. 
The equipment, according to the CFE Treaty (information from 01.01.02), con-
sists of: tanks – 0 (limit 210), ACV – 209 (limit 210), artillery – 148 (limit 250), 
combat helicopters and planes – 0 (limit 50 and 50). The “blood for friendship” 
policy could represent an opportunity to modernize the equipment, chang-
ing to the standards of the Alliance, the number growth of personnel and the 
professional up-grade of the Army that could be capable to run the mission of 
defending the constitutional order when it is necessary.
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C h a p t e r  V I I .
TRANSNISTRIA: MILITARY, POLITICAL 
AND OTHER RISKS AND CHALLENGES 
Boris Asarov,
President of “Pro-Europa” association
Doing an analysis of the main risks and challenges determined by the exist-
ence of anti-constitutional enclave from the Transnistrian region of the Repub-
lic of Moldova, first of all, we have to distinguish them from the point of view of 
their character. Thus we distinguish two main categories of risks: risks linked 
with the transparency of structures and interests of the separatist regime; risks 
linked with the increase of the international contradictions.
7.1. Terrorist elements and structures under the protection 
of separatist regime.
a. Legal transfer of weapons and the control upon the Russian military 
armory in  the region 
The armories of the Operative Group of Russian Forces, the stocked weap-
onry and the ammunitions, extremely vulnerable to paramilitary groups and 
criminal structures from the region exist in Transnistria. In 2000, the quantity 
of weapons and ammunitions, belonging to the Russian Federation, stokpiled 
in the Transnistrian region consisted 42 000 tones. According to the public 
reports of the OSCE mission in Moldova, between 2000 and 2004 from the 
territory of the Transnistrian region of Republic of Moldova were evacuated 
or destroyed on the territory about 50% of weapons, military equipment and 
ammunitions. In the mentioned period a total of 56 suites with military equip-
ment were evacuated. The evacuation and the use of goods of Operative Groups 
of Russian Forces (OGRF) from Tansnistria were financed from the voluntary 
Fund of OSCE. The from weapons left on the territory, according to the OSCE 
reports consisted, approximately of 19 916 tones of: cartridges, bombs, rockets 
and air bombs, kept in the armories on a territory of about 100 hectares, near 
Cobasna railway station. After a detailed analysis of the specifications and the 
list of these ammunitions we can state that the total of explosives from within 
the armoriesin Cobasna make up for more than 10.000 tones.
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The OSCE reports about the quantity of stocked ammunition cannot be 
considered to be exact, as the documentation presented in different periods by 
the representatives of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, is not 
a transparent one. We can suppose that in the armories of OGRF exist 25 tones 
of weapons and ammunitions. A possible explosion of the armories from the 
neighborhood of Cobasna station could be compared with the explosion of an 
atomic bomb of 10 kilotons that represents the equivalent of the bomb which 
was thrown upon Hiroshima in August 1945. The force of the wave of shock 
of such an explosion could completely destroy brick and reinforce concrete 
buildings within a range of 4, 5 km from the epicenter.
The crater would have a radius of 1, 5 km and a depth of 75 m. However in 
the case in the case of explosion in Cobasna, the local factor will also have an 
impact caused by the rural character of the place, the range of action of the first 
wave of shock could be of 40-50 km and more. The consequences of such an ex-
plosion can be compared with an earthquake of 7-5,5 degrees on Righter scale, 
in the region of Vrancea. The triggering of an explosion the armories from 
Cobasna can lead to an ecological and human disaster in the North-Eastern 
region of the Republic of Moldova and the adjacent territory of Ukraine on a 
territory of 500 square km to 3000 square km, affecting the places from the very 
neighborhood of the explosion epicenter (Ribnita, Haraba, Slobodca (Ukraine) 
and Varancau), as well as Slobodka, Krasnâe Okni, Balts, Kotovsk (Ukraine), to 
Rezina and Soldanesti on the territory of Republic of Moldova, as well as fara-
way zones from Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania.
The acute danger is also acknowledged by the representatives of the so-called 
“Ministry of Defense” of the separatist enclave, namely General Atamaniuk, 
who affirms that “the explosion of these ammunitions can destroy dozens un-
less hundreds of localities not just in Transnistria but as well in Moldova and 
Ukraine”. But the declarations of high officials and the leaders of illegal forma-
tions of the criminal regime about the scale of dangers the OGRF armories for 
frightening the Transnistrian of locals by spreading around imaginary threats 
about terrorist attacks from the Secret Service of the Republic of Moldova. It is 
to be mentioned that the armories of OGRF are dubbly encircled by the posts 
of the so-called “Transnistrian State Ministries of Security and Defence”. The 
forces of these posts were increased in the summer of 2001, and since then did 
not decrease. The armories of weapons and ammunitions are just a pretext for 
the Russian Federation to go against its commitment to evacuate the arsenal 
and the troops of the OGRF. The statement according to which the leaders of 
the regime are stopping the evacuation are ill founded as Vladimir Antiufeev, 
the general-major, the head of the enclave and the employee of the Russian Fed-
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eral Service of Information (FSB) is reporting directly to the chief of this special 
Russian service, Nicolai Patrusev. However, according to “our information”, 
even if the illegal military formation “transnistrian army” posseses enough and 
different systems of weapons, it does have a lack of ammunitions. Because of 
this MGB pays a great attention to the armories OGRF.
b. The security services
Under the control of the military formation of the so called “Ministry of 
State Security” (MGB), there are mobile groups with special destination: “Del-
ta”, with a personnel of 500 to 1000 troops, as well as the existence within the 
“ministry of home affairs” of the formation “Dnestr”, with a personnel of 700 to 
1000 troops. These military formations may be used to participate in different 
conflicts on the territory, as to well as commit terrorist acts on the territory of 
Moldova’s and on other separatist enclaves from Georgia (Abkhazia and South-
ern Osetia), whose leaders are in good relationships with the criminal regime 
leaders in Transnistria.
The battalion “Dnestr” participated, supporting conservative forces, at the 
Moscow “coup d’etat” attempt from  September – October 1993. Once MGB 
took control over the main political and military institutions from the region, 
it alsoo took control over the financial resources, banking system and the pri-
vatization process, which assures unlimited resources to the special services of 
the separatist regime. Durring last years we could state the threat of creation of 
supporting groups of MGB even on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.
For this aim, the MGB finances and works on changing the ideology of the 
Chisinau youth group entitled “National Bolshevik Party” that participated at 
many street riots, in the centre of the capital during 2002-2005. After the “orange” 
revolution from Ukraine, the same MGB initiated the foundation, organization 
and strengthening of the radical movement “Proriv”, which aim is to counteract 
any attempts of orange “revolution” in Tiraspol and eventually, to pass all these 
actions on the right bank, in order to organize in Chisinau a red-green “putsch” 
(the color of NMR flag).
c. Smuggling and unlawful trade, illegal process of privatization
Unlawful trade is possible due to the fact that the transnistrian segment 
of the Moldo-Ukrainian border, lacks appropriate control of the constitutional 
bodies Republic Moldova, as well as because of the policy of the Ukrainian Au-
thorities’, which does not correspond to European principles. During L eonid 
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Kucima’s leadership in Kiev, the conventional leader of the regime that admin-
istrates Transnistria territory, Igor Smirnov, transferred monthly to his lobbies 
from Kiev, sums of money equivalent with 2 million US dollars. From those 
1222 km of Moldo-Ukrainian border the Transnistrian segment constitutes 
452km, which is not controlled by the constitutional authorities of the Repub-
lic of Moldova’s. Such circumstances create the best opportunities for criminal 
affairs, smuggling, illegal emigrants and weapon traffic are just as usual.
From the Ukrainian side, the guard of the Transnistrian segment of 
Moldo-Ukrainian border is assured by the Kotovsk and Maghiliov detach-
ments of Border State Service. The guard in this region consists of: 4 border 
patrols, 22 border posts, 6 departments of border control, 4 mobile divisions, 6 
operative divisions, 19 customs (17- auto and 2- railway). The entire personnel 
constitutes just 1900 people. These forces have: 2 helicopters, 3 motorboats, 8 
stations of radar-location, 6 projectors stations, 200 cars and motorcycles, 626 
radio stations. In the first five months of this 2005, the number of caught ille-
gal emigrants tripled. The number of people who were administratively trialed 
for trespossing the border line increased 2, 3 times, the quantity of confiscated 
weapons and smuggling goods increased 8 and respectively 3.5 times.
The plans of the State Border Service for the development of the frontier 
security infrastructure is to setup posts of supervision and control. This has 
never been done in the ex-soviet space on the Transnistrian segment. Till now, 
the Ukrainian competent bodies have had a selective attitude what concerns the 
detention of delinquents on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldo-Ukrainian 
border. The main way of smuggling from the Transnistrian region follows the old 
Nistru flow. The “transport” is organized as a convoy or caravan, which means 
15-20 trucks at a time. The route on the old Dniester river flow was set up by the 
obscure structures in 1997. This happened after the settlement at the Pervomaisk 
Kuciurgan entry, of mixed Chisinau and Tiraspol customs that were eliminat-
ed from the enclave’s initiative in 2000. Until then, smuggling of goods passed 
without any control. At the end of 1997 the path along the old Dniestr flow had 
already a gravel cover, meaning that smuggling increased greatly. The caravans 
that usually were accompanied by transnistrian multia cars, when reaching the 
border further were entrusted to their Ukrainian companions. After entering 
the Ukrainian territory at a distance of 35-45 km the trucks were unloaded. 
The main smuggled goods were cigarettes and alcohol. As a rule, the trucks 
belong to Ukrainian citizens, put the convoys were organized in Transnistria. 
The convoys were formed of military trucks of such models as: ZIL-131 and 
Ural-375. These were bought from the former 14th Army. It is to be stated that 
the Moldovan Custom Department and the Department of the frontier forces 
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have repeatedly requested explanation notes from the Ukrainian competent 
bodies. In 2004 Ukrainian border state service said they know about the route 
of old Nistru flow, but there were no criminal activities registered.
It is generally known that at least “Sheriff” group makes most of the ille-
gal activities of import-export and has strong co-operation relationships with 
economic agents from Ukraine, they use this route for the transportation of 
their own fuel and motor oils to warehouses, that they rent on the Ukrainian 
territory. A proof of a extremely strong lobby for “Sheriff” group in Ukraine, 
is the fact that on the territory of Odessa region was registered and functions 
the GSM operator “Intercom”, that represents a subdivision of “Sheriff” group. 
Drugs are also a part of the smuggled goods. The control on the drug opera-
tions is done by the “state security ministry” as well as upon the illegal export 
of weapons. The drug and weapon smuggling is also done by the representa-
tives of the criminal world controlled by the MGB and already got their own 
place in the structure of the enclave.
d. Illegal weapon manufacturing in the region
Additional to the fiscal facilities that the Russian Federation offeres to the 
separatist region, in the last decade they received considerable aid for the set-
tlement and functioning of some autonomous systems of weapon manufacto-
ry, assamblage and trade. Under the control of the Russian Federation military 
security experts, a lot of companies on the separatist territory systematically 
manufacture different types of heavy and light weapons on orders received 
from some Russian agencies of weapon export (Rossvoorujenie). We are going 
to present the main military companies and the types of weapons manufac-
tured by them:
The mechanic factory
It manufactures serial products since 1995. Here are some of the manu-
factured weapon systems: reactive systems for volley fire with 20 barrels (set 
on car platforms), antitank mine thrower (since 1995), 82 mm and 120 mm 
mine throwers (since1996),  mobile antitank mine thrower (since 1996), 5,45 
mm caliber guns. Few dozens of reactive systems were delivered to Abhazia 
for illegall military formations. Given the location of the factory (on the right 
bank of the Nistru, in the heart of the security aria with special regime from 
Bender city), Tiraspol leaders complemented setting up the controll point of 
peacekeeping forces situated on the Bender bridge just with Russian and tran-
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snistrian militaries. Since 1992, according to the decision of the United Con-
trol Committee (UCC), trilateral control points must be set on all bridges over 
Nistru. All further attempts by Chisinau to establish the trilateral charter of 
this control point, as well as the attempts to inspect this factory, according to 
the agreement from 1992 and UCC status have failed. 
Moldova’s Metallurgic Factories and its subsidiaries. In the spring of 
1995 at MMF was launched the manufacture of mine throwers of 82mm and 
122 mm caliber. The teasting of the first mine throwers were made on May 
17th 1997 with the presence of buyers from the Russian Federation. In the same 
period the factory manufactured the first lot of experimental antipersonnel 
mines, in wooden frame. Further the manufacturing of anti-attack mines was 
launched.
Pump factory. Manufactures 40 mm antipersonnel mine throwers GP-25.
“SELHOZTEHNICA” manufactures certain parts for the mine throwers 
produced at the pump factory.
“ELECTROMAS”. Manufactures: 9 mm machine-guns, 9 mm Macarov 
pistols, 5,45 mm pistols, hunting pifles and special items on command.
“ELECTROAPARAT”. It manufactures parts and sub ensembles for differ-
ent weaponry systems. Other companies on the transnistrian territory were also 
set upto manufacture weaponry systems for exemple the factory “Tocilitmas” 
manufactures mine launchers “Grom”, which have no equivalent in the CIS area. 
Weapon manufacturing from Transnistria constitutes one of the main factors 
that provoke instability in the South-Eastern region of Europe. The manufac-
tury and the sale weaponry systems are under the control of the “Minister of 
State Security of Transnistria”, Vladimir Antifiufeev. A greater attention must be 
paid to the manufacturing of reactive systems for volley fire which could become 
very dangerous once achieved by the terrorists. Camouflaged weapons (the so 
called special items) may be used to eliminate politicians of opposition as well as 
non-subordinating businessmen. Mine throwers “Grom”, which have no equiva-
lent in the CIS area, are proof of ability of the criminal regime to set up a long-
term production of different types of weaponry systems.
Acnowledging that there are anti-personnel mines produced in Transnis-
tria, they have to be entirely destroyed according to Ottawa Convention. The 
Republic of Moldova fulfilled all the obligations set up by the Convention on tje 
terrytory under its control. Criminal regime leaders reject Convention obliga-
tions. It is not a secret that Smirnov – Antiufeev regime delivered weapons to 
Abkhaz separatists. The representatives of this regime do also not hide the fact 
that they delivered a wide range of weaponry systems to bandit formations of 
“Srpska Republic” led by Radovan Karadjic. The bandit formations of Karadjic 
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are officially recognized as being responsible of genocide acts against Bosnians, 
and Radovan Karadjic is in the process of general prosecution by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Again we are not excluding the fact that the transnis-
trian weapons could have been bought by Saddam Husein’s secret services, as a 
series of Iraqi emissaries often visited Transnistria during 2002 and 2003.
7.2. Negative impact on the domestic political situation 
in the Republic of Moldova
a. The preservation of an ethnic intolerance climate,  
linguistic exclusiveness and terror 
The fist statement comprises the promotion of an obsolete concept, actu-
ally defined as national segregation; the second one comprises a concept qual-
itatively different, but not less negative, defined as “denationalization”. The 
concept of national segregation means “separate development” whilst “dena-
tionalization” is the forced obstruction of antinational standards particularly 
in the educational process and in culture in general. The “target group” of 
the national segregation policy is constituted of Romanian transnistrian rep-
resentatives, who adopted an active civic position and grouped around the 
Romanian lyceums from Transnistria. The “target group” of  the “denation-
alization” policy is represented by Romanian people that lost the national eth-
nic belonging. They are an ideal “target” for the maintenance of combined 
criminal policy of combinated socio-cultural treatment, operated in the region 
beginning with the 20s of the last century and intensified in 1937, along with 
the forced introduction of Cyrillic alphabet in Romanian language. The aim 
of this policy is to create an ethnic sub-group that would identify themselves 
as Moldovans, different of Romanians, to create an ethnic sublayer that would 
auto-identify itself as belonging to a claimed independent Moldovan nation, 
different from the rest of Romanians (the so-called “Stalinist-concept”).
To be true, the majority of Romanian ethnics from the Transnistrian region 
are of transilvanian and not of moldavian origin, fact proved by the hystorical 
evidence and data about the region’s population, as well as by the dialect kept 
by the Romanians that live in neighborhood of river Nistru-Bug. As a result 
of the implementation of the above mentioned plans of the leadership of this 
region, Romanians do not formally exist, with the exception of a little group of 
workers subdued to the complete socio-cultural treatment that were effectively 
“denationalized”. The representatives of the ethnic majority in this region are, 
practically lowered to the status of inferior citizens; parallel to the triumph of 
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the “Russian only” concept. The declaration of Moldavian language as the of-
ficial language in “TRM” means on one hand  just a demagogy that became 
classic, and on the other hand a component part of the policy of socio-cultural 
processing of the majority Romanian ethnics. The development of the experi-
ment of creating of a new silvic parallel to “Transnistrian nation”, the creation 
of some marginal organizations and the intensification of national, chauvinist, 
Pan-Slavic and anti-semitic tendencies.
This experiment was initiated in 1992, with the aim to put the people from 
the region against the Republica of Moldova. It is characterized by 2 types of 
approach.
The first resides in wearing away the feeling of nationality status of Rus-
sian, Ukrainian and Moldovan ethnic groups with the aim to promote the 
ideology of “Transnistrian nation as a new community”.
The second one resides in the continuous development of the perverted 
feeling of pride of Russians and Ukrainians growth constantly accompanied 
by the invocation of “acts of imperial bravery” of Russian nation and those of 
“the Ukranian “fraternal” one from the USSR. 
The apparent contradiction is swept away by the aggressively propagued 
conclusion that the “Transnistrian nation” in only the objective result of the 
process of formation of the soviet man in a certain region, emphasizing that 
he belongs to the Slavic group. The Romanian-friendly population, subject 
to degradation is actively suggested by the propagandat that Moldavians, by 
the origin, are half-Slavic nation. The process that helps to form an aggressive 
awareness is accompanied by the provocation of the most mean infamous in-
stincts of national intolerance, xenophobia and anti-semitism. The old genera-
tions are subdued to intense ideological processing based on “soviet values”.
b. Anti-semitism as an element of pan-Slavic ideology
A key-element of the pomoted policy is the creation of youth organizations 
in order to constitute elementary concepts of radical essence, about the present 
social processes. This presents a special danger, as it creates nationalist visions 
of the youth that is exposed to radical means of expressing their attitudes. 
On the territory of the enclave there were created and fostered such youth 
ultra-Chauvinist organizations as: “Transnisrian Union of Patriotic Youth”, 
“Viteaz”, “Slavic Youth League” and some smaller ones. Under the control 
of MGB, these organizations regularly called reunions based on the military 
model, at the training camp near village Ternovca. These actions regarded the 
intimidation and application of force against citizen in opposition to the re-
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gime, including the deployment of a riot at the Jewish cemetery in Tiraspol in 
March 2004, “authorized” by the Transnistrian special services. The pogrom 
must be discussed in details.
The pogrom has no precedent in the matter of duration. It began on March 
13th and continued until March 30th. The criminals have destroyed more that 
20 funeral monuments and other 50 were desecrated practically. On each 
monument there were left signs in the form of swastika, one of the SS symbols 
inscriptions of the word “skins” (skinheads), number 88, which taking into 
account the 8th position of the letter H in the alphabet, represents a codifica-
tion of the famous “Heil Hitler”. The first signs were known on March 13th. 
On March 20th, the police was informed but only after the continuation of 
the acts of profanation. However, the pogrom continued for at least 10 more 
days. In spite of the fact that the police and municipal administration were an-
nounced, no one took any measures in order to stop the profanation or arrest 
the criminals.
There are more than 600 hundred of public organizations on the terri-
tory of Transnistria. The most of them are fictitious and were created just to 
imitate the process of formation of the civil society in Transnistria in front 
of the international public opinion. Nevertheless, some of them are func-
tioning, and rather well. The most dangerous ones are youth organizations 
“Slavic Youth League”, “Viteaz”, “Lutici”. They have many things in common. 
All these organization are considered “patriotic”, have hundreds of members 
and are closely linked together. They are propagating the so-called “patriotic” 
ideas wich in fact often border on ideas of national exclusivity.  “Slavic Youth 
League”, “Viteaz”, “Lutici” are strongly supported by the Transnistrian author-
ities, and yearly, they are carrying out more and more reunions at the training 
camp from Ternovca, situated not far from Tiraspol. It must not surprise any-
body that these organizations are generously supported by the authorities as 
each member of these organizations is treated as a potential worker at the state 
ministry of security. For this purpose there is an MGB officer delegated to each 
organization who patronizes them and has to choose the best candidates. The 
assignment of these “tutors” to methodically supervise all the actions of the 
above mentioned organizations and, depending on their opinions and convic-
tions it is decided support or liquidate of the organization.
The so-called “patriotic” nationalist and Chauvinist organizations are sup-
ported by MGB, which is run by Vladimir Antiufeev, as well as by the Tiraspol 
municipal administration. In Transnistria the militia have no authority, they 
are under the constant pressure of MGB structures that regurarly interfere in 
different situations as they like. The participation at the pogrom of the “patri-
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ots” from the “Slavic Youth League” and “Lutici”, who have never hidden their 
anti-semite visions and who expressed their readiness “to kill Romanians”, 
meaning citizens of the Republic of Moldova.
The activity of one of these organizations and namely their leader are 
worth analyzing.
We are speaking about the “Viteaz” organization, the leader of which is 
Ruslan Pogorletki. Known for his anti-semitit visions, Pogorletki has never had 
problems according to his organizations sponsorship or tutorship. Thus based 
on “Tirotex” sport club, “Viteaz” youth “patriotic” sport club was founded. The 
numberous minutes and reports of bodies of public order against Pogoretschi 
offer us many interesting facts: “Carrying out trainings without any control” 
on “Olimpiet” stadium, Pogorletki included the “skins” movement in “Viteaz” 
and provided it with new attributes (crosses, slogans, uniform, handshaking) 
and which later organized and carryed out a series of terrorist acts (synagogue 
explosian attempt of blowing up the of the Jewish community president, acts 
of vandalism from the Jewish cemetery, etc.). All these facts were knoun by the 
workers of the law enforcement bodies long time before the evants happened, 
but they have never taken measures of counteraction.
Why? The answer is: obviously they just did not want to deal with an 
organization which is under MGB control. As some ex-members of “Viteaz” 
say, R. Pogorletki never let the control out of his hands. They said that he was 
“blessing” each action, gave advice regarding security and organization, men-
tioning he that was a weapons specialist, that he was trained in “Delta” troops 
from MGB, that he had special training in a training camp from Montenegro. 
Every summer, the young transnistrian “Führer” organized military style re-
unions for the “patriotic” youth. MGB chiefs regularly attendent reunions.
The Smirnov-Atiufeev regime was so interested to support these villains 
that it even accepted to create a special newspaper that would reflect the activ-
ity of “patriotic” organizations. For this purpose, “Youth March” newspaper 
was created, the founder of which is “Strateghia” centre, run by the chief of 
the MGB section for defence and constitutional order, Dmitri Soin. Oleg Elkov 
worked as an editor at this newspaper. The ultranationalist publication was 
youth-oriented, exalted the ideas of pan Slavism and of national and racial 
exclusivism. The newspaper regularly published articles about Satanism and 
violence, there were also offensive published articles about public persons who 
were against the polics of Smirnov – Atiufeev regime. These articles injured the 
dignity and honor of citizens, so that in 1999 and 2000 there were submitted 15 
law-suit requests against the newspaper for defending dignity and honor.
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Although it had great support, the newspaper could not avoid the sentence 
and was shut down at the end of 2000. The mass-media declared that “Youth 
March” publication was financed by Transnistrian MGB structures with the 
aim to keep the informational space from this region under control. Right af-
ter the liquidation of this newspaper, Oleg Elkov was hired by the official news 
agency “Olvia-Press”, specialized in misinformation, being an MGB structure 
and its main PR project. The ex-editor of the nationalist paper still continues 
to publish his provocative articles that have the aim to increase the hate of 
Transnistrian citizens to all that is related to the Republic of Moldova on the 
“Olvia-Press” site. We have the impression that, under the Smirnov-Antiufeev 
regime, Transnistria was transformed into a twilight zone, a reservation where 
experiments on the awareness of citizens are made. The programs processing 
socio-cultural awareness of the citizens, based on nationalist, Chauvin and 
misanthropic ideology, exported by some marginal groups from the Russian 
Federation, got deep roots in the “Nistrian Moldovan Republic”. The poison-
ous seeds of nationalism have already begun to appear. All  this would not 
have been posible without the approvement from “the top”. The creation and 
functioning of the anti-semitist nationalist organization has become possible 
due to the ideological beliefs of Vladimir Antiufeev. 
Vladimir Antiufeev never hid his beliefs. In 1995 he was on the 4th posi-
tion on the list of the Liberal Democratic Party from Russia (LDPR), lead by 
Vladimir Jirinovschi. He stood for elections in the Russian Federation State 
Duma. As the head of the MGB, Antiufeev holds control upon Transnistria’s 
weapon manufactury and sales, other illicit financial fluxes and leads person-
ally the system of political pursuit in the region. His visions may be known 
from the few interviews given by this major-general at that time. Some infor-
mation may be found in the book “About land, people and war”, edited in Kiev 
by “Nezalejnist” publication, in January 1995. Antiufeev’s hate speech is most 
focused on Colonel Mihail Bergman. Colonel Bergman was the commander 
of Tiraspol garrison and one of general Alexandr Lebed’s companions in the 
fight against Tiraspol mafia, which at that time was just at the begging of il-
licit weapon smuggling. Bergman regularly unmasked bandits in military uni-
form. Antiufeev was very clear about Bergman: “Bergman is a bastard”, “Colo-
nel Bergman is a Mossad collaborator”, “Bergman is a cheater in addition”. His 
real name is “Monia”; even the colonel’s name drew him crazy. By the way, 
the graves of colonel relative’s were also profaned. Also in this book Antiu-
feev launched declarations about “Slavic unity”, about international politics, 
with declaration like: “Romanians have a reservation here in the Balkans, the 
role that Israel has in the Arabic world”. There is no surprise that the leaders 
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of” patriotic” organizations feel completely safe and are allowed to do almost 
whatever they want as  there is no surprise that militia bodies are afraid to take 
any measures against them. Thus, for example, when 4 years ago, after another 
pogrom at the same Jewish cemetery, on the 9th of May, when people came to 
the graves of their relatives, the Russian nationalists caught one of them and 
have burnt out the Star of David on his back. The police did not do anything 
to arrest the criminals.
c. The challenge and alimentation of the chawinistic sentiment 
of the political elites from the states in the region
In relation to the Russian Federation, the effect of these threats is charac-
terized through constantly made appeals of the leaders of the regime and the 
organizations controlled by them towards the Power and the public opinion 
in Russia, appeals with the request to “defend the compatriots”, “Transnis-
tria – Russian land”, “NMR – Russia’s bridgehead”. The corruption of Russian 
politics and clerks. In relation to Ukraine, these are expressed in the determi-
nation of Ukrainian elites to degrade on the way of creating a new model, con-
ventionally named “Russia II”, instead of the evolution to “European Ukraine” 
model. It is expressed through the control and speculation of the interests of 
the Ukrainian citizens who live on the territory of Transnistrian region, mak-
ing problems for ensuring proper control on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, 
slowing down of the modernization and domestic reforms in Ukraine and, 
tolerating corruption and smuggling, especially in the region of Odessa.
This is manifested through the transformation of these elites into certain 
groups of lobby for the regime which administers the territory of the separa-
tist enclave. It is expressed in fact by direct corruption of the political leaders, 
as well as by indirect corruption through the offers to operate in common a 
policy coordinated by Moscow, the nature of which is to confer financial and 
political advantages to these leaders and their groups. As an example serves 
the kidnap of the deputy Vlad Cubreacov, member of the Parliament of the Re-
public of Moldova and of the Parliamentary Meeting of the European Council, 
made by orders of the FSB of Russia Major-general  Vladimir Antiufeev, who 
is, in the same time “State Security Minister”, as well as the failed assault to the 
President of the Republic of Moldova V. Voronin in august 2004.
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7.3. The process of illegal privatizations
The illegal privatization initiated in the Transnistria aims to attract finan-
cial means for the leaders of the criminal regime, as well as for the increase of 
interest of big Russian companies towards the existence of the enclave. In the 
view of the leaders of the regime and their protectors from Moscow, the Russian 
economic agents who have important properties on the Transnistrian territory 
will volens-nolens have to conduct a policy of hard pressure on the constitution-
al bodies of the Republic of Moldova with the aim to support their own interests 
and, thus, to maintain the existence of the enclave.
As a clear example can serve the “privatization” of the Moldovan Pow-
er Plant in Kuchurgan. The leadership of the criminal administration of the 
Transnistrian region owed a large sum of money to “Gazprom”. Only dur-
ing the year 2004 the debt of Tiraspol for the consumed natural gases has 
increased by 32 million US Dollars. As the total debt, meaning the applied 
penalties and sanctions, was about 1 billion US Dollars. Today Transnistria is 
able to pay for half of the currently supplied natural gases. At the same time 
the “Tiraspoltransgaz” company, has to pay the last one 10 million dollars in 
sanctions because of the systematic illegal bonding to the gas pipes of the mo-
nopolist company “Gazprom”.
The illegal theft of natural gases from the pipe line has suddenly increased 
with the drastic cutback by “Gazprom” of the deliveries to Transnistria and es-
pecially to the Moldovan Power Plant for the low level of a quittance and for the 
fact that it didn’t have a direct contract for the delivery of natural gases. Art-
lessly, Tiraspol doesn’t have and doesn’t plan to have the means to pay the debt 
in the near future. The sale of property is the only possibility left to make even 
with the creditors. That is why, during the last two years, the Tiraspol authorities 
have proceeded to selling the companies situated in the region. These companies 
are purchased mainly by citizens of the Russian Federation. We’re talking about 
the “Pribor” factory from Bender, the companies “Moldavisolit” from Tiraspol, 
“Buket Moldavii” from Dubasari, the wire factory from Bender and the shoe fac-
tory “Tighina”. The only objective that is able to ensure Russia with geo-political 
as well as with economic advantages is the Moldovan Power Plant on the bank 
of lake Cuciurgan. This one has been sold to the obscure “Russian-Belgian” firm 
“Saint Guidon Invest NV”, at a very low price of just 29 million Dollars.
According to the estimations of experts, the Power Plant costs not less than 
200 million dollars and at a full exploitation of its capabilities it could bring an 
annual income of 2 billion dollars to its owners. The Moldavian Power Plant 
continues to be the economic foundation of the enclave. In the period of the 
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USSR, when all 12 power blocks were functioning, the Power Plant provided the 
necessary electricity not only to the Moldavian SSR but also to a considerable 
part of Ukraine. More than that, a third part of the produced energy was being 
exported to Bulgaria. In the period of the disaster, the plant stopped working. 
Today there are being used just 2 blocks in the summertime and 4 in winter. But 
even this is enough to make the electricity for 40% of the territory of the Repub-
lic of Moldova including Transnistria. With the aim of buying the Moldavian 
Power Plant, the companies “Gazprom” and RAO EES have envisaged the crea-
tion of a consortium which would have to invest into the reconstruction of the 
Power Plant and, after the growth of the delivery capacities, to make a sort of 
energetic expansion in Europe. It was considered that with an investment in the 
Plant of 30 to 50 million dollars, the capacity of production would increase in 
two years, making it possible to export the electricity, meanwhile the Transnis-
trian region would be integrally ensured with electricity.
The exports would have assured a financial flow which would have fur-
ther been invested in the modernization of the Plant. The consortium made by 
“Gazprom” and RAO EES is planning to increase the amount of investments 
to 100 million dollars. “Gazprom” and RAO EES were those who will persuade 
Russia to give a “humanitarian credit” of 100 million dollars to the leaders of 
the regime. This credit, would have paid the Transnistrian debt for the delivered 
natural gasses through “Gazprombank”. It has to be mentioned that the debates 
regarding the sale of the Plant began a few years ago. We have the information 
that in 2000 the American “Exsson power investment company” had offered 
the Transnistrian leaders a redemption for the Moldavian Power Plant.
Besides, instead of Russian gasses, the American company was offering 
the use of Colombian coal (!). Interested in buying the Moldavian Power Plant 
were also the British, German, Italian businesses, the bureau of attorneys “Bi-
netsky and associates” from Moskow, and even the US Agency for Internation-
al Development (USAID). “Seabeco” was also interested in the Power Plant. In 
2003 Boris Birstein has brought to the Power Plant the representatives of the 
American firm “BK Group”, who promised to invest not less than 100 million 
dollars into the Power Plant. We have to remark that “Saint Guidon Invest 
NV”, leaded by Daniel Goldenberg has forwarded the same investment offer. 
There is information that Boris Birstein is the head of the “Saint Guidon Invest 
NV” administration. As a matter or fact, the lobby for the Russian-Belgian 
company has been made by the ex-governor of the Tiumen region, Leonid 
Roketsky, the son of who, Andrey Roketsky is one of the directors of the “Saint 
Guidon Invest NV” company.
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Notable is the extremely small period in which the privatization of the 
Moldovan Power Plant was operated. On December 5th 2003 the competition 
for investors has been announced and on December 19th the privatization com-
mittee requested all the necessary documents to be presented. In this febric-
ity, the people that were making lobby for “Gazprom” and RAO EES simply 
didn’t make it to finish the judicial and economic evaluations of the Plant. The 
auction has been made in a private way. The majority of the members of the 
privatization committee, after a secret voting, decided to sell 100% of the state 
owned shares of the Moldavian Power Plant to “Saint Guidon Invest NV” com-
pany. According to the affirmations of Elena Cernenko, minister of economy in 
the Smirnov administration, also the head of the privatization committee, “the 
offer of the Russian-Belgian company was the optimal one for the “Nistrian 
Moldovan Republic””. As regarding the other candidate for the privatization of 
the Moldavian Power Plant Cernenko said that “Gazprom” and RAO EES have 
presented unacceptable conditions: the Russian companies intended to sell the 
Plant on the account of the debts for the delivered natural gasses.
The secret of this rush is hiding behind the fact that Boris Birstein has 
been supported by the director of the Moldavian Power Plant Gheorghi Je-
liabov. This fact has also been confirmed by the words of the head of “Saint 
Guidon Invest NV” company Daniel Goldenberg, who promised to leave in-
tact the “head administration of the Plant”. According to certain intelligence 
the “Saint Guidon Invest NV” company is a joint project of Boris Birstein and 
Igor Smirnov and, not in the last case, this explains the preference showed 
by the members of the privatization committee. In 2005 the situation around 
the Moldavian Power Plant has changed, because of the qualitative changes in 
the process of regulation of the Transnistrian conflict. The administration of 
RAO EES began an open lobby regarding the acknowledgement of “NMR”, but 
on the other side the position of Ukraine towards the criminal enclave by its 
south-west border has changed. The anxiety to “fix” the Transnistrian region 
of the Republic of Moldova for the intervention of Russian funds has lead to 
the diminution of the influence of the “administration of NMR” and to the 
increase of the influence of their chiefs from Moscow. As a result of these proc-
esses, the Moldovan Power Plant has been transferred into the hands of RAO 
“North” company, which is a subdivision of the Russian RAO EES structure. 
At the same time, we have to mention that companies privatized by the “Sher-
iff” group are practically lost for the Russian business, because of the policy 
promoted by the administration of this very group. If wisely approached this 
circumstance, could further be efficiently used.
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7.4. The caused insecurity: threats and tested scenarios
a. Threats towards the security of the citizens: From the point of view of 
their origin, these threats are separated into two basic categories. The first one 
is about the threats to the security of citizens who adopted an active civic po-
sition. It manifests itself through constant threats to use violence upon those 
who request the demission of Igor Smirnov, as well as upon those who ap-
peal for the re-attachment of Transnistria to the jurisdiction of the Republic of 
Moldova, but first of all upon those who are actively manifesting in the field of 
developing the activity of youth NGO’s.1
The second category is about the increased criminality in the region. De-
spite the fact that in the middle and the end of the 90’s some serious excesses 
took place regarding the division of the spheres of influence resulting in the 
elimination of an important number of leaders from the criminal world, the 
region is mainly characterized by an extremely high level of criminality, much 
higher than the recorded level on the rest of the Moldovan territory. 
With the absence of any tools of supervision and responsibility, with the 
pretext of “constant war” against those who haven’t accepted the “Transnistri-
an state”, the secessionist regime is interested in maintaining certain conflicts 
on the territory, and feeding the meaning of the “besieged citadel” to the locals 
of the region. It is to be noted that in the framework of this combat tactic, the 
authorities from Tiraspol constantly appeal to certain challenges which have 
the aim to bestir conflicts and further to use the Russian peacemakers to con-
serve the obtained “tactic victories”. As examples serve the siege of the railway 
building in Bender, as well as the occupation of Vasilievca village, establish-
ment of customs points even on the territory of the villages from the left bank 
that are under the jurisdiction of Chisinau, the blockage of traffic on the freed 
territory of Copanca village (on the right bank of Nistru river), etc.
 Examples: threats of physical elimination made by the MGB officials towards the leader of the 
Union of the Liberal Youth in Transnistria Mihail Korobelnikov have lead to the fact that he 
had to request political asylum from the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
has been satisfied; the murder attempt of Andrei Ponomariov, the leader of “Pilgrim-Demo” 
organization, which collaborates with the Embassy of the United States of America, incident 
that made Andrei Ponomariov leave the Republic of Moldova; non-stop challenges towards 
the leaders of the opposition Alexandr Radcenko and Nikolai Buciatsky, the first one had 
undertaken physical violence and the second had been attacked using chemical weapons.
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7.5. The fake challenges of the transnistrian separatist regime:
In order to further assure their pivotal role of mobilizer of the material 
and human resources in the region, MGB authorities have elaborated certain 
operative plans of implication or so-called “operational response” to an attack 
from the Republic of Moldova in a “virtual” military conflict. Each of these 
plans follows a set of scenarios depending on the further evolutions. The main 
accent in these plans, as we can see, is put on the challenges from villages Dor-
otcaia, Copanca and Cremenciug. One of the plans contains the forced transfer 
of one or more villages under the jurisdiction of the enclave’s administration 
and the extremely callous treatment of the officials of constitutional authori-
ties of the Republic of Moldova. This aims at challenging the units of the MFA 
of the RM to take actions in response, which will be qualified as “intrusion 
into the NMR” with the further declaration of war, call for mobilization and 
the request for help to the Russian Federation.
Another plan contains the employment of a special initiative with the help 
of the special expedience detachment of the “Delta” brigade. Dressed up in the 
uniforms of the Moldavian police (“Scut” battalion), the armed group should 
make attempts at the representatives of the peace-maker troops of the Rus-
sian Federation. But before that, it is mandatory to maximize the tension of 
the situation in the region of action (it could be Dorotscaia village), to cause 
the stressing of the relations between locals and Russian peace-makers. Again, 
after the challenge, comes the declaration of the status of war. But in this case 
the stakes are on the fact that in such an development (the attack on Russian 
peace-maker forces) the reaction of the administration of Russian Federation 
would be faster than in the case of the first scenario, thus making it easier for 
such a plan to be applied, in other circumstances this being more difficult 
for the regime. Another plan contains the formerly formulated idea about the 
organization of challenges in the region of Varnita village (a suburb of the 
Bender City). The constant challenges in the Severnii region on the border 
of Varnita village and the city of Tiraspol show that it is available for further 
application. One of the variants of this plan regards the explosion of ammuni-
tions in a vehicle with the Chisinau registration mark. After the application of 
such a challenge, this will be proclaimed by the representatives of MGB as an 
act of terrorism done by the Moldavian special services, the fact that will also 
bring, as in the previous stated plans, to the declaration of the status of war and 
the help of the forces of the Russian Federation will be called upon. 
We cannot exclude also the eventual challenges regarding the organization 
of a terrorist act at one of the armories of the SGRT. A certain terrorist act could 
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lead, around the region of its development, to a rather difficult situation, that 
could bring to a big catastrophe. This terrorist act could be easily done by a group 
of the special expedience detachment of the “Delta” battalion of MGB. The re-
sponsibility for this act could be placed upon the special services of the Republic 
of Moldova, after that, as in the previous plans, the status of war is inducted and 
it is appealed to the help of Russian Federation. As a result of the realization of 
one of these plans, the inevitable and immediate introduction of additional mili-
tary forces of the Russian Federation into the Transnistrian region will follow, 
the fact that will lead to the creation of a qualitative new situation and, in con-
sequence, would make the process of reintegration of the Republic of Moldova 
more difficult. In case of such a development it is possible that the troops of the 
countries of the European Union would clash with those of Russia.
As we are approaching the final solution of the Transnistrian conflict, the 
MGB administration would consider any challenges with the aim to extend 
the existence of the enclave. Making terrorist acts is one of the means regard-
ing the achievement of this aim, which is seriously regarded by Vladimir An-
tiufeev. There are three real terrorist threats, not directly linked with the chal-
lenges to start an open military conflict. The first and the most important 
threat is the possible attempt of the MGB to eliminate the President of the 
Republic of Moldova Voronin. As we are approaching the final solution of the 
Transnistrian conflict, the risk of an attempt of murder of the President of the 
Republic of Moldova would rapidly increase, because the policy promoted by 
Vladimir Voronin seeks to completely eliminate the criminal regime from Ti-
raspol. We have to remark that in the situation when certain groups from Mos-
cow are really interested in the existence of the enclave, this policy makes the 
President of the Republic of Moldova an undesired figure for the conservators 
from FSB, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the representatives 
of the Russian criminal business world. Such a terrorist act could be realized 
with the forces of the special expedience brigade “Delta” from MGB, as well as 
with the help of another group of MGB.
The realization of a “classic” terrorist act (blowing up a strategic object) in 
Chisinau, with the aim of a psychological hit for the Moldovan authorities could 
be realized by officers of the “Delta” brigade. In case when we approach the fi-
nal solution of the Transnistrian conflict, for the realization of terrorist acts the 
groups of extremists from the “National bolsevic party” could be used. Targets 
for the terrorist acts could be politicians and state officials from Moldova who 
are undesired by the administration of the Smirnov-Antiufeev regime, as well as 
the objectives with a strategic importance. Also, there is the possibility for fake 
attempts or other actions with a shocking character meant, as terrorist acts, to 
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 151
unbalance the socio-political situation in the Republic of Moldova and, eventu-
ally, to paralyze the functioning of the objectives with an economic importance.
The enclave’s negative influence upon the Ukrainian policy is in correla-
tion with the actual threats towards NATO. In case if the administration of 
the Russian Federation insist upon its destructive position regarding the en-
clave, this fact will inevitably lead to the use of additional efforts regarding the 
wrap of Ukraine into the Russian Federation’s sphere of influence. A degraded 
and Russia – controlled Ukraine would present a risk for the south-eastern re-
sponsibility zone of NATO, because this will brake the supposed extent of the 
Coalition towards East. We cannot exclude also that variants of the scenario 
when the Ukrainian authorities will continue in words to imitate the process 
of becoming an independent state; meanwhile in the reality this one will follow 
the path of “Russia II” model and will be fully controlled by Moscow.
This fact presents a certain danger, being that, applying to the tactics of 
imitation and mimicry, this Ukraine could be affiliated to NATO, and there-
fore the Coalition would have a new member, thievishly controlled by Moscow 
and highly exposed to the destructive influence of the French and German 
elites, namely Shirac and Schroeder, who promote a policy foreign to the real 
interests of their countries, especially, and to NATO in general. This way or 
another, the existence of a “black hole” in Europe with its entire negative po-
tential (especially the existence of huge amounts of weapons and ammunition 
sold gradually) is not in conformity with NATO’s interests and, in the case of 
the slowing down of the process of integration of the Republic of Moldova, 
the Coalition will have to eliminate the enclave using the method of forced 
intervention. Such a case could be used by the destructive French and German 
elites to trigger the anti-American and anti-British hysteria. In the situation 
when the French and German elites will be in the opposition, there will be 
also criticized the Euro-Atlantic liberal-patriotic elites governing these states. 
Anyway, the decision to eliminate the enclave using the method of forced in-
tervention could bring to unwanted excesses, although in a certain situation 
this kind of intervention could be the only acceptable method.
7.6. Recent tendencies in the policy 
of the separatist regime:
a. “Russia’s influence”: The policy promoted by the actual administration of 
the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Moldova becomes more aggres-
sive and less responds to the actual objective processes following the tendencies 
of globalization, characterized by the spiral evolution. The attempts to re-es-
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tablish the lost influence in Moldova are followed by convulsive tactic attacks, 
characterized through a policy of sanctions and through an open involvement 
into home affairs. If in conditions of globalization, the involvement into the 
home affairs of the totalitarian states, where the human rights are violated is 
considered normal, because it has the aim to install the democratic standards, 
then the involvement of a totalitarian state like Russia into the home affairs of a 
state with a higher degree of democratic development means a challenge to the 
whole international community. The non-perspicacious policy of the Russian 
Federation will contribute to the gradual bordering of its administration on the 
European and on the international level. The pressures upon the Republic of 
Moldova, which will continue as long as Vladimir Putin is the head of the state 
and till the elites that are behind him will lead to the fact that the US and EU 
will promote a much tougher policy towards the Russian Federation and to the 
acceptance of the Republic of Moldova into NATO.
It is necessary to remark that the actual administration of the Russian Fed-
eration is betting much on its military presence in the Transnistrian region of 
the Republic of Moldova and on regaining its influence. In order to consolidate 
their positions, the presidential administration of the Russian federation and 
the administration of FSB envisage appointing in the position of “president of 
NMR” the chief of MGB Vladimir Antiufeev, major-general of the Federal In-
telligence Service. The Russian citizen Vladimir Antiufeev is being prosecuted 
by the General Court of the Republic of Moldova and the Interpol, being sus-
pected of committing a series of very serious crimes. He is practically the real 
moderator of Transnistria because Igor Smirnov has the role of a “parade gen-
eral”. The acceptance of Smirnov in the position of the leader of the separatist 
enclave was made by the KGB of USSR, as well because of its criminal past. 
Here is a short profile of Smirnov family:
Nikolai Stepanovici Smirnov, father of Igor Smirnov, during the Second 
World War has been behind the front, working as a prime-secretary of the re-
gional committee of CPSU from the city of Zlatoustie, Sverdlovsk. During this 
war he formed a gang which terrorized the city, killing and stealing. In 1946 he 
was sentenced to capital punishment through shooting, but just after 15 years 
of imprisonment which he had integrally expiated. Igor Nikolaevich Smirnov 
followed the same path: has formed a gang that was also stealing and killing. 
In 1956 has been sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment, but he stayed there just 
3.5 of them. Later on, thanks to his collaboration with the KGB, he gained the 
possibility to hide this fact in his biography.
Today the citizen of the Russian Federation Igor Smirnov and the groups 
linked with him control a fund of more than a billion US Dollars. The next one 
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in the criminal regime’s hierarchy after Vladimir Antiufeev is Grigori Mara-
cuta, the president of the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria. The Transnistrian 
referendum for the introduction of the right for private property over the land, 
which took place in 2003 and failed because of the weak presence at the bal-
lot, has been organized by Maracuta with the aim of further buying the best 
land (!) through some interposed firms. The following situation shows us how 
big the real power of Maracuta is. In 2002, after the meeting of Igor Smirnov 
with Rudolf Perina and Pamela Hide Smith from July 27 in Vienna, Smirnov 
decided to leave Transnistria. Smirnov flew to Austria with his oldest son, who 
leads the customs department and a part the business of “Sheriff” corporation. 
Analysing the situation, Maracuta requested that Smirnov gets back to Tran-
snistria, if not he will eliminate his second son, who is in charge for “Interd-
nestrkom” company. A lot of times Transnistria has been brought to the edge 
of introducing an exceptional situation, and in the military units and subdivi-
sions of MGB has been announced first degree of military alert.
Igor Smirnov is needed as a puppet for legitimizing in the eyes of Transnis-
trian citizens the criminal regime that has been imposed to them. The advance 
of Vladimir Antiufeev in the position of the “president of NMR” will signify that 
the actual administration of the Russian Federation is willing to continue and to 
intensify its confrontation with the Republic of Moldova. Even if they are pain-
ful, all these actions of Russia are meant to fail. But this calls for the involvement 
of the international community, because the small Republic of Moldova will not 
be able to oppose long enough to such a big country like Russia. On one hand, the 
involvement should be materialized into offering the Republic of Moldova of cer-
tain preferential clauses by the EU, but on the other hand into a progressive ap-
plication of pressures upon the administration of the Russian Federation in order 
to bring the foreign policy of this state to the today’s  realities. For the Republic 
of Moldova the situation will change into a better one when Mihail Kasianov is 
elected the head of the Russian Federation. If the Kremlin doesn’t start to modify 
the Costitution and organize the operation “electing Putin for the third mandate, 
but as the president of the single state Russia-Belarus”, Kasianov has got impor-
tant chances of success, because he will be supported by the international com-
munity. If Kasianov wins, the influence of Russia in the Republic of Moldova will 
diminish, and after the inevitable retrieval of the SGRT it will be minimal, limit-
ing just to certain cultural projects. But if the actual elites continue to be at the 
head of the Moscow administration, the situation will continue to be tensioned 
and just a rough position of NATO will be capable of influencing the solution of 
the Transnistrian conflict in the favour of the Republic of Moldova.
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b. “The union with Ukraine”: We have to remark that without the support 
of Ukraine it is very difficult to solve the Transnistrian problem. Regarding this 
fact, the process of the reintegration of Republic of Moldova also depends on the 
evolutions in Ukraine. If Yulia Tymoshenko continues to be the prime-minister 
we can hope for a faster solution of the Transnistrian conflict, considering the 
fact that in September it is envisaged the distribution of authorizations in the 
favour of the prime-minister. Anyway, we have to consider that the presiden-
tial administration from Moscow and the administration of FSB examines the 
figure of the secretary of the National Council of Security and Defence as one 
that should be advanced in the position of prime-minister. Regarding this fact, 
the challenges towards Yulia Tymoshenko have a constant character, including 
through the pressures from the Russian oil producers. A government subversion 
in Kiev and the advance to the posture of the head of the state of Petro Porosenco 
will certainly mean a catastrophe not only for Ukraine, bur for the Republic of 
Moldova as well, because Petro Poroshenco, as a Russia – influenced agent will 
not admit the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova in rightful conditions. 
The peak of the challenges against Yulia Tymoshenko will be in August.
There is also a big probability that Yulia Tymoshenko will stand against 
the Russian pressures and become the number one politician in Ukraine. In fa-
vour of this fact speaks the degree of her popularity, which is higher than that 
of Yushchenko and that of the new joint power, as well as the fact that after the 
mass re-privatizations, on which Yulia Tymoshenko insists, the representatives 
of the European and American businesses could be between the owners. In a 
situation like this, the representatives of the Russian business could participate 
in the process of re-privatization especially just as western partners, which will 
lead to a policy of lobby for the Russian interests of business in the West. If 
Yulia Tymoshenko maintains her function of prime-minister, – but consider-
ing a series of processes (ethno genesis, geopolitics, tectonic processes, as well 
as other processes linked with the objective process of globalization) which are 
not the objective of this study, this could be very possible, – the “PRM” will 
discontinue to exist in its actual shape in not more than a year time beginning 
with the moment of empowerment of the prime-minister and her team.
This factor is in correlation with the real threats against NATO. The first 
threat is about the fact that a degraded and Russian controlled Ukraine would 
present a risk for the south-eastern responsibility zone of NATO, because this will 
brake the process of integration of the Ukraine into the Coalition. The second 
threat is about the fact that the Ukrainian authorities which follow the path of 
degradation, meaning the creation of the “Russia II” model, will be fully control-
led by Moscow, and even if Ukraine in admitted into the NATO after imitation at 
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all levels, then the Coalition will have a new member, which is thievishly control-
led by Moscow and highly exposed to the destructive influence of the French and 
German elites, namely Shirac and Schroeder, who promote a policy foreign to the 
real interests of their countries, especially, and to NATO in general.
c. “The mechanism of coercion”: In order to constitute new democratic prin-
ciples and standards in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova it is 
necessary to determinate a model of “a mechanism of coercion of democracy”. 
It is absolutely clear that the regime that administers the Transnistrian territory 
is not capable of starting and finishing authentic democratic processes because 
of its immanent totalitarian character. “The mechanism of coercion” could be a 
mission invested with large special empowerments. Such analogies exist in Bos-
nia Herzegovina, where the function of the head of the state is practically carried 
out by the High Commissioner of the UN (At the same time in Bosnia he is a 
special representative of the European Union). It could also be a mission of mili-
tary and civil observers in the framework of the European Security and Defense 
Policy. As one of the variants, it could be possible to apply to OSCE, but just in 
the case if this organisation follows the provisions made by the Parliament of the 
Republic of Moldova. The mechanism of coercion could also be elaborated dur-
ing the application of pressures by Ukraine upon the criminal regime.
7.7. From the logic of the accomplished deed to pro-active 
policies of changing field realities
In relation to the European Union and the Republic of Moldova we notice 
a deceleration of a series of aspects in the process of integration. In relation to 
Ukraine, the appearance of legal department clauses and hesitations upon the 
sincerity of the European values and policies promoted by Ukraine. In relation 
to the Russian Federation – the economic interests come in contradiction with 
the political and humanitarian ones, regarding the conformation of human 
rights. Launching methods and means for the diminution and overwhelming of 
the risks and challenges to the security that are coming from the Transnistrian 
region of the Republic of Moldova, we have to consider the following aspects:
a. Neutralization of the MGB leaders:
The counteraction of the policy promoted by the MGB is a fundamental 
aspect for the reasonable and successful completion of the process of reintegra-
tion of the Republic of Moldova. Two persons from the MGB have to be targeted. 
We’re talking about the chief of the institution Vladimir Antiufeev and the head 
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of the department for the protection of constitutional order, Dmitry Soin. It is 
necessary to intensify the relations with Ukraine regarding the creation of con-
ditions for persons that have key functions in the structures of the enclave to be 
forbidden to enter on the country’s territory, analogically to the countries that 
have adopted such means. Actions coordinated for the development of activities 
regarding the involvement of the administration of Ukraine and of the civil soci-
ety of this country into the process of reintegration of the Republic of Moldova.
The accent should be put on coordinating the joint efforts with the 
prime-minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko hasn’t got any 
economic interests in Transnistria, thus, making her more available to par-
ticipate at the rightful solution of the Transnistrian conflict. Along with 
the implementation of the envisaged reform in Ukraine, the function of the 
prime-minister will become more important in this country, because of the 
gained authority. We have to remark that Yulia Tymoshenko was the one who 
lead, in November 2004, the operation in the Lvov region of intercepting the 
vehicle with coins destined for the banking system of the enclave and that she 
was the one who personally gave the order to the commander of the regional 
subdivision of the special expedience unit “Berkut” regarding the neutraliza-
tion of the MGB officers who escorted the vehicle. Yulia Tymoshenko is the 
most perspective Ukrainian politic, she is certainly its next leader and her pop-
ularity is higher than the actual joint power. The next official that is necessary 
to cooperate with is the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, Boris Tarasiuk. 
He is known as a firm adept of the pro-Euro-Atlantic options. He was one of 
the authors of the plan for the regulation of the Transnistrian conflict.
All the negative clauses from the plan presented by Victor Iuscenco have 
been revealed after the estimation by Tarasiuk, under the pressure of the sec-
retary of the Council for National Security and Defense, Petro Poroshenco. 
Another person convenient for establishing tight relations is the minister of 
defence of Ukraine, Anatoly Gritenco, who is also pro-Euro-Atlantic oriented. 
It is also mandatory to intensify as much as possible the coordination of joint 
actions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and with the Security 
Service of Ukraine (SSU). This is necessary for to be able to organize prosecu-
tions on the territory of Ukraine of people prosecuted by the Interpol, espe-
cially the chief of MGB, Vladimir Antiufeev and his subordinate, Dmitry Soin, 
the head of the department for the defense of constitutional order. We have to 
remark that the collaboration with the SSU could not be so fruitful, because 
this organisation is lead by Petro Poroshenco, who is one of the lobbyists of the 
interests of the criminal regime Smirnov-Antiufeev in Kiev. Such actions of 
Poroshenco are motivated by its interests in Transnistria on one hand, and on 
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the other hand by the fact that Poroshenco is an agent influenced by Russia in 
the surroundings of Victor Yushchenko.
Chisinau has to support Yulia Tymoshenko in her clash with Poroshenco, 
especially because there are possibilities in this direction: Petro Poroshenco 
holds the majority of shares of “Gemenii” J.S.C from Chisinau, but obtain-
ing the control package of this company has been made possible by violating 
a series of articles of the penal code of the Republic of Moldova. An impor-
tant thing to do is to unfold adequate actions for attracting certain respect-
able notorieties from Ukraine to the process of solution of the Transnistrian 
conflict. A special accent should be put upon the interaction with Ukrainian 
mass-media, especially with “Zerkalo nedeli” (The mirror of the week) and 
“Stolicinâie novosti” (The news of the Capital), as well as on the work with 
the most influent experts, like Olexandr Sushko, the director of the Centre for 
Foreign Policy, Reace and Conversion. Separately, it will be necessary to estab-
lish relations, which will increasingly intensify, with the organisation “Pora” 
and with its leader, Svistovich, because with the support of this organisation, 
ready for an “export of revolution”, it will be more easy to realize the necessary 
transformations in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.
The next thing is to establish contacts with the mayor of Odessa, Eduard 
Gurvitz. The previous mayor, Ruslan Bodelan, was one of the head representa-
tives of the criminal world in Ucraine. He was just covering the entire economic 
activity of the regime on the territory of Odessa region, where the Iliciovsc port 
is situated, being one of the key transport channels, to the well functioning 
of which the existence of the enclave depends. Eduard Gurvitz was also the 
mayor of Odessa, but had to leave this posture after, on the indication of Leonid 
Kucima, the elections have been invalidated and one hundred thousand bal-
lots (!) expressed in the favour of Eduard Gurvitz have been burnt. Gurvitz is 
now one of the most important opponents of Kucima, because at that time the 
Ukrainian ex-president has deprived him from the chair of mayor of the city, si-
multaneously bringing him a serious business prejudice. The conflict between 
these Ukrainian politics appeared when Eduard Gurvitz attempted, with the 
help of the representatives of Chechen criminal world, to take control over the 
oil terminal in Odessa. In the case of preliminary contacts with Gurvitz there 
is a big possibility to reach to an agreement so he will ignore the requests that 
inevitably will be formulated and the contacts that will also be inevitably estab-
lished with him by the emissaries of the criminal regime from Tiraspol.
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b. Forming an adequate lobby towards the political elites 
in the Russian Federation:
Regarding the unfriendly policy of the Russian Federation towards the 
Republic of Moldova and the openly made brake in a lot of fields of the reinte-
gration process, including by systematic interference in the home affairs of 
the Republic of Moldova we have to establish contact with the forces that are 
in opposition to the actual regime from Kremlin, meanwhile continuing the 
diplomatic activities to show the Russian administration the wrong and the 
non-perspicacious character of the chosen path regarding the RM. Those from 
the opposition would be Boris Nemtsov, Irina Hakamada, Grigori Yavlinskii, 
Garry Kasparov, Vladimir Ryzhkov. The last is one of the deputies with a lib-
eral orientation from the state Duma of the Russian Federation and could be 
of a special help. Taking into account the consolidation of democratic forces 
at the 2008 elections, the resonance of the declarations and actions made by 
the opposition will continue to grow. Starting from now on, we have to estab-
lish relations with Michail Kasianov, the main candidate of the opposition for 
the 2008 elections. The criticism of the actions of the authorities of the Rus-
sian Federation from within the country, on the background of pressures from 
without and of the intransigent position of the Republic of Moldova, could 
have a relatively benefic effect, which could be used with the aim of propa-
ganda in favor of the reintegration process of the Republic of Moldova.
A special attention would have to be given to the relations with Russian 
mass-media from the opposition. There is a slight progress in this direction, 
but only the interest of the oppositional publication “Komersant” and the ra-
dio station “Eho Moskvi”, in the processes in the Republic of Moldova and 
treating them more or less objective is clearly not enough. At the same time 
inhibited remained such publications like “Novaya Gazeta” and “Moskovskie 
Novosti”, known for their oppositionist sights. It is necessary that the interests 
of the Republic of Moldova are promoted including through the creation of a 
positive picture of the reintegration process and through forming in Russia of 
an objective attitude towards the criminal regime Smirnov-Antiufeev using 
the means of the television channel Ren-TV, whose news blocks are making it 
the most oppositionist of the Russian television channels. Other than that, a 
project should be launched to open in Chisinau a representation of the RTVi 
channel which, even if not received on the territory of the Russian Federation, 
it is being watched in all the post-soviet countries, in Israel and in USA.
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c. The constant intensiﬁcation of the NATO – 
Republic of Moldova relations:
We have to realize that the security of the Republic of Moldova could be 
guaranteed only by NATO. In order for the Republic of Moldova to make its 
way to the European Union, some security guarantees are necessary, which 
only the Coalition could offer us. The conditions of adherence to the NATO 
are more facile than those of adherence to the European Union and could be 
carried out in an immediate perspective. The only impediment is the presence 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova of the obsolete provision about 
neutrality. This article has been included in 1994 with the aim of preventing 
by law the fixation of presence of the Russian military bases on the territory 
of the Republic of Moldova. Today this problem is already not actual and to 
further advance into the building of a modern democratic state, the Republic 
of Moldova has to integrate into NATO. One of the most important assign-
ments, immediately after the completion of the Republic of Moldova – NATO 
Plan of Actions, is to exclude from the Constitution the article about neutral-
ity and starting the implementation of the Plan of Actions as a member of the 
Coalition. The adherence to the NATO will permit the Republic of Moldova to 
further avoid the Russian attempts to bring it back under its protectorate and 
to feed the separatist tendencies on its territory. 
The Coalition is able to offer the Republic of Moldova the help critical for 
solving the Transnistrian conflict. Despite the declarations of partnership with 
NATO the administration of the Russian Federation has considerable fears re-
garding this organization, because it realizes that in case of a conflict Russia 
doesn’t stand a chance in the clash with the forces of the Coalition. The consoli-
dation of the relations of the Republic of Moldova with NATO will lead to an 
inevitable increase of pressures from the Coalition upon the Russian Federation 
with the aim to determine the administration of this country to end the effec-
tive occupation of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.
d. A special policy of promoting the territorial reintegration 
of the Republic of Moldova:
The elaboration of a complex Plan of creating the mechanisms of coercion 
to democracy or the elaboration and implementation of means to support this 
process for the eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova; the concentration 
of the efforts of the Parliament, the President and the MFA of the Republic of 
Moldova in promoting the idea regarding the imperative need to cancel the 
160 MOLDOVA ON THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY
main debtor obligations of the Republic of Moldova, including those of the 
Transnistrian region, including the penalties owed to the states and economic 
agents referred to.
A special and obligatory clause would have to be the elaboration of a special 
policy to actively promote the idea of reintegration of the Republic of Moldova 
between the citizens in the Transnistrian region. It is advisable that the made 
efforts are promoted differentially in two basic directions: 
Creating certain oppositional groups and movements of different orienta-
tions in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, as well as adopt-
ing ample means of supporting them.
Carrying out a series of actions for attracting to the side of the adepts of 
the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova of deputies at all levels elected in 
the representative bodies of the enclave, directors of companies, middle-sized 
and small entrepreneurs, all types of officials.
We can also point out to a series of means justified under practical aspects, 
like: the elaboration of a special joint policy of the Republic of Moldova and Ro-
mania regarding the bilateral relations with the accent on the amplification of 
efforts to solve the Transnistrian conflict; the intensification of accents on the 
application of penal legislation in the directions related to smuggling, illegal eco-
nomic activity, as well as terrorism; the elaboration of a plan to create a Zone with 
a special fiscal regime in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.
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C h a p t e r  V I I I . 
THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
IN THE BLACK SEA AREA: STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
FOR ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA 
Dr. Dan Dungaciu
“We want Russia to get bored with NATO and NATO enlargement”
Madelin Albright, 
US Secretary of State, 1996
“Keep in mind that Romania’s approaches are not strictly in the interest 
of Romania. We have commitments to our European partners, our NATO 
partners. As a frontier-country of the two structures – European Union and 
NATO – we have to promote the interests of these structures, not only our in-
terests…: the Black Sea will become secure when it becomes internationalized, 
when the solutions that were adopted at the Mediterranean Sea are adopted. To 
become an area of peace it must be taken out from the unique influence of Rus-
sian Federation and I am convinced that president Putin will accept a process 
more or less rapid for the internationalization of the Black Sea, given the strate-
gic importance that the extended area of the Black Sea has already achieved.”
President of Romania, Traian Basescu, 
Bucharest, July 2005
“We consider the elaboration within PARP of objectives of the partners-
hip for the realization of the national army reform and of measures regar-
ding the amelioration of the capacity of our armed forces to operate together 
with NATO forces of special expedience.”
President of the Republic of Moldova, 
Bruxelles, June 2005
I underline that Moldova had a positive and close relationship with 
NATO during the last 10 years, being member of the Partnership for Peace 
Programme. This relation, which was encouraged by us, is a part of the vi-
sion of president Bush in the case of Europe, which is seen united, free and 
peaceful…Article 10 of the North-Atlantic Treaty stipulates that any Euro-
pean country that shares the principles of the Treaty, wishes and isable to 
contribute to the assurance of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, can become 
a member of the Alliance, if it is invited to do this by the countries which are 
already members. Moldova could become a member someday, too.”
Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USA in Moldova, 
Heather M. Hodges, August 2005
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The analysis provided in this paper attempts to explain the variegation of 
security aspects and geopolitics in what is called ‘the extended region of the 
Black Sea area’. The main idea behind this text is that, although the interest for 
the region has massively increased lately, this far there exist only the premises 
for the outline and implementation of a strategy in this area. The text below 
has to be read because of this, too: it aims at outlining the premises and main-
frame of such a strategy.
The arguments will be exposed in several levels. The first one regards the 
geopolitical interpretation of the space in question, respectively the fixation of 
mainframes to a geopolitical analysis, which would permit the understanding 
of evolutions and dynamics that marked this space. We will then proceed to 
the evaluation of the region from the perspective of security dimensions, with 
the statement of the ample signification that the concept acquired after 1990 
and that, naturally, has to be regarded in the case of the respective region as 
well. After these two steps we will conclude that the need to delimitate the 
Black Sea area, as a security region, imposed almost with necessity. 
Recently, these favorable premises that regard the geopolitics and security 
of the region were joined by another one, as well as important and with a po-
tential that is impossible to ignore. We are talking about the European political 
context, which makes today, and especially tomorrow, the interest for the Black 
Sea area to grow – in addition, the need for a regional strategy to be even more 
pressing. We will review these political evolutions which announce significant 
strategic changes at the scale of our continent with direct impact on the region 
we are interested in. 
In the second part of the study we effectively outline the elements that 
may generate a strategy at the Black Sea, beginning with the premises and 
eventual similarities that can be detected on the continent. The stress will be 
put on Romania and its role in the region in the context of its double mem-
bership – in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and, after 2007, in the 
European Union. Thus, the pattern is taken over from two older Euro-Atlantic 
initiatives – NEI and NDI – which proved to be efficient in relation to the ad-
vance of the Euro-Atlantic frontier to the North Sea and Baltic countries. The 
important actors and mainframes of such a strategy at the Black Sea will be 
evident in this section. In this context, we will also insist upon the strategic op-
tions of Romania and the Republic of Moldova in the context of advance of the 
Euro-Atlantic frontier to the extended region of the Black Sea. A whole section 
will be dedicated to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, the importance, 
of which to our opinion is crucial in the present strategic conjuncture at the 
Black Sea. Finally, we will draw some conclusions and will warn about the 
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threats that can lead to the blocking or canceling of such a project – the most 
obvious: the fallacious solution of the Transnistrian conflict which is looming 
today in some gestures and declarations coming from the East and West, in-
cluding from Bucharest. 
8.1. Geopolitical context: 
Black Sea – the space of Euro-Atlantic frontier
All the significant (geo)political events – evolutions and stagnations – that 
took place around the Black Sea have, to a greater or smaller degree, the mark 
of a global geopolitical progress. More precisely, they are determined by the 
advance of the Euro-Atlantic frontier to Central Asia, by the indecision of these 
institutions to establish the border ample enough to include nations that wish 
to be part of this space.1
Here we are talking about the Euro-Atlantic space, suggesting, between 
lines, an institutionalized definition of Europe. In fact, it is the definition that 
explicitly and implicitly explains the affiliation to Western institutions, espe-
cially EU and NATO. Here the stress falls not on the cultural or geographical 
Europe, but rather on the institutional Europe. Parenthetically, the oratory of 
American officials on the subject of “coming back to Europe” has methodical-
ly marked these elements after 1990. The idea of America to create an “integral 
and free Europe” practically meant the expansion of the Western institutional 
framework illustrated by NATO and EU towards the East. In April 1997, for 
example, the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright considered that the central 
reason of NATO expansion “is the correction of the mistakes of the past. If we 
don’t expand NATO, it would mean that we validate the Stalin vector imposed 
in 1945 and which was fought against by two generations of Europeans and 
Americans” (Browing 2002:6). Also, president Bush, addressing to the students 
from Warsaw, on June 15th, 2001, outlined the idea that the new democracies 
of Europe must have the chance to join the European institutions, and about 
NATO he stated that “we must be interested in how much we advance on the 
way of freedom.” The idea is clear: the will to eliminate the interior borders of 
Europe was becoming synonymous to the expansion of NATO (Bush 2001).
Getting back to the “technical aspects” of the approach, it must be said that 
frontier would mean, in the theoretic mainframe used here, the dynamic aspect 
 The conceptual mainframe used in this analysis was developed in another work. See Ba-
descu, Dungaciu 995.
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of a geopolitical evolution, respectively the totality of processes through which 
a historical expansion, a nation, a civilization or an empire etc. manifests itself. 
The frontier, as a dynamic aspect, causes and maintains a wide variety o spir-
itual and institutional processes, which we call frontier processes. The border is 
the static, stable (established) aspect of the advance of a frontier. The advance of 
a frontier is set somewhere, on a border. But this does not automatically mean 
that, once the border is set, the dynamics of the frontier advance process disap-
pears or is suspended. On the contrary, when we deal with an artificial (political, 
geo-strategic) setting of a border we as well assist at the perpetuation of frontier 
manifestations, and the area where such evolutions take place is called frontier 
area.2 These frontier spaces, respectively those zones that forward – justified 
or not – claims or affiliation to a certain area and inclusion in the interior of a 
border to which they do not have, as yet, access, are frequently, geopolitically 
speaking, areas of crisis, of geopolitical turbulence, which cannot be decrypted 
or understood right without taking these aspects into consideration.
This kind of frontier area is the region of the Black Sea today. There is 
nothing clear there if the advance of the Euro-Atlantic frontier and the conse-
quences that this advance – and especially the setting of the artificial border 
on Prut – generates are ignored. Today the Black Sea is, geopolitically speak-
ing, an Euro-Atlantic frontier area.
8.2. Two geopolitical axes: East-West and North-South 
It was sometimes too much spoken about “axes” in relation to the area 
of the Black Sea, and not only. Nevertheless, the abundance of the discourse 
had only one effect: it left the problems unsolved, and the reader confused or 
convinced that everything is only a political speech, lacking substance and 
field relevance.3 But the term “axis” has importance and signification, and two 
explanations should have been offered at the time of its launching. On one 
hand, that its significance is firstly geopolitical, and only in the second place 
political, and on the other hand, that the sense of the “axis” is not the West – as 
2 Only in case if the setting of the border of advance of a frontier process is natural, thus 
organic, the frontier area stops its existence. The typical case here is, for example, the ad-
vance of the protestant frontier in Europe. This advance stopped, organically, at the border 
of the orthodox area, so the setting of the protestant border happened by itself (it is not 
adequate to mention here why the things are namely this way).
3 The way in which those assigned with the explanation of the significance of the presidential 
declaration have acted contributed only to increase the climate of confusion and to dimin-
ish the prestige of the subject.
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it was abundantly and mistakenly speculated –, but the East. The geopolitical 
signification of the axis results from what is described in the previous section, 
respectively the advance to the East of the Euro-Atlantic frontier. This advance 
to the East of the Euro-Atlantic frontier has structured the geopolitical space 
on two major geopolitical (strategic, economic etc.) axes, namely the North – 
South Axis (Russia – Armenia – Iran) and the East – West Axis, which in-
cludes, via Caucasus and the Black Sea, the essential energetic resources from 
Caspian Sea and intended for the Western countries. 
The mentioned axes only delimit a region – the “point” which could be Az-
erbaijan – of fundamental security also on the agenda of great common rooms 
with interests and influence in the region.4 It is not the case to describe here 
the so-called “extended area of the Black Sea”, because a description was made 
elsewhere. This area should include all the three Caucasian states – Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan –, the Euro-Asiatic energetic corridor, which links the 
Euro-Atlantic system to the energetic reserves from the area of the Caspian sea 
and to the states from Central Asia. In addition, it is about a stable system of the 
Black Sea North of Transnistria, Odessa and Sokhumi, because a stable system 
supposes the solution of “frozen conflicts” along the North-East curve and the 
accest to big commercial rivers that flow into the Black Sea: the Danube, the 
Nistru and the Nipru. At that moment, the concept of extended area of the 
Black Sea will be so broad and varied that the area of the North Plain of Ger-
many or the area of the Baltic Sea/North (see: Ron Asmus and others: 2004). 
These political axes have become visible especially after 2000, when in Moscow 
president Putin comes to power. Finally, the geopolitical context and area has 
to be marked more frequently by orange landmarks or stakes with flower scent. 
The result of this geopolitical confrontation is what we see today around the 
Black Sea. Now let us set the mainframe in which the security problems of the 
area must be perceived and assessed.
8.3. Analytical mainframe of the regional security
Walker Connor, one of the most important American historians, com-
mented somewhere on the main drawback of the domain which is called “for-
eign affairs”: these specialists tautologically tell us that the states make war 
because of “state reasons”, but do not bother to explain what does this raison 
4 For a general presentation in terms of security context, see Herzig 2000; for a presentation 
of foreign policies and conflicts in the region, see Bertsch and others… 2000; for a geopo-
litical analysis of the area, see Thual 2004. 
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d’etat mean, who and how legitimates it. And he was right, at least regarding 
the approach of foreign affairs or the security that prevailed until not long ago. 
For understanding the significant evolutions from this field, until the matter 
of identity becomes, for Copenhagen for example, a crucial item on the secu-
rity agenda, we have to rewind, even if concisely, the movie of the evolution of 
the domain we are concerned by in this work.5
After World War II, the doctrine of realism Ineo-realism – with stress 
upon the bipolarity of the system – was dominated. One of the characteristics 
of this doctrine from the perspective of our immediate interest is the distinc-
tion between “high politics” and “low politics”. The issue of security is related to 
the first aspect – “security” regarded mainly the “politico-military” problem. 
The issue of environment, economy, social and “home” problems belonged to 
the second field. “Low politics” was becoming interesting only in the moment 
of a direct impact in the diplomatic or military field. 
This dichotomy was to enter a crisis after 1990, as well as the definition of 
“security”. The collapse of the USSR has lead not only to a crisis of the world 
political system, but also to a crisis of the theory that supported it. As Edward 
Kolodziej shows, the security of the Soviet Union was totally compromised not 
by the lack of military capacities – enormous at that time –, but because of so-
cio-economic reasons. The observation has decisive consequences, and mainly 
for the distinction of “high” and “low politics”, which progressively diminish 
their relevance. The failure of the “traditional” definition of security opens the 
perspective of a new debate which does not make itself expected and which in 
fact undertakes some of the trends detectable already before 1990.
Barry Buzan is a fundamental author here. His work from 1983, People, 
States, and Fear marks the most pregnant reconsideration of security prob-
lems. The idea that security must be reduced to the “study of threats, use and 
control of military forces” (Stephen Walt) – the classical definition-, irremedi-
ably enters into crisis. The target of Buzan’s work – the 1991 edition of which 
will have a greater impact than that of 1983 – is the redefinition of the concept 
of “threat” and the achievement of a useful connection between “threats” and 
“vulnerabilities”. Crucial questions now become: “Namely what must be se-
cured?”, respectively the object of security, and “Against what threats should 
the reference object be secured?”. To a great degree these questions were those 
5 Here we will use McSweeney 996, 999, Terriff… 999; Bird and Croft 200. See Dungaciu 
2004 as well. For an excellent analysis of the evolution of security problems in the 20th 
century, see Hough 2004.
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around which the security debates are centered from now on. For Buzan, the 
“security of human communities is affected by various factors in five major 
sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. The military 
security regards the game in two levels of offensive and defensive capabilities 
of the states and the perception of states regarding the perceptions of each one. 
The political security regards the organizational stability of states, systems of 
government and ideologies that confer them legitimacy. The economic security 
regards the access to resources, markets and capital, necessary for supporting 
acceptable levels of welfare and power of the state. 
The societal security regards sustainability, in acceptable conditions of 
evolution, of traditional language, cultural and religious patterns, as well as 
patterns of national customs and identity. The environment security regards 
the maintenance of the local and global biosphere as an essential support on 
which depend all the other human activities. These five sectors do not operate 
separately. Each one defines a focal aspect in the mainframe of the security 
problem and a method for ordering priorities, but all of them are linked to-
gether by a strong linking network” (Buzan 1991: 19-20). After this Buzan de-
limits the “international system”, the “states” and the “individuals” as “objects 
of reference” and the military, political, economical, societal and environmen-
tal spectrums as potential sources of threat for the respective “objects of refer-
ence”. However, for Buzan, at least in this work, the main object of reference of 
any security analysis must remain the state.6
Besides the a roused criticism and disputes – or maybe namely because 
of that! –, the book has become one of reference in the study of international 
relations. A commenter, Ken Booth, wrote in 1991 about the volume: “…re-
mains the most complete and complex theoretical analysis of the concept of 
security in the literature of foreign affairs until now and, since its publication, 
we, the rest, still write its footnotes” (Apud Bird and Coft 2001). The 90s mark 
the appearance of a true reflection school, in which other researchers wish 
to undertake and continue the model joined Buzan. The group will be called 
“Copenhagen School”. The culmination of these efforts is the work from 1998, 
Security: A new Framework for Analysis, in which the authors continue the 
analysis of security in military, societal, economic, environmental and politi-
cal terms. These dimensions operate at different levels: states, groups of indi-
viduals (nations), regions or global contexts. The model is willowy and suffi-
6 Critiques were present, of course – why not the “individual”? –, and this option of Buzan 
was attributed to his “neo-realist” past. 
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ciently subtle to include issues ignored for too long: poverty, migration, human 
traffic, environmental risks, economic or political threats. 
The conceptualization of security has gone further within the school. Ole 
Waever, for example, in 1995 opens the problem of security to its approach as 
the “state’s” “discourse”, from here comes the ambiguous relation between the 
two. Waever talks about the “existential” threats addressed to the states and in-
dividuals, from here comes the appearance of the concept of “securing” – with 
reference to the object and strategies of security –, crucial in the analyses of this 
polymorphic school, which comprises researchers coming from neo-realism, 
as Buzan, or post-structuralists, as Waever. The importance of the school, de-
spite the criticism over years, is enormous, and not only on theoretical level 
(see McSweeney 1999). A fundamental fact for our goal is that it was felt in the 
strongest military alliances of all times. 
In 1991, at the summit in Rome, NATO decreed – in a language that conspic-
uously reminds that of Copenhagen School –, that the security now has five di-
mensions: military, societal, political and environmental. It is the most durable 
and concrete performance of this perspective: it put its mark on the highest level 
of global politics. One more reason for being assumed at its real magnitude.7
8.4. Political context
The political context appears to become a favourable one for a more con-
sistent and efficient approach to the Black Sea’s agenda. We are talking about 
the change of stresses in the European politics, from the so-called “Euro-con-
tinentalism” (neo-gaullism) to “Euro-Atlantism”. As all commentators of the 
area have unanimously observed, “during the last years the German chancel-
lor Gerhard Schroeder, together with the president of France, Jacques Chirac, 
have opted for a neo-gaullist concept about Europe, which tends to build its po-
litical and geo-strategic identity in opposition to the United States of America” 
(Vieregger 2005).
7 Romania, in its turn, is today a NATO member state, obliged to conform its security ap-
paratus to the requests resulting from this adherence. We refer to the elaboration of na-
tional security doctrine and, accordingly, to the definition and elaboration, depending on 
this doctrine, of all the logistic apparatuses – military forces, special services, legislation, 
intellectual and academic centres, research institutes, conferences, publications, encyclo-
pedias etc. – for putting it into practice, with all its components. In addition, all the com-
plexity of the security problem is one of the elements which make the Black Sea, including 
the Republic of Moldova, a target of maximum interest for Romania. 
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But the electoral changes outlining in Berlin suggest changes in the German 
foreign policy strategy. This is what interests us the most here. The pre-election 
polls each time show consistent advantages for Angela Merkel (around 15-20%) 
compared to the candidate of the Social Democratic Party. Angela Merkel will 
be, in the eventuality of her election, the first German chancellor from Eastern 
extraction from the post-Nazi period. This detail must not be neglected, if we 
take into account that the Christian-Democrats from the East of Germany re-
gard America much more positively that the average of the country, and share 
at least reticent ideas regarding the Russian Federation – according to other 
opinions, the Russian Federation would be the main threat for Germany’s se-
curity. In addition, Angela Merkel represents a new type of politics in Berlin 
– a new type of “right”, with admiration for the Anglo-Saxon people, especially 
for the British model. The similarity with the French minister of Home Affairs, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, from this point of view is important. (Bordonaro 2005).
Signals in this direction were numerous as well. Regarding the presence 
of Germany in Irak, Merkel is not content by the absence of Germany in the 
area – in addition, in Berlin and Washington there were discussions about the 
positive opinion expressed by Merkel in relation to the American president 
George Bush and his policy in Iraq. There are many opinions that affirm that 
an “eventual victory of Merkel will bring Germany to the Kohl period, when 
Germany was the main partner of the USA in Europe. Secondly, Germany’s 
interests for newcomers to the EU will be synchronized with those of Great 
Britain, particularly in the extended area of the Black Sea. Even if the Berlin 
– Moscow energetic partnership will continue, Merkel will be much more cau-
tious with this partnership, in order not be in opposition with the targets of 
Washington in the Middle East or Central Asia (Bordonaro 2005).
This is the reason why in Washington “everybody concentrates on what 
comes after Schroeder”, affirms Stephen Szabo, specialist in European prob-
lems at Johns Hopkins University (apud. Ibid.). If “what comes after” is Angela 
Merkel with her vision about Germany as an “honest broker” between differ-
ent players with in an Atlantic community affected by conflicts, she will have 
to work hard for the amelioration of relations with America. Angela Merkel 
knows this and probably she will try to do it – even if she hesitates to include 
clearly this point in the electoral platform of her party. 
These evolutions will influence the relation of Germany with Russia, on 
one hand, and that of Europe with Russia, on the other hand. As it was already 
mentioned, Germany had a “complex foreign policy”, in which it tried to bal-
ance the expansion of the EU to the East and its privileged relations with Rus-
sia (Russia as a commercially and energetically strategic partner). However, 
170 MOLDOVA ON THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY
the complexity of this policy, which is talked about recently, cannot ignore the 
Paris – Berlin relation as a crucial axis of foreign policy. The most important 
aspect here is, however, the decrease of the role which the Paris – Berlin alli-
ance will have in future. If the foreign policy of Schroeder or Chirac was one of 
detachment from the foreign policy of the USA, this time might predominate 
the principle of complementariness, together with the changes from Paris and 
Berlin. Indeed, while Schroeder is busy with the declaration of his firm confi-
dence in this reliable mechanism, Nicolas Sarkozy, the holder of the Ministry 
of Home Affairs of France and the potential successor of Jacques Chirac in 
2007, has already expressed his feeling that this Franco-German cooperation is 
outdated. On June 27th, he declared to the French press that “an expanded Eu-
rope cannot continue to be alimented only by the power of a engine in cycles” 
(apud. ibid.) Therefore, there exist the premises for the re-definition of the for-
eign policy of those two countries, if not radically, then at least significantly, in 
case of major changes in Paris and Berlin. The switch of Europe’s foreign pol-
icy – in case something like this will be brought about – from “neo-gaullism” 
to “Euro-Atlantism” will be a good thing for a strategy at the Black Sea and, 
implicitly, for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the states in the region.
8.5. The East is the epicentre of responses of the earthquake 
in the EU or the need for a strategy in the Black Sea
Besides these favourable contexts, we must also approach the elements 
which make the strategy at the Black Sea an unquestionable necessity. The fail-
ures of referenda for the European Constitution in France and Holland for some 
European commentators transformed into a true “earthquake”. An earthquake 
the responses of which where most acutely felt in the Black Sea, and Romania, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are the most affected coun-
tries (Emerson 2005). But the effect will be felt in Belgrade, the whole South 
Caucasus and in Moscow, too. Not all virtual or actual partners of the EU have 
felt the shock in the same degree. The effect of the shock was directly proportion-
al with the will of the respective states/regions to finally integrate in the EU. From 
here comes the idea that the partner states included in the so-called Process 
from Barcelona do not feel acutely this shock since the Arabic states have never 
really had expectations or wishes to integrate in the EU (ibid.:1).
But the situation is different at the Black Sea or in the Balkans. This valve 
sticking which occurred at the level of Western Europe has short- and medi-
um-term effects and these must be identified. As we have already mentioned, 
we deal with a gradual effect of the European earthquake. For example Roma-
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nia and Bulgaria, which have already signed the Treaties of adherence, must 
pass through the ratification process through the parliaments of the EU mem-
ber countries. Given the fact that the ratification is made by parliamentary 
vote, the chances of success are big. Nevertheless, how some commentators 
suggest, there may be emotions, especially if the integration of Romania and 
Bulgaria will be delayed until 2008, and the ratification will take place in the 
middle of the election campaign for the presidential elections in France. Tur-
key comes on the second place, with the date for starting the adherence nego-
tiations set on October 3rd. The pros and cons debates have began again, and 
grey clouds may gather upon Turkey, especially if the elections will accredit the 
Sarkozy and Merkel couple in France sud Germany. The above mentioned are 
followed by the Baltic states, members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC), including Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, with Macedonia being the 
applicant state. From June 16th-17th, 2005, the Council of Europe has encour-
aged there states regarding the adherence to the EU, some significant groups 
of European level even suggesting 2014 as target year. (ibid.2) 
Now comes the turn of states included in the “Policy of Neighbourhood” of 
the EU, namely the Ukraine, Moldova, and the three states from South Cauca-
sus, the most affected by the “earthquake” from the EU and which now see their 
chances of integration in more and more dark colours. The shock is even bigger 
because, in the meanwhile, new regional initiatives appeared, among the most 
significant being the so-called “Baltic – Black Sea axis”, respectively the “club of 
Georgia’s friends”, to which have adhered four new member of the EU (Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Poland), together with Romania and Bulgaria (February 
2005), the resurrection of GUAM (the Summit from Chisinau in May 2005 be-
ing an important element) or the particular interest which Romania, through 
president Traian Basescu in the first place, show for the area of the Black Sea.
Under these conditions, the question that surprisingly arises today is re-
lated to the moment which was reached in the field of relations between these 
countries and the Western institutional area: which are the risks that arise 
regarding the democratization of this area in the context of a blockade of the 
process of Euro-Atlantic integration? Namely: was the critical mass of the de-
mocratization process reached in that region to a degree that a blockade/re-
duction of integrationist processes would not affect the already triggered de-
mocratization? (Ibid.:4). Our answer is no! More than that, we think that a 
slowing-down of the integrationist processes will generate a massive set-back 
of the democratization of the area and will trigger a short- and medium-term 
crisis which will be handled with difficulty by the EU. The need of an update 
of European policies and of some signs that the area was not abandoned is 
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imperative. Moreover, the need of an authentic strategy at the Black Sea today 
asserts more pressingly than ever. Before approaching this issue directly, we 
will mention a few more moments in its premises: what are the precedents on 
which this kind of strategy could be based?
8.6. Elements for a strategy in the Black Sea Area: 
The Baltic Sea case
So far, despite the initiative launched in 2004 by German Marshall Fund, 
by institutional networks or by the debates with this vector (Asmus… 2004), 
there does not yet exist an authentic strategy at the Black Sea. The field politi-
cal and geopolitical realities are and at the same time are not the most favour-
able premises for such an adventure that had already entered the horizon of 
expectation of at least the countries bordering on the Black Sea. The divergent 
interests, the sometimes contradictory affiliations make this region with few 
collaboration traditions, historically speaking, hardly to place under a single 
efficient institutional cupola. In 2003-2004, the years when the mainframes of 
the future strategies were being created, the Black Sea presented itself, institu-
tionally speaking, in this eclectic form (Aydin 2004:21)
Participation of countries from the extended area of the Black Sea in interna-
tional and regional organizations8
BSEC EU NATO OSCE GUUAM CIS Collective 
Defence 
Treaty from 
Tashkent 
SECI Stability 
Pact 
WTO
World 
Trade 
Organiza-
tion
Council 
of 
Europe
Albania X SAA EAPC X X X X X
Armenia X PCA EAPC X X X X X
Azerbaijan X PCA EAPC X X X O X
Belarus X EAPC X X X O
Bulgaria X A EAPC X X X X X
Georgia X PCA EAPC X X X X X
Greece X x x X X X X X
Macedonia AC SAA EAPC X X X X X
Moldova X PCA EAPC X X X X X X X
Romania X A EAPC X X X X X
Russia X PCA EAPC X X X O X
8 X – Member State; A – Accession Country; N-NA – Non-Negotiating Accession Country; 
AC – Applicant Country; EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; O – Observer State; 
PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; SAA – Stability and Association Agree-
ment.
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Serbia &
Montene -
gro
AC SAA X X X O X
Turkey X NNA X X X X X X
Ukraine X PCA EAPC X O X
For integrating these countries with diverse affiliations – some of them con-
tradictory! – there is needed imagination, commitment and persistence in the 
project. There are no standardized formulae and no guaranteed solutions. Among 
the projects circulated and implemented on the continent, with relevance for the 
area of the Black Sea, we consider that two deserve the most profound attention, 
exactly for offering a number of suggestions for what should be an Euro-Atlantic 
strategy at the Black Sea. Their acronym is NEI and, respectively, NDI.9
The Northern European Initiative (NEI) is a political strategy launched by 
the USA in September 1997, during the second mandate of President Clinton. 
The fact that it was so little written about it and that it was discussed relatively 
seldom, makes it one the most interesting American initiatives, especially for the 
expanded area of the Black Sea. Its origins are found in an article of RAND ana-
lysts, Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick (the first one will become the Second 
Secretary of Stat, USA), appeared in 1996 in Survival periodical (Asmus and Nu-
rick 1996). The target of the article was to find a solution for solving the problem 
of Baltic States and of the affairs with NATO regarding the expansion to come. 
The relation between NATO and the USA was evident in this case. In 1998 the 
US-Baltic Countries Charter is signed, and NEI becomes an option of future.
The adherence to NATO in 1999 has not included the Baltic countries, 
only Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. The exclusions were made firstly 
thanks to Moscow’s opposition, generating the idea that the expansion from 
1999 may be cited under two aspects: on one hand the USA are favoured by 
the expansion and Russia by blocking the Baltics. In this case some had spoken 
about passing from geopolitical games with a null sum to a “win-win” game 
situation (Tassinari 2004: 198-201). NEI tended to be placed somewhere in 
between. The idea of cooperation with Russia in Northern Europe is a geopo-
litical event and change of attitude. The cooperation covers many of the fields 
that are part, after the NATO Summit in 1991, of the category called “soft se-
9 We will base our analysis on the most ample work that exists today on this subject, namely 
on that of Fabrizio Tassinari: see Tassinari 2004. In addition, for the problems of Baltic coun-
tries and security in the area, see: Lieven 993, Bildt 994, Brundtland 994, Asmus and Nurick 
996, Conference… 996, Lejins and Ozolina 997, Burke and Cilluffo 997, Puheloinen 997, 
Jopp and Arnswald 998, Brzezinski and Larrabee 999, Browning 2002.
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curity”. The NEI agenda is based on 6 priorities: promoting trade and business, 
promoting the rule of law, building the civil society, energy, environment and 
public health. The applicability area was, as we mentioned: Baltic countries, 
North countries and Russia. The target was not any more a formula of “games 
with zero sums” type, but a “win-win situation”. Nevertheless, the articulation 
of NEI with NATO, from here the inherent realism of the project, is an essen-
tial element for the comprehension of the American strategy in the area. (See 
Browning 2001 and 2002 also). 
The initiative has never disappeared with the political changes at the White 
House. In October 2003, Bush launched the so-called Enhanced Partnership 
in Northern Europe (e-PINE). This new American initiative was built on the 
experience of NEI and regarded the continuation of the basic pattern and phi-
losophy – in addition, it claimed a possible export mechanism in other similar 
areas. What this policy really meant was seen later: a temporary and softer 
substitute for the actual presence of NATO in the area (Tassinari 2004: 200). 
In fact, it is about the illustration of the fact pictured concisely by Colin Powell: 
“NATO is the fundament of our affairs with Europe. It is something inviolable. 
Weaken NATO and you will weaken Europe, that will weaken America” (apud. 
Browning 2002). In conclusion, NEI and its “eyeball”, e-PINE, have opened 
new paths of action and collaboration for the North dimension of Europe, es-
pecially between the Baltic countries and Russia. No matter what the initial 
intentions were, the interpretations were almost never similar or convergent, 
from this result the syncopes and malfunctions.  
The Europeanization of this collaboration on Northern scale of the old 
continent will not be delayed and will get the allure of an applied and consist-
ent policy, even if it is not free of syncopes. NDI or the EU Northern Dimension 
Initiative was launched in 1997, but its roots are more distant (Tassinari 2004: 
201-204). In order to understand the premises of this European initiative, two 
previous elements must be brought into discussion: the regional policies that 
had begun to be promoted in the “Baltic Sea Regional Initiative”. In 1995 was 
launched the idea of a regional mainframe of dividing Europe into seven re-
gions, one of them being the region of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea Regional 
Initiative is launched in 1996, and the two initiatives become, as we were say-
ing, the premises of the project to come. 
NDI is launched in September 1997 through the discourse of the Finnish 
Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen – Findland’s initiative remains since one of 
reference regarding foreign affairs. In his speech, he stated: “a policy dedicated 
to the Northern Scale must be based on the definition of the interest of the 
Union in the area”. It must be mentioned that, for understanding this initiative 
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and its success “the Finnish label that existed in the periods before the project 
was submitted and implemented must not be neglected.” (apud. Tassinari 1994: 
205) As it was well observed, the EU was now becoming not an actor, but the 
actor in the area. The European dimension of the initiative was outlined in the 
speech of the same person: “the Northern dimension of the EU is not a regional 
initiative, but regarding the politics of the whole Union.”
The plan forwarded by the Finnish minister confirms this modification, 
because the initiative pursued five main problems: economical cooperation, 
infrastructure, natural resources, environmental cooperation, frontier coopera-
tion. In essence, it is about the non-military security issues exposed in the 
initiative of the EU Commission in 1996. Regarding the relations between this 
project and the expansion of the EU, the Finnish prime minister has outlined 
not only once the fact that the two are not at all exclusive: “in fact, NDI is al-
ways ahead, supporting and completing the expansion process.”
The initiative from 1997 has caught attention rapidly, because it already 
came from a constituted horizon of expectative. Rather fast, it achieves recogni-
tion of EU scale. In November 1998, the Commission issued a Release regarding 
NDI. The three Northern presidencies of the EU are constituted in favourable 
factors of promoting the project. There were organized Ministerial Conferences 
on this issue and a Plan of Action was forwarded, which was supported at the 
Council of Europe in June 2000. The Plan of Action followed the initial project 
of the Finnish minister, and indicated clearly a series of priority targets, namely 
the environment, energy – more specific, the access to the immense resources 
of the Russian Federation –, human and scientific resources, health, criminality 
prevention and the issue of Kaliningrad. The financial aspect was to be regu-
lated by the community framework: TACIS, PHARE and INTERREG.
As the commentators of this project mentioned, the main problem is that the 
ambiguity of the Plan of Actions was, equally, the force and weakness of NDI. 
The addition of Russia to the program was an element that made the project less 
efficient and introduced syncopes. The ambiguity functioned, because it was 
left at the discretion of the parties to decide the limits or the depth of implication 
in the relation with the Russian Federation.10 Nevertheless, the openings offered 
by the Plan of Actions must not be underestimated, and the energetic dimension 
of the project – that generates the importance of the Russian Federation – was 
a significant initiative in a moment in which Moscow was not so important on 
0 For the perception between the Baltic countries and Russian in matters related to the secu-
rity problem see Jaeger  2000.
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the oil market as it is today. The thing that lacked more was, according to Fab-
rizio Tassinari, the “lack of political view”. The lack of clarity and foresight of 
Bruxelles – there is no fixed budget, administrative flexibility, lack of centraliza-
tion – made the project not reach the ambitions of its initiators.
Nevertheless, the project was not abandoned, and at the European Council 
in Bruxelles from October 16th-17th, 2003, during the Danish presidency, was 
adopted the Second Plan of Action, for the period of 2004-2006 (Ibid.:213). 
The Plan of Actions was centered on five sectors: economy, human resources, 
environmental problems, trans-frontier cooperation. This time there were ac-
centuated two points rather ignored previously: regional cooperation and the 
addition of Russia (one of the targets was Kaliningrad.)
The result of these projects is not the object of this study. It is sufficient 
to remind here that the Baltic countries were included in NATO during the 
second stage of expansion and, after that, in the EU (2004). Which was the 
contribution of these projects is too soon to be told. There is no sufficient proof 
for evaluating such a thing. But it is certain that they had an important role in 
these evolutions and – because of this! – can be used as patterns for other ar-
eas. The area we suggest is the extended area of the Black Sea, which nowadays 
needs a “Finland” the most!
8.7. Black Sea – comparative analysis
The extended region of the Black Sea can be understood best in a compar-
ative context, the comparable elements being the two European seas already 
included, even if partially, in the Euro-Atlantic area: the Mediterranean and 
Baltic Sea. Generally speaking, Fabrizio Tassinari identifies three analytical 
framings for the description of cooperation at the Baltic Sea from the fall of 
Iron Curtain until the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries, as it 
can be seen in the image below.
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The first framing coincides with the appearance of what Tassinari calls 
“regionalism from below”, namely a natural regionalism, historically located, 
revived and now promoted by a small number of Scandinavian intellectuals.11 
This group had an extraordinary logistic importance, because they were the 
voice that expressed and systematized a number of field initiatives in this direc-
tion. They have become real “regional actors” and have indicated the potential 
for the subsequent regional construction. “The common experience, the new 
feeling and life altogether characterized the North, they told, can be reformu-
lated with regard to the Baltic Sea also”(apud. ibid.:274). The Baltic Sea has a 
sufficiently rich history, own myths and mythologies capable to generate a con-
sistent regional identity. The idea of debates was not opposed to the state initia-
tives that intended to build a regional identity, on the contrary, a “top-down” 
approach was welcome, but with complementary function, and never as a main 
accelerator of the project. The intervention of institutional actors marked this 
first stage, and the creation, in 1992, of the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) has finished it. For the “founder parents” of this institutional structure, 
this formula was “a symbolic step for building a new, united Europe.”
The second framing, which lasted until 2004, is characterized by foreign and 
security policies that may be put under the title of Europeanization. In fact, at 
the Baltic Sea there existed three categories of states situated under this regional 
cupola, with different agendas. Namely, the “Old Europe”(Germany and North 
countries), the “New Europe”(Poland and Baltic countries) and Russia. Given 
the institutional location or different interests, the three agendas were not every 
time similar, especially regarding security problems. In Tassinari’s opinion, there 
can be identified two discourses that regard security problems. The first was 
prominent in the first half of the second framing, and regarded the expansion of 
NATO and the EU. Its terms were confrontational, traditional, namely hulling a 
geopolitical game of null sums. The Baltic region (BSR) was placed in that period 
at the border of two “quasi-empires”, the EU (plus NATO) on one side and Rusia 
on the other. For the first camp, the expansion of the EU and NATO meant the 
expansion of the Western military complex to the East and the achievement of 
a more secure and securitized Europe. For Russia this was a loss, an invasion of 
the “near neighborhood”and threats for its own security.
The second discourse more probably marked the second half of the second 
framing and was identified as “dimensionalism”. Here are included NDI and 
 It is an aspect that never existed at the Black Sea, which was and still is important in the 
economy of developing a cooperation process in the area.
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NEI. Together with these initiatives was introduced a mainframe of increasing 
the interdependence by securizing the non-military aspects, a different one in 
relation to the first framing in which the stress fell on the military dimension. 
This dimension was accentuated in the third framing, post-2004, in which the 
discourses related to security/securization went together with the political one. It 
must be outlined here that the security problems related to environment, for ex-
ample, were extremely important. From this point of view, the Baltic Sea is an ex-
ception, not a pattern. The gravity of the environmental problem in the Baltic Sea 
has forced this regional collaboration. (From this point of view, the similarities 
with the Black Sea are obvious, and one of the “engines” of a collaboration at the 
Black Sea should be the problems of environment – disastrous in the region.)
8.8. The Baltic and the Mediterranean Sea
There is significant literature that tries to compare the type of coopera-
tion at the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea (Maestro 2001). Firstly, it was 
outlined that both are “closed seas”. Both regions “benefit” from the presence 
of EU states – France, Italy, Spain, and Greece etc. in case of the Mediterranean 
Sea –, applicant countries – Turkey and the Balcanic area – or non-member 
states – Northern Africa or the countries of Middle East. In addition, in both 
cases the presence of the EU regarding the coordination and activation of the 
regional collaboration was massive.
Beyond similarities, it seems that the differences still prevail (Tassinari 
2004: 282-283). The experience of regional collaboration has not gone through 
the same chronological order – if in the case of the Baltic Sea the post Cold 
War period was that in which the collaboration had practically begun, in the 
case of the Mediterranean Sea the things were clarified long ago from this 
point of view. “Tabula plena”is the syntagm used to mark this case. Secondly, 
the initiation and promotion of the region of the Baltic Sea was inspired by 
what happened at the Mediterranean Sea. NDI was inspired by what was called 
the “Barcelona process”, the framework through which the EU is involved in 
the Mediterranean Sea starting with 1995. The differences are important here 
also. Thirdly, the Mediterranean dimension of the collaboration was deficient 
with regard to the collaboration of actors from the region. The reasons are 
obvious: the extraordinary diversity around the Mediterranean Sea defies any 
tentative to put all the actor under firm control. It is more natural to speak here 
about sub-regions, as the Adriatic, Egee Seas etc. 
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8.9. The Baltic and Black Sea
Even if more quantitatively and qualitatively limited, there still exists lit-
erature that tries to compare the Baltic case with that of the Black Sea (Vahl 
2001: 9-10, Emerson 2001). The latter is also surrounded by states with diverse 
affiliations: future EU members – Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, non-member 
states – Ukraine, Georgia, Russian Federation. For now, the poor collaboration 
at the Black Sea has taken shape in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, about 
which we will discuss in one of the following sections. 
The differences greatly surpass the similarities. The EU presence is incom-
parably reduced, the same as that of NATO. If in the Baltic case the security 
problems accentuated the non-military aspects, namely the soft-security, in 
case of the Black Sea the challenges are (also) of other nature. The so-called 
“frozen conflicts” from the region bring forward concrete threats and of hard 
type (Tessarini 2004, 283). The region starts to catch the Western interest by 
an initiative that was little talked about(it is true that it did not have a resultful 
path.) The so-called Eastern Dimension is one that begins to make its way to the 
agenda of interests of the Euro-Atlantic political actors and regarded the “new” 
EU neighbours, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Russia etc. The initiator 
and main “sponsor” of the initiative was Poland, a country that entered the 
EU in 2004. Poland has discussed about these issues since 1998, and in 2003, 
a “non-paper”of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland starts to circulate in 
the Western common rooms. The Polish suggestion invoked the experience of 
NDI, specifying that the ED does not intend to become a competitor of NDI, but 
rather complementary to it. It should be built on the experience of the Northern 
Dimension and on that of the process from Barcelona” (apud. ibid.284).
Regional differences are significant, of course. The so-called “frozen con-
flicts” from the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Nagorno Karabah, the dic-
tatorship from Belorus, the poverty from Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova, 
the massive dependency on Russia of the states from this region etc. In addi-
tion, unlike other cases, the regional idea of the Black Sea has appeared only 
sporadically and inconsistently at local elites.12 Unlike the region of the Baltic 
2 In Romania an exception is the temporary appearance of the consistent publication named 
EUXIN, Magazine of Sociology, Geopolitics and Geo-history, Editor: Euxin group, trimes-
trial publication, no. -2, 997, p.328. In the program of this publication it could be read, 
among other things, that: “The gordian knot of NATO is the euxinian society, with its 
limits, its multitude of relatives and its invincible Orthodox Christianity. Euxin wants to 
answer this challenge which makes the Euxin Griff a centre of the world and Romania a 
trio confinium of the three big regions of problems: Atlantic, Russian and German.”
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Sea, that from the Black Sea includes countries that have no immediate chances 
to adhere to the EU. The Polish suggestion indicates from this point of view the 
fact that these countries must not be denied this possibility. The door has to 
stay open, irrespective of the fact how far is this perspective. It is interesting to 
apprehend that “the ED strategy regards four East-European countries, among 
which Poland does not figure. This is a different situation from that of Finland, 
for example (or even that of Poland), which was included in NDI” (ibid.: 285). 
The philosophy changes: “it is not about inclusion or participation, but about 
the identification of one another and securization, which NDI (in part) and 
the region of the Baltic Sea wished to get over. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus 
are threats that have to be solved, problems that must be settled, unlike the 
challenges that would arise if their incorporation was regarded”. In addition, as 
it was noted, the Polish non-paper referred to the Russian Federation only en 
passant, without discussing the distinct status of this country or the enormous 
influence regarding other countries. The influence of this initiative, which did 
not explicitly regard the Black Sea, was reduced.
8.10. Romania – Finland at the Black Sea
The premises set at this point are, of course, as a rough guide. With regard 
to the capacity of exporting the “Baltic pattern” or its compatibility with the 
Black Sea, things must be taken with precaution. If there exist similarities be-
tween the region of the Baltic Sea and that of the Black Sea, however, they are 
more probably of morphologic or geopolitical nature. 
The main difference relies in the different degree in which these regions 
were affected by Europeanization.13 The Baltic Sea is by far the most privileged 
region, because the other regions were almost not at all affected by the expan-
sion from 2004. Secondly, there are no “hard” security problems at the Baltic 
Sea anymore, which would slow down the processes, which is not the case of 
the Black Sea, where these are priorities. Thirdly, the aspect of “inclusivity” 
has dominated the cooperation at the Baltic Sea since its very beginning, was 
visible and efficient, while in the rest of the cases, especially in the case that 
interests us here, this element was not present. (Tassinari 2004: 286). The con-
clusion, according to which the Baltic Sea is an exception in this context, and 
not the rule, seems to be right. 
3 One of the broadest – but worn out – definitions of Europeanization would be the degree 
in which the domestic/home changes were caused by the European integration.
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Nevertheless, the “Neighborhood Policy” of the EU, which regards states 
from the mentioned region (as well) in concrete Plans of Actions (2004) can-
not be ignored (Emerson 2004). It is a step, and a significant one. Besides this, 
however, there were gathered a series of evolutions that make things impossible 
to stay at this stage. The idea of a strategy at the Black Sea, which has some con-
sistent premises, as we have already seen, has become an imperative today.
Firstly, in order to avoid a project crisis in this area, specified by the skep-
ticism settled at the level of the EU population and also at the level of some 
important political leaders, the EU will have to upgrade its integration policies 
so that it would compensate the European effort regarding the adherence to the 
union of the countries from the area. The CEPS researcher, Michael Emerson, 
considers, for example, that such a reevaluation based on the idea forwarded 
by Romano Proddi, according to which the spaces must “accept anything but 
institutions”, is necessary, reiterating the mainframe already launched by the 
former Chief of the European Commission: I. Politics – democracy and hu-
man rights and education; II. Economy: macroeconomy, market economy and 
economic networks; III. Security – justice and home affairs and foreign security 
(Emerson 2005: 5; see also Emerson 2004). In addition, it is suggested to change 
the name from “Neighborhood Policy” to “European Integration Policy”, which 
would better suit the interests of the respective governments and states.
Which would be the role of the Black Sea area in these evolutions? As we 
have already seen, without being fully assimilable, the Baltic pattern offers some 
suggestions. We must start off from the idea that the Black Sea is today the only 
European natural “outskirt” which was ignored by Bruxelles (Aydin 2005). The 
resurrection of this problem in Bucharest, especially together with the integra-
tion of Romania and Bulgaria in the EU, may reopen the file. The old exist-
ent structures which have influence at the Black Sea must be re-calibrated and 
coordinated, and some of them adjusted to the realities. The case of Economic 
Cooperation at the Black Sea is the most important. The actual format of BSEC 
is insufficient, and Romania has to fight diplomatically for its change and ad-
justment. In autumn this year, Romania will receive the presidency of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation, which “is extremely important from the point of 
view of promoting our strategy on the extended area of the Black Sea”(president 
Basescu, September 2005). This institutional framework is insufficient.
The EU was initially invited by the BSCE, but refused to participate, and 
Russia has then declared the high officials of BSEC that “the active implica-
tion of the EU will not be well received”. In May 2005, the USA was denied the 
status of observer, what placed America somewhere below Slovakia, a country 
that has the status of observer. (Russia is considered the country that blocked 
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the implication of the USA, a fact that infuriated 8 post-Soviet countries at the 
Black Sea, which publicly declared that the USA must be admitted at the de-
bates. Turkey did not comment on the event, even if BSEC is its “product” and 
it could have influenced the decision. In addition, the amelioration of relations 
between Russia and Turkey will make BSEC more unfunctional. 
Under these conditions, the initiative must be taken urgently. As it was 
already suggested, Romania and Bulgaria could be committed to what was 
called by a commentator the “Black Sea Forum” (Emerson 2004: 6), namely 
an institutionalized framework based on the initiatives described above and 
eventually co-sponsored by the EU. All members of CEMA should adhere to 
this mainframe, plus, mandatory, the United States of America. What should 
come after this is a Plan of Action at the Black Sea, supported financially by 
the European Union. The relation with Russia should be negotiated in this 
new mainframe – situation similar to NEI or NDI. An important point of the 
agenda must be NATO, which under the conditions of relative recoil of the EU 
in the area must take over the Euro-Atlantic integration. If we should resume 
the several ideas that are now on the market and expect a regional actor – a 
Finland! – capable of giving them coherence, these would be the following:
• The crisis of referenda from the EU are to be compensated with fresh 
initiatives, because the risk of dropping from the processes already 
initiated by the Euro-Atlantic area should not be underestimated in 
the conditions in which the critical mass14 for integration has not yet 
been produced in the majority of countries from the extended area of 
the Black Sea;
• The EU has to upgrade its policies in the area, respectively to pass from 
the “Vicinity Policy” to the “European Integration Policy”;
• The need of a new strategy at the Black Sea is imperious. Romania (toget-
her with Bulgaria, eventually) would have to take an initiative and try to 
formulate an inspired coherent project probably inspired by initiatives of 
NEI and NDI type; the idea of a “Forum at the Black Sea” in which the 
4 When we affirm that the critical mass for the North-Atlantic option was not reached yet it 
means that we are not at the moment of reaching the institutional and human (functioning 
of institutions, level of education and orientation of the persons from political and civil 
administration, economic, cultural or social trade, political agreements etc.) after what the 
process of Euro-Atlantic integration becomes irreversible or, at least, that it is impossible to 
come back to the former Soviet area (CIS etc.). This aspect – reaching the critical mass – is 
the thing that differentiates most firmly the Republic of Moldova from Romania or Bul-
garia for example. (If this critical mass is reached with the sincere agreement of the political 
leaders who generate it or without their agreement is of no importance, after all.)
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 183
EU and the USA will be represented at the top, must be brought, together 
with the BSEC members, to discussion more frequently and applied.
• NATO has to become a fundamental actor in the region, especially 
in conditions of a relative temporalization of the EU expansion in the 
region (Emerson 2004: 7).15
Therefore, the strategic directions of Romania, together with its European 
integration, must stay oriented especially towards the Black Sea, because only 
this way it can bring significant ideas and contributions to the table of foreign 
policies of the EU. The Black Sea is, as Gheorghe Bratianu said during the 
inter-war period, the actual area of Romania’s security.16 It is now appropriate 
to write some words about the (geo)political actor who needs, in our opinion, 
to take over a good part of the initiative on this area in the conditions when the 
EU, respectively NATO has pushed the stop button. Anticipating, we already 
suggest that the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization should be the only main 
strategic option for the Republic of Moldova. 
8.11. NATO and the Black Sea
Besides the suggestions made above, there exist some concrete foreign and 
home solutions that make the adherence to NATO of countries from the region 
imperious.17
Failure of the EU constitution and its eﬀects for the Eastern area
One of the effects of the blockade apparently reached by the EU is the spirit-
ual state of the population from the “grey area” of adherence, namely those states 
that have made revolutions (or evolutions) (also) for contiguity, then for integra-
tion in the EU. Faced by a refusal, we can expect that, gradually, they would go 
5 Before elaborating a strategy, Bucharest has to proceed to immediate action of early warn-
ing regarding the Transnistrian issue. The initiatives circulated nowadays risk to compro-
mise not only the solution of the conflict, but even a Euro-Atlantic strategy in the ex-
tended area of the Black Sea, a part of which is the conflict from Transnistria (we will be 
regarding some issues in the last part of this material).
6 For an evaluation of Bratianu’s analyses dedicated to the Black Sea see volume I of Badescu, 
Dungaciu 995: 03-0; Dungaciu 2004a: 292-298).
7 Including the Republic of Moldova, because the perpetuation of the “neutral” status of this 
country – artificial anyway, given the fact that foreign troops are still on its territory, de-
spite its own will – is a mistake. Of course, the management of this process  must be made 
with determination and intelligence and with an eye on the events from the East region of 
the republic (Transnistria). 
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back, i.e. to where the “colourful revolutions” got them out from for a big period 
of time… Signs of satisfaction in this sense were already recorded in the capital 
of the Russian Federation. Alexei Makarin from the Centre of Political Technol-
ogies in Moscow declared on June 7th, 2005, according to RIA Novosti, reacted 
this way after the failure of the EU referendum: “in this situation, Russia has an 
opportunity window. Unlike the EU and the antagonisms between the states 
from which it consists, Russia exercises only one political will. Russia offers its 
neighbours concrete and lucrative economic projects, not only hope of integra-
tion in a far future. In the same time, Russia asks for much less in return from its 
neighbours. On the contrary, every step towards the European integration, even 
the most primary, is accompanied by numerous economic and political condi-
tions. This is why, after the wave of colourful revolutions, the pendulum can go 
in the contrary direction. The labour parties from Georgia, the Progressive So-
cialists from the Ukraine and Rodina Movement from Moldova, which support 
the integration with Russia, could benefit from a big chance.”
This opinion was not the only one. According to Russia up to date Agency, un-
der the title of “The failure of the European Constitution – a chance for Russia”, 
Alexander Dughin, geo-politician, the leader of the Euro-Asiatic International 
Movement, created on the basis of the pro-presidential movement, “Euro-Asia”18, 
publishes a significant article in Rossiiskaia Gazeta at the beginning of June. The 
voice of Dughin is not the only one in this matter, but he is probably the most 
articulated. We give his text to indicate a clearer style of thought and approach.
In Doghin’s opinion, “the European integration represents a geopolitical 
process, a result of two rather different vectors. The increasing confrontation 
of these two vectors was the factor that generated the present European crisis. 
The problem resides in the fact that, in the first stage – 60s-70s, the process of 
European integration was prepared exclusively in the mainframe of Atlantism 
strategy – under the control of the USA and in the interests of NATO.” We 
are talking about the consolidation of the Western world before the “Soviet 
threat”. This was a stage of a strategic plan in the spirit of the dual logic of the 
“Cold War” – “capitalist Atlantism versus socialist Euro-Asiatism. The stagna-
tion of this NATO version of Europenism still exists today. This phenomenon 
can be named “Euro-Atlantism”. In this process, “a primary role is reserved, 
as always, to the United States and their close ally on the Old Continent, Great 
8 Alexander Dughin was one of the founders of the National-Bolshevik Party (the holder of the 
party member card no. 2, and no. was reserved for the leader of national-Bolsheviks, Eduard 
Limonov). The “Euro-Asiatic” ideology of Alexander Dughin is based on the priority of the 
state’s interests, counteract of the world globalization and “fighting Americanism”.
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Britain, as well as to the newly entered states (not without pressures from the 
USA) from Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. Euro-Atlantism anticipates 
the NATO subsequent expansion to the East and follows the traditional line of 
the “Cold War” geopolitics, even if one without ideological significance.” 
Euro-Atlantism insists on accepting former soviet republics, now “or-
ange” – Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, to NATO and the EU. It stands for the ad-
mission of Turkey, makes pressures on Moscow with regard to “human rights” 
and Chechnya, attentively and tolerantly observes the separatist tendencies 
from North Caucasus and Povoljie. Euro-Atlantists count on liberal ideology, 
called on to make the European economy and socio-political system closer to 
the ones in the USA. 
Rejected by the French and Hollandaise, the project of European Consti-
tution was elaborated by Euro-Atlantists and reflected their major priorities – 
equality in rights for all the countries, orientation towards the acceleration of 
including the CIS countries and Turkey in the EU. After the collapse of the 
USSR, another vector was observed in the European Integration, embodied in 
two giants of Europe – France and Germany. These two countries, with the 
most evolved economies and industries, with profound social (anti-liberal) ten-
dencies. During the European integration, around the Paris – Berlin axis there 
gradually began to form a second alternative – the identity, nucleus of “another 
Europe”. This phenomenon can be called Euro-continentalism. The essence of 
Euro-continentalism resides in the fact that the unified Europe is not thought 
of as a satellite of the USA and not as part of the Western world in the middle of 
vertiginous globalization, with a unique system of values, but as a geopolitically 
and historically independent subject with its own agenda, interests and with its 
own cultural, social and economic specific. Euro-continentalism refuses the 
logic of “Cold War” and anti-Euro-Asiatism, especially because the ideological 
motives are history. In the opinion of Euro-continentalists the “community of 
values” between Europe and the USA means less today, and the difference in 
interests of the Middle East and Eurasia is, in its turn, more and more evident.
As a conclusion, Dughin states: “Totally unexpectedly, after its colossal 
failures in geopolitics in the post-soviet area, Moscow has got a chance. The 
strike made by the French to Euro-Atlantism is especially advantageous for 
Russia. From now on, the chance of fast integration in the EU of the “orange” 
opponents from CIS has fallen out, Euro-Atlantism has weakened and, in con-
sequence, the positions of Russia consolidated. Now Moscow has only to cor-
rectly and efficiently use the failure of its opponents.” The Republic of Moldova 
must evaluate correctly the situation created and to decide firmly the direction 
it will follow in the far or near future. 
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Internationalization of the Black Sea
President Traian Basescu has recently appreciated in a public intervention 
that the Romanian-American partnership is based on two elements active: le-
gal and military presence of the American forces at the Black Sea “by establish-
ing new bases in the Black Sea area” and the internationalization of the prob-
lems of this area, which is one of the mechanisms that guarantee peace in the 
area. We can mention here a comparison with the Mediterranean Sea, former 
area of conflicts, until its internationalization was achieved and the final es-
tablishment of the VI American Fleet and other forces in the area. This would 
be the solution for the Black Sea, too. Today, the Black Sea is under the control 
of the Russian Federation (with its 6 bases), but the latter does not assure the 
type of internationalization of the Black Sea that would generate stability and 
democracy in the area by itself. (Dungaciu 2005).
There would be something more to add to this topic. It regards an ex-
tremely interesting news. Lenta agency announced, on June 12th, 2005, that 
the Italian vice admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, commander of 
the united military marine forces of NATO in Eastern Europe, warned that, 
in 2006, the “Active Endeavour”, antiterrorist mission that has been carried 
out for several years in the Mediterranean Sea, will expand to the Black Sea, 
too. Here the position of the Russian commentator after hearing the news is 
interesting, too. This is what the cited agency writes: “The way of carrying out 
the Atlantization of the Black Sea will be seen by the way in which the Active 
Endeavour operation evolves in the Mediterranean. On the background of this 
operation there was applied, for the first time, article 5 of the status of NATO: 
on September 12th, 2001, on the day after the attack on WTC. Formally, Active 
Endeavour has begun on October 26th, 2001, at the same time with the issue 
of formal order, in the Southern perimeter of the Mediterranean. At that date, 
NATO ships have proceeded to the actual course of the operation, supporting 
the international campaign against terrorism. Officially, Russia cannot for-
ward any requests to the Organization. With the exception of Russia, Georgia, 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine have access to the Black Sea. Even if 
they are not member yet, Georgia and the Ukraine strongly support NATO. As 
to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, they are already members of the Alliance. 
Russia is practically alone. There is only one thing left for it: following the Brit-
ish saying – If you can’t beat them – join them, to sign for the mission. This way, 
Moscow will be able, to a certain degree, to protect its interests in the region. 
And let’s not forget that there is the problem of Crimea, of Sevastopol Ukrain-
ian harbour – the main base of Russia’s fleet from the Black Sea. According to 
the same comment, Kiev is so eager to join NATO as Tbilisi is, and they will un-
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doubtedly try to use Active Endeavour in their own favour. “It is more than sure 
that the presence of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol will be stopped after 2017. If 
until that date Ukraine and Russia will keep the same political direction, in 2018 
Sevastopol will become a NATO base.” The “internationalization” of the Black 
Sea is a process from which the Republic of Moldova won’t stay away. The access 
to this crucial process for the area can be made only by the firm and total open-
ing to the process of joining the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Why NATO? Home arguments
Integration in the EU and NATO cannot be seen as two different processes, 
at least at first. The idea of NATO as a political project is essential. This is the 
reason why, for example, the declarations of some Ukrainian officials accord-
ing to which “if we would take care of the Ukraine’s military aspect it would 
have the possibility to join NATO in 2-3 years” must be read with seriousness. 
The Ukraine does not have clear chances for joining NATO this soon, and the 
elections from 2006 may be decisive. The reason? NATO is not only a military 
project (Iceland, NATO member country, has no army, and North Korea, even 
if one of the most advanced armies in the world, with this regime, will never 
join NATO), but a political one, as well. The democratic values, in the first place, 
must be defended and politically exported. So, at least for the first instance, we 
can talk of complementarity between joining the EU and NATO.
Therefore, we refer to the “non-military” functions that NATO carries out 
and which, although left aside by some authors, are crucial for any regional evo-
lution. These functions are extremely important, especially in the area that be-
longed to the USSR and where societies had not found the balance necessary for 
a functioning adequate to their objectives. These societies lack the mainframe 
in which they would function adequately. Now we come to the crucial function 
that NATO could fulfil: that of rationalising a society. The obvious systematic 
crisis suffered by the states in the area – crisis of functioning of the institu-
tions, democratic deficit, elite selection etc. can be passed over only by changing 
the rationality regime of the system in its integrity. These major modifications 
– as in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, for example – are not taking place 
(only) in the interior – they happen much faster and more efficiently when the 
mainframe (form) of the evolution of processes is established from the exterior. 
NATO could function as such a mainframe, the most plausible by now and that 
could generate the necessary change of the system of functioning (social, politi-
cal, economic etc.) of the states from the area of the Black Sea that have not yet 
integrated, including the Republic of Moldova. More than that, the Republic of 
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Moldova and other states from the region do not need to direct their projects 
of Euro-Atlantic integration only towards the EU. They have to try alternative 
solutions as well, and the most accessible today is NATO. In addition, it is more 
realistic as well, in conditions in which the EU seems to be more aggressively 
going to the closing of doors and not their opening.
8.12. NATO – a strategic course of the Republic of Moldova
When, in 2003, during the big manifestations of protest organized by the 
CDPP, in the Great National Meeting Square were fluttered – for the first time 
in the Republic of Moldova! – the flags of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, the reactions were contradictory. Some were amazed, other saluted them 
tacitly, and the majority stood concernedly, not saying a word, expecting the 
consequence with fear. To the relief of the latter, the continuation did not take 
place. Not a single political debate – as yet the CDPP is the only political party 
that continuously supports the adherence of the Republic to NATO –, not a 
single public debate have taken place in the Republic of Moldova. The journal-
ists, political commentators, analysts etc., with rare exceptions, have kept the 
silence with regard to the subject. The very recent political signs have broken 
the ice and have promoted comments that appreciated the NATO option posi-
tively. This is very good, even if regrettable afterwards. 
The debate is more necessary today, when it becomes more and more clearly 
how fluid is the situation of the Republic of Moldova from the security point of 
view, how little it depends on itself and how much on others, who do not neces-
sarily wish its good. The AP OSCE resolution (Washington, July 1st – 15th 2005) 
plus other so-called plans of solving the conflict from the East of the Republic 
of Moldova have already provoked the stupefaction and irritation of the political 
leaders from Chisinau.19 This was well deserved – to systematically ignore the 
9 Beginning with the so-called Iuscenko Plan and continuing with those that put the idea of 
elections in Transnistria in focus, before the demilitarization and decriminalization of the 
area. In addition, here comes the intolerable passing-by of what the parliament of the Repub-
lic of Moldova has already accepted, namely the organic Law on the principles of solving the 
Transnistrian difference, adopted on July 22nd by the Parliament of Moldova. A stupefying 
example took place at the beginning of September, when the representatives of the Ukraine, 
Russia, OSCE, the USA and the EU have approved the suggestion of starting the preparations 
for creating an international mission for organizing free and democratic parliamentary elec-
tions in Transnistria. Vladimir Ogrizko, prime vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Ukraine, has made a statement about this during a press-conference in Kiev, specifying that 
the respective decision was adopted in conformity with the result of negotiations that have 
taken in place in the “3+2” formula, in which participated representatives of the Ukraine,
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declarations of the parliament from Chisinau from June 10th, this year and to 
force Transnistria into elections when Chisinau walk more and more firmly to-
wards the EU and NATO means, for a short term, to write the electoral campaign 
of separatists – the “Nazis from Chisinau unite with the Nazis from Romania 
and join the camp of American imperialism!” –, and for a long term, to place the 
whole Republic of Moldova under the direct and indirect control of Tiraspol and its 
protectors; more than that, to definitively block the Euro-Atlantic adherence of 
Chisinau. This causes the imperativeness of a discussion of this kind.
Republic of Moldova and NATO – signiﬁcant steps towards 
a decision that was too long delayed
A fast review of the documents issued by NATO clearly indicates the fact that 
the functions, attributions and effects of joining the Alliance are today different 
from those resulting from this deed before 1989. The assumptions are total, the 
actions of the Alliance as well. Hence the insistences of the Western officials that 
the political dimension of joining NATO is crucial, or the stress on “unconven-
tional threats” which threaten Europe or NATO from within the area of the Black 
Sea: drugs smuggling, illegal migration, arms and human trafficking etc.
The Republic of Moldova is already a part of the security system at the 
Black Sea and must realize this fact as fast as possible. There are already signs 
that she had done it. On September 9th, 2005, an important official of the 
American State Department has announced that the expansion of NATO will 
not be possible before 2008. The adjunct undersecretary for European and Asi-
atic problems, Kurt Volker, has declared that the candidate countries are not 
yet ready for joining NATO. The candidate countries, Albania, Macedonia and 
Croatia hope to adhere at the end of the next year. The American official has 
mentioned, however, that the “situation is not favourable for an expansion of 
the Alliance this year or the next one.”
The news is not at all favourable for a country like Moldova (unlike the 
Ukraine, which had bigger requirments), which anyway had not signed the 
necessary documents for a so complex association. In addition, it is a sign that 
the doors of the alliance are not closing and that, in 2008, new members can 
 Russia and OSCE on one side and the USA and EU on the other. The priority issue of ne-
gotiations was the organization of free parliamentary elections in Transnistria. The official 
from Kiev has declared as well that the Ukrainian MFA is satisfied by the course of consul-
tations, which was also attended by the EU representative for Moldova, Adriaan Jacobovits 
de Szeged. The Republic of Moldova did not participate in the discussions!
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join the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is a tacit invitation that must 
be ignored by Chisinau, continuing the series of positive measures taken until 
present. They exist, and the actions made by the political leaders of the Republic 
of Moldova with regard to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization are extremely 
significant. A significant event in the post-soviet history of the republic and was 
not properly outlined.
From this point of view, the most important event taking place in this period 
is by far the concrete and solid approach that Chisinau continues towards the 
North-Atlantic Alliance through the Declaration from August 17th of Martin 
Fedor, Secretory of State at the Ministry of National Defence the from Republic 
of Moldova, that came after the conclusion of the Moldo-Slovakian agreement of 
military collaboration, in which the representative of a NATO member country 
has spoken about the creation of a mixed military contingent of Slovakians and 
Moldavians is essential. On their way towards the Alliance, all the states have 
made their way through bilateral cooperation – Romania, for example, has made 
up a common battalion with Hungary, a NATO member country at that time. 
The event from August is, in fact, a top of an iceberg for a series of positive evolu-
tions of Chisinau on the direction of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Chisinau, for example, has requested political support and assistance from 
NATO for elaborating an individual plan of actions of NATO-Republic of the 
Moldova partnership and its implementation in parallel with achievement of 
Republic of Moldova – EU plan of actions. In his speech from Tuesday, June 
7th, in front of the North-Atlantic Council, in Brussels, president Vladimir 
Voronin has declared that the Republic of Moldova has irreversibly optioned 
for its integration in the EU and, despite an unfavourable geopolitical con-
junction, attributes a major importance to the development of relations with 
NATO. “For the Republic of Moldova participation in activities of the Council 
of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and of the “Partnership for Peace” Program 
is not an academic exercise. The actual problems we deal with – terrorism, 
aggressive and intransigent separatism, organized crime, human traffick-
ing, corruption, smuggling – represent a threat to the democratic essence of 
our states and can be solved only together”, has declared Voronin, mention-
ing that for the Republic of Moldova cooperation with NATO represents the 
best method to join international efforts regarding the creation of a common 
security system in the Euro-Atlantic area and of consolidation of stability in 
the world. President Voronin says that the Republic of Moldova want to value 
to the maximum the potential of cooperation offered by the Partnership for 
Peace and the Council of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and, at the same time, 
to increase the dynamics of its relations with NATO. “We consider the elabora-
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tion within PARP of the objectives of the partnership for the achievement of 
the reform of the national army and measures regarding the amelioration of 
the capacities of our armed forces to operate along with the NATO forces to be 
of a special utility.
On June 7th, 2005, the collaboration between the Republic of Moldova and 
Romania in the military field has constituted the main subject of the long dis-
cussions between the Minister of Defence, Valeriu Plesca, and the Ambassa-
dor of Romania in Chisinau, Filip Teodorescu. According to the Press Service 
of the Ministry of Defence, there were elaborated all the premises for such 
a collaboration – the parts have agreed that this can be achieved within the 
Partnership for Peace Program, and “directly” as well, the bilateral Agreement 
signed by the military institutions from Chisinau and Bucharest being the legal 
basis. This year, on June 18th, upon his return from the Reunion of the Minis-
ters of Defence within the Euro-Atlantic partnership, the Minister of Defence, 
Valeriu Plesca, has declared, in an interview given to “Europa Libera” radio, 
that in future the adherence of Moldova to NATO is not excluded. When he was 
asked if the conclusion of the individual Plan of Actions for the Republic of 
Moldova – NATO could constitute a first proof of the intention of authorities 
to give up the neutral status of the Republic of Moldova as a first step towards 
adherence to NATO, Plesca answered that the conclusion of a document of 
this type does not mean the adherence to a military-political bloc, but, at the 
same time, does not exclude this fact. In the opinion of the Minister, this fact 
“remains in the attention of the future of our country, civil society and espe-
cially of the political elites, which have to mark out the European policy of the 
Republic of Moldova.”
In addition, the official visit of the Minister of National Defence of Roma-
nia, Teodor Atanasiu, to Chisinau, on June 21st, this year, has become a new 
stage in the more efficient achievement of the common plan of cooperation 
between the armies of the two states. In other words, the cooperation of the 
Republic of Moldova with NATO, because this is what means the relation of 
the Republic of Moldova – Romania in this respect. At the end of July, this 
year, a delegation of the Republic of Moldova, lead by the Minister of Defence, 
Valeriu Plesca, has visited the USA, where they have met representatives of the 
Pentagon. The discussed issues were: the Moldo-American bilateral collabora-
tion, problems of global and regional security, the fight against terrorism etc. 
According to a press release of MD service, Plesca has had meetings with the 
vice-regent adjunct of the Secretary of Defence of the United States, Gordon 
England, and with the adjunct of the assistant of the Secretary of State  in 
politico-military problems, Robert Loftis, for identifying the “priorities of the 
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next year’s collaboration” and for marking out the “ways of achieving these 
goals within the Moldo-American military relations”. 
On August 4th, 2005, President Voronin has assembled a meeting with the 
participation of the decisive factors within the Government and Parliament, 
dedicated to launching the process of elaborating the Individual Plan of Ac-
tions of the Republic of Moldova – NATO Partnership. According to “Moldova 
Suverana” official publication (No. 124 of August 5th, 2005), “the chief of state 
has reminded the participants of the meeting that he has requested the signing 
of an Individual Plan of Actions of Partnership (IPAP) with NATO on June 
7th, this year, during the participation to the meeting of the North-Atlantic 
Council in Brussels”. Vladimir Voronin has announced that, recently, “he 
has received a positive answer to this intercession from the Secretary General 
of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who informed the government of Moldova 
about the decision of the North-Atlantic Council to sign such a document with 
our country already in the first semester of 2006.” The president has exposed in 
detail a series of arguments in favour of the elaboration and implementation of 
the Republic of Moldova – NATO IPAP. The participation to the NATO “Part-
nership for Peace” Program, since March 1994 and until now, “has brought 
Moldova numerous political, economic and security benefits and determined 
the approach between our country and the Alliance.” 
In an interview given to “Moldova Suverana” periodical from August 17th, 
2005 (no. 130), the Minister of Defence, Valeriu Plesca, has reiterated these ide-
as:” the experience and the positive results of cooperation within the Partner-
ship for Peace, the expansion of the Alliance up to the borders of the Republic 
of Moldova, the conclusion of the Moldova – EU Plan of Actions, the increase of 
the political dimension in the activity of NATO – all these dictate the necessity 
of passing to another stage of political dialogue and cooperation between the 
Republic of Moldova and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.”
The interventions of the minister have the look of a true campaign. He 
has come back to this issue in Moldova Suverana again (No. 138 of September 
1st, 2005), stating: “In my opinion, the parallel achievement of the two plans, 
Moldova – NATO and Moldova – European Union, will accelerate the achieve-
ment of our main objective – joining the EU… Together with the beginning 
of the elaboration of the Moldova – NATO Individual Plan of Actions, the 
Ministry of Defence has practically become one of the main bodies of state, 
on which depends the success of this action. Starting from this point, a spe-
cial section of Euro-Atlantic integration, which will deal exclusively with this 
problem, was created within the already accomplished reform of the central 
body of the military department. It will coordinate and elaborate all the basic 
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documents in the military field which will be stipulated by this plan.” From 
the perspective of evolutions from the Republic of Moldova with regard to 
the North-Atlantic Treaty, these declarations are extremely spectacular. They 
must catch consistency as soon as possible. On the other hand, some unofficial 
voices coming from the top of the government try to accredit the contrary, 
namely that these signs do not mean what some would interpret as: “So, what 
does Moldova want? To join NATO? Categorically not. Voronin did not want, 
does not want, will not want us in NATO. The CDPP adepts, i.e. those of Iu. 
Rosca, would want us in NATO. But the power is in Voronin’s hands, who, 
since 2001, has wanted to unite the countries. (Moldova Suverana, July 2005). 
Organized into a comparative grid, these last voices have more probably 
a strategic importance than an actual one and have the appearance of muting 
certain declarations which may irritate home and foreign groupings for which 
the NATO option of the Republic of Moldova is unacceptable (as it was, prob-
ably, in the case of the Baltic republics, too…).  We have to wait and see which 
opinion will be the winner and in what direction will the actions of Chisinau 
authorities be going.
8.13. Conclusions
In any debate regarding the positioning of a country in a security area, the 
reaction of the population, society, leaders of opinion remains the crucial factor. 
From this point of view, a more consistent debate in Chisinau on the matter of se-
curity options of the Republic of Moldova imposes itself. Today, it is obvious that 
the so-called “neutrality” is an anachronism without importance and value. 
The alternatives must be researched, and the only viable option – NATO – is 
one that was not explained and debated enough. The decision must be based on 
a serious debate, not on political labels and patterns apodictically formulated. 
The media and the civil society must open a dialog through the afferent chan-
nels at the end of which the security option of the Republic of Moldova would 
appear more clearly. Today it is not clear at all. The pro-European declarations 
of the leaders are not necessarily a warranty – the critical mass for the North-At-
lantic option was not yet reached in the Republic of Moldova.
Not a single country of those saved from the former soviet camp has joined 
the EU without first joining NATO. It is not difficult to understand why. NATO 
integration is a process. This very process is the one that modifies almost radi-
cally the institutional configuration of an area (changes at the administrative, 
human, selection criteria levels etc.). This means the capacity of the North-At-
lantic Treaty Organization of rationalizing the social systems. The present state 
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of society of the Republic of Moldova, crushed by corruption, systems of rela-
tives in selecting and promoting any kind of staff (political, administrative, 
academical level), the institutionalized and state corruption, administration 
and allegiance of the sub alternates through files and blackmail etc. does not 
have yet any relation to he functioning of a society which wants to join the EU. 
Because of this, the initial integration into NATO was a fundamental condi-
tion – and still is! – for the subsequent integration into the EU of the societies 
from the East of Europe, including the Republic of Moldova.
The idea of NATO as a political project is crucial. Democratic values must 
be protected and politically exported in the first place, as we have already men-
tioned in our analysis. 
The situation from the Ukraine must be avoided, where the discrepancy 
between the political elite and the population with regard to integration into 
NATO is today almost impossibly to be managed. If the acceptance of integra-
tion into the EU exceeds 50% at the level of population, NATO receives the 
agreement of approximately 20% of the Ukraine’s population, despite the fa-
vorable declarations of the political government. Today, political parties avoid 
approaching the subject, because of obvious reasons. It is one of the effects of 
the Kucima regime, which, even if making significant steps towards the ap-
proach to NATO at some moment (at least in comparison with the Republic 
of Moldova that systematically sabotaged the process – see “Partnership for 
Peace”), has not done a national debate from it (let us add that namely this ap-
proach of the Ukrainian army to NATO was one of the elements that assured 
the success of the Orange Revolution – a pervert effect that was not sufficiently 
taken into account by the Ukraine!).
Now we are assisting a paradox in the Ukraine: civil society, the only one 
that can freely talk about NATO, does not have the right to debate over the 
subject, and political parties do not have electoral motivation. This kind of evo-
lution must be a lesson for the Republic of Moldova – the debate regarding the 
North-Atlantic Alliance must start now, especially because the political sup-
port of this organization today is more consistent in the Republic of Moldova 
than in the Ukraine. The difficulties met now by the Republic of Moldova in its 
efforts of orienting towards the EU and – especially – towards NATO must be 
evaluated with calmness and lucidity. The domestic effects of the declarations 
favorable to NATO of president Voronin and of Minister Plesca cannot be un-
observed. And they were observed! The breach introduced by these in the (still) 
compact bloc named PCM could be fatal for the unity of the party after a period 
of time. One thing gets more obvious: with regard to the Euro-Atlantic integrity, 
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the enemies of declarations similar to those cited above are not in the opposition, 
but in... the governing party20.
8.14. Instead of conclusions: the Transnistrian conflict – 
aim of the strategy at the Black Sea
This study aims to open a debate that has been delayed for too long. In 
consequence, it provides as yet more questions than answers, and does not aim 
to conclude anything. Nevertheless, there are some specifications to be made, 
and they regard the risks that have accumulated in present for the problems 
of the Black Sea to be left without solution for a significant period of time 
from now on. The risk refers to the mistaken solution of the “transnistrian 
conflict”, the meaning of which becomes today more summoning. The bet of 
Transnistria is, in fact, the bet of a strategy at the Black Sea. Before showing 
what should Bucharest do under these conditions, in our opinion, we will re-
view some significant evolutions in the Transnistrian file, taken place in the 
capital of Romania.
The Cypriot sollution for the Republic of Moldova?
After the publication of the report made by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Ion 
Naval, How we can help Moldova to help itself, SAR Policy Brief No. 16, Bu-
charest, August 2005, it is the turn of “Ovidiu Sincai”Institute to publicize a 
Report of political analysis: Transnistria: Evolution of a frozen conflict and 
perspectives of solution, Bucharest, September, 2005. Both materials have 
something in common, namely the so-called “Cypriot solution” for solving the 
Transnistrian conflict. Among other things, the last Report affirms that “the 
actual integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union can be 
made applying the same mechanism used in Cyprus. The part from the West 
of Nistru will be integrated into the European Union, the rest will be under an 
international protectorate of the UN.” The resurrection of the “Cypriot solu-
tion” as a kind of deus ex machina is surprising for Moldova. Firstly because 
those who forward it suggest, even if tacitly, that they had discovered the “so-
lution” and finally deliver it to a public in Romania, Moldova and further on, 
who was giddily wandering, without a saving clue.
20 The Talibans of the Communist Party are sufficiently numerous. The pro-NATO declara-
tions are as Damocles sword above the head of the president of the republic. The bet is the 
party’s unity and the political position which Vladimir Voronin will adopt in future.)
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1. This is wrong, too, at least because of several reasons21. The first is 
related to deontology. It is incorrect to suggest pretentions to origi-
nality. In reality, the comparison with Cyprus was made two years 
ago, in Chisinau or other Western environments. The one who has 
given it the most eloquent form was Nicu Popescu, in the capital of the 
Republic of Moldova, who published in 2004 a text called “’Cyprus’ 
lesson for the Republic of Moldova” (Eurojournal.org, Moldova AZI 
etc.) In the mentioned article, Nicu Popescu has written about five 
lessons that Moldova can learn from the Cypriot case with regard to 
the combination of two processes that overlap, namely the European 
integration and the regulation of a secessionist conflict22;
2. The process of negotiations with Transnistria is not as important as 
the home transformations in Moldova and the approach to the EU, 
which in time may positively influence the process of Transnistrian 
regulation as well. 
3. Democratization, reforms and Moldova’s approach to the EU are the 
keys of success for the problems of Transnistria;
4. “Rush ruins the deal”: South Cyprus concentrated on its own develop-
ment in the first place, and after more that two decades has come back 
to the table of negotiations in a position of force and has dictated to a 
greater degree the conditions of reunification.) In Bucharest, within a 
more ample discussion dedicated to plans of solving the Transnistrian 
issue, this text was mentioned and commented as well. (See Lumea, 
no. 12, 2004). 
The text had the benefic role of an accelerator for a necessary debate, and 
some of the questions forwarded then were left without answer even until to-
day. Together with the resuscitation of this idea in the reports that were al-
ready mentioned you can feel the atmosphere of a remainder with at least two 
years ago. The reason: none of the questions forwarded then by the critics of 
the Cypriot scenario are not approached nor solved today. In addition, in the 
absence of clear answers to these questions, the plans from Romania risk to 
turn against the interests of Romania and the Republic of Moldova. 
2 We do not have here the pretention to exhaustivity, so we will leave aside the confusions 
existent in the two reports, including that illustrated  by comparisons with areas with 
which Transnistria is incomparable: Cyprus, Kosovo etc.
22 A divided state can join the EU. Therefore the argument that “as long as Moldova is not 
able to solve the Transnistrian problem – the adherence to the EU is impossible, is not 
valid, at least formally.
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What does Transnistria mean?
To speak in terms of a “Cypriot plan” of solving the conflict means to ignore 
the fact that the premises of the two situations are radically different. In case of 
the Republic of Moldova, the off cut between the two entities is today deprived 
of any criteria, with the exception of that related to military power. Those who 
suggest a Cypriot solution must firstly define what does “Transnistria” mean 
and how do they “separate” it from the rest of Moldova (even if temporarily), in 
comparison with which there are no significant ethnic or religious differences. 
Even the data of the census – questionably – organized by the Transnistrian 
“authorities” and broadcasted this month indicate a structure of population in 
which prevail the Romanians/Moldavians with approx. 32%, followed by Rus-
sians 30% and Ukrainians – 28%. In addition, there is a significant religious 
homogeneity, over 80% declaring themselves Christian-Orthodox.
Where comes then the differentiation from the rest of the country? Those 
who suggest a “Cypriot plan” probably think about “historic” territorial off 
cuts – Transnistria would be the region from the left bank of the Nistru. This 
kind of suggestion has nothing to do with the reality. Today, the territory con-
trolled by separatists makes significant bites from the right bank of the Nistru, 
so that this river is not a border anymore. What will happen to Tighina, for ex-
ample? Where will be placed this important city in the opinion of the supporters 
of a Cypriot plan: in the Moldovan part, thus towards European integration, or 
in the “expanded Transnistria”, thus the territory will be “frozen”? What if it is 
chosen that Transnistria should stop on the Nistru frontier, how will it be done? 
Through military actions for pushing separatists “home”? This would cause 
armed conflicts which on one hand  would be unacceptable for everybody, and 
on the other hand would finally mean exactly the recognition of the separatist 
regime, since you want to push them to “their place”, that is beyond the Nis-
tru! If it was opted for negotiations with the separatists for “vacating” the right 
bank of the Nistru, which is  occupied by Smirnov, it would get to recognition 
again. If only the passing of smirnovists over the Nistru is negotiated, then you 
have legitimized the regime from Tiraspol and recognized the independence of 
Transnistria. This is exactly what the promoters of the “Cypriot plan” want to 
avoid...And what if the negotiations will regard the status of the whole region 
controlled by separatists, what sense does the “Cypriot plan” have?
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Romania is not the “Greece” of Moldova
The plan elaborated for the Southern part of Cyprus was subsidiary based 
on the presence of a firm and strong actor who would promote that area to-
wards the EU, by lobby actions, international pressures, plans and projects of 
economic, social and other type of development. That actor, crucial for the 
comprehension of what has happened in the case of Cyprus was Greece – 
NATO and EU member state. Without it, the solution would have been impos-
sible. Is Romania a Greece for Moldova without Transnistria? Obviously not. 
It had not been and it does not seem possible in the near future as well. Under 
these conditions, to speak in Bucharest about a “Cypriot plan” means not to 
understand the profound springs and the main “engine” of the present success 
of the Southern part of Cyprus. In addition, it means to completely abandon 
Transnistria on one hand, and on the other to leave the Republic of Moldova 
(minus its Eastern part) without a solid partner on the presumed way of Euro-
pean integration.
Why shall we neglect the diversity of the population in Transnistria?
The “Cypriot plan” abusively suggests that there is a homogenous Tran-
snistrian “public opinion” that would be identical to that of the puppet regime 
from Tiraspol. Since everybody thinks in soviet terms, refusing with hostility 
any approach not only to Moldova or Romania, but to the Euro-Atlantic area 
as well, everybody should be abandoned and ignored until they “reconsider 
their position”. The idea is both mistaken and unacceptable. On one hand, as 
we have already mentioned, it suggests homogenity of the population from the 
territories occupied by Smirnov et. comp., which does not really exist. Sec-
ondly, it ostentatively and impermissibly ignores what those people believe or 
say; and they are not few. Some of them even try to speak Romanian publicly 
as well...
To ignore this population and its diversity, to ignore methodically the 
opinion of a population of 500-600 thousand people means not giving a penny 
for the democracy you promote so much. And in order to find out this opin-
ion, you do not need the “Cypriot plan”, but the democratization of the region, 
which cannot be actually made without its demilitarization and decriminali-
zation...Thus, we come back to the Strategy of the three Ds or to the Law adopt-
ed by the legislative body from Chisinau.
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The problem of refugees from the Eastern part of Moldova
Beginning with 1992, the Eastern part of the Republic of Moldova – qual-
ified by the Council of Europe as “zone de non-droit” – was left by approx. 
100 000 – 130 000 people, Romanians in majority. It has been estimated that 
more 50 000 thousand people have left the right bank of Nistru still occupied 
by the separatist forces. In addition, the Russian Federation has encouraged the 
transfer of thousand of allogenes, especially Russians, to whom there are dis-
tributed or sold, through “Sherif” company (belonging to Smirnov family), the 
houses left by the Moldavian refugees.23 The problem that appears in the idea of 
a Cypriot plan which supposes the dumping of the Eastern part of the Republic 
of Moldova, is what will happen with the refugees who are practically invited to 
integration into the EU on one hand, and separated from the area where their 
material goods, relatives, friends etc. are. What will happen to them?
A Cypriot scenario is tardy and useless
If two years ago a suggestion of “Cypriot scenario” for the Republic of 
Moldova had a certain sense, at least for attracting the attention of the West 
around this “frozen conflict” or the revitalization of debates on this issue and 
that seemed to take an extremely dangerous direction of a federation that 
would have definitively blocked Chisinau in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, to-
day this kind of suggestion has no reason. It comes late and does not move 
anything from its place.
Now the problem is not the non-involvement of international instances, 
but the manner in which they do it. A plan of Romania for Transnistria seems 
to come too late. The OSCE, as well as the EU, the USA, the Ukraine or Rus-
sia seems to be decided to “solve” the conflict. The problem is how? If things 
go in the direction they are evolving now, we will find ourselves again in years 
2001-2003, meaning in the middle of anti-federalization fights that took place 
in Chisinau or Washington and where the supporters of certain federalization 
projects with serious consequences for the Republic of Moldova have been forced 
to give up because of the rejection of the Kozak memorandum. Then the civil 
society from Chisinau has carried out an extraordinary action of early warning 
and has succeeded – not easily! – to convince the great European capitals not 
to accept the federalization of the republic. The pro-federalization camp was 
23 A considerable part of these colonists come from the extra-European area of the new Mid-
dle-Asian countries.
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numerous: it was found in the OSCE, in Washington, Kiev, Moscow, Tiraspol or 
Chisinau. Those who opposed were practically in the same places, in Chisinau 
– in the streets or in the democratic press, in Washington and in Brussels.24 Fi-
nally, the clarification was made, but today there is a risk that the status of Tran-
snistria will be discussed again above the citizens of the Republic of Moldova or 
the legislative initiatives of Chisinau. (The most important of which is the “Law 
on basic stipulations of the special legal status of the establishments on the left 
bank of the Nistru – Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”.)
The Transnistrian stake is the stake of the credible 
and pro-Western strategy at the Black Sea
Here Romania could eventually intervene, too. Not in suggesting “solu-
tions” that no one takes seriously, but warning that a failure or mistaken strat-
egy in Transnistria blocks the entire process of elaboration of a strategy at 
the Black Sea and, in consequence, ruins the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the 
states in the area. The Transnistrian stake is the stake of a coherent and cred-
ible strategy at the Black Sea. If the “solution” will be made without taking 
into consideration the elementary norms of democracy that the West wants 
to introduce in the area, then there will be given the signal that the region 
is abandoned and left to reside in the situation it is encountered today. The 
consequences are extremely negative and it is upon them that the regional ac-
tors, including Bucharest, must concentrate, because the failure of the policy 
of expansion of the EU to the Black Sea will generate a period of instability at 
the EU frontier because of several reasons:
1. The public pressure of generations from limitrophe countries oriented to 
the West and which do not have the nostalgia of “welfare of the former 
USSR” any more, these grew, educated themselves with the “European 
idea” (to which they attribute even more significations) and which cannot 
be turned back any more since the aspirations had been unleashed. In ad-
dition, these generations do not longer speak Russian satisfactory, becau-
se the significance attributed to the Russian language is not the same.
2. Even in case of a massive tilting over to the East of these states aban-
doned by the Euro-Atlantic area, the inter-state collaboration with the 
Russian Federation will not be possible: the failed state status of these 
countries impedes them to collaborate efficiently and normally with 
24 See this issue in detail in Dungaciu 2004b. 
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Moscow – the elites with (economic) connections in the capital of the 
Russian Federation will totally and immediately control these states, 
because the economic/political separation in these weak and non-func-
tional states does not function at least as it does in normal states. As 
soon as they are abandoned they will become Russian colonies, not 
states capable of economic or political collaboration with the Russian 
Federation – a thing that would be normally desirable for any state.
3. The appearance of “torn countries” in the area – discrepancies between 
generations and flaws within population as a consequence of blocking 
the access of these states to the Western area – and the perpetuation of 
the state of insecurity in the region. 
4. Because of this there will appear waves of emigrants and a constant 
pressure at the doors of the EU, doors which countries like Romania 
will be called to block. It will be a true “impossible mission”.
5. The securitization of energetic routes is crucial; the EU cannot base 
on an area providing energy in case the routes of combustible are not 
politically secured. In case of politico-economic abadon of the area, 
securitization is an illusion.
Getting back to Transnistria and keeping in mind the above mentioned, it 
becomes clear that what we call today “frozen conflicts” will perpetuate and 
that they can be solved only by global strategies at the Black Sea, intelligently 
promoted by local actors and introduced by international actors. If the West 
follows a “solution” that would legitimize the Transnistrian regime and the 
foreign military presence in the area, then this will become a clear sign that 
what happens with the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea will not happen to 
the Black Sea, i.e. the Euro-Atlantic integration of this area. The “frontiers of 
freedom” will transform in frontiers of failure and crisis.
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C h a p t e r  I X .
THE BLACK SEA REGION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF THE “OIL AND GAS” DIPLOMACY
Ion Naval
Scientific researcher, SAR Romania
Introduction
Before going to the actual subject of this study, with a topic that was so 
craved and approached in the last period, with so many prognoses, anticipa-
tions, speculations, illusions etc., we should explain in short the theoretical 
principles that formed the base of our analysis. In other words, we want to 
observe from the very beginning that, setting off from the same data of the 
problem, many annalists have reached totally different results and conclu-
sions, that would make the reader understand that each approach can only be 
relative and subjective. 
Lately, very many studies on foreign affairs outlined the fact that the anal-
ysis was mainly based on the economic aspect. A fast review of the internation-
al life suggests that the economy dominates the stage in the detriment of the 
public. Nevertheless, a true economic diplomacy relies in something else: and 
namely in following the economic objectives by different means (economic, 
military, juridical, political). The economy is, therefore, far away from domi-
nating without a division of the finalities of the diplomacies. Moreover, the 
importance economy is given appears to be cyclic sometimes or only a cause 
of some circumstances. Even if the economy appears to be the basic concern 
in the studies on foreign affairs, there still exist some “hypotheses” that have 
to be re-evaluated:
• “The loss of sovereignty of politics in comparison with the growth of 
the economic factor”. Still, political authorities are, in the majority of 
cases, the ones form the markets, define their conditions of functio-
ning, fix their geographic limits, by a political choice with serious con-
sequences (i.e. “Until what point can the EU expand?”…);
• Another hypothesis shows that diplomacy has become the tool of 
companies for assuring their expansion abroad. Or, the tree should not 
hide the forest. The identification of a foreign policy with a company 
or a product that is practiced only in the states where the economy is 
not diversified;
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• Another frequently circulated idea is that the economy has such an 
important role in the international context, that it generated a new 
form of conflict, namely the economic wars. An eloquent example 
shows that the things are not exactly this way: does there exist an eco-
nomic war between the aeronautic industry of the two giants, “Airbus” 
and “Boeing”, which use engines and equipment manufactured by the 
other? The disappearance of one of the two companies would have a 
disastrous effect on the other one, this way becoming victims of the 
anti-monopoly law. We have to remark the mistake of regarding the 
economy from a conflict perspective, the logic of functioning of the 
economy not being the same with that of politics. 
We think that it is exaggerated to affirm that the economic factor has 
monopolized the international life. It is true that nothing would happen in 
the foreign policy that would negatively and directly influence the economy; 
there are no political moves without economic implications. But we cannot 
talk about the dictatorship of one aspect over another; it is more probably an 
interaction between the two dimensions, political and economic. In our study, 
we will insist more on the economy from the Black Sea area; we tried to regard 
the economy and politics in permanent interconnection. 
The second empirical aspect of this work refers to the way of analyzing the 
“actors” (states) from the Black Sea region. We should outline from the begin-
ning that the vision about this problem will be put closer to that of construc-
tivists. We remind that after constructivists the “Interests of states have their 
roots not in the configuration of the relations of force as the realists, nor in an 
approach based on the calls expressed by the “actors” of the society as well as 
the liberalists, but in the states’ identities, in other words, in the representa-
tions the states make for themselves and for the others, for the own role and 
that of the others in the context of the international system.”
In the context of international relations, these geopolitical self-represen-
tations of the states count as much as their actual situation. For picturing this 
idea we will take the case of Russia (one of the main actors in the Black Sea 
region), for which the pernicious vision of the Russian ruling groupings of 
“encompassment”, despite the actual situation, gives birth to dissensions in 
foreign affairs. For understanding this attitude of Moscow, it is necessary to 
explain the reasons that generated it. For the West, Russia is a geopolitical 
reality that has occupied the centre of the Euro-Asiatic space during one thou-
sand years, having clear intentions to control the outskirts of Europe, as well 
as those of Asia. Here is where from comes the certainty of Moscow that the 
Western powers seek Russia’s isolation for impeding its expansion. 
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It is not important if the surrounding of Russia is real or not, or that it is 
only partial, what is, paradoxically, very obvious is that the Russian political and 
military elites are absolutely convinced that this “surrounding” exists, and the 
consequences of this obsession were always disastrous (the history has showed 
that); no matter if it is about strategies of counter-“surrounding” or other sorts 
of actions. Other actors from the basin of the Black Sea (and Caspian as well) 
had built certain images configured by their political, economic and cultural 
identities and the images of the surrounding states. This is valid for relatively big 
countries like Romania and Ukraine, which see themselves at the outskirts of 
Europe and the Russian “Empire”, and for post-soviet states as Moldova or Geor-
gia, for which the perception of colonial and post-colonial states still persists. 
The paradox relies in the fact that it does not matter if the reality corresponds 
to the image which the respective state has formed, but that the political elites 
act guided by their own picture about the country and the area. In consequence, 
neither the activity of the diplomatic bodies can be other than a reaction to this 
perception.  This is why it is difficult to expect economic, geo-strategic or other 
types of miracles in these states in the near future.
9.1. The economic problems of the Black Sea
Today, after 15 years from the collapse of the communist regime, the coun-
tries from the basin of the Black Sea still have not got over the multiple his-
torical discrepancies that separate them. The national objectives of these states 
are not compatible – and this may be because there are no affinities between 
the new states in the area, this fact having global consequences on the security 
in the area. Today the security risks must be regarded deeper, surpassing only 
the military risks. Taking these into consideration, too, we should orient more 
towards stringent problems: terrorist acts, loss of sources of raw materials and, 
especially, of energy (the victims of which could be the majority of states from 
the region); the modification of migration waves and unaccepted demographic 
pressures, as the case of tatars who returned to Crimea and, of course, the prob-
lems related to the control of the routes of transportation of oil and gas; etc. In 
fact, the number and reasons of potential conflicts in the area are much bigger 
than we imagine. Michel Foucher, in his work, “Fragments d’Empire”, identi-
fies 173 possible causes of conflicts at the outskirts of Russia in 1993.
This is, in general, the heritage of the Cold War and particularly of the pol-
icy of Moscow in this region during half a century. Today we realize even bet-
ter that this part of Europe will be further facing problems of security. Speak-
ing in strategic terms, this area is located on the “outskirts” of two great forces, 
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Europe and Russia. Besides, Brussels is aware of this fact, too, a proof of this 
being the fact that the Strategy of Common Security gives priority to the idea 
of Common Neighborhood, which, according to the opinion of foreign analysts 
as well as of those from the region, will be at the base of a new architecture of 
security on the old continent, today under construction (maybe because it has 
been superficially regarded by Europeans for a long time).
In this study we will examine these things in movement, referring only to oil 
and gas, which are not the only basic energetic resources in the world economy, 
but only a very important element which will influence the new architecture of 
security in Europe. In fact, the importance and relevance of this aspect results 
more probably from the fact that their logic is often different from the political 
one, but every time they are dealt with from the perspective of their real conse-
quences. For a state like Russia, the centennial wish of which is to be treated as a 
great power, even if its GDP today does not exceed that of Holland, the energetic 
policy becomes an essential advantage (if not the only real one) in its foreign ne-
gotiations and here we refer especially to those with Europe. This way, the small 
countries from the area are in a double captivity generated by the energetic policy 
of Russia – on one hand, by their dependency of the Russian oil and gas and on 
the other hand, by the ascendant dependence of Europe on this oil and gas. In 
the lines below we will try to analyze the state of things in this area today, from 
the perspective of hydrocarbons, as well as the way they could develop in a short 
term. Especially that today, after a strong come-back of pro-Europenism in the 
former soviet republics, the desiderata are much more clear. The desire of these 
states to jump out of the Russian influence, whether political, economic or of 
security, became obvious, and on the other hand it is obvious that they greatly 
depend on the “agreement” between Russia and Europe with regard to this area.
9.2. The Black Sea as an option for exporting oil and gas 
from the Caspian Sea 
After the collapse of the communist regime we have assisted to a continuous 
growth of geo-economic and geopolitical problems around the Black Sea – this 
increase has two major causes: a) the appearance of eight new states in the former 
soviet area, seven of which are enclaves; b) re-discovery of oil and gas at the Cas-
pian Sea. The Caspian Sea is one of a closed type1 and because of this the Black 
 A fact that generated great debates between the states on the shore, i.e. those that claim that 
it is a lake want a re-distribution of its natural resources according to the rights on the 
closed waters, while the opponents, meaning Russia and Iran, consider that it is a Sea and 
its distribution must be made according to the sea rights of dividing waters, i.e. any shore 
state can make use of its submarine resources in neutral waters.
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Sea becomes the quasi-obligatory passage for accessing the European market, as 
well as the American one. After the discovery of Caspian oil and gas, the main 
problem was the control over transport networks. This kind of control offers 
the beneficiary more than economic advantages. Because of this many analysts 
were tempted to speak of a new «Big Game»2 for emphasizing the attraction of 
some multinational companies and Western states for an area considered for a 
long time a closed field left in the Russian sphere of interests.
The fights for transport networks and those of exploiting natural resourc-
es are linked between them. It is obvious that a drilling company, for example 
a Russian one, will seek to use ways of exploitation from the territory of Russia 
and will collaborate with Russian companies, something like Lukoil-Transneft 
tandem. In these cases all methods are permitted: destabilization of partners, 
fight for price dumping credits, and overcharge of projects without the ability 
of distinguishing the realist suggestions of bluff strikes... After technical de-
bates on the best trajectories and ways of transportation (routes, railways, oil 
pipelines…) there quickly appeared a series of political and strategic issues. A 
simple proof in this direction is the period between ’96-’97, when the oil was 
very cheap, unprofitable for depth exploitations where the great reserves from 
the area were discovered (during the first years there were speculations about 
figures comparable to the resources from the Persian Gulf, or the real situa-
tion was different…). Exactly from this period the Americans have begun to 
invest massively and to be very seriously interested in this area (even leading 
to the designation of a Secretary of State for problems of the Caspian Sea area), 
it could be clearly seen that oil was more of a pretext to infiltrate into the re-
gion. Of course, today when we look at the region through the price of US$ 50 
for a barrel of oil, we can hardly remember the amazement related with those 
investments when a barrel was less than US$ 15.
9.3. The great projects of transiting oil and gas
Before speaking about the important projects of evacuation of oil and gas 
from the region of the Casian Sea via the Black Sea, we should mention the 
fact that there existed and still exist a great number of projects, but most of the 
2 It is about the reference to the first Big Game from the Caspian region, i.e. the strategic war 
between the British  and the Russian Empire from the 9th century.
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times these could not be fully implemented. However, the geopolitical analyses 
regarding these areas have often granted them an important place.3
In Azerbaijan, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, Aboulfaz Eltch-
ibey is elected, in June 1992, president of the Republic. Member of intelligence, 
passionate nationalist, convinced anticommunist, he wanted to interrupt all 
relations with Russia in order to form new strategic alliances with Turkey, the 
USA and Israel. One of his priorities was the economic development by using 
the oil potential. Big international companies have used this opportunity to 
implant themselves in the area they were kept away from until then. These 
foreign investors could not be stopped by the Russian-Azery legal provisions 
about the status of the Caspian Sea, but only by the difficulty of choice be-
tween routes of evacuation. This was the essence of the problem. The whole 
area of Apseron in Baku should have been providing 700.000 barrels a day (35 
million tones) in 2006, compared to 7000 barrels in 1996. Thus, the future of 
the balance of forces in the area is regarded as a total perturbance.
In June 1993 a pre-agreement between an international consortium and 
SOCAR (Azery oil company), was concluded which, ironically, will never be 
finalized. Given the fact that, during several days after the conclusion of the 
pre-agreement, president Eltchibey was overthrown by a military strike secretly 
conducted by Moscow and directed by colonel Suret Husseinov, a hero of the war 
from Karabah. The Russians could not tolerate the fact that none of their compa-
nies will participate at the extraction from the gigantic extraction field of Azerba-
ijan. Heidar Aliev, an old machinist, replaces Eltchibey. Ex-chief of Azery KGB, 
Heidar Aliev had also been prime-secretary of the Communist Party of the Azery 
Republic. Immediately after his return, he decides to dissolve the pre-agreement 
signed by his predecessor and to restore relations with Russia.
Thus, Moscow takes advantage of these favourable circumstances in the 
area for consolidating its authority in Caucasus and Central Asia. Firstly, Rus-
sia takes advantage of the chaos from this area – one well maintained by Mos-
cow (the legal agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding Kara-
3 For this reason we will not insist on the cases, in which the progress moves much more 
slowly (not to say it is are inexistent) than imagination. A relevant case in this direction is 
constituted by the diverse projects that were speculated in case of GUUAM, but we re-
peat – there still do not exist cases that would overwhelm imagination. Because it is not so 
correct to «annex» the Traceca project to GUUAM, and nothing else was specified. Thus 
the reader should not be surprised that he/she will not find GUUAM on the route of big 
projects (even if many of the recent analyses regarding this organization use only superla-
tive characteristics and I wonder what is the actual reason).
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bah, the secessionism of the following republics: Adjaria, Southern Osetia and 
Abkhazia from Georgia, the “gas” diplomacy in Ukraine. Under these condi-
tions Azerbaijan has concluded a series of contracts of extraction of its oil and 
gas, which unified in an international consortium (called the “contract of the 
century”, the abbreviation being AIOC in English and AMOK in Russian), 
which comprises ten partners: Emoco, Exxon, Penzoil, Unocal for the USA, 
Lukoil for Russia, Delta for Saudi Arabia, Socar for Azarbaijan, TPAO for Tur-
key. Thus the total of investments initially stipulated rises to a figure of US$ 
14 billion. After the conclusion of these contracts, the immediate problem that 
appeared was the way of evacuating the black gold. The problem of evacuation 
is much more complicated and difficult to solve. Here were mentioned three 
problems: the quantities to be transported, the areas to be traversed and, fi-
nally, the costs of installation and the duration of use. 
9.4. EU route projects
The EU is not limited to projects regarding its future member states (Ro-
mania, Bulgaria), on the contrary, one of the biggest projects financed by the 
EU refers to Eastern and Southern states of the Black Sea’s shore. It all began 
by accident. In 1990 – 1991, wishing to deliver food aid to the conflicting So-
viet Republics in Caucasus and Central Asia, Europeans have discovered that 
they could do this only through Russian networks, which were difficult and 
insecure. Out of eight states that obtained their independence in 1991, Georgia 
is not an enclave – although this is a special case as well, it did not really have 
control over its entire shore, because Adjaria and Abkhazia had more than 
three quarters of the seashore. 
Providing these eight states a credible alternative solution at the Russian 
monopoly from the existent great export axes is the aim of TRACECA pro-
gram (Transport Europe-Caucasus-Asia), which is launched by the EU in 1993. 
Later it is extended for Ukraine and Moldova as well. The program stipulated 
only classical transport means: harbours, road and railway networks. In addi-
tion to the fact that the program is supported by the EU, another element of its 
success is due to the fact that at the beginning it did not “disturb” Russia with 
terms like oil pipeline and gas pipeline, which is vital to the mind of Russian 
strategists. Nevertheless, it was completed with an important project dedicat-
ed to oil pipelines (Inogate), as well as by a project of air route (Southern Ring 
Air Route), making a true “Euro-Asiatic corridor” from this ansemble.
Even if they were not the initiators of this project, the US would have 
quickly offered their support, participating at its application and responding 
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to offers. At the end of 1996, with the purpose of strengthening the attractive 
power of the project, it was recorded in an old myth, changing the name of the 
route in “The silk route from the 21st century”, even if the so-called route 
has never used an axis this complex. The objective of occidentals is clear: the 
consolidation of the new sovereign states implies a greater possibility of ma-
noeuvres for choosing economic partners and their introduction on the world 
market. It seems that this objective has succeeded. In any case, this far there 
hasn’t been projected a more complex alternative for the former soviet repub-
lics. The adherence of this economic project to GUAM is for now the only real 
fundament for consolidation in practical terms of the projects of this organiza-
tion. This organization, until now more probably lacking political coherence, 
now has got to the time of practicing more concrete things, if it does not in-
tend to remain an eternal phantom, mentioned only in studies. Especially that 
the chiefs of member states of this organization are perfectly aware of the fact 
that the path to a security alternative (one of the fundamental targets of the 
organization) goes exactly through the solution of this problem of economic 
dependence on Russia, i.e. on Russian oil and gas. 
9.5. Older projects of Russia
The transport of big quantities of raw oil implies the use of several routes. 
Even from the beginning, Russia thought of using a single route for transport-
ing oil to the Black Sea, and namely the already existent one at Novorossiysk, for 
both the oil extracted in the first years or that produced in a long term. This oil 
pipeline had, in exchange, a great inconveniense, as it passes through Groznii, 
and the war in Chechnya has changed a lot the data of the problem. Even if dur-
ing the first years Russia is affected by internal political fights for power over 
Kremlin (and not only, because everywhere in the region has occurred a change 
of all the elites), in the years that followed immediately after that it began to react 
in the manner that is specific for it. Moscow has launched again its own trans-
port solutions that excluded the participation of foreign companies. According 
to the declarations of Vladimir Yakunin, the Russian minister of Transport, “in 
the period of globalization of economy, the importance of transport has grown 
for Russia. And we will not exaggerate saying that they had become the basic ele-
ments of our Russian geopolitical paradigm.”
Nevertheless, Russia must be aware of a great handicap, undoubtedly a 
fundamental one, because it refers to the complex strategy followed by Mos-
cow in this region since 1991. During many years, Kremlin counted on the 
acquisitions of its secular domination without assessing the complexity of 
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changes and movements in process, be it about the bilateral relations or those 
within the CIS, Russia has followed a policy that was imprudently based on 
pressures and promises. This attention of Moscow regarding the crucial prob-
lems of transport that serves Russia and its openings towards the world does 
not surprise us. Organizing transport and flux networks in the soviet area and 
its outskirts was one of the essential factors of political coherence of the sys-
tem, a determining element of manipulation on its own territories. In the same 
time, the new states formed as a result of the breakdown of the USSR were 
seeking opportunities for affirmation of their sovereignty and own territory, 
implicitly of their oil and gas pipelines, but a redefinition of the logic of space 
and fluxes that were entering a world open to competition processes. 
Moscow has reacted by facilitating a new program of reorganizing its own 
network. The Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline was enlisted in this program 
and offered Russia a double advantage: a slightly bigger capacity than that of 
Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (6-7 million tones, and Transneft assures that it can be 
increased to 17 million tones) and the construction of the branch pipe that avoids 
Chechnya. These advantages have allowed the connection to a new oil terminal 
in Mahachkala. For Russians, the expectances for this project include the cover-
age of raw oil exports from Turkmenistan in their advantage as well. Another 
important project is the acquisition of the CPC (Caspian Pipelines Consorti-
um) with a capacity that should increase during the next years until 67 million 
tones. It links the North-Kazakh fields of exploitation with the new oil terminal 
from Novorossiysk, Cheskaris, a terminal with a capacity of approximately 40 
million tones, which practically doubles the traffic of the harbour. 
In the meantime, Russia will build the crucial branch pipe of the Sama-
ra-Novorossiysk pipeline between Suhodolnaia and Radionovskaia, which will 
allow the avoidance of passing through Lisichansk in Ukraine. The realization 
of several gas pipelines should in short allow the Russians to definitively break 
the Ukrainian quasi monopoly in the transit of Russian gas, a fact that would 
have a great effect on the relations of interdependence between these two states. 
Considered for a long time a “sea snake”, the Blue Stream project advances rap-
idly. This submarine gas pipeline that links the Russian harbour Drugba with 
the Turkish harbour Samsun (with a capacity of 16 billion of cubic meters annu-
ally) through the Black Sea would allow the substitution of the present pipes to 
this country that neighbours Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria at the Black Sea.
Another totally unexpected project is the construction of a pipeline between 
Novorossiysk and Ceyhan (!), via Georgia. The reason of this is to avoid Bosfor 
and Dardanelle and the re-launching of transitting the Azeri and especially Ka-
zakh raw oil through Russia, after BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) is ready. It could 
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bring Russian authorities up to US$ 600 million annually. A problem of this 
project is that it has to transit a secessionist republic from Georgia – Abkhazia, 
and its relations with Tbilisi are still unsolved.
Even if it has a quasi-monopoly over the evacuation of resources from 
the Caspian area, in present Russia seems, nevertheless, to have only partial 
answers. Evidently, the history and geography of this country offers it major 
advantages in the game played in the Black Sea area today. The overlapping 
of internal contradictions with the lack of means, which oblige it to maintain 
cooperation/rivalry relations with the West, makes the future of its policy in 
the region rather unpredictable. This unpredictable future becomes one of the 
major risk factors at the address of security in the area. 
9.6. Competing alternatives
Diverse constraints have lead to seeking other solutions to evacuate the 
Caspian oil and gas: the transport capacities, the insistence of Americans 
or the wish of Azeri (as well as Turkmens and Kazakhs) not to depend only 
on Russian routes. Under these conditions, from the very beginning the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, appeared as the most important alternative to 
Russia’s projects until today. No matter what has been said, nobody, including 
the Russians, can doubt today the necessity of two main routes. 
Besides, Georgia has been permanently seeking for other source of financ-
ing, especially from the USA, the Americans being very interested by an ex-
panded regional network for valorising their contracts concluded with Kaza-
khstan, by Chevron regarding the exploitation of the Tenguiz field (it is known 
that the American diplomacy has an unwritten rule, but tried in practice – Flag 
followed travel). The Caspian Sea is a way of diminishing the dependence of 
the USA on the countries from the Near East. The Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
has become an absolute priority for Americans in terms of opposition to Te-
heran and Moscow. This oil pipeline must become in fact the fundament of 
stability of the countries from the area. “It is not one more pipeline, declares 
in 1999 the Secretary for Energy, Bill Richardson, it is a strategic structure that 
promotes the national security interests of the USA.”
The next step of the USA was the support of a project of Trans-Caucasian 
pipelines which would be related to BTC. The hydrocarbons from Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan avoiding, transition through Russia after passing Azerbai-
jan. In parallel, the USA gives the 8 riparian states of the Caspian Sea a more 
important military assistance, the amount of expenditures being assessed to 
approxima tely US$ 1 million in 2000. In this context it was evident that Wash-
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ington wanted to occupy the most instable state of the area – Georgia (with 
three secessionist republics: Abkhazia, Adjaria, Southern Osetia). Under the 
pretext of helping the Georgians and, finally, under the pretext invoked by Rus-
sians of fighting Chechen Islamists infiltrated in Pankisi Gorge, the Pentagon 
establishes the first politico-military springboard, even though a modest con-
tingent, this fact implying an intimidation of Russians (from the simple reason 
of not touching American soldiers4) as, contrary, offences or repercussions on 
Georgian land would start. We wish to mention that, even if this contingent 
has a small number of militaries, its presence here assures endowment with 
advanced military technology, including patience (besides, this kind of scheme 
contains nothing new: between 1962-1967, in the South of Vietnam, it came to 
several hundreds of instructors and 500 thousand American combatants).
Russia reacted immediately. The incidents on the Russian-Georgian bor-
der burst out immediately, while Putin was announcing the consolidation of 
measures of control at the border with Azerbaijan. The message of Moscow is 
clear: Russia has sufficient means for the destabilization of relations between 
the two states or for seriously impeding the application of the pipelines that it 
disagrees with.
Lately, it seems that Republic of Moldova has also gotten over the dead point 
in which the project from Giurgiulesti has been staying for several years, i.e. the 
construction of an oil terminal (and a sea mini-harbour) at the Danube. This 
is about a terminal that would have a capacity of exploitation of over 2 million 
tones of oil annually, but as well about the construction of a plant for processing 
raw oil. The company that deals with this investment, “Azpetrol”, is good for 
Moldova from the simple reason that it comes from a big oil producer/exporter 
country – thus it would have interests to lobby in favour of traversing the raw 
Caspian oil via Moldova. Even if the project is not great – it is advantageous, 
at least for local economy, in addition it diminishes the dependence on Russia’s 
oil, not to mention the geopolitical dream of any state – access to the sea, with 
all that it represents. Surely, the project does not reach the level of declarations 
of the local politicians regarding this (we remind you that the agreement was 
signed during an electoral period) and besides, how would we explain the fact 
that during eight years there was no serious investor for it and even BERD, as 
initial financer, did not manage to finish it. But we repeat that for an enclave 
state access to sea is the fulfilment of geo-strategic dreams, and regarding the 
4 The results were not expected long, nobody can imagine today Saakasvili seizing power 
without the help of Americans. 
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economic effects it only should get rid of pompous declarations of “golden gate 
to Europe” type (if it starts from this kind of dreams any result is a failure). But 
it seems that this is characteristic for the majority of countries in the area – all 
small economic projects were politicized in all their aspects, and the result was 
the same each time: all that is just a façade.
It should be noted that all these alternatives to Russia’s projects should not 
be competing among them. As long as the major interest of these small states 
is getting out of the Russian influence, they cannot have a real influence unless 
working together, because today it is clear that Russia has won in the fight from 
the 90s. This thing has rather serious consequences, at least for a short term the 
map of oil and gas from the area will hardly change. Or, in the moment when 
comes up the problem of competition between Moldova and Romania, Ukraine 
and Georgia etc. for these projects it is difficult to believe in a redefinition of the 
geo-economic map in the area. Let us hope that after the wave of orange revolu-
tions the political elite from these states will acknowledge this fact.
9.7. Romania’s expectations regarding the transition 
of Caspian oil and gas across the Black Sea 
Among the new geopolitical actors at the Black Sea, the geo-strategic 
position of Romania is one of the most ungrateful – situated for centuries at 
the intersection of interests of the great powers “the position of Romania can 
equally represent a dead angle or become a zone of interference”. Today the 
geo-strategic position of Romania is consolidated by the Danube – Black Sea 
channel, which completes the Rhine-Main-Danube connection and which 
is consolidated by Romania’s control over the last 1000 km of the navigable 
course of the Danube. 
The Rhine-Main-Danube channel, finished in 1992, creates a true navi-
gable corridor between Rotterdam and Constanta (3000 km can be made in 
three days and a half). This allows the projection of a direct commercial flux 
between the North Sea and riparian states of the Danube and the Black Sea, 
this fact generating the hope to transform Constanta into an equivalent of 
Rotterdam for the Black Sea (hope encouraged by the recent Japanese invest-
ments in the modernization of waterside infrastructures). From all the coun-
tries traversed by the Danube, Romania is today the richest discourse in future 
projects related to this great river. In fact, this discourse is not new, it features 
in a great list that begins with the 30s of the 19th century, when Walachia and 
Moldova principalities were known under the name of Danube Principalities 
(the Moldo-Walachian elites managed to attract the interest and sympathy of 
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Napoleon III and Queen Victoria, who saw in the unification of principali-
ties the creation of a friendly and allied state, the guardian of the entrance 
to the Danube, a logic that allowed the unification of the Principalities, and 
expunged Russia from this area). During the communist period, there were 
achieved two big projects: the construction of the Iron Gates I (1972) and Iron 
Gates II (1994) barrage and hydropower plant and of the Danube – Black Sea 
channel, which two branches, one in Constanta and the other in Midia. 
With these advantages, during the last years Romania has submitted ex-
tremely ambitious projects, among which we mention only “Romania at cross-
ways”. The aim of these projects was to attract a significant part of oil and 
gas from Central Asia and Caucasus to Eastern, Central and Western Europe 
through IV, VII and IX corridors of TRACECA. Let us remind the route of 
these three European corridors:
– IV Berlin-Bratislava-Budapest-Bucharest-Constanţa;
– VII Rotterdam-Constanţa on the Danube and on the Danube-Main-
Rhin channel;
– IX Helsinki-Kiev- Egee See, through Constanţa and Istanbul.
The importance of these corridors for Romania is explained by a big de-
mand of oil and gas in European countries5, a request that will double in the next 
20 years, increasing from 70 to 140 million barrels a day. Among other things, 
the World Council of Energy anticipates a consumption of 360 million tones of 
oil for the year 2020 in the countries riparian to the Black Sea and in those from 
Central Europe, with a population estimated to 111 million inhabitants.
9.8. Advantages and disadvantages of Romania
Constanta harbour is the most important in the country. It has an area of 
3200 ha, having a double function: that of a sea harbour and that of a Danube 
harbour, at the end of Danube-Black Sea channel. Once the fourth stage of the 
harbour is finished, it will become the second European harbour in size after 
Rotterdam, with 260 operational compartments with a capacity of exploitation 
of 237 million tones annually. Nowadays the harbour can load and unload ships 
with a maximum capacity of 165 000 tdw, and annually there can be operated 
between 4000 and 5000 ships. Constanta has special terminals for raw oil (with 
5 However, I think it is the case to talk about a big need on the home market of Romania, too: 
I would mention a figure that will make you understand the gravity of the problem (for gas 
and oil), today 53 % of Romanian people heat up with wood, which means that every year 
there are burned 40 000 ha of forest. 
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a capacity of 24 million tones annually) and for oil products (12 million tones 
annually). Of course, today, Constanta is one of the major advantages of Roma-
nia, but this advantage is still theoretical, because more than 60% of the water-
side capacities of Constanta are not used. Namely this is today the problem of 
Romania – maximum exploitation of its possibilities as an important state at 
the Black Sea. It should be mentioned that until now, as we have already seen 
and will see below, the great projects kind of avoided and still avoid Romania.
Referring to projects, during a conference, “EU – the Black Sea area: ex-
pansion of cooperation between the two key-actors on the world energetic 
market”, representatives of 13 member states of BSECO (Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organization) have signed a memorandum for the achievement 
of 32 projects of energetic interconnection (oil, gas, electric power) of states 
from the Balkans, EU, Caucasus and Central Asia. These projects will be 
achieved and financed with the help of the EU within the Synergy program by 
using the already existent tools: PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, Interreg. Romania 
was excluded from the majority of oil routes because, as the coordinator of 
the operating group for Balkan interconnections, Cristos Papoutsis, had men-
tioned, “Romania had not presented any oil project during this meeting.”
The achievement of energetic interconnections between the East and the 
West will offer the producing countries and those that are present on the maps 
of transport the access to big European consume markets. It seems that Roma-
nia has lost its piece of the “cake” as no approved project figures Constanta as a 
network terminal, nor the petrochemical plants from Midia and Navodari are 
mentioned. In the EU perspective, the participation of Romania at the trans-
port of gas and oil from the Caspian Sea and Caucasus to the Western Europe 
seems to be excluded. Bulgaria is preferred instead (as we have already seen, 
the country is preferred by the Russians as well), with its opening to Greece, 
ex-Yugoslavian area, Northern Italy, for avoiding the oil transfer through Bos-
for and Dardanelle.6 Today, Romania has to finish a single project – the oil 
6 Note: The problem of Bosfor and Dardanelle straits. The Turkish straits are practically the 
most used in the world, with over 50 000 ships annually. Rather narrow, they are among the 
most dangerous as well. Bosfor has a length of 3 km and a width of maximum 700 metres 
and Dardanelle a length of 70 km and a maximum width of ,3-2 km. Thay are transited by 
over a hundred ships daily, among which 5 % transport dangerous merchandise. Turkey has 
permanently tightened the conditions of passing, and Russia, playing upon the Turk-
ish-Greek rivalry, has forwarded the idea of building an oil pipeline between Burgas and 
Alexandropolis harbours. Turkey is not part of the UN Convention on Sea Straits, and, on 
the other hand, the straits are still under the jurisdiction of the Montreaux Convention
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pipeline from Constanta to Trieste. The problem is that of the route to Con-
stanta, i.e. what is the amount of goods and ships with real chances of reaching 
Constanta from the Caspian Sea, as long as there exist a multitude of alterna-
tives: Bulgaria, Turkey, the Ukraine – with the same final destination (a simple 
look on the map shows, despite many speculations, that Bulgaria and Turkey 
are really better positioned from the geo-economic point of view), a lot of work 
is still to be done for succesfully rivalling the competitors in other aspects.
 from 936, where art. 2 stipulates clearly that “commercial ships have complete freedom of 
passing and sailing the straits, day and night, no matter the flag or loading”. Thus Russia 
has strongly protested against unilateral restrictions imposed by Turkey, regimes that 
caused great economic losses to countries riparian to the Black Sea, by the simple fact that 
many ships were detained at the entrance to the straits. Of course nobody tried to think 
that these restrictions have environmental reasons. In fact, they are strongly related to the 
export of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, Turkey wishing them to transit its own terri-
tory, while Russia plans that up to 00 million tones of oil would leave Novorossiysk and 
pass through the straits. 
Map no. 1
Mapping oil and gas pipelines in the Black Sea Area
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9.9. Romania’s partners and rivals for route projects
Georgia is one of the most important partners of Romania in the achieve-
ment of projects regarding the Black Sea (taking into account the fact that the 
Caspian raw oil in many cases passes through Georgia). Keeping in mind the 
interest of the two parts for establishing viable relations between the TRACE-
CA corridor and the IV and VII pan-European corridors of transport, the two 
countries have agreed to take joint measures in this direction. They submit 
joint programs to the European Commission in order to obtain funds within 
PHARE and TACIS programs with regard to the achievement of these rela-
tions. With this occasion, the two countries have agreed to make efforts to 
draw up a global agreement in the field of transport between the countries of 
the Black Sea. This mission is not simple at all for these countries, given the 
fact that their main competitor is Russia.
This way, even from the period of Emil Constantinescu it was (very dip-
lomatically) mentioned that the new corridors of transport are not aimed at 
competing with Russia (Constantinescu declared: “The problem of competing 
with Russia on these routes is out of question. Russia will play an essential 
role”). In expectance of new projects, it seems that Bucharest will be taken over 
by the Italians from the ENI, which is a member of the “Romania at crossways” 
Forum, or by its subsidiary office, Agip. ENI is present in Azerbaijan (“Cipco” 
consortium) and in Kazakhstan, where it operates in the Northern part of the 
Caspian Sea, as well as in Karachaganak. Thus, from this point of view, Ro-
mania seems to be well positioned to attract a part of the oil exported through 
pipelines from Novorossiysk, as well as through those from Poti.
Among all the competitors met by Romania in its projects at the Black Sea, 
the most dangerous one is, of course, Russia. We have to remind that, Gazprom 
and Lukoil Russian companies have important participations already at sourc-
es in the contracts of prospecting and exploitation of oil and gas at the Black 
Sea. We all know that today Russia is the main, if not the only provider for the 
countries at the Black Sea (with the exception of Turkey). As a consequence, 
exactly from this powerful position it negotiates with its partners from BSECO 
and supports the project of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline. Even if, 
according to the “famous” Romanian expert, engineer Dan Capatana (former 
councilor of Constantinescu)7, the costs of raw oil transport through Bourgas 
are 50% higher than those using the Novorossiysk route, then through the 
7 We remind that the project of engineer Capatana envisaged an oil pipeline underneath the 
Black Sea, which until today remains in the field of hope in Romania.
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Constanta-Trieste oil pipeline (US$ 3,5 a barrel in the first case versus US$ 2,2 
in the second one).
For the Romanian press and political class, the declaration of Alexander 
Misjulin (ex-president of BSECO and chief of the Russian delegation) given 
to Novosti agency, was enough: “Russia wants to pull Romania out of the oil 
routes.” But sometimes a piece of information regarding the foreign policy has 
the same connotation: “Bulgaria blames Moscow for economic blackmail”. 
However, such declarations remain isolated and the Romanian political class, 
as well as the press has adopted a more careful way of taking positions and 
making comments. The Romanian-Russian competition seems to evolve to-
wards cooperation, too, if we judge following the logic line of majority par-
ticipation in the Romanian refineries’ stock, which were bought by Lukoil and 
Holster Trading Ltd and through the prism of projects of massive investments 
which are planned by Lukoil for the Romanian industry. 
Ukraine, at its turn, has its own expectances, whishing to fully exploit the 
capacities of transport it had created with Georgia on the Kiev-Odessa-Po-
ti-Tbilisi route, in order to supply its refinery from Ilitchevsk. If extended to 
Baku, this route could serve for the transport of oil and gas from the Caspian 
Sea. The appearance of the Ukraine as an actor on the international stage has 
Map no. 2
The gas pipelines infrastructure in the Black Sea Area
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brought two fundamental problems for Romania: that of frontier and that of 
minorities (it is not the case to stop at this problem in this work.) The problem 
of acknowledgement of frontiers is rather complicated, keeping in mind that 
Romania has done this twice until 1991, on February 10th, 1947, while signing 
the Paris treaty, and in 1975, through the conclusion of the Final Act from Hel-
sinki, which declared the inviolability of the European frontiers through the 
use of force or by pressures for using it; the only accepted exception being the 
agreement between parties, as it was in the case of Czechoslovakia. 
Regarding frontiers we will stop only at the case of Snake Island. Although 
the real problems refer, in fact, to the continental plateau (5000-7000 km2) and 
according to the international sea rights of the exclusive economic region – a 
region of strategic interest8 and a priori rich in resources (according to some 
experts there are oil stocks greater than in the North Sea and even the Caspian 
Sea). The continental plateau from around the island has been annexed to the 
USSR in 1946. Romania has very few chances to win in the case of this is-
land and here we have to remind an element which seems essential to me, and 
namely that the Ukraine is well protected by the Budapest memorandum on 
the guarantee of security regarding the adherence of the Ukraine to the Treaty 
of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (signing states: USA, Great Britain, 
France and China guarantee the independence, sovereignty and the existent 
frontiers of the Ukraine). Thus, the Ukrainian diplomacy has made clear from 
the very beginning that it will not accept any examination of the problem be-
fore instance of international arbitrage, whether it is the International Court 
of Justice of the UN or other instances. Romania has managed to obtain the 
acknowledgment of Ukraine that the Snake Island is to be uninhabited, which 
in terms of international sea legislation means that the Ukraine cannot claim 
an exclusive economic region around the island.
After the orange revolution in the Ukraine the relations between the two 
countries, at least at the beginning, have changed in the direction of a rather 
serious collaboration and cooperation at all levels. We would not want to enter 
speculations regarding the future of relations between these two states, but it 
is certain that, even having a great desire to escape the big dependence that the 
8 According to certain sources Moscow has transformed the island into a base of nuclear 
submarines, where there can stay, be maintained and provided for “Akula” class subma-
rines. On the island there is equipment of control of medium range missiles launched from 
Crimea or Ural, as well as necessary equipment for connection with spy satellites placed 
above the Middle East. The radar equipment allows the surveillance of the sixth American 
Fleet: three cables link the island with the continent.
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Ukraine has for the Russian gas and oil9, this thing seems possible only for a 
long-term. Thus, Kiev will be playing Moscow’s game in the field of energy for 
many years to come, and Romania is not able to acknowledge this fact, hav-
ing to accept, in its turn (hardly, in fact), the situation that was established in 
the middle of the 90s. It is true that today the economic aspects regarding the 
Black Sea area are resumed with great enthusiasm, but it is also true that the 
results of these demarches will not be seen in the next years. 
The new president, Traian Basescu, has announced that a priority in his 
foreign policy is the Black Sea project, the idea of attracting the attention of 
Europeans that the Black Sea would become an entirely special frontier and 
that there should be actions made for its security is essential. The strong side 
of the project of Romania’s president resides in the fact that it has very well 
acknowledged the relation of forces in the region, and especially the thing on 
which Romania can rely on to apply this foreign policy in the region. Accord-
ing to the remarks of president Basescu, Romania will export democracy and 
will import energy from this region that became the priority for its foreign 
policy. This fact is more creditable as it is being tried to value the potential of 
the country as an independent actor and not just as a supporter of the EU and 
NATO policy in the region. The export of democracy in the region is very use-
ful today. For states like the Ukraine, Georgia and especially Moldova it is as 
important as this future own “ambassador” in Brussels. 
We do not know how influent Romania may be in Europe, but this does 
not mean that its demarches are not good or utopian. We do not think that 
Greece was more influent when succeeding to defend very well the interests of 
Cyprus in Brussels. Even if we realize that the problem in the area is of another 
nature, today the taking into account of the energetic factor to this degree is 
not yet so exaggerated. It is true that the needs for oil and gas have substan-
tially increased for Europeans. It is obvious that this dependence has increased 
in relation to Russia – Russia’s gas is essential in a lot of European countries. It 
means that the majority of Europeans (as well as Americans) are very careful 
in relation to Putin.  This fact is seen clearly in the case of Southern Osetia as 
well, when nobody supported Saakashvili in his plans solve the long-protected 
conflicts of secession in Georgia. 
9 The Ukraine imports 69 % of its raw oil consumption from Russia, the Ukraine producing 
3% and the rest coming from other imports. This country does not produce more than 7% 
of its natural gas consumption, the Ukraine being the first world importer of natural gas. 
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9.10. Conclusions
Even if the progress of democracy in countries like Georgia and the 
Ukraine consolidates USA position in the area in its dream to block Russia, 
in order to bring the oil resources from Central Asia to Turkey, this policy 
had contrary effects, too. Mobilized Russians made Europe to make a step 
back quickly. Thus, it is very difficult to think that Europeans will soon open 
new geo-strategic and geo-economic fronts that would go against Russia’s inte-
rests – and this fact is also seen in the regular summits between Russia and the 
EU (where the EU has not obtained a big deal until now). 
The former Soviet states from the Black Sea area, even if more seriously be-
coming dependent on the EU (in the perspective of a future expansion, the EU 
needs stable and well governed states on the outskirts of its Eastern frontier), they 
are still far away from leaving the Russian sphere of influence, this fact being a 
major impediment in forging a clear-cut pro-EU foreign policy. Thus, it is still 
difficult to speak today about them as rather independent regional actors. Their 
demarches still need a consistent foreign support. Even if boring and repetitive, 
the games from the region are explained through the prism of great actors.
There is something else clear today. The Black Sea countries, neighbours 
of Romania, need its help (similar to Poland offereing help to the Ukraine and 
Belarus today) for stability and development. Of course, the recent Bucharest 
analysis is right, stating that Romania has not yet emerged as a generous donor 
and hasn’t got the necessary power to counterbalance certain streams in the 
region. The fact that Romania wants to do is somehow related to the need that 
Europeans should change their attitude towards Russia. But Romania doesn’t 
have the necessary power for such a foreign policy in Europe, even if it has 
some incontestable trumps.
On the other hand, neither Europeans stick together. Here we’re talking 
about the idea promoted lately, that the British and the Americans are mak-
ing by all possible means that a security project launched by Germany and 
France fails. Or in these plans of Americans, Bucharest has its own role. Lately 
the idea that Warsaw, Bucharest and Kiev will have a special role in this Eu-
ro-Atlantic (not saying that it is American) plan has been circulated. It seems 
that Romania and Poland will be used to balance the situation (as well as the 
votes) in the European Union, and East-European democracies from states 
like the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (with a possible adherence of Belarus) 
will gravitate on the orbits of these two states. Until today, recent events have 
showed that this idea is not that false (in this logic or axe there is not included, 
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to remain in strategic limits, “the plan of Yushchenco” for solving the Tran-
snistrian conflict – where Romania is not among the participants…). 
But we have to remind that Romania’s policy in this direction, although it 
is very good and courageous, needs more objectification and another degree of 
expectations. It could be supported, but we’ll have to expect the results much 
later. The objectification would be to show Europeans what Romania could 
bring to this region, otherwise Europe would regard Romania as a country 
that plays the US’s game and would avoid taking part in any rougher demarche 
against Russia (just because of Romania). This is not valid just for Romania but 
for other “small” states in the region – the actual direction is good, but needs 
more objectiveness and a longer period of realization. From the perspective of 
oil and gas, Russia has a clear advantage in this game, but the fact that, in the 
market economy, the factor of a solid and advantageous competition hasn’t got 
the last word, requires that Russia be competed against in other fields, too.
Annex No. 1. Routes of exporting Caspian petrol via Black Sea
Location Route Capacity Length Estimative cost
Baku-Ceyhan “Main 
Export Pipeline”
Baku (Azerbaijan)-Tbilisi 
(Georgia)-Ceyhan (Tur-
key)  
1milion barrels/day 1660km $2,8-2,9 billion 
Baku-Supsa Baku-Supsa(Georgia) 
Western route
100.000 barrels/day 
capacity which will 
be increased up to 
600.000 B/day
824km $600 million  be-
fore the increase of 
capacity
Baku-Novorossiysk 
North route
Baku-Novorossiysk (Rus-
sia) via Chechnya
100.000B/day ca-
pacity which will 
be increased up to 
300.000B/day
1389km out of 
which 144 in 
Chechnya
$ 600 million for in-
creasing the capac-
ity up to 300.000 
B/day
Baku-Novorossiysk, 
the route that avoids 
Chechnya with the 
link to  Mahachkala
Baku via Dagestan until 
Thoretk (Russia) linked 
to Novorossiysk
Capacity in 2000 
120.000B/day, which 
is to be increased 
to 360.000B/day in 
2006
327km 140 million $
Gardabani-Batumi Gardabani (Azerbaijan)-
Batumi (Georgia)
– Already exis-
tent oil pipe-
line in recon-
struction
–
Caspian Pipeline Con-
sortium (CPC)
Ternguiz (Kazakhstan)-
Novorossiysk (Russia)
Maximum capacity 
1,35 million B/day
1900 km Approx.  4 billion 
Source: Kellner Thierry “Geopolitique de la nouvelle Asie Centrale”, 
PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 203
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Annex No. 2. Comparative table of costs for oil transportation (for an oil pipeline 
with a capacity of 50Mt/year)
Route Price of transport 
through oil pipeline 
($/tone)
Price of transport by 
tanker ($/tone)
Total cost ($/tone)
Baku-Supsa-Bosfor-Trieste 4,86 5,46 10,32
Baku-Supsa-Kiykoy-Trieste 7,86 5,33 13,19
Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brody-Gola-
Sisak-Omishali
14,02 1,37 15,39
Baku-Supsa-Constanta-Trieste 12,15 1,37 13,52
Baku-Supsa-Constanta-Gola-Si-
sak-Omishali
12,15 1,37 13,52
Baku-Supsa-Burgas-Vlore-Trieste 11,14 3,12 14,26
Baku-Supsa-Samsun-Ceyhan-Tri-
este
10,03 5,21 15,24
Baku-Ceyhan-Trieste 8,89 4,62 13,51
Sursa: Kellner Thierry “Geopolitique de la nouvelle Asie Centrale”, 
PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 212
Annex No. 3. Routes of transport for Caspian oil that avoid the straits of Boxford 
and Dardanelle
Location Route Capacity Length Estimative 
cost 
Albania-Macedonia-
Bulgaria (AMBO) Oil 
Pipeline
Burgas (Bulgaria)-Macedonia-Vlore 
(Albania)
750.000 B/day 950-1000 km $1 billion
Burgas-Alexandrupo-
lis (Trans Balkan Oil 
Pipeline)
Burgas-Alexandrupolis (Greece) 700.000 B/day 260-300 km $600 million
Constanta-Trieste Oil 
Pipeline
Constanta-Pancevo (Yugoslavia)-Omi-
salj (Croatia)-Trieste (Italia). Omisalj 
was oﬀered as a terminus as well.
660.000 B/day 1400 Km $1,5 billion
Odessa-Brody Odessa-Brody, with an option to the 
“Drujba” line to Plotsk in Poland or in 
Slovakia.
700.000 B/day 667 Km $600 million
Source: Kellner Thierry “Geopolitique de la nouvelle Asie Centrale”, 
PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 215
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C h a p t e r  X . 
BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE NEIGHBOURS 
AND STRATEGIC GEOPOLITICAL PLAYERS
Dr. Radu Gorincioi, 
Ina Tcaci
Every state willing to be a player on the international arena must establish 
three levels of cooperation and partnership: international, regional and bilateral. 
Within this research, at the international level will be examined the relationships 
of Republic of Moldova with the United Nations (UN), at the regional – with the 
European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and GUAM; at bilateral lev-
el – with its neighbors and key actors: Ukraine, Romania, Russia, and the USA.
Transformed after 1991 into a periphery of the former Soviet Empire, 
Moldova tried to overcome its status by developing a broad network of relations 
with various states and international and regional organizations. Following the 
Wallersteinian developmental theory, Moldovan diplomacy has focussed on 
transforming the country from a periphery into at least a semi-periphery by 
weakening its relations with the former centre. For a country in transition that 
used to be almost all the time on one or another border of different Empires 
(Ottoman-Russian, Soviet-Western blocs), it was crucial to be recognized as a 
new international actor. In this respect, the new independent state pursued quite 
a complex foreign policy to diversify its relations with the Western countries, 
at the same time following the track of other former soviet republics towards a 
deeper integration into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). How-
ever after more than a decade of balancing between East and West, the Republic 
of Moldova could acknowledge the failure of its foreign policy in preserving 
independency, sovereignty, territorial integrity and social security. Neither the 
Transnistrian conflict was solved, nor got Moldova integrated into Euro-Atlan-
tic institutions. As result, the domestic socio-political and economic situation 
dramatically decreased, as well the social security and foreign investments, that 
lead to paverty, unemployment and high corruption, which favoured a deep gap 
between rich and poor people and a very high migration of population.
In the framework of the globalization process, Moldova’s liberal policies 
proved to be inconsistent and ineffective in assuring economic security and 
people prosperity. Moldova’s domestic policy failed to fulfil the expectation of 
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population also because of the weak support of Moldavian diplomacy in pro-
moting the new country’s image abroad, in attracting foreign investments and 
in building fruitful partnerships with the neighbours and other strategic ac-
tors within the new geopolitical order. On the contrary, the ambiguous charac-
ter of Moldova’s foreign policy has raised many obstacles in the relations with 
both Euro-Atlantic and CIS states. Because of this unpredictable policy, many 
of them couldn’t understand what are the national interests of Moldova, and 
its geopolitical role. Lacking any strategic partner1, Moldova confronted all 
this time with the false dilemma of belonging to two geopolitical areas – East-
ern and South Eastern Europe. Looking forward to become a bridge between 
East and West, Moldova’s political elite from the middle of 1990s, tried to de-
veloped the model of a small and open country mainly due to the historical 
background, old mentality and complex ethnic situation within the country.
10.1. The United Nations and Republic of Moldova 
The United Nations (UN) has been created in order to ensure the stability 
of international environment by preventing main powers to act one against 
each other. According to the UN Charter, United Nations represents mainly 
a security organization, which has the duty to react to any type of conflicts2. 
But one could not speak so far about any UN involvement in the Transnistrian 
conflict resolution and post-conflict building process. There is a general UN 
policy to not intervene in intra-states conflicts, excepting the cases when that 
conflicts become a threat to international security.
Starting from this point, the main task of Moldovan authorities should have 
been the internationalization of the conflict. Moldova should have designed its 
arguments in order to convince the international community that Transnistrian 
 Tough, according to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova, priority was 
given to the bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, taking into account the 
historical and geopolitical situation. Upon: Concepţia politicii externe a Republicii Mol-
dova, Chișinău, 2 februarie 995 Nr. 355-XIII.
2 There are four ways of the UN peacekeeping management – so called  “four generations of 
peacekeeping”: () Traditional peacekeeping , typical of the first forty years of UN peace-
keeping); (2) ’second generation’-  multifunctional operations, have been associated with 
the end of proxy Cold War conflicts through negotiated settlements; (3) ‘third generation’, 
‘middle ground’ or ‘humanitarian interventions’ operations started after success of ‘second 
generation’ interventions, when UN decided to intervene more, especially in Human 
Rights issues; (4) ‘ forth generation’, ‘task-sharing’ or ‘wider peacekeeping’, when UN peace-
keeping role is to enforce global security on the base of regional complementarities.
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case represents a threat to international peace because of the big stocks of weapons 
on this uncontrolled separatist region. Following the international law, the inter-
nationalisation of the conflict could be crucial for Moldova to have at least the 
UN Committee for Disarmament and International Security more involved in 
dealing with this security threat at the stage when conflict erupted. Cooperation 
with individual states and regional organisation in this view was indispensable 
for putting this new type of conflicts on the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council Agenda. Another possible option may be to build strategic relationships 
with France, United Kingdom and, especially, with the USA – permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council, which are to some extent already involved in the 
Transnistrian conflict resolution process through other regional organizations. 
Romania the membership of which in the UN Security Council may be a new 
opportunity for making use of this important international forum.
If a necessary number of UN General Assembly’s members would be con-
vinced about the regional security benefits of addressing post-soviet frozen 
conflicts, a set of conflict resolution measures could be implemented and fi-
nanced through the UN system mechanisms. But what is even more impor-
tant, any UN Resolution on Transnistrian issue would offer the legal bases for 
taking more active actions by other regional organizations. 
At this stage, it is still necessary that Moldova pays more efforts on get-
ting international support for affirming, first of all, its sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and economic independence. UN membership offers the Moldovan 
diplomacy the necessary framework to present its vision on the way of solving 
Transnistrian issue. The only fact that finally, Moldovan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs succeeded to address the Transnistrian military threat on the UN Gen-
eral Assembly is emblematic for the effectiveness of UN-Moldova cooperation 
in the security field. Because of the unilateral approach of its foreign policy, 
Moldovan authorities failed to take the necessary measures to place the coun-
try in a more favourable framework by taking into account the international 
context. They have concentrated more on preservation of the existing regional 
relations, rather than on building new strategic partnerships with the interna-
tional players.
10.2. Different approaches towards the Transnistrian issue
Taking into account the fact that the Transnistrian conflict represents the 
Achilles’ heel of the Moldovan statehood, when addressing Moldovan foreign 
policy, one should keep in mind the role of each international actor and neigh-
bouring country on this particular issue. Retrospectively, the contradictory 
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foreign policy of Moldova may be explained as well by the weak impact of 
the Transnistrian issue on the international and regional security agenda. Be-
ing well-known as a key actor in the Transnistrian problem, Russian Federa-
tion was allowed to play a very active role in this respect, and in such a way 
succeeded to stimulate regularly the rivalries between Chisinau and Tiraspol, 
by backing officially and unofficially the latter. As result, instead of promot-
ing international involvement in conflict resolution, Moldovan diplomacy 
has looked forward to get the support of Russian Federation for putting pres-
sure on Tiraspol secessionist leaders. Due to the close cultural, linguistic and 
economic ties, that some of the orthodox pro-Russian elites preserved into 
Moldovan society, Chisinau has tried all this time to improve its relations with 
this huge regional neighbour through various ways of reconciliation.
For example, after the Parliament of Moldova elected the Communist leader, 
Vladimir Voronin, as the new president of Republic of Moldova on 4th of April 
2001, the pro-Russian government of Moldova set as main tasks to end the Tran-
snistrian conflict and to re-establish the economic and political relations with 
Russia. In this respect, joining the Russian-Belarusian Union, giving to the Rus-
sian language an official status in Moldova, deepening economic relations with 
the CIS partners and reconciliation with the separatist region of Transnistria 
have been promoted as the key slogans of the new ruling party electoral plat-
form. Due to this huge “progress” in the Moldovan-Russian relations, the Rus-
sian President agreed to guarantee a smooth solution of the Transnistrian issue 
and to repeat that Chisinau has become the Moscow’s “strategic partner”.
As a result, a big shift in solving the Transnistrian problem was noticed, on 
16 May 2001 being announced the official signing of four important coopera-
tion agreements between the conflicting parts: concerning the economic co-
operation; free access for journalists to cover news on both banks of the Nistru 
river; coordination of taxation, removal of customs checkpoints, guarantees 
for foreign investors; and mutual recognition of official documents. But, when 
at the end of May 2001, the Russian State Duma addressed the Presidents of 
Russia, Belarus, Moldova and the separatist Transnistrian republic with a pro-
posal for holding multilateral consultations and studying the conditions for 
the accession of both Chisinau and Tiraspol to the Russian-Belarusian Union, 
its negative echoes in Moldovan society and abroad seemed to dismiss local 
politicians from theirs mind. Though the proposal was discussed earlier dur-
ing the talks between the Russian and the Moldovan presidents, this idea being 
shared also by the former Russian prime minister, Evgeniy Primakov, chair-
man of the Russian Federal Commission for the regulation of the Transnistri-
an issue, the social-political situation inside the country started to deteriorate 
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rapidly. During 2001-2003 years, Moldova became periodically the arena of 
mass demonstrations and joint movements of both civil society and political 
opposition striking against the Russian sphere of influence.
At the same time, Moldova had been accepted as a full member of the Stabil-
ity Pact for South Eastern Europe and of the World Trade Organization, which 
favoured a more specific approach of the Moldovan authorities towards the re-
gional integration of their country into global community. Both the events have 
been characterized as a big success of the Moldovan diplomacy. Starting from this 
point, one may note that the Western/European vector of Moldovan foreign policy 
is being developed as its second pillar. At the beginning of 2002 a new Concept of 
Foreign Policy is being lunched by a group of young diplomats from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Moldova. Although it could not be officially approved due to 
the opposition of the Communist ruling party, in fact this document became the 
unofficial Concept of the Moldovan foreign policy, establishing its new priorities 
and directions for the coming years. In such a way, the 2001-2003 years represent-
ed a period of big contradictions of the Moldovan foreign policy, similar to the 
1994-1998 period, when the national interests of Moldova had been undermined, 
its independence and sovereignty sharply affected by initiating its further isola-
tion from the regional trends of integration into EU and NATO. Consequently, 
promoting national interests within the traditional policies and the actual priori-
ties of Moldovan Concept of Foreign Policy proved to be disastrous.
Only when Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan refused Moldo-
va’s accession to the eastern Common Economic Space in the late 2003 year; it 
became clear (for the Moldovan Communist ruling party, in particular) that the 
progressive integration of Republic of Moldova into the EU represents the best 
solution for assuring the stability, security, territorial integrity and a progres-
sive transformation of the society. Having noticed the huge impact this regional 
trend on many neighbours and on other countries with similar past, until 2005 
parliamentarian elections, Moldovan politicians couldn’t understand that pro-
moting the European integration as such can not bring much success.
Addressing more thoroughly the main security issues Moldova confronts 
in the new geopolitical realities, the diplomats started to promote more actively 
its interests within the EU, NATO, OSCE, UN and other regional organization. 
The case of Russian military forces and stockpile munitions from the Transnis-
trian region has been addressed more regularly on both bilateral and multilat-
eral levels. Though important progresses have been done during the last years, 
Moldovan diplomacy failed yet to find any important players as supporters of 
this idea within the NATO and EU. Romania solely is not likely to play a sig-
nificant role in this regard, both in NATO, OSCE or UN. But if Romania joins 
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the EU in 2007, as planned, the problem will become a more pressing one for 
the EU. This means that, in the next few years, the European Union would have 
a common border with Moldova, which still represents a major source of inse-
curity because of the uncontrolled trafficking of arms and human beings. The 
illegal trade in this area often has its epicenter in Transnistria. It is not a casual 
matter that EU lunched its first initiative towards Transnistria by sending a 
civilian monitoring Mission at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. If successful, 
this Mission may become a key instrument in encouraging a more coopera-
tive behavior of the Transnistrian leadership towards Chisinau proposals. One 
would admit that the unexpected change of attitude of both Tiraspol and Mos-
cow proves theirs weakness in preserving any more the existing status-quo.
Following the geopolitical landscape changes after both NATO and EU 
enlargements, it may be stated, using one of the Primakov’ famous sayings, 
that: “the process of political settlement has come to a point in time when 
the monopolization of peacemaking efforts by any single side does not create 
favourable conditions for progress”3. That’s why, after more than 13 years of 
“mediation and conflict resolution’s efforts”, Russian peace-keeping operation 
came to a fatal end, showing it’s unwillingness to solve the existing conflicts 
on its “near abroad” area of interest.
10.3.  Moldova and European Union: 
the partnership and neighbourhood policy
Moldova had signed a bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) with EU in 1994, applicable only from 19984, which formed until the be-
ginning of 2005 year the base juridical framework of cooperation with Euro-
pean institutions and theirs member-states. But even before PCA started to be 
implemented, Moldovan authorities become keen on arguing that EU should 
change its approach towards Moldova by offering it a chance of “association 
to EU”, as it happened in the case of other Central and South-East European 
3 After Washington brokered the now-famous 993 Israeli-Palestinian handshake on the 
White House lawn and the signing of both Oslo Agreements, Russia subsequently renewed 
its interest in the region, in opposition to U.S. efforts. Upon: Itar-TASS (Moscow), October 
2, 997.
4 The long period of time since PCA was signed and ratified 998 by all EU member states 
and entered into force is due also to the failure of Moldovan diplomacy to promote its image 
abroad and to persuade European states about the will of Moldovan authorities to promote 
market-oriented reforms.
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countries. Starting from the 13 December 1996, Moldovan President repeat-
edly addressed to the European Commission with the request to start the ne-
gotiations for signing by 2000 an Association Agreement. 
After 1998 parliamentary elections, when the new political establishment 
of Moldova more clearly expressed the European integration objective of the 
Republic of Moldova, European Commission managed to convince the most 
reluctant European states to ratify finally the PCA. At that time, European 
officers only stated that the future of EU-Moldova relations will depend very 
much of the successful implementation of the PCA. Meantime, the launch of the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was perceived by Moldovan diplomacy 
as a new chance for a faster integration into European initiatives. The National 
Strategy for South East Europe, written in 1999 both by some representatives 
of civil society and of the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, promoted the 
idea of deepening regional cooperation in South-Eastern Europe as one of the 
best ways for lessening the dependence of the CIS states. Strengthening regional 
cooperation within the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the South-Eastern 
Europe Cooperation Initiative, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and 
other regional initiatives was seen also as a way of backing Moldova’s economic 
interests in South-Eastern Europe. This kind of organizations included actual 
and prospective EU and NATO members that could offer theirs support for 
Moldova’s integration into EU and solving other domestic issues.
But as far as Moldova has been included in the Stability Pact for South-East-
ern Europe only in June 2001, when many important regional projects started 
to be implemented, our country wasn’t ready to be involved fully in all three 
Roundtables. Even the huge sums of money allocated for important projects, 
within ”Gender”, “Human Rights and National Minorities”, “Media” and “Ed-
ucation and Youth” Task Force Programs, didn’t bring any foreseeable result 
in Moldova.
Moldova has been also involved in four regional Quick Start Projects, for 
which has been allocated 600’420 ECU and in two other projects for building 
Moldova’s infrastructure, for which have been secured other 36’27 mln. ECU5. 
Finally, many of these projects failed to be implemented, compromising the 
image of Moldovan state. Although other US$ 299’500 have been allocated in 
2001 year for implementing Moldova’s action plan to fight corruption, the level 
of corruption dramatically increased in the last years. In such a way, one may 
notice that the effect of ethnic and development assistance offered through 
5 The Stability Pact and Moldova. Press Handout. Source: www.stabilitypact.org
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the Stability Pact to Moldova wasn’t that officially expected by the Moldovan 
authorities. The irresponsibility and lack of transparency allowed some active 
NGOs and lobby groups with close links in the Government to benefit pecu-
liarly from the offered assistance.
Though Moldova’s European integration was proclaimed as the cor-
ner-stone of its domestic and foreign policy, the effectiveness of this policy 
may be proved by the set of policies the country is willing and able to under-
take in various fields. Both the foreign and domestic policies of the state shall 
be adjusted to the European values and standards, in order to provide the nec-
essary framework for progressive implementation of Acquis Communitaire.
The impact of EU policies on Moldova became more obvious as result of 
the accession of 10 new countries to the EU from 1 May 2004 and signing 
by Bulgaria and Romania of the EU Adhesion treaties one year later. The EU 
policy towards Moldova will increase more as soon as it will become a direct 
neighbour of the EU, most probably in 2007. Therefore, it is the core interest 
of the EU to have an independent, politically stable and economically strong 
Moldova as a neighbour. This is even a key condition for lasting peace and 
stability at the EU borders.
As it was stated already in March 2003, when Brussels presented a new 
policy of cooperation with whose 14 direct and indirect neighbours from East 
and South, the EU was creating through the New Neighbourhood Policy an 
opportunity to bring these states closer to the integration process that is taking 
place in Europe, at the same time avoiding new dividing lines. The Concept 
of European Integration of Moldova, presented in September 2003 in Brussels, 
clearly mentioned the importance of making a principle difference between 
that two concepts lunched within the Wider Europe EU policy: “enlarged Eu-
rope” and «neighbourhood policy». However, in the process of issuing «action 
plans» for seven partners: Ukraine and Moldova, as well as EU Mediterranean 
neighbours Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, 
all these states were treated almost similar. Looking forward to escape from 
being treated at the same level with Jordan and Palestinian Authority or even 
with Russia and Belarus, the Concept of European Integration of Moldova em-
phasised at that time on a specific way of integration into EU, by accepting 
Moldova as part of the Stabilization and Association Process signed with some 
Balkan countries. Because of this main focus it put on the regional integra-
tion within the Process of Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and other 
European initiatives, the Concept failed to fulfil the expectations of Moldovan 
authorities. 
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One shall notice that due to the missperception of the geopolitical reali-
ties and of its regional role, Moldovan diplomacy failed again to promote the 
national interests. This may be concluded from the fact that the EU-Moldo-
va Action Plan refers very broadly to the EU support for the participation of 
Moldova within the Process of Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe. The Ac-
tion Plan as such does not offer any perspective for Moldova as integration into 
EU. As clearly was mentioned by the EU Commissioner, Ferrero-Waldner, no 
EU neighbor is being offered the prospect of membership in the bloc6.
Consequently, the Action plans represents solely a key policy strategy of 
EU over the next five years as Brussels seeks to extend the zone of «peace, 
stability, and prosperity» to countries around the EU. By these plans, the Eu-
ropean Union wish is to gain the benefits of a stable neighborhood. It offers the 
necessary framework for providing necessary assistance and support for these 
countries to pursue with their own economic and policy reforms, to spread 
“the benefits of prosperity and democracy”. To fulfill the European integration 
perspective, Moldovan authorities shall look beyond this Action Plan and take 
into account the following recommendations:
• To promote a new thinking into society and approach of all govern-
mental-related bodies regarding the meaning and ways of achieving 
European integration. 
• The visa regime policy of Moldova shall be made less burdensome to 
allow, at least unilaterally, a more flexible European flow in the move-
ment of people and capitals. 
• It shall be opened some new Embassies in other European capitals, 
and especially, new Consulates in the biggest industrial and commer-
cial centers. 
• Moldovan diplomacy shall promote a better image of the state, and to 
attract foreign support and investments in various fields. 
6 Ferrero-Waldner: «Let me be clear about what the ENP is and what it is not. It is not an 
enlargement policy. It does not prejudge prospects for European countries that may at some 
future point wish to apply for membership, but it does not provide for a specific accession 
prospect either. What is it [then]? It is an offer. It’s a substantial offer, it’s a real concrete 
offer: the offer of much deeper cooperation, and a progressive integration – this is impor-
tant – a progressive integration into certain EU policies and programs, depending, of 
course, on the fulfillment of commitments». Source: Ahto Lobjakas «EU: Brussels Unveils 
‘Action Plans’ For Ukraine, Moldova, Mediterranean Neighbors, http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2004/2/59bb8c0e-008c-4440-8ff-bba9b5b92d.html
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• To start urgently the process of harmonization of national legislati-
on to Acquis and the redirection of theirs policies towards European 
standards, as Croatia did, without having any European perspective. 
• To provide a stable, predicable and an open market-oriented policy, as 
well as affordable facilities for improving domestic investment climate.
• To ask EU for applying the Most Favorable Nation clause into practice, 
by opening European market to Moldovan goods, and meantime to 
waive from some of the CIS free trade agreements. 
• Finally, Moldova shall be remembered that to reach its ambitions of 
European integration, the EU should be understood from two levels: 
as a unitary actor (both as an economical and political body) and as a 
conglomerate of actors, with theirs own interests, problems and fears.
10.4. Moldovan-Russian relations: 
beyond the “near abroad” doctrine
In what it concern the foreign, defense and security affairs, the EU rela-
tions with Moldova could not be developed without taking into account that 
stability and security in the region relies on the abilities of both sides to man-
age theirs ties with Russia. If EU and Russia are ready to share a co-decision 
making role in this part of Europe, as it was already stated7, the Transnistrian 
problem may become in the near future a testing area for a common crisis 
management operation Mission. One shall not forget that the Ukrainian factor 
counts very much in the EU-Russia relations.
The recent evolutions regarding the Transnistrian conflict proved that 
Russian interests in the region depend entirely from EU-Ukraine, EU-Moldo-
va and Ukraine-Moldova relationships. In order to preserve its future stat-
ute of military Power, Russia needs to maintain its former military base from 
Transnistrian region (similar to that from Kaliningrad, Georgia, Armenia, 
etc.) as an effective instrument of political persuasion of former soviet repub-
lics. While we are speaking in terms of geo-strategic arrangements, it’s obvious 
that the Russian military capabilities are too weak to influence the behavior of 
other geopolitical players in the region. Neither NATO, nor EU enlargement 
could be blocked because of the political harassment of Russia in the case of 
Baltic States, but also of new course of Georgia and Ukraine towards NATO.
7 Beatty Andrew “Russia may be offered bigger say in European security”, http://www.eu-
rojournal.org, accessed: 26.02.2004.
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Though it seems like Russia and EU (backed by USA) have reached an agree-
ment on the Transnistrian issue, as USA succeeded to do in the case of Russian 
bases from Georgia, it is far enough until the Russian imperial ambitions in 
these two regions will decrease. Moreover, Russia had to accept the EU and 
USA involvement into existing five-side format of negotiations, after a series of 
commercial sanctions have been imposed to Moldova. In the aftermath of the 
most rigid Moldovan-Russian relations form their recent history, the Russian 
oil monopolist, GAZPROM, announced that starting from 2006 the exported 
gas to Moldova will be sold at the world prices. By this new treatment, Russia is 
still trying to keep the former soviet republics on its foreign policy track.
While building its new relationships with Russia, Moldovan officials shall 
try to persuade it to distinguish between the cultural, economic, political and 
security issues they have to deal with on the mutual benefits of both sides. A 
common approach of the cultural and economic bilateral relations may offer 
Russia the necessary framework for preserving its historical role as protector of 
Russian-speaking Diaspora from Moldova. At the same time, linking the eco-
nomical influence that Russian minority is still benefiting in Moldova with theirs 
traditional ties on Eastern market, may help to maintain the necessary level of 
trade balance and labor migration with Russia. Meanwhile, the economic rela-
tions with South-Eastern, Central European and other countries shall develop 
progressively, securing the strategic economic independence of the country.
If one would analyze Moldova-Russia relations from the perspective of the 
EU-NATO and US-Russia set of relations, it may become clearly the complex-
ity of international relations because of new factors, the international players 
shall consider in theirs foreign policies. Due to the traditional US-Russia ri-
valry, since the inception of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 
Moscow has pressed for greater involvement, viewing EU military develop-
ment as a means of diluting NATO’s primacy in Europe. At the same time, be-
cause of EU-US rows over European defense abating and the threat of regional 
instability moving up the agenda, the EU now looks ready to grant Moscow its 
wish, in return for more flexibility8.
As result, EU-Russian relations may develop in the near future with much 
more willingness than many politicians from their neighboring countries 
would like to admit. Especially, this is the case of small states, like Moldova 
or Georgia, which lack strong supporters in Europe, this change may bring 
8 Beatty Andrew “Russia faces Europe” / ISS-EU, http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml? 
aid=4592 , accessed: 26.02.2004 
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negative consequences for theirs national interests. As it was mentioned, this 
move could offer Russia to play a co-decision making role in EU crisis manage-
ment operations and post-conflict stabilization. Transnistrian case may serve 
as a significant input for testing a new co-operation strategy together with 
OSCE – a setting that Moscow has repeatedly called for. 
Though this common EU-USA offer to take part in the negotiation proc-
ess on the settlement of Transnistrian conflict could move beyond the EU 
monitoring Mission of the illegal traffic on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border 
within the separatist republic of Transnistria and pave the way for a multina-
tional stabilization Mission in Transnistria – led probably by OSCE – it might 
prove soon its inefficiency in reintegrating both parts of the Nistru river into 
a democratic and viable state. For the EU and USA is much more important 
to prompt Russia to withdraw its 2,500 troops from the area and to push the 
Transnistrian separatist’s leaders to respect the international law and demo-
cratic values. As soon as these goals will be formally achieved, EU and, per-
haps, USA would diminish theirs role in this region, unless new tensions will 
disturb the regional stability and security.
Taking into account that the issue of energy supplies represents a special 
topic on Russian-EU Agenda since Russia provides 21 per cent of the EU’s oil 
and 41 per cent of its gas imports, the recurrence of internal instability in neigh-
bouring countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus because of Russia, could 
hardly influence the European structures to put pressure on Russian Federa-
tion. Moreover, the EU might face big problems in the process of adapting to the 
need to take decisions if 30, because of the differences in attitude between the 
“old” and “new” European members, especially in what it concerns Russia.
In the meantime, the new Russian Foreign Policy Doctrine has recently 
revised its policy in the post-Soviet space, as well the mechanisms of its im-
plementation. As general principle of the “near abroad” doctrine, it has been 
stated that «any country that would promote the doctrine of Russia’s rollback 
will certainly create a conflict in the relations with this country»9. This might 
be perceived as a great threat to the national security of many former soviet 
republics, although it doesn’t affect the new EU and NATO members. The con-
clusion that arises from these statements leads to a new dividing line and new 
spheres of influence across Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. As far 
as a more radical leader would succeed V. Putin, this policy may include also 
9 “Russia: Kremlin redefining Policy in Post-Soviet Space”. Sources: fednews.ru, RIA-Nov-
osti, February 3, 2005.
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the Baltic states within its area of interests, particularly on such issues as tran-
sit or the status of the Russian language and Russian community. As pointed 
out by G.Pavlovski, the tactic at this policy might consist of introducing those 
issues on the agenda of Russia’s discussions with the EU, NATO, and some 
major West European capitals. More unpredictable could be Russian foreign 
policy towards Moldova, Georgia and other disobedient neighbours. 
Would then EU and NATO try to tackle the issues on which Moscow seeks 
to regain a voice, or will encourage its neighbours to deal alone with that range of 
“bilateral affairs”? While the Republic of Moldova tries to identify its new place on 
the regional landscape, it has to look upon how to face its security dilemma. Being 
at the same time a small neutral country and facing very huge foreign influences 
and internal disintegration trends, Moldovan policymakers have to find new al-
ternatives to the actual mechanisms of preserving national interests.
10.5. OSCE-Moldova cooperation: 
unfulfilled commitments and lost hopes
Starting with 1992, the partnership built with OSCE represents a pecu-
liar way of solving the Transnistrian conflict. Because of the narrow mandate 
offered to the OSCE Mission from Moldova and to the consensus character 
of this organization, it could not perform an effective role in settlement of 
Transnistrian issue. Until the 1999 the relations developed by the OSCE with 
Republic of Moldova hardly can prove a coherent policy approach of how this 
specific conflict issue should be addressed.
After 1999 Summit in Istanbul, Russia has played redundant diplomatic 
efforts to overwhelm its counterparts from the OSCE. In order to misuse the 
Summit Declaration, which clearly stated Russian commitments to withdraw 
its military forces and munitions both from Moldova and Georgia, the diplo-
macy in Moscow succeeded to persuade and even to block the following OSCE 
Summits at which Russian interests where affected. The most recent Washing-
ton Summit of the OSCE proved once again that Russia may use efficiently its 
lobby and diplomatic means for vetoing any decision that could harm its geo-
political interests. As V. Socor pointed out10, some of the rejected amendments 
at the Washington Summit of the OSCE, proving that this organization has 
lost its potential to deal with frozen conflicts in post-soviet area, were:
0 Socor, Vladimir “OSCE Parliamentary Resolution Sets Stage for Recognition of Transnis-
tria”/ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Monday, July , 2005 – Volume 2, Issue 33.
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• to urge Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova’s territory;
• to define the conflict as an international one between Russia and Mol-
dova, rather than an intra-Moldovan conflict;  
• to require democratization efforts and civil-society building in Trans-
nistria as a prerequisite to holding any internationally-supervised 
elections there and others;  
• to assert/revive its credibility on the international arena, instead of 
losing efforts on conflict resolution; OSCE could better concentrate on 
monitoring of the elections, enforcing human rights and democratic 
freedoms on the black-sides and separatist regions of Europe. 
The OSCE’s failures in dealing with such frozen conflicts, as Transnistria, 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Northern Karabah may be easily explained if we 
take in consideration Russian’s right to veto any decision of the Committee of 
Ministries. Even the OSCE Parliamentarian Assembly may be threatened in 
the process of voting its Resolutions because of the Russian pressure to block 
the budget financing and adoption procedure and the pro-Russian lobby in the 
Political and Security Committees.
As result, a complex process of revising its statutory mission and prospec-
tive role started inside the OSCE during the last years. On one hand, Russia and 
other few CIS members are pleading for reaffirming OSCE role in conflict reso-
lution and taking away from its mandate such functions as: monitoring of the 
elections, evaluating of the respect for human and minorities rights and other 
democratic freedoms. On other side, the US and some other European powers 
stand for offering a more active or even an exclusive role in promotion of human 
and minorities’ rights, of electoral standards, etc. to OSCE. Moreover, this group 
of states have mentioned the role of other international organizations in conflict 
resolution and post-conflict stabilization, offering to the OSCE a minimal role 
in this field. Like the UN, the OSCE represents an institution from Cold War 
times, which is still trying to find its new place on international affairs.
The “dynamic” and controversial policies the OSCE Mission to Moldova 
promoted during the last few years concerning the Transnistrian problem, 
proved that OSCE lacks a viable vision and the necessary will and capaci-
ties for solving this conflict. At the same time, the strong opposition of many 
political parties and civil society representatives, that OSCE confronted, has 
proved the old-fashion and unilateral character of this organization. Instead 
of bringing together the representatives of both governmental bodies and civil 
society from conflicting sides and show its readiness to accept all the pro-
posals, OSCE Mission from Moldova acted sometimes against the will of the 
main civil society groups. Finally it succeeded to change its methods of work, 
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promoting a new strategy through development of civil society cooperation in 
the conflicting region.
Despite this, unfolding elections in the Eastern part of Moldova requires 
much more efforts to be done in order to promote democratic values, freedom 
of Media, independent political parties and nongovernmental organizations. 
It’s very unlikely that OSCE may perform this task due to few funds available 
for civil society development. A more realistic alternative could be to allow 
Council of Europe and European Union to get involved directly in the proc-
ess of post-conflict stabilization and rehabilitation measures, while preserving 
its mandate for the future monitoring of elections as soon as the necessary 
conditions will appear. Otherwise, a common OSCE-EU stabilization and/or 
monitoring Mission would mean more bureaucracy, less efficiency and better 
interference of other interested players in the Transnistrian region.
10.6. Moldova cooperation with NATO and GUAM: 
achievable perspectives
While speaking about NATO and GUAM cooperation, one should address 
these organizations in geopolitical terms. Although NATO and GUAM rep-
resent quite different perspectives for securing regional security, in the sense 
of this study, they are treated together, because of the specific set of relations 
promoted by the Moldavian authorities in this respect.
Starting from 1994, when Moldova joined Partnership for Peace Program 
(PfP) and was invited to take seat in the Euro-Atlantic Council, it has repeat-
edly stated that this type of cooperation represents one of the most suitable 
ways of maintaining its military capabilities. At the same time, Moldova se-
curity dilemma, closely related to its neutrality status, was perceived more 
obvious after 2001, when Russia refused to fulfill its Istanbul commitments. 
Neither OSCE, nor PfP cooperation could help Moldovan authorities persuade 
Russia on this issue. It became clear that the neutrality status was good enough 
for keeping Moldova away from CIS militaries structures and securities af-
fairs, but represents the worst possible mean for ensuring its national secu-
rity. Having a foreign military base located on its separatist region, controlled 
both by foreign security forces and the local military elite, Moldovan neutral-
ity could prove its usefulness if an international organization or some Great 
Powers would agree to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the country. Instead of this, Moldova was still belongs both to the 
Russian sphere of influence, and partly to the Balkan region, where is quite 
difficult to speak about stability. 
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But after persisting domestic conflicts from this area have threatened inter-
national security, the South Eastern Europe succeed to became one of the most 
dynamic regions where the accession to the EU and the process of approaching 
NATO membership represent the dominant political tendencies of almost all 
these countries. The case of Croatia, but also of the neighbouring states, are 
quite emblematic for understanding the role of NATO and EU in promoting 
stability, security and prosperity in the region. If there where no NATO and EU 
involvement, one could hardly imagine how many of the Balkan region coun-
tries would became NATO and EU members. The Black Sea regional coopera-
tion, Stability Pact, South Eastern Cooperation Initiatives and others couldn’t 
solve so far the security, political and economic issues of theirs members.
Therefore, the Republic of Moldova shall realize that, within the actual 
geopolitical order, its neutrality may not guarantee the fulfilment of its na-
tional interests. As soon as this will be recognized, a fruitful integration in 
NATO may bring Moldova better perspectives for Transnistrian settlement, 
and as result, a further integration into EU.  In political terms, as a prospective 
new NATO member, Moldova should11:
– Demonstrate its commitment and respect for OSCE norms and prin-
ciples, including the resolution of ethnic disputes and external territo-
rial disputes or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means;
– Show its commitment to promote stability and well-being, economic 
freedom, social justice and environment responsibility;
– Establish an appropriate democratic and civilian control of its defence 
forces;
– Undertake its commitment to ensure that adequate resources will be 
devoted to achieving the obligations expected from a future NATO 
member, according to the principles stated in the Washington Treaty.
From military point of view, as a prospective new member, from Moldova 
are expected:
– to accept, as a minimum, the NATO doctrine and polices aiming at 
achieving a sufficient level of training and interoperability with Allied 
forces;
– to participate actively in Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities and 
within the Individual Partnership Actions Plan (IPAP), including in 
Planning and Review Process of common operations.
 Romania’s Westernization and NATO Membership: a Historical Approach, (Coord: Br.gen. 
Ionescu, M.E), Chapter 5: Study on NATO Enlargement // Occasional papers, No.3 (I)/2002, 
pp. 50-5.
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– to be prepared to bring its contribution to the common security and 
collective defence and to pursue the objectives of standardization, 
which are essential to Alliance strategy and operational effectiveness;
– to establish a permanent political and military representation at Brus-
sels and SHAPE HQs.
– to train and provide qualified personnel for participating in multina-
tional and international missions; etc.
If we analyze what Moldova managed to undertake during its participa-
tion within PfP, it is surprising to note that many of the above requests have 
been or are going to be fulfilled. But, as far as Moldovan people are staying 
on further supporting the constitutional provision, on neutrality the national 
security strategy should take into considerations other means for ensuring na-
tional interests.  
Although the PfP activities are enough limited in scope, until now Moldo-
va’s cooperation with NATO was mainly focused on providing and training 
available forces for participating in peacekeeping, humanitarian and SAR 
missions and exercises. This is why some experts argue that Moldova didn’t 
succeed to use the entire PfP potential, lacking the necessary political will to 
identify the final goal of such cooperation. Assuming that the neutral status 
is offering enough space for manoeuvres, the Moldovan Supreme Security 
Council failed to adopt a military strategy at the national level. In this regard, 
the existing military Doctrine formulates quite general the existing means and 
capabilities for addressing the main threats and challenges Moldova faces. On 
the other side, as a neutral country, one could say that Moldova does not need 
any military strategy and even any national army to secure its interests. And 
its may prove right if Moldova would be in the case of Canada or Swiss. But 
unlike them, Moldova is confronting with both internal and external threats 
to its national integrity and security.
This is why that in 2005 Moldova has started high-level consultations with 
NATO officials to sign an Individual Partnership Actions Plan (IPAP). Cur-
rent bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of the IPAP pro-
vide Republic of Moldova the minimal framework to define its basic interests 
and prospective fields of cooperation with NATO (economic, political, secu-
rity, military, environment, etc.). As far as a more sincere dialogue with NATO 
and its member states will be developed, the IPAP may prove its effectiveness 
in addressing the most stringent security and military issues, Moldova is con-
fronting with now.
Finally, one should keep in mind the existing rivalries within NATO be-
cause of the leading role USA maintains in the main decision-making struc-
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tures despite the EU ambition to reach parity. After Russia had adopted a more 
positive stance towards NATO enlargement, it’s more probably that EU may 
pledged for offering Russia a clearer format of involvement in both the EU and 
NATO crisis-management missions.
Concerning the cooperation within GUAM countries, there shall be dis-
cussed first of all USA and also Ukrainian role in the region. Depending on 
the level of US-Ukraine relations, the other states from the region may plan 
both theirs contributions and benefits. Between 1997 and 2001 years, when it 
may be stressed that GUAM appeared as an organization, with its stated goals 
(GUAM Charter), the evolution of this regional initiatives hasn’t inspired any 
hopes. It was clear that at that time USA supported this forum of some of the 
Western CIS head of states to warn Russia against any imperial evolution in 
the post-soviet area. It was a symbolic way to show Russia that US strategic in-
terests lay beyond the former USSR borders and that’s all. From the other side, 
the basic interests of GU(U)AM members were economic and financial ones. 
Some of the GUAM participants (Ukraine and Moldova) were mainly inter-
ested in signing a free trade agreement, for the others – building of the neces-
sary infrastructure, but for each of them the biggest challenge remains theirs 
effective participation in the construction of the new “Silk Road” Europe-Asia 
transport corridor. Indirectly, those countries interests were to obtain more 
independence by balancing the Russian sphere of influence.
When the orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine brought in power 
pro-Western politicians, the role of GUAM started to be revaluated by both its 
members-states and the American diplomacy. At the Chisinau Summit, par-
ticipants openly addressed a large spectrum of problems, ranging form pro-
motion of democracy, strengthening regional security and stability, regulation 
of “frozen conflicts, up to combating terrorism and transnational organized 
crime, stepping up an intra-GUUAM trade- economic cooperation12. Moreo-
ver, Romania and Lithuania have been invited to participate as observers, while 
Ukraine affirmed its new role of regional actor by proposing a plan of Transnis-
trian settlement. It was a significant step that positively improved the regional 
security environment and challenged the future development of its relations 
with Russia, the EU and NATO. Beyond these positive input in launching a new 
Agenda of this organization, GUAM potential is quite limited due both to its 
consisting elements and the regional environment, dominated by Russia.
2 Declaraţia Comună a Șefilor de Stat ai Azerbaijanului, Georgiei, Lituaniei, Moldovei, 
României și Ucrainei, Sursa: www.mfa.md 
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Trying to preserve its geopolitical role in the region and to the diminished 
significance of the GUAM community of states, the Russian Federation still 
can use the economic, gasoline pipelines as levers to deter many of the GUAM 
unfriendly actions. The hasten measures both Ukraine and Georgia are taking 
to ensure theirs domestic electricity and fuel security demonstrate that GUAM 
is far from fulfilling its regional role. Thus a closer economic cooperation be-
tween the EU and Russia will definitely have an impact on the Black Sea-Cas-
pian Sea regions as well. At the same time, the process of “Europeanization” 
of NATO is being reflected in continuing “its persistent campaign of clear-
ing the relations with Russia from the “threat perception” to theirs countries’ 
security”13. This huge competition among the main international actors may 
affect both positively and negatively the further evolution of GUAM.
10.7.  The United States interests in the region 
After 1991 the United States of America represents the most important 
player on international arena that, actually, didn’t pursue any strategic inter-
ests in its cooperation with the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, the US di-
plomacy allowed Russia to maintain its military influence in the region, and 
avoided to focus on Transnistrian conflict resolution. The main achievement 
of American diplomacy regarding Moldova was to make pressure on the Rus-
sia to sign the Istanbul Summit Declaration from 2001, and to link up the 
fulfilment of the Russian commitments in this respect with the ratification of 
the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)14. Though the CFE 
treaty was signed in the last days of the Cold War (November 1990), and might 
look obsolete, it still represents an useful mechanism that limits the number of 
battle tanks, heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters deployed 
and stored between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia’s Ural mountains. Fearing 
that USA or NATO may transform some of the former Soviet republics into 
the outposts for nuclear arms or army bases, is still interested in its ratifica-
3 Black Sea Basin Regional Profile: The Security Situation and The Region –Building Op-
portunities, / Research Study 0 (April – June 200), Edited by Institute for Security and 
International Studies (ISIS), Sofia.
4 After the Kozak Memorandum has been presented to Moldovan authorities, Stephen Rade-
maker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control “underscored the position of the 
United States and NATO alliance that the adapted CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) 
treaty cannot be ratified until Russia fulfils its Istanbul commitments, including the with-
drawal of munitions and troops from Moldova” in Tailgunner Joe Russia must remove 
Moldova troops for treaty – US, www.FreeRepublic.com
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tion by all these countries. But as the 2002 and 2003 years deadlines have not 
been fulfilled, wile the international environment has changed very much, the 
importance of CFE significantly decreased. It became more an instrument of 
persuasion between the USA and Russia.
At the political and economic level, the role played by the US in Moldova 
proved to be crucial for domestic democratic and market-oriented reforms. 
Different kind of assistance US offered during all this time lead to important 
changes in forming a new political establishment in Moldova. The symbolic 
messages of different US Ambassadors in Moldova had a big political and eco-
nomic impact on its internal and external policies. Despite of this, US had 
focused on the regional stability, security and development. The main idea of 
this policy was to support a democratic transition in these countries in order 
to threatened Russian authoritarian influences in the region.
As far as the regional environment radically improved during the last few 
years as the result of NATO enlargement to East, new security options started 
to be considered in the US Department of States. That does suppose to en-
hance the regional role of Ukraine in order to balance Russian interests. Build-
ing a strategic alliance with Ukraine offered to the USA some strong reasons 
for becoming a more active player in the region. This may be noticed in the 
Ukrainian track toward GUAM, NATO and EU. Moldova can definitely ben-
efit from these geo-strategic changes if will undertake more active diplomatic 
efforts towards the Euro-Atlantic integration. Nevertheless, this may lead to 
new tensions with the neighboring NATO members, and especially with Ro-
mania. The new threats the USA is facing around the world in its fight against 
terrorism represent another significant challenge for getting it more involved 
in the regional security politics. This might be also the case for being invited 
together with the EU to address the Transnistrian issue more directly. The role 
USA will be willing to play in this perspective is not yet clear. But it is obvious 
that a more US involvement in the Transnistrian settlement would have a posi-
tive impact as it might diminish the Russian influence in the region.
10.8. The Moldovan-Ukrainian relations
In what it concerns the Ukrainian factor, it shall be mentioned from begin-
ning that Ukrainian neighbourhood represents both advantages and disadvan-
tages for Moldova. This is why Moldovan-Ukrainian relations varied from one 
extreme to another. If Kucima’s involvement in conserving the Transnistrian 
conflict proved to be disastrous for securing Moldovan interests, Yuscenko’s 
recent plan marked a more pragmatic approach that stresses on the positive 
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potential of bilateral relations. But despite of the existing political will to solve 
the common-border issues, in both Chisinau and Kiev the separatists leaders 
may succeed to preserve theirs power in the region. The financial, technical 
and logistic support EU is offering both to Moldova and Ukraine in securing 
theirs borders may be insufficient to enforce the expected democratic changes 
in the region. Especially if the Ukrainian political and lobby groups will not 
manage to save their lasting relations with Tiraspol local elites. 
While analyzing the perspectives of Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation, one 
should remember that Russia still supplies around 80 per cent of the required 
natural gas to Ukraine, as well as 67 per cent of its oil and 100 per cent of its nu-
clear fuel. According to Russian figures, Ukraine owes US more that $2 billion 
for gas, and preserved quite dependent economic relations with Russia, mainly 
in the Eastern Ukraine. From this point of view, both countries are seeking 
ways of moving out of Russia’s sphere of influence. In this context, many West-
ern politicians and diplomats underlined the importance of a stable and pros-
perous Ukraine, oriented towards Europe and the Atlantic community. These 
regional trends give impetus for a more fruitful cooperation between those two 
neighbours. If the Euro-Atlantic integration will remain the main goal of new 
political elite from Ukraine, both countries will have to bring closer theirs bi-
lateral policies, to share common values and to pursuit similar interests. The 
success of one of them will give more opportunities for another. At the same 
time, it might be easier for NATO and EU to develop their new strategies for 
the whole region, rather than separately for each country. If the latter case, the 
costs would be much higher, because even if Ukraine succeeds in its aspiration 
of joining the NATO and EU on the long term, the social, infrastructure and 
economic ties will still remain strong dependent by Russia. This supposes to 
promote quite a contradictory policy for assuring both the economic grow and 
social-political stability. One of the perspective solutions could be the establish-
ment of a regional free trade area, consisting from Moldova, Ukraine and Geor-
gia, similar to CEFTA. This type of regional cooperation may strengthen theirs 
capacities to meet EU standards. The expected economic growth and a more 
clear EU and NATO membership perspective will ensure that they not return 
to their political or economic past. On the contrary, theirs social-political sta-
bility and economic grow may represent a model for Russia, Belarus, and other 
developing countries, as it happened in the case of Balkan region15.
5 Commonwealth Conference National Intelligence Council 2020 Project – Scenario, p. 4. 
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Otherwise, the lack of political will of Ukrainian elites to solve the Tran-
snistrian conflict may offer Russia new ways for enforcing its “new abroad” 
strategy as soon as the economical situation will allow. The economic reckless-
ness, nostalgic political behaviour and pro-Russian movements in the Eastern 
part of the Ukraine and Moldova could give the way to radical fragmentation 
trends, political instability and insecurity in the whole region. This black-side 
and separatist perspective of one of the key geopolitical regions of Eastern Eu-
rope justifyes the special interest the US, NATO and UE are paying to inte-
grate Ukraine within the West.
10.9.  Moldova-Romania case: a special relationship?
The relationships built by Romania and Moldova should always have a 
privileged character, due to the common culture, language and historical past. 
But actually, since Moldova got its independence in 1991, their level of interac-
tion varied in intensity from romantic and close cooperation to much tensioned 
relations in the period of 2001-2002 years, when a huge diplomatic crisis was 
hardly overcome. As result, real pragmatic relations could not be established 
and the existing potential has not been developed so far. Instead of taking mu-
tual benefits from the existing emotional relations, Moldovan politicians tried 
to politicize the cultural and linguistic values for their own benefits. On the 
other side, Romanian leadership didn’t succeed to build a pragmatic relation 
with their Moldovan counterparts. The failure to manage professionally the 
complex set of bilateral relationships paved the way for an inadequate and ar-
rogant treatment by the Media. 
At the same time, Moldova failed to understand that good relations with 
Romania are important at least for two important aspects: the Euro-Atlantic 
integration and the Transnistrian issue. One should recognize that since Ro-
mania decided to follow the way of the Euro-Atlantic integration it behave as an 
advocate for lobbying Moldova’s further integration in these structures. Build-
ing special relations with Romania should be the crucial task for all Moldovan 
politicians, as Romania has to be seen as a ‘long term ally’. Even if we have to 
admit that Romanian advocacy role in the regional and international forums did 
not always bring the expected benefits, it can not be underestimated.
After Romania will be accepted as a full member of the EU (as esti mated – 
in 2007) it would has a key role in strengthening the regional stability and eco-
nomic prosperity. As a messenger of Moldovan interests in the EU structures, 
Romania might try to advocate new proposals in European Commission and 
European Parliament for a better treatment of its citizens from Republic of 
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Moldova. Romanian may also pledge for a quicker solution of the Transnistri-
an problem and Moldova’s progressive integration into European structures16. 
But getting European Union involved in post-conflict stabilization requires 
fostering the level of cooperation between Moldova, Romania and other Euro-
pean Union’s members. Even if in the current situation, when Romania itself is 
hardly struggling to be accepted in the EU, it can not do so much for Moldova; 
there are still certain ways to support Moldova’s European integration. 
One of the main tools could be to engage both sides in a cooperative part-
nership starting from the experience, Romania acquired as a candidate EU 
member. There is a large scale for cooperation, including sharing the experi-
ence of translating and implementing the Acquis communitare, organizing 
trainings and trans-border activities, institutional management, legislative 
reforms, etc. The common language, common problems and geographic prox-
imity represent the main advantages to be taken into consideration during the 
adaptation period of Moldova to the EU standards.  
As a NATO member, security management and conflict resolution meas-
ures may represent other significant fields, where Bucharest could share its 
experience to its Chisinau counterparts. There is also a vast area of coopera-
tion within the negotiation and implementation of the Individual Partnership 
Actions Plan (IPAP). Until now, Romania failed to propose within NATO any 
initiatives for a better involvement of international community in post-con-
flict stabilization, small arms and light weapons, environment and “border 
security” fields. IPAP may offer such an opportunity as far as Ukraine and 
Georgia efforts towards NATO became more visible.
One would mention that until now that there is no real success of Roma-
nian diplomacy for finding its track of involvement in increasing regional sta-
bility and trans-border security. Nevertheless, bilateral relation should be de-
veloped in terms of real strategic partnership, which implies commitment from 
both sides in dealing with the full range of issues. As soon as Romania will be 
integrated into EU, it could certainly play a key role in Moldova’s integration, 
stabilization and conflict resolution processes and this is while Romanian per-
spective regional impact should not be ignored by any Moldovan Government.
In conclusion, it may be stressed that there is a stringent need for establish-
ing priorities of the Moldovan foreign policy. The actual Concept of Foreign 
Policy should be radically modified, by defining and developing more clearly 
6 “Transnitria – evoluţia unui conflict îngheţat și perspective de soluţionare”, / Institutul 
“Ovidu Șincai”, București, septembrie 2005. Sursa: www.fisd.ro
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its strategic goals. Taking into account the above mentioned factors and the 
regional and global challenges Moldova is facing with, promotion of an active, 
efficient and realist diplomacy may prove to be more useful than continuing 
to build its military capacities.
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C h a p t e r  X I .
THE DYNAMICS OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS IN MOLDOVA: EXPERT VIEW
Contrary to the common opinion of the Moldovan citizens that their coun-
try is a experiencing a steady stagnation (POB, 2005), indubitable improvements 
have emerged since the last parliamentary elections in March 2006. The most 
remarkable change was, according to the majority of the experts, the conditional 
cooperation between the power and the opposition. Another important change 
consisted in a surprising pro-Western discourse, so restlessly voiced by the au-
thorities in Chisinau. How frank and substantial is this discourse? Or, in other 
words, is the Moldovan political class capable to prove the seriousness of its in-
tentions in the implementation of the Action Plans (namely the Moldova-EU AP 
it has committed to? Will the political class yield in the short-run (the Moldova-
NATO AP)? We tried to answer these questions by focusing on a sample of ex-
perts, selected by sex, age, education and nationality. The interviews had been 
carried out during June-July, while the answers were analyzed in August.
11.1. Political Developments:
11.1.1. To what extent does the current Parliamentary conﬁguration reﬂect 
the pro-European aspirations of Moldovan society? What is the 
extent of popular support of the politicians? Does the Moldova-EU 
Action Plan reﬂect the conditions of internal stability in Moldova?
The experts’ opinion is fragmented on this matter, as some sustain that the 
current Parliament reflects the pro-European aspirations of the Moldovan peo-
ple, because EU is generally attractive. Thus, the political leaders have to follow 
the mainstream in the public opinion and back it up with the necessary deci-
sions and policies. The other side of the expert group state that the turn towards 
Europe is just a race for the votes of the people, the radical change of the political 
discourse of some of the parties, like the Communist Party, right before the elec-
tions does not, therefore, reflect the change in the mentality of its leaders.
“I personally believe that the majority of the political forces support the idea 
of European integration because of opportunistic reasons; meaning that the polit-
ical parties plead for European integration because they want the people’s votes”.
“The whole situation reminds me of the “independence parade” in 1991; 
then Chisinau was waiting to see what Kyiv will do, eventually proclaiming its 
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own independence a couple of days distance from the Ukrainian independence. 
Now the situation is the same: the Rose revolution, followed by the victory of the 
pro-Western Yushchenko in Ukraine, forced the politicians in Moldova to think 
about the national interest.” 
“As opposed to the former Parliament, the structure of the current one is 
more optimal, more durable, because domination of a single party is always bad, 
but domination of a party like the one at power in Moldova is extremely bad, 
considering the priorities Moldova has put on its agenda.”
The experts say that, despite the vocal support for the European integration 
blared by the political parties, the latter are not ready for such a commitment; 
they do not know the rules of the game. That is why the politicians in Moldova 
display exclusively consumptive expectations towards the EU. Individually, 
the politicians speak or EU as just of a future perspective, this not damaging 
their position in the party, and not demeaning their popular support.  How-
ever, among the experts there are skeptics thinking that the actual Parliament 
fits has slim and partial support in the masses. According to these skeptics, the 
citizens with pro-European expectations have strong doubts about the capacity 
of the ruling party to implement the objective of European integration. Public 
support would boost of our politicians were more consequent to defending the 
national interest regardless of the circumstances.  
The experts also point out that the Brussels-inspired Moldova-EU Ac-
tion Plan is a necessary document for the country. It is, in the meantime, not 
enough in terms of the society’s expectations. Nonetheless, the fact that this 
plan was signed and the politicians committed to implement it, the people can 
still hope for the emergence of another plan, or another process of accession 
to the EU. 
“Moldova-EU Action Plan responds to the Brussels’ interests, rather than for 
the needs of Moldova” 
“The Action Plan is viewed differently by the parties. For the EU it is just an-
other subfolder in the long list of documents which make its Neighborhood Policy 
towards Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Georgia; whereas for Moldova, the Action 
Plan is a scarce ticket on the train to Europe. Of course, there is nothing tragic in 
the EU perceptions. The Moldova-EU Action Plan is good anyway, because its 
implementation would bring to overall improvements, even if the Plan neglects 
some of the desired aspects.”
The Moldova-EU Action Plan consists of a series of priorities, the realiza-
tion of which would substantially consolidate the internal stability of the coun-
250 MOLDOVA ON THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY
try. Among the priorities, the experts nominated the following: the settlement 
of the Transnistrian conflict, on top of the list, will open a leeway for further 
reform. The responsible implementation of reforms would build a good image 
for Moldova before the eyes of the European institutions. The accomplished 
reforms would rise the attractively of Moldova in Europe. Stabilization and 
strengthening democratic institutions is the next priority in the list. Freedom of 
expression and free speech, poverty reduction, fostering a fair, transparent and 
predictable business environment, eradication of corruption and of the organ-
ized crime, assuring an efficient border control, including on the Transnistrian 
sector complete the next couple of years agenda for the Moldovan leadership.
11.1.2. Is there a satisfactory environment for the protection of public 
order, human rights and fundamental constitutional freedoms of 
the citizens in Moldova?
Some experts consider that the quality of the legal environment in Moldo-
va is not necessary for the effective protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the citizens. Moldova needs a sound reform, on of the security sec-
tor, on both conceptual and practical levels. The legislation of Moldova does 
not yet correspond to the EU standards. The state structures have not yet been 
adjusted to a level that would allow protecting a democratic order of the soci-
ety, the rule of law and the market economy. Despite of the substantial efforts 
to diminish a number of risks such as trafficking in human beings, organ-
ized crime and smuggling, the results were slim. The structures responsible for 
tackling these risks are not yet keeping it up. 
“No, we’re not even close to perfection. We need a sound reform in the system 
of maintaining public order and security and first of all on the conceptual level. 
Our legislation does not even correspond to the realities in our country. It is not 
being adjusted to the democratic principles set forth by the EU, both conceptually 
and structurally.”
“It is not a secret that, in Moldova, even the position of a judge is for sale. If 
you end up buying, you will later find yourself bought and sold in the same way 
as you did first. Corruption decides everything even before the trial. The same 
corruption makes the judiciary vulnerable before political intervention. As for the 
police, the main problem there is the insufficient professional level of officers, the 
poor endowment with the necessary equipment. This miserable state of the police 
is aggravated by another negative phenomenon: corruption. It is not a secret, as 
the police is being overtly corrupt; then no surprise the public can see it.”
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Other experts think the legislative environment in Moldova is good. Moldo-
va has been more than receptive to the calls of the international community to 
upgrade its legislation. A great number of active laws have been elaborated with 
the active support of the international community and according based on the 
international legal practice. The problem is not in the laws, but in their enforce-
ment and execution. Several problems exist here: the problem within the judi-
ciary and the enforcement institutions: the police and the prosecutor’s office. 
These problems pertain to the low level of democratization of the country. 
“The legal environment could be evaluated as satisfactory, but not the prac-
tice, as it depends on the culture and democratization of the society.”
“The problem in Moldova is not in its laws, but in their application. There 
are numerous institutions that parasite on the low capacity of implementation 
of legal projects: that is the situation of the judiciary, the law enforcement and 
the police.”
11.1.3. Are the elected Parliamentary oﬃcials capable of settling the 
Transnistrian conﬂict between 2005-2007?
The experts are convinced that the current Parliament will be able to settle 
the Transnistrian conflict between 2005-2007. 
“The Parliament has a clear understanding of the situation around the con-
flict; it has a vision and a settlement plan. I would say that by the fact of es-
tablishing the real causes of the conflict, by having chosen an adequate set of 
instruments to settle the conflict, by redirecting the vector of foreign policy and 
by the coherence of domestic reform, one could say the Moldovan authorities 
have proven maturity.”
Nevertheless, the experts declared that the Russian factor is still a crucial 
variable in the conflict settlement equation and it could only be balanced by 
the US and the EU. In this case, we should mention that the quality of the 
conflict resolution process is the of the same importance as the timing. That 
is why it is important to plan very accurately the stages of this process, rather 
than be happy with a sudden and unprepared resolution.  
“What does it mean final settlement? It could be that tomorrow a document 
is signed and a declaration will state the conflict is over; is that a viable solution? 
It could be “yes”, but could be “no”.”
“The conflict will remain unsettled until Russia wants it. Are the [Moldovan] 
parties capable of convincing Russia? At least the Parliament is showing an 
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unprecedented unity when facing two most important issues in the history of 
Moldova as an independent state: the Transnistrian settlement and the Euro-
pean integration.”
11.1.4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the political class 
in Moldova in comparison with the similar entities in Ukraine, the 
Baltic states and Romania?
The great disadvantage of Moldova is that its political class was born and 
brought up in the USSR. It still has not gotten rid of its Soviet heritage. Remov-
ing this heritage is not the easiest task either, the experts said. The revival of 
the political class is a priority for the development of the country. Only the 
emergence of new politicians will solve the problems in our domestic and for-
eign politics.  However, the experts consider this experience is not singular, as 
all the former socialist states are facing this problem. The only exception are 
the Baltic countries, where the young leadership, free of past influences seized 
the power right after the partition from the USSR. 
“Where did this class have to come from? We have always been a province, 
subject to a constant policy of Russification and de-nationalization put into 
practice with the help of the party staff from the right-bank [of the Dniestr Riv-
er]. Here comes the expression: “If you want to be a Minister, you have to come 
from [beyond] the Dniestr.” Today, we see the power in Moldova is in the hands 
of Transnistrians, but we still talk about the Transnistrian conflict. Should we be 
interested in the political class as part of the elite, as a social locomotive, sorry, 
but here we see more vices than qualities.”
“It is a fact that the Moldovan political class is much weaker than the one in 
the Baltic countries. There are several explanation of that. It is a sure fact that 
the individuals who form our political class were born, brought up, educated and 
came into politics in the Soviet era.”
“Our political class has the disadvantage of representing a society that is 
very much fragmented, in political terms, and in the meantime ignorant of what 
is happening up there in politics.”
It is only now that people who understand the European regional policies 
entered politics in Moldova. These people do not have primitive and cynical 
interests of local inspiration. They have a vision of being part of the European 
region and exercise their policies in a European way.” 
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11.2. Neutrality and Euro-Atlantic Integration
11.2.1. Is neutrality a necessary and favorable condition for the development 
of Moldova as an independent, democratic and unitary state?
It is salient that all of the questioned experts gave precisely negative an-
swers ot this question. Their ideas converged in the fact that Moldova is not 
and has never been a neutral state and that the neutrality status does not cor-
respond to the real status of Moldova. The experts state that the neutrality of 
a state should be confirmed by relevant international agreements and specific 
legal instruments. The actual conditions of Moldova are the following: the 
country is occupied by foreign troops, that are unlawfully and illegitimately 
stationed on its territory, while the security of the state is not guaranteed by 
any collective security clause.
“The so-called neutrality does not correspond to the internationally-recog-
nized concept of neutrality. Moldova can declare itself a neuter state as much as 
it wants, but it will never be treated as such in the absence of any international 
agreement recognizing its neutrality.”
“The neutrality clause inserted in the Constitution of 1994 emerged with the 
help of Russophile forces, who aimed at eliminating the possibility of Moldova’s 
orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic or European structures. The clause has 
been widely used ever since by the Moldovan side as reason for getting rid of the 
Russian troops. Nonetheless, that proved to be inoffensive, as Russia hasn’t cared 
much about the stipulations in the Moldovan Constitution, as it has its own 
strategic interests which have to be followed, regardless of the cost.”   
“It is clear that Moldova will not accede to NATO until the Transnistrian 
conflict is unsolved. This also provokes a small paradox: «Why will we need 
NATO when the Transnistrian conflict is solved?»”
“Ukraine declared that accession to NATO and the EU is a foreign policy pri-
ority for Ukraine. Looking back to the EU, it becomes clear that Ukraine will not 
get there before Moldova, and that will definitely not happen before 2013. This 
was relentlessly declared by the EU Enlargement Commissioner, when referring 
to Turkey, rather than to Ukraine, but, nonetheless, it was stated that the budget 
plan for 2007-2013 does not include a penny for new membership. I cannot see 
why the EU should change this vision for the sake of Ukraine, or, moreover, for 
Moldova. Leaving the EU aside, Ukraine could join NATO in the next 5 years. 
That would make Moldova a NATO enclave. Then, Moldova will get by default 
the security guarantees that it lacks today. If Ukraine should fail, then Moldova 
will have the only card left, and that is applying to NATO by itself.”
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“Regarding neutrality, I cannot understand what is it, because, declaring 
neutrality means becoming a neutral party. Moldova was everything but neu-
tral. I have been constantly asking, if there was any written specification or defi-
nition of Moldovan neutrality; neutrality in relation to what and, in fact what 
does it mean? I am actually speaking about the Concept of National Security.”
Some experts consider that Moldova could only be a neutral state only if Ro-
mania and Ukraine are NATO members and Moldova is a NATO enclave. This 
situation could favor Moldova even more than membership in the Alliance.
11.2.2. Is Euro-Atlantic integration a viable option for the Moldova? What 
should be the priorities and benchmarks for the political class in 
Chisinau?
The opinions of the experts diverged over this issue. The most of them, 
however, believe that the Euro-Atlantic integration is inevitable for Moldova. 
The reason is that there has been no developed country that has developed 
without previously getting security guarantees form NATO.  The logics tells us 
that we should proceed immediately to the elaboration and ratification of an 
Individual Partnership and Action Plan with NATO, to the repudiation of the 
neutrality clause and to the immediate and energetic pursuit of pre-accession 
conditions for NATO, as well as to building lasting and trustful relations with 
the neighboring countries by fostering a dialogue on neighborhood, border 
security and interoperability among the various security structures.  
“Yes, this integration is inevitable. The need for it stems from the national 
interest of Republic of Moldova, the regional geopolitical context and the geos-
trategic reality. If looking though the lens of the Partnership for Peace, then we 
can definitely state our obvious rapprochement to the Euro-Atlantic standards. 
If we look through the political lens of the integration process, then we should 
consider accession to NATO, EU and other organizations we’ve missed by now.”
Some experts believe that Euro-Atlantic integration is not an inevitable 
option for Moldova. This could be explained by the idea that Moldova would 
benefit much more from being sandwiched between two NATO members, 
namely Romania and Ukraine, rather than from acceding into the structure. 
That means Moldova will receive all the benefits of a member, but with mini-
mum of commitments. That does not absolve Moldova from the imperative of 
corresponding to European standards. For that, the political class of Moldova 
shall have to cope with the following requirements: continuation of economic 
reforms up to a level, when Moldova will be the most liberal economy in Eu-
rope; a sound administrative reform affecting the central administration (the 
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Government, the Ministries and other central administrative agencies) as well 
as the local public administration; further reform in rising the livelihood, rais-
ing the standards of labor, etc.
“Such a small country like Moldova, should evaluate its dimensions and 
strenght, should define its place and not bravely navigate by the rules of poli-
tical surfing through the changing context in order to be able to grab the vital 
opportunities.” ... “I believe that if we have exclusively good relations with Ro-
mania, a NATO member, we should not «play chicken» with the big bear, we 
should not disturb the great power that we have already disturbed a lot. That 
is why I believe the priority should evisage primarily reaching regional stability. 
The regional solidarity on the example of the Visegrad and the Baltic countries 
that have focused on the social-economic development by shutting down the old 
security issues...”
“The elaboration and the signing of an Individual Partnership Action Plan 
between Moldova and NATO as top priority objective, together with establish-
ing mass-support for NATO accession and renounciing to the neutrality status. 
Along that, all the pre-accession conditions should be respected.”
It is to be noted that, regardless of the inevitability of Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration, reforms still have to be made. These reforms will bring Moldova closer 
to Europe. 
“The polls show a discrepancy in the popular preferences for EU and NATO. 
If the popularity index of EU is 60-80%, than that of NATO is around 40%. It 
is unclear whether Moldova will ever join NATO, even if Ukraine will accede. I 
believe Moldova has a couple of important priorities: first – to reduce the social 
divisions referring to the quality of life and, second – the continuation of eco-
nomic reforms, so that, eventually, the Moldovan economy could become the 
most open economy in Europe.”
11.3. Good governance
11.3.1. What are the strategic priorities for the economic and social 
rehabilitation of Moldova? 
The experts generally approve the priorities formulated in the programme 
of the actual Cabinet (the Strategy of Economic Growth and Poverty reduction, 
the Moldova-EU Action Plan, the Declaration of the Parliament on the Legisla-
tive Priorities). Nevertheless, some of the experts point out that the Moldovan 
economy is growing, but not getting developed. This type of growth does not 
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bring long-term benefits, as, because it is not accompanied by qualitative and 
intensive development structurally. The following should be emphasized: rais-
ing the competitiveness of the Moldovan enterprises on the European market, 
improving the investment climate, decreasing the state’s involvement into the 
private sector. 
“The biggest problem facing Moldova is that we have wasted 15 years on eve-
rything but political consensus. We should note that the economic reform is lagging 
long from the other reforms. Why did it happen? Here is the question: Moldova has 
been the most affected by the European protectionism, because it is an agrarian 
country, and the agrarian sector is the most protected on the European market. 
This is one of the major causes of the steep fall of the Moldovan GDP.”
11.3.2. Are the neighbors of Moldova – Ukraine and Romania good 
examples to follow in terms of consolidation of administrative 
capacity? If yes, than in what speciﬁc sectors? Are you satisﬁed 
with the quality of the current relations between Moldova and its 
neighbors? If not, than why?
Some experts consider that, if responsibly followed by the politicians, any 
good practice is a good example to follow for Moldova. Other experts believe 
that neither Ukraine, nor Romania are good examples for Moldova, as these 
countries have been barely successful during the last 10-15 years. It is obvi-
ous that Romania has accounted for more positive developments than both 
Moldova and Ukraine. However, if talking about a sound administrative mod-
el, none of these two countries are good examples, as both have not pursued a 
serious course of administrative reform. 
“No, we are not happy with the level of development in Moldova. Ukraine 
is a different story. We should carefully assess what we get from the East and 
what from the West, in business terms, of course.  From the west, we have all the 
big brands, coming primarily from Romania. As for the East, we import vari-
ous crooked schemes of how to trade our humongous energy debts. East winds 
also bring us all the shadow business, which became pervasive in the Moldovan 
economy.  It has become true that the civil society is Romanian-speaking, while 
business is Russian-speaking. This double communication played the trick on 
us. The Russian-rooted business penetrates Moldova much more easily and 
freely. The people are going to Moscow or Ukraine, where they learn the skill of 
how to adapt the numerous shadow-business schemes to the Moldovan market. 
The west winds bring the sophisticated corporate culture. That is the difference 
between what we can learn from Romania and Ukraine.” 
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“I am not satisfied with the level of relations between these countries. The 
main problem is the weakness of the Moldovan state. Having its fundamental 
problems, such as the Transnistrian conflict and the shattered economy, Moldo-
va cannot conduct a coherent foreign policy. Well, it is a past thing. However, we 
still haven’t reached a level that would allow us propel our interests.”
“Talking about the administrative capacity, then Romania could be a better 
example, especially after its integration into the EU. Ukraine is also on a good 
path, but there is still much to be desired. Ukraine still has a big lag behind Ro-
mania in this respect.” 
All the experts, with no exception, have shown their low appreciation of 
the relations of Moldova with its immediate neighbors: Romania and Ukraine. 
There are, apparently, distinct political agendas that cannot be synchronized: on 
one hand is Ukraine, stuck in the CIS and its Single Economic Space, but with 
serious pro-European aspirations and, on the other hand, Romania, a NATO 
member, and holder of an EU Accession Treaty, but with serious shortcomings 
in the accession process. Along that, there are numerous myths and stereotypes 
that distract the attention of the elites and the population from the priorities of 
Euro-Atlantic integration and negatively affect the trade between the states. 
„So the lack of synchronization of the agendas of the three states has both 
a positive and negative effect on the development of the relations among them. 
That is why I am unsatisfied with the state of these relations.”
11.3.3. What are the most useful models/institutions for the modernization 
of the public administration system of Moldova? 
The experts say that ideal models and institutions, easily implantable into 
Moldova do not exist. However, some elements of them could be given a good 
consideration. First of all, the concept of the reform has to be indigenous, or at 
least comparable and applicable to Moldova.  Secondly, best practices should 
be analyzed. These could come from anywhere: Brazil, China, Vietnam, Ar-
gentina. So, when the first territorial-administrative reform was enacted, ex-
amples of nearby countries have been taken into account: Romania, Slovenia, 
the Baltic states. However, this reform was inverted in Moldova and the present 
situations is described by a total dependence of the local powers on the central 
administration of the state. Every Government has had a different program, so 
were the work schemes of the central and local powers. The working model has 
not been found yet. That is why the power in Moldova is still searching for it.   
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“Today, Moldova is in a very favorable situation. In 2003-2007 the labor 
force will be invaded by the youth born between 1980 and 1983, the period of the 
highest birth rate in Moldova. This will ease the burden of social security system. 
The situation will change in 2007-2008 when less young people will enter the 
work force, but the number of people who will benefit from welfare alimonies 
and pensions and other forms of social assistance. That proves that the reform 
has to be done immediately.”
“The best model for us is the Scandinavian one. Because of the fact that the 
rightist and leftist ideologies, in its European form, free of radicalism, will both 
be present in Moldova; it is the job of the “leftists” to solve the social issues. From 
this point of view, the local public administration is the key element for mate-
rializing the Scandinavian model in Moldova. The refusal to continue the ter-
ritorial-administrative reform and the fact that this reform was brought to the 
past, outdated standards deprived us of the advantage in the negotiation process 
with Transnistria on the state construction of Moldova. However, the question 
of state construction is still vital for Moldova.”
11.3.4. What are the priorities in for the economic and institutional 
cooperation between Moldova, Ukraine and Romania for the 
next 5 years?
According to the expert’s opinion, the development of cooperation with 
Romania and Ukraine requires the creation of new instruments: treaties, 
agreements, trade facilitation, free economic zones, etc.). Here we come again 
to the idea synchronization of reforms and of new platforms of development 
priorities between the neighbors. Other experts consider that the cooperation 
with Romania and Ukraine requires different approaches. The only coopera-
tion among the three countries is the one within Euro-regions, which is a tri-
lateral cooperation and needs enhancement.
“The priorities of economic cooperation between the tree countries are nu-
merous and elusive. A great attention should be drawn to improving and mod-
ernizing the infrastructure in the countries. Romania is way ahead, Ukraine al-
ready started the process, while in Moldova is seriously lagging behind the both.”
“If Moldova determined a group of products to be primordial, these products 
should be getting real attention. It would be desirable that Moldova penetrates 
the Romanian and Ukrainian markets with a group of products that it has a real 
advantage in.”
FROM THE POST-SOVIET SPACE TOWARDS THE WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES 259
11.4. Regional developments in the Black Sea area
Is there any recognized concept concerning the prospects of transforming the 
Black Sea area into a region strategic importance and wide involvement of Euro-
Atlantic political, economic and security institutions?
There are many institutions which declare their concern for the develop-
ment of the Black Sea area: EU, OSCE, NATO, the Economic Organization of 
the Black Sea area countries, GUAM. Their involvement is still slim, because 
of the lack of a locomotive for cooperation. As for the involvement of political, 
economic and security institutions, then the involvement of the countries from 
Black Sea area is crucial. Cooperation in this area is less active than expected at 
the moment when the entire process of cooperation was initiated in the Black 
Sea area. That happens because of the diversity of immediate priorities of each 
country in the Black Sea area.
“BSEC exists for many years, but its efficiency is pretty low. There are a lot 
of explanations and theories proving its inefficiency. Being part of this context is 
a very important problem for our country, as it is a strategic zone of interest for 
global actors, but there isn’t enough substance in these structures”.
“Regarding the geopolitical context, I consider again that we should draw a 
parallel between Baltic and Black Sea areas. Yes, I agree that this axis has to be 
formed, as it is in our interests to do so. The lack of such coordination and cooper-
ation, and, exactly, the lack of the security element slows down this evolution. We 
have to learn a lot from the experience of the Baltic States and to what is now re-
garded in the European Parliament as the “Eastern Dimension”. I am a supporter 
of this dimension, because even the previous polish initiative comprised the most 
important aspects and determined very important tools and mechanisms for sta-
bilizing and developing this region. I can only welcome these points.”
“Time will prove whether this hot spot on the defense and security maps of 
the European and American specialized structures will form a plausible concept 
recognized at international and regional levels.”
Nonetheless, some experts have mentioned there is a long-term American 
strategy also called “the strategic ellipsis of Black Sea”, which later could be 
formed as a plausible concept, recognized on international/regional level. The 
strategy regards six principles that lead to a strengthening democracy around 
the Black Sea: supporting Romania and Bulgaria and, as well, the new democ-
racies around, to reforming the institutions from  Black Sea, involving Turkey, 
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giving priority status for the frozen conflicts, harmonize US’s and EU pro-
grams of democratization focused on Ukraine’s future.
11.4.1. What is the role of Moldova’s neighbors: Ukraine and Romania in 
the larger context of the creation of a new security architecture in 
the Black Sea region?
“Different, but positive. First of all there are elements of antagonism, the at-
tempts of Romania and Ukraine to play the role of regional leaders in a number 
of certain political, economic and security problems. In the same time, there ex-
ist frameworks allowing their cooperation: the North Atlantic Treaty framework, 
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council framework, the UN, with an enough vis-
ible role at certain levels”.
The experts consider that for the moment the role of Moldova’s neighbors 
is very different. Both Romania and Ukraine would like the role of “regional 
leader”, but it looks like Romania is more active in achieving it than Ukraine. 
A NATO member, Romania would like to be considered a security provider to 
its neighbors. Romania’s lately initiatives show that this country could become 
a critical actor for the process of transformation of the Black Sea area into a 
stable zone. Ukraine’s situation is different, but with the change of power in 
Kiev it is possible for it to become more active in this area. 
“Those three countries can become together a bridge between Europe and 
the Caucasus, and can easier eliminate the hot spots of instability from the re-
gion, with Western help, of course”.
“I would like to warn our Romanian friend about the euphoria, and they 
shouldn’t relax and count on Kremlin’s friendliness, because this could come 
at a very high cost to them. I have talked to Russian politicians, who openly 
declare that: “well, the majority of Romania’s complaints are against us, but 
against Ukraine”. The Russians will act nervously on Romania. They will try to 
minimize its influence in the region by maximizing the contradictions between 
those 2 neighbors, Romania and Ukraine. That is why we were looking forward 
to Yushchenko’s visit to Bucharest so that these questions are settled down. The 
possibility that someone can make Yushchenko change his mind regarding the 
commitments he had agreed on with the Romanian president is a warning sig-
nal. All of them, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine have to strengthen themselves. 
This also concerns regional security”.
All the experts confirmed the fact that these regional evolutions contrib-
ute to the stability of the region. The revolutions were nothing more than just 
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democratic processes, but every democratization process is a generator of sta-
bility. These revolutions had benefic effects on those countries, but also on the 
entire zone and were sure signs of good regional stability.
11.4.2. What priorities should the associate states to GUAM set? Is 
GUAM membership beneﬁc or not for the process of South-East 
European integration for Moldova? 
 The main objective of GUAM countries is: the economic dimension and 
the security dimension. Each country as a member of this organization has its 
own advantages, but an efficient way of cooperation in this structure hasn’t 
been found yet. The fact that the funds offered by the American Congress have 
not been used for common projects, the fact that GUAM has not been able yet 
to produce something in the benefit of its members, something real that would 
be evident in the activity of the CSI structures, proves that these organization 
is weak, that its weakness is natural. 
“Burying the Soviet past and allying with the West. Being a GUAM member 
means South-East European integration. This organization in sponsored by the 
US, supported by Romania. Some day, GUAM will become an enormously impor-
tant structure with a decisive role in the settlement of frozen regional conflicts.”
“We definitely have to create and strengthen GUAM-like instruments. We 
should, however, not repeat the story of the CIS; thank God CIS proved to be so 
weak. We should learn from our mistakes. I believe the Orange revolution has 
taught us something”.
GUAM membership is favorable for Moldova. Moreover, it does not affect 
our pro-European aspirations, nor does it hamper our South-East European 
integration. The EU encourages all kind of cooperation among states in the 
region, aspirants to EU accession, as long as the goals of these cooperation 
initiatives don’t contradict the goals of the EU.” 
11.4.3. What position should Moldova take towards Russia in its foreign 
policy?
Some experts say Moldova should not refrain from declaring openly that 
Russia is an occupant, unlawfully occupying a part of Moldovan territory and 
should be treated accordingly. Other experts consider Moldova cannot take 
such a stand towards Russia. 
“Russia is obviously involved in and guilty of the most of the frozen conflicts 
in the ex-Soviet space by being one of the parties in each of the conflicts.” 
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“The Transnistrian conflict is a type of conflicts, the settlement of which is 
one or two levels higher, from the pint of view of multi-level international con-
flicts. The settlement of the conflict has to be complex: that is the regional level, 
the geopolitical level; the external context is very important for the resolution, 
but not a deciding factor.  The government in Chisinau is pervasive at all levels. 
Chisinau’s stand is the weakest point in the conflict resolution process. In other 
words, Chisinau lacks any pragmatic idea of statehood and state-building. The 
Chisinau-Tiraspol relations are a set of governing subjects.”
In this case, we should declare that, on the Eve of the 21st Century we have 
a situation of illegal occupation of a territory belonging to a recognized state; 
therefore, the whole foreign policy of Moldova should be conducted based on 
this idea. Moldova should use all possible instruments to make Russia cooper-
ate towards the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict and also make Russia 
withdraw its troops and munitions. There are lots of possibilities to do that. 
One of them is tackling Russia’s long time desire to join the World Trade Or-
ganization, in the ranks of which, Moldova holds membership. This chance 
should not be missed. With that, Moldova should make good use of any tool to 
force Russia comply with the commitments determined at the OSCE summit. 
11.5. Frozen Conflicts: Strategies to follow
11.5.1. What are the background similarities and discrepancies between 
the ex-Soviet states? Are the EU enlargement limits rigid and clear?
According to the experts’ beliefs, the background discrepancies pertain to 
the geopolitical vectors of the states in the region. Russia has its own orbit of 
gravity, which is radically distinct from those of the states in the region. The 
first vector being the Russian one, which is headed towards hampering the 
EU enlargement, by preserving this zone of “exclusive Russian interests” in 
the detriment of other vectors.  The second vector is that of the NATO states, 
with a far larger strategic agenda than Russia. These states have the interest of 
extending their influence and interests. On the border of these two system of 
values, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan are situated.  All this coun-
tries have adopted mild pro-European agendas driven by the reshaping of the 
power architecture in the region. This shift brings along important changes 
that would have been otherwise far from coming. 
“The issues based in historical divisions create problems and sharpen the 
trade-off between intensive cooperation and rivalry. The solution of these di-
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visions can only be reached by the installment of new rules, by fostering un-
precedented cooperation, which would diminish or settle both the old the new 
conflicts.” 
„The majority of countries in the Black Sea area share the option of integra-
tion into the EU, save Russia, the only diverging opinion. Russia is trying to block 
by all possible means this process of enlargement.”
„The intention of Ukraine to re-position itself in a new reality, dimensions 
and instruments is more that welcomed. However, reserves remain on the con-
crete steps Ukraine has planned to take. The Ukrainian plan reflencts primarily 
the interests of the government in Kyiv. It is not impoartial and synthetic.”
According to the expert’s oppinion, the limits of EU enlargement are nwit-
her rigid, nor clear. Brussels is still dominated by uncertainty about enlarge-
ment. The failed referenda in France and the Netherlands proved that further 
enlargement is not going to come soon.  
Eight experts have been interviewed. Among them were:
Viorel Cibotaru, Bogdan Cibotaru, Sergiu Burca, Tatiana Lariusina
